DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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

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DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Scie

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

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NOTE ON THE 10th ANNIVERSARY

The winter, 1958, issue of *Dædalus* opened with the words: "With this issue, *Dædalus* continues its ascent to the goal which clearly beckons: to give the intellectual community a strong voice of its own." The decision to convert the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences into a quarterly, "a medium through which leading scholars in all fields can address one another," was announced. Today, a decade later, a stocktaking is in order—a retrospective look at what has been accomplished during this time, together with an outline, however tentative, of what will be attempted in the years ahead.

Gerald Holton, Editor in 1958, indicated that the journal would seek to "represent the world of the intellectual, first of all to himself." Issues would dwell on specific subjects, he explained, "but in the long run our attention encompasses the full range of our interests—the humanities, the sciences, the social studies, and public affairs." There was no denial of the value or need for more specialized scholarly journals, and no suggestion that *Dædalus* would seek to enter fields where others were already successfully engaged. Mr. Holton saw *Dædalus* as fulfilling a role made increasingly imperative by the proliferation of scholarly activity and publication. He wrote:

> As a by-product of the gratifying successes obtained with our refined tools of specialization, fruitful communication between members of different sections of the learned community is now widely held to be increasingly difficult; a small but growing group even considers it increasingly unnecessary. The very structure of our professional allegiance

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emphasizes the differences between fields. In this situation *Dædalus* can serve as an instrument for focusing our attention again on that which does or should make us members of one community.

The labyrinth cover design worked out by Gyorgy Kepes conveyed the same intention: "to lift each of us above his cell in the labyrinth of learning in order that he may see the entire structure as if from above, where each separate part loses its comfortable separateness." The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, interdisciplinary in its organization and purposes, established a journal whose aim was to mediate between the professions, not so much to establish peace between them (this was rarely the problem), but to make each aware of what the other was doing and, when appropriate, to stimulate joint efforts between disciplines where co-operation gave promise of useful results.

Dædalus saw itself as a new kind of journal. It quickly developed a set of conference and publication procedures calculated to foster the sorts of communication it deemed to be important. The decision to embark on these wider projects reflected the belief that the eighteenth-century Academy and its twentieth-century offspring had distinctive functions in the modern intellectual world, functions different from (though related to) those pursued by professional societies with their more specialized publications and universities with their burgeoning interdisciplinary research centers. The professional societies, very properly, concern themselves chiefly with matters that fall within the province of a single discipline. Universities, even when hospitable to interdisciplinary inquiry, rely essentially on their own faculties. In *Dædalus*, there was an opportunity to draw on all disciplines, to launch inquiries calling on the talents of men and women associated with many kinds of institutions, both in this country and abroad, to pursue studies just so long as the interest was keen, to terminate them when it seemed wise to do so, and to accomplish all this without a long-term commitment to building programs, lavish equipment, or acceptance of some particular school of thought.

Problems that did not traditionally fall within the competence of a specific discipline, that seemed to cry out for collaborative study, had a special claim on the attention of those responsible for the new journal. To assemble, from whatever quarter, the best-informed persons and to stimulate not only those interests which had become attenuated with time, but also those which had never man-

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aged to establish themselves became primary objectives. The suggestion for an issue of *Dædalus* might originate from a chance comment, a parenthetical remark; just as frequently, it came through an explicit request by an interested reader.

The *Dædalus* practice was to summon a small group to consider whether a question recommended for study had merit, to reflect on how it might be handled, and to recommend those who might be engaged in its investigation. If the group concluded that a study would be useful, a larger planning committee would be formed, to consider how best to proceed. Such committees met regularly and provided the guidance on which the Editors increasingly relied. Planning committees developed the general outlines for particular issues and gave invaluable assistance in recommending the authors to be approached. Invitations to write would be issued on their advice, and six months (or sometimes a year) later, a major conference would be held, with members of the planning committee and authors meeting together with a small group of interested persons to study draft papers that had been prepared and circulated. These meetings, always closed, permitted a candid discussion of all the issues raised by the papers. Authors were encouraged to revise their drafts on the basis of what was said in these sessions. The deliberations of the group, in an edited form, were sometimes made available to others who had an interest in the subject; comments were solicited. Only then would the revised papers be published in the journal of the Academy.

A commitment to this kind of inquiry and to this form of publication was seen to have a great appeal. Many showed themselves willing to reserve time to deliberate and write on matters that may or may not have figured high on their agendas at the time the original invitation reached them. Inevitably, certain subjects appeared more prominently in *Dædalus* in this first decade than others. None, perhaps, were more important than the nature of contemporary learning, the relations which subsist among the various intellectual disciplines, the adequacy of existing educational institutions, and the changes which ought to be considered to make teaching and scholarship more viable enterprises, ones more responsive to the needs of our day. Education was recognized to be the "business" of *Dædalus* in a way that no other subject could be. The independence of the journal, its freedom from any kind of institutional or professional restraint, proved to be an invaluable asset. The object was always to approach those who had reason to be in-

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formed on a particular matter, even where their professional affiliation or occupational status gave no hint of such a concern.

The word *American* figures in some form in the titles of ten of the forty issues during the decade. How is one to account for this emphasis? On one level, it may be said to reflect the gravity of America's problems during the period; on another, the rapidity of the change that occurred and that the journal sought in one way or other to record. Only once during the decade were the Editors moved to reserve space in two consecutive issues for a single subject—we elected in 1965 to give a full account of the continuing study undertaken by the Academy on the Negro American. The Academy's interest in this subject coincides almost precisely with the beginnings of *Dædalus*. In the late 1950's, research funds for studies of the Negro's situation were hard to come by. Through the generosity of the Carnegie Corporation—a foundation that was to help *Dædalus* on innumerable occasions—the Academy was able to initiate its inquiry in the early 1960's. A series of conferences and publications was made possible by the Carnegie grant. The Academy's interest in the subject persists to this day in its continuing seminar on poverty. The *Dædalus* issues on the Negro American are memorable not least for having engaged so many professional disciplines; all the social sciences were seen to have relevance to the problems discussed.

The decision to concentrate so heavily on American themes ought not to be taken as simply a reflection of the Editors' concern for the crises that increasingly preoccupied the nation during the decade. Other reasons existed for our interest. Because contemporary American intellectual and social developments are too often reserved for treatment by the mass media—which, in their concern to make themselves heard, distort by dwelling too much on the sensational and the "newsworthy"—there is a special obligation for a journal like *Dædalus* to do what it can to reassert the virtues of detail and complexity. This was a primary objective for *Dædalus*. It explains the decision to undertake such studies as represented in the volumes "The Woman in America," "The American National Style," "American Foreign Policy: Freedoms and Restraints."

The *Dædalus* interest in speaking to an international audience, in seeking to dwell on issues which had not yet (but might soon) become matters of the greatest international import, has consistently figured high among the priorities set by the Editors. In 1960, the Academy convened its first closed conference on arms control. The

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meeting served several important purposes: It brought together persons who, although working on various facets of a common problem, in many instances did not know of the others' interest in the subject; it stimulated inquiry in a new area and provided incentive for additional study; it established a reason for busy men to reserve time to write on subjects which called for the kind of analysis only they were capable of making. The Academy's contribution in the field of arms control—through the *Dædalus* issue, the subsequent hard-cover book which sold many tens of thousands of copies, and the work of the continuing Academy group which meets regularly to this day—suggests how far-reaching are the possibilities opened by the conference and publication procedures developed in these ten years. The original *Dædalus* volume was written by Americans; it was not an accident that the issue of *Dædalus* immediately following contained the comments of Europeans who had been sent galleys of the original text.

Whether the subject was youth, science and technology, fiction, conditions of world order, Europe, or utopia, there was a constant effort by *Dædalus* to engage the interests of scholars from outside the United States. Conferences which originally met mostly at the House of the Academy in Brookline were soon regularly meeting abroad. Bellagio, Copenhagen, Paris—these were the sites of major *Dædalus* conferences during the decade; they testify to the growing concern of the Editors to find locations convenient for the large number of foreign contributors who were appearing in our pages.

For the whole of the decade, the journal showed a marked partiality for studies of the future. Issues entitled "The Future Metropolis" and "Evolution and Man's Progress," which appeared in 1961, confirmed what might already have been suspected from the volumes of the preceding years—*Dædalus* intended to take seriously the obligation to undertake systematic analysis of future options. The recent publication of the papers and debates of the Academy's Commission on the Year 2000 serves to underscore that point. In this, as in so many other areas, certain kinds of results can be achieved solely through interdisciplinary inquiry. Only the decision of scholars from many disciplines to band together and to meet with those who are more actively engaged in managing the country's political and industrial affairs can lead to an exchange out of which imaginative conjecture may result. The alliance is not intended to be permanent; nothing is more valuable than the fact

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that it, like all other Academy study groups, can be dissolved when the preponderant number conclude that its work is done.

That many men and women have been willing over a decade to participate in these meetings suggests that there is pleasure to be had—and, it is to be hoped, intellectual stimulus as well—in such informal discussion, whose larger public purpose is realized through the publication of relevant materials in *Dædalus*. The prospect of publication in the journal of the Academy gives point to continuing deliberations, making them a congenial exercise for many who might otherwise question so large a commitment of their time. *Dædalus*, which made its appeal to a few thousand subscribers in 1958, is today read by many tens of thousands. Issues are now printed in approximately 60,000 copies; on at least one occasion recently the number reached 70,000. Six months to a year after publication as a *Dædalus* issue, a hard-cover version appears in the Houghton Mifflin *Dædalus* Library. Authors of the original *Dædalus* papers are invited to revise their work for this second edition, and additional papers are commissioned to fill gaps which are seen to exist. Finally, some six months after that, Beacon Press reprints the hard-cover Houghton Mifflin edition as a paperback. The cycle from paperback to paperback is complete. This is normally the end of the publication tale. With Academy seminars and conferences continuing even after that, it is not, however, impossible that in the coming years *Dædalus* will take up again at least a few of the themes it explored during its first decade as a quarterly.

What, in addition, may be anticipated in the years ahead? It is to be hoped that there will be an even greater concentration on those issues which are not properly the preserve of any of the existing professions and which figure among the more bewildering of our time. The late Percy Bridgman wrote in an early issue of the journal that the humanities were "much more complex and difficult than the sciences." He enjoined us to turn to the study of the mind and to recognize how necessary it is for the sciences and the humanities to face together the problems such an enterprise might involve. *Dædalus* only occasionally responded to this call in its first decade. It intends to give it a much higher priority in the years to come. A grant from the Ford Foundation, specifically intended to support interdisciplinary research in the humanities, will make it easier for us to do so.

No one should underestimate the difficulty of this task. In the late-twentieth-century world, where relevance is so much sought

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after, isolation, imposed and self-imposed, is a continuing hazard. Intellectual protectionism is a constant temptation, an easy response to frustration. To find a way to bring humanists and scientists together to focus "attention again on that which does or should make us members of one community" is a worthy objective. It can only be achieved by a more explicit understanding of what each has to offer in the resolution of particular problems. In the study of language, literature, art, history, and music, we have additional resources for the study of the mind, to which, quite as much as to society and nature, we ought increasingly to direct our energies.

There is a certain appropriateness in the second decade of *Dædalus* opening with an issue devoted to "Students and Politics." The topic is novel; scholarly inquiry into such matters was almost unknown a decade ago. Those who write for the issue are almost all young themselves; it is to be expected that they will persist in their inquiries and continue to make a considerable contribution in a field which was until recently largely unexplored. In 1962, in the *Dædalus* issue on "Youth: Change and Challenge," Erik H. Erikson argued against a too great preoccupation with the *problems* of youth. To concentrate on the activities of young people, to see how they resemble one another in the world today, and to interpret their common needs may be as useful as any attempt to dwell on deviant and exotic behavior. Mr. Erikson's injunction would seem to be even more appropriate today than when it was written. If *Dædalus* can show itself receptive to the scholarly preoccupations of younger men and women, if it can distinguish between what is momentarily fashionable and what has a longer-range significance, if it can anticipate as well as document new intellectual and institutional developments, its publications will effectively challenge accounts which do no more than record the more bizarre circumstances of the day.

My final remarks have to do with another kind of isolationism (or parochialism) which *Dædalus* will seek to overcome. In the midst of war and civil disturbance, it is all too easy to become preoccupied with American problems, both domestic and foreign. This is particularly the case once one realizes how much the stability of the rest of the world is affected by America's capacity to cope with the situations which presently overwhelm it. To ignore or underestimate these problems would be folly; to permit them to obtrude all interest in what touches those who live outside the United States would be no less foolish. In a time like the present, a journal like *Dædalus* has the opportunity to remind its readers of what

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others are thinking, saying, and doing. Intellectual links, not only those with Europe, need to be maintained, precisely at this moment when they are subject to such severe strains. The labyrinth can hold the individual captive within a particular discipline; it would be even more grave if it held him captive within his national and linguistic culture. *Dædalus* is committed to thwarting both these confining possibilities.

—STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD

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Acknowledgments

This issue in an outgrowth of a Conference on Students and Politics held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 27-April 1, 1967. The conference was sponsored by the University of Puerto Rico and the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. It was organized on behalf of these institutions by Seymour Martin Lipset, of Harvard University, and Philip G. Altbach, of the University of Wisconsin. Grants to support the conference were made by the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development (with funds made available by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation), the Instituto Latinoamericano de Relaciones Internacionales, and the Committee on International Studies of the Harvard Department of Social Relations.

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SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

Students and Politics in Comparative Perspective

TEN YEARS ago, hardly anyone devoted himself to research on students and politics. Today hundreds of scholars are analyzing student political movements, behavior, and attitudes. It is evident that student activism and the importance of students in politics long antedates the current interest. Students were a key element in the Revolutions of 1848 in Germany and Austria, and student activism stimulated the "Professors' Parliament," which almost succeeded in toppling several monarchs. In Czarist Russia, students spearheaded various revolutionary movements, and the university campus was a major center of revolutionary activity. In the East European countries, where education was limited to a small proportion of the population, students were often the carriers of modern ideas of liberty, socialism, industrialization, and equality of opportunity.

The important role of students in the movements for national independence in the developing areas also goes back a half century or more. In Imperial China, students were crucial to the Imperial effort at modernization, but at the same time spread republican and radical ideas throughout the society. Students helped overthrow the dynasty in 1911, and were thereafter one of the elements continually pushing China toward modernization and radical ideologies. In other Asian and African countries, students were often a central element in anticolonial struggles. Particularly important were the "returned students"—those individuals who had lived and studied abroad, mostly in Europe, and returned home with ideas of modernization and Marxism, socialism and struggle. International student meetings were held as early as the 1920's, and such men as Nehru of India and Hatta of Indonesia were profoundly influenced by these student organizations and movements.

Scholars in the past paid relatively little attention to the rather

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major role students played in reform and radical movements, in part because student movements are quite transitory in character and have left fewer records than adult organizations. Moreover, to stress the role of youth and students, rather than that of the social classes or religion, seemed in a sense to underemphasize the seriousness and significance of the happenings and to turn them into "children's crusades."

Then, too, from the Marxist perspective, intellectuals and students are not significant independent social forces. Rather, they have been viewed as vacillating, unreliable, "*petit-bourgeois* elements" who are inclined to shift with the prevailing ideological winds. Although students have played a rather major role in supporting various Communist movements at different times, the Party has tended to deprecate their role.

The greater willingness to recognize the political role of students stems, in part, from the awareness by many on the left that other social forces are not always available for support. The organized workers of the developed countries of Europe and America, for example, have become a conservative force, as C. Wright Mills has pointed out. Trade unions and labor-based parties have been integrated into an institutional system of representation and collective bargaining. As such, they are not concerned with policies and programs that may upset the political pattern. The orthodox (pro-Russian) Communist Parties in many countries have also become part of the regular system of representation and no longer advocate use of extralegal and extraparliamentary tactics. In Latin America, they oppose the guerrilla tactics fostered by Castroites and Maoists.

Mills saw in the intellectuals and students a major potential mass base for new revolutionary movements. They have *remained* a source of new radical leadership and mass support, while other elements of society have not. Thus, more attention is being focused on the American student movement at present than occurred during the 1930's, even though the movement was larger in both absolute and proportionate terms in the thirties. But beyond the emergence of an intellectual concern with the politics of students, well-publicized events of the past decade have illustrated the significance of student politics. Student demonstrations and movements played a considerable role in the overthrow of Perón in Argentina in 1955; the downfall of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela in 1958; the successful resistance to Diem in Vietnam in 1963; the massive riots against the

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Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in Japan in 1960 which forced the resignation of the Kishi government; the anti-Sukarno movement in Indonesia in 1966; the October demonstrations for greater freedom in Poland in 1956; and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. It is important to note, however, that although students may be catalysts for political action, they can seldom bring a revolutionary movement to fruition. In Korea, students began the movement that succeeded in toppling the Rhee government in 1960, but they relied on popular pressure and the army to make their movement successful.

Although much of the recent writing on student politics has focused on leftist activist groups, it is also important to analyze the strength and activities of traditional and conservative groups as well. Opinion data for various countries assembled by Glaucio Soares indicate that the left-wing students are in a minority, often very small, even in countries where leftist demonstrations have made international headlines. Even though university campuses provide a significant proportion of the future radical leadership, as well as the mass base for antigovernment demonstrations, most students are not involved in such activities. In most countries, the vast majority of students are apolitical and tend to endorse the moderate or even conservative parties. In the United States today, the largest campus political groups are the Young Democrats and Young Republicans, which have a total combined membership of under 250,000 members, as contrasted to 7,000 members of the new-left Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). A recent (1967) U. S. survey of American college students reports that a plurality favors the Republicans for the 1968 Presidential Election. Four national surveys conducted during 1965 and 1966 found that from two thirds to three quarters of American students support the Vietnamese war.

Influences derivative from university experiences are, of course, not the sole or even primary determinants of student political beliefs. Family perspectives often influence students' orientations. The high correlation between the political stance of students and that of their parents would imply that the children of poorer families should be more leftist than those of the more well-to-do, since socio-economic class and political choice are generally related in this way. Although research in various countries tends to validate the generalization, it does not, for a number of reasons, apply this simply to student populations. Students from relatively poor families tend to come from that minority within the lower strata which is

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strongly oriented toward upward mobility and the values of the privileged. Hence, their parents are often among the more politically conservative of their class. Moreover, upwardly mobile students who represent the first generation of their family attending university tend to be vocationally oriented. They are more likely to be found in fields that lead to professions. This strong concentration on careerist professional objectives, plus the need to have a job during the school term, results in these students being less available for political or other extracurricular activities than those from more privileged backgrounds.

In Scandinavia, a student of working-class origins is likely to shift from a Social Democratic family orientation to a conservative one. There is less probability that a student from a conservative middle-class background will shift to left-wing parties. Recent American data suggest the reverse finding. Attendance at university is stronger in pressing well-to-do students to a position to the left of their parents, than in moving those from less-privileged Democratic and liberal families to the right. Such findings should be subjected to more precise specification as to type of school attended and academic discipline studied. The greater shift to liberalism among the more well-to-do in the United States may reflect the high proportion attending the better universities, which characteristically have the most creative, intellectually oriented, and liberal faculties. Conservative students on such campuses experience a political atmosphere hostile to their family political beliefs.

Well-to-do parents are also among the better educated. Particularly is this so among professionals. Increased education is associated in most underdeveloped countries with approval of modern, as contrasted with traditional, values and in the developed societies with belief in "noneconomic liberalism"—support for civil liberties for unpopular minorities, internationalism, and so forth. These orientations are generally fostered by the more liberal or leftist campus groups. Matters related to economic class are less salient sources of campus politics than noneconomic ones. Students in the United States, for example, are much more concerned with civil rights for Negroes or political rights on campus and in the larger society, than with the power of trade unions or the consequences of different systems of taxation on economic growth.

Many of those who experience a tension between the political atmosphere of the university and their family tradition escape the choice by abstaining from politics, by accepting the doctrine that

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school and politics do not mix. Most students from conservative backgrounds remain in this tradition. In countries where there is a visible difference in the dominant political orientation of universities, continuity in family political orientations may be facilitated by the process of conscious selection of universities because of their political reputations. In Latin America, conservative privileged families will often send their children to schools with a conservative or apolitical reputation, such as the Catholic or other private universities. Unfortunately, there is little reliable information on this subject.

American research findings suggest that there is congruence between the characteristic political orientation of different disciplines and the political beliefs of entering students who plan to major in them. Conservatives are more likely to study engineering or business, and liberals the humanities or social sciences. Such selection reflects the extent to which varying political orientations influence students to opt for different career goals. Leftists, particularly those from well-to-do and well-educated families, are inclined to favor academic fields concerned with social and political issues or careers in the arts, social work, scholarship, and public service.

Academic ecology, the social environment in which a student happens to find himself by virtue of his choice of university or academic field, tends to be more important than his class background in affecting his opinions. The faculty within which students are enrolled seems more predictive of their political stance than class origins. In various Latin American countries, the differences among universities in their modal political choice are greater than the social-class variation within them. Nevertheless, those who bring strong traditionalist values with them to the university are more likely to remain conservative and apolitical than others. This may be seen most strongly in the role of religion. In the Catholic countries of Latin America and Europe, practicing Catholic students are much more conservative than nonbelievers. Thus, reported differences in family religious practices are highly predictive in this respect. Similar findings have been reported for India. In the United States, Catholics and evangelical Protestants are also among the most conservative groups in the university.

Minority-majority social status also seems more important than economic class background in affecting student propensity for action. In Germany and Austria, for example, students from

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minority groups (Jews and Slavs) and from the lower-middle class spearheaded the Revolution of 1848. Students from minority ethnic backgrounds were also active in the pre-revolutionary Russian student movement as well. Today in the United States, Britain, and Argentina, Jews contribute heavily to the membership and support of activist left groups.

In many of the developing countries and in nations like Belgium and Canada, there are often deep cleavages that prevent a sense of community among the students. Religious divisions, regional, linguistic, caste, racial, and tribal differences often severely inhibit the growth of national student movements devoted to societal objectives, or even to university reform. In a number of countries, divergent student groupings based on such variations are locked in conflict. In India, students have taken to the streets because of religious or linguistic differences. In Indonesia, student groups are often organized on the basis of religious or regional affiliation.

The varying demands that universities make on students also affect the possibilities for political participation and the political climate on the campus. The examination system used is a key factor in determining student political activism. In the American system, for example, students are generally required to take examinations at regular intervals and to maintain at least minimal academic standards to stay in school. They may take part in extracurricular activities, political or other, but these are at the expense of their studies. In Latin America, where examinations are not so important or may be postponed, such sanctions do not exist.

In many countries, it is possible to predict accurately the cycle of student activism on the basis of examination schedules. In India, students do not generally study until a month before the annual examinations. Thus, most students have a very substantial amount of free time during the year. In Latin America, many student leaders are able to maintain their status within the university for years by postponing their examinations and devoting themselves full-time to political activity.

Entrance requirements to a university may also affect political reactions. The Japanese and American patterns place great emphasis on getting into the best universities and require high-school students to work long hours under considerable psychic pressure. These patterns clearly affect the way some students behave after they are admitted to the university. A great deal of Japanese and American student activism is concentrated in the freshmen and sophomore

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years, which may reflect the students' reaction to being released from the pressures of entrance anxiety. Upperclassmen tend to be more liberal in their attitudes than lower-division groups, but to give less time to politics. Presumably years of university attendance are associated both with greater liberalism and more concern with preparing for jobs or admission into good graduate schools.

The greater activism of lowerclassmen may also reflect the liberating influences of the university. Students often express their newly found freedom by engaging in various forms of "nonconformist" behavior. Regardless of class in school, students living away from home, either in dormitories or in private accommodations, are more likely to participate in activist politics than those commuting from home. Moreover, Berkeley data suggest that "new" students—whether freshmen, juniors, or graduate students—are more likely to be activists than students who have been in residence for some time. In other words, recent transfer students contribute disproportionately to the activist core. This raises a general question about transferring from one campus to another. A campus is not always a community in which students remain for the entire period of their education and in which they are gradually socialized into the community norms. Frank Pinner suggests that young people, particularly students, join organizations or integrated collectivities because they have just left their families, their home town, or friends and are anxious, disoriented, and lonely. They find in organizational life—particularly in movements that have a sense of commitment, purpose, and high intimacy—a kind of replacement for the collectivity they have just left. This factor, which would apply more to the new than to older students, would also vary by country and university system. It would depend, in part, on what proportion of students live at home or close to home.

Opinions as to the place of politics in the university are inherently related to feelings about the larger society. Those—whether of the extreme left or right—who believe that drastic changes are necessary, that major evils exist, or that the basic verities are under attack will feel that students and faculty ought to be deeply involved in politics. Conversely, moderate conservatives and liberals are more likely to accept President Benitez's formula that a university is a "house of study," rather than a "house of politics." Conservatives, as believers in the *status quo,* will generally be even less active politically than liberals or moderate leftists. Glaucio

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Soares's Brazilian data indicate that conservative students not only are not interested in politics, but often "perceive student politics as an undue interference with their studies." The leftists, on the other hand, feel that they have a duty to be politically engaged and that the university should be an agency of modernization and radical change. As Soares puts it, conservatives argue that the political and academic roles should be compartmentalized, while leftists seek to integrate the two. This means, of course, that under current conditions in most countries, the student left will mobilize a much greater proportion of its potential strength for politics than will the moderates or the rightists.

Most of the recent writing on student activism tends to ignore the phenomenon of rightist activism. Indeed, although many students are conservatives, there has been little rightist campus activism since the 1930's. As a result, little material has been published concerning the activities of the extreme rightist student groups of the 1920's and 1930's in much of Europe. German and Austrian students were on the left during the early-nineteenth century, but many turned to rightist nationalism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism were characteristic of many of the more politically sophisticated German fraternities, and Nazism had great appeal in the universities in the 1930's. French Fascism, strong during the interwar period, received considerable support from university students. Many of the student groups active during the 1930's in Latin America had strong Fascist views, due mainly to the influence from Spain and Italy, while German Nazi influence was strong in some Arab movements. In the colonial areas, nationalist movements often looked with favor on Hitler and Mussolini because of their opposition to the imperialist powers of Western Europe. Although ideological issues were confused, university students tended to accept some aspects of Fascist ideology, particularly the stress on militant nationalism and race pride and the concern with militaristic thinking.

From a functional point of view, such "rightist" behavior is quite similar to contemporary left-wing styles of politics. Rightist students were nationalistic, anti-authority, and concerned with the seeming inferiority of their nation within the world community. The subtleties of ideology were not meaningful to the rightist student movements of the 1930's. There was often a mixture of rightist and Marxist rhetoric, which combined notions of racialism with ideas of "proletarian" and exploited nations.

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As Frank Pinner suggests, student organizations may, for analytical purposes, be divided into two categories: *transgressive* groups, which are directed mainly against the authority structures of their societies, and *traditional* groups, which socialize their members into their role as conventional citizens of the society. A similar distinction can be made in the role of the university itself. On the one hand, universities are centers of innovation where scholars are expected to challenge the traditional truths of their fields and receive the highest rewards for work which is sharply innovative. On the other, they are schools with faculties of teachers and, thereby, part of the socialization process of their society. Universities and the subdivisions within them vary in the extent to which they emphasize these functions. Many parts of the university, particularly the professional schools, are essentially concerned with a socialization function—training students in socially useful skills. The so-called liberal-arts subjects, on the other hand, tend to value scholarly innovation and competence in research more highly. Thus, transgressive student groups are more likely to be found among liberal-arts students than among those in professional schools, such as engineering, education, or business. In Latin America and other countries, universities that are affiliated to religious bodies tend to have little student activism. In Japan and the United States, the most important centers of scholarship tend also to be the strongholds of transgressive student movements.

It is possible to differentiate further among transgressive social movements: Some are concerned with changes in basic social *values* (ultimate ends or conceptions about basic social institutions) and others with affecting *norms* (means to attain agreed upon social values).

Movements concerned with value change are more prevalent and stronger in the underdeveloped countries than in the developed ones. Talcott Parsons and S. N. Eisenstadt have suggested the need to look at the magnitude of the differences between the values of the adult and youth generations in varying types of societies. They indicate that generational conflict is caused, at least in part, by sharp value differences among generations, and that such cleavages —particularly between the better educated (younger on the average) and the uneducated (older)—are great in modernizing societies, but relatively minor in the developed societies.

Similarly, the difference between the values of the university and those of society is considerable in backward societies and

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small in developed societies. Michio Nagai has argued, for example, that the university is basically universalistic and meritocratic, even in societies that are neither universalistic nor meritocratic. On the one hand, the university judges people, events, and research on the basis of objective achievement criteria, and, on the other, it values freedom of inquiry and discussion. Thus, when we speak of a university anywhere in the world, we have a similar model in mind, no matter how far reality may deviate from that model. The norm of academic freedom is basic to the idea of the university. The tension between university and society will, therefore, be great in authoritarian societies, considerable in emerging and developing nations, which are normally quite particularistic, and relatively small in the developed democratic societies. Faculty and students will reflect the depth of these tensions in their behavior. One should expect *value* conflicts (differences about ends) between student movements and the society in emerging or authoritarian nations and more normative conflicts in developed societies. Education, particularly university education, is inherently a modernizing force, and hence in underdeveloped countries it will be in conflict with those elements seeking to maintain traditional values and institutions. In the democratic developed states, the society more generally accepts the values of universalism, achievement, and freedom.

These distinctions help to account for the varying emphases on ideology among student movements. In general, ideological concerns have declined among student activists in advanced industrialized countries during the postwar period, as compared to the 1930's, but have remained important in many of the developing countries. Nationalism, which involves a concern for modernizing and industrializing, is also particularly important in developing countries. Even such relatively non-leftist groupings as the Philippine student movement and the militant KAMI organization of Indonesia are extremely nationalistic. The ideological concerns of student groups in the emerging nations reflect their interest in value change in the larger society. They are at odds with any forces that support traditional values or stand in the way of rapid economic growth.

In the West, however, where the tension between social values and the political concerns of students is less manifest, even the relatively small radical student movements do not show a strong attachment to formal ideologies. Thus, pragmatism and a preoccupation with specific issues characterize its student politics. This

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obtains even in Eastern Europe, perhaps because ideologies would be difficult to voice. Students there have been a key element in demanding liberalization in the name of the manifest socialist values and have argued for a nondogmatic approach to society and politics. Even the French Communist students have been in the forefront of revolt against the ideological commitments of the parent Party. Scandinavian students have campaigned for individual freedom and an end to social regulations, particularly those related to sex.

In many countries, one may find some version of the maxim: "Anyone under twenty who is not a radical [socialist, Communist, anarchist] does not have a heart; anyone over forty who still is one does not have a head." There is a notion that it is normal, appropriate, and morally correct for young people to be radicals or revolutionaries. Indeed, many societies treat radical youth, particularly students, as if they believed this maxim. They permit students a degree of political freedom, even license, to violate the norms and laws of society without being punished, or with less punishment than is generally meted out to others. Thus, Berkeley students who surrounded a police car and held it captive for thirty hours were neither arrested nor otherwise sanctioned. Even in authoritarian countries like Czarist Russia, Communist Poland, or Franco Spain, student oppositionists have been treated more lightly by the authorities than have other organized opponents. Sentences against student revolutionaries are usually mild compared to those given non-students.

This tolerance reflects, in part, the fact that university students are often the children of the "elite." The vast majority of the offspring of the privileged strata go to university. This elite finds it difficult to employ stringent measures against its own children. In Cuba, the Batista regime was undermined, in part, because some of the young people with Castro in the mountains were the children of Cuban upper-class families. Members of the Havana elite exerted tremendous pressure on Batista to quit because they wanted their children back from the mountains alive. In recent years, many of the trials of student activists in Spain have involved at least one son of an important family. In this context, the Spanish courts have been faced by two conflicting forces: the particularism of the society, which requires that an offender who belongs to a privileged family be treated lightly, and the universalism of the law, which implies that all those who commit similar offenses be treated in the

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same way. Most of the punishments of Spanish students have, therefore, been relatively mild.

Nations may also be differentiated by their varying conceptions of youth. Revolutionary ideologies are generally positive toward youth. Hence, the vitality of revolutionary ideologies may be measured by the extent to which they still identify virtue with youth. One of the best pieces of evidence that the American revolutionary tradition is still viable is the prevalent belief in youth, which interestingly the Russians no longer have. The United States is very much a youth culture; it stresses the truism that the young will inherit the world and are probably on the side of justice and progress, as opposed to adults. Many adults thus feel youth should be encouraged in their disdain for the old, in their advocacy of progress and change. Older people consequently lack assurance when debating with youth. It is significant that the Soviet Union has sharply modified the belief in youth that prevailed immediately after the Revolution. Stalin eliminated the notion that youth is right in its conflicts against the older elements, and his successors have not reinstated it. Mao Tse-tung, in his seventies, however, is attempting to emphasize the role of youth as the main source of support for a continuing revolutionary ideology in China.

Authoritarian systems like Fascist Italy or Communist Cuba have, however, been interested not in encouraging students to be critical of the system, but in using "youth" as a social base to support a supposedly "revolutionary" regime against conservative adults. They have hoped to inhibit adult opponents by impressing on them the idea that they represent a historic anachronism. A stress on the worth of youth politics in a democracy may bring to reform movements the support and encouragement of students and other youth. Conversely, it may inhibit some adults who disagree from strongly resisting the proposals of activist students.

Michio Nagai has suggested that as societies "modernize," their universities necessarily move from a diffuse to a specific relationship with both the state and religion. The growth of the scholarly and research function has required universities to separate themselves from the clergy and the politicians. The university must be free to find and teach what is scientifically "true," without concern for the reactions of religious or political establishments. The norm of academic freedom assumes that these outside bodies will leave the university alone. Conversely, if the university insists on freedom

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from external interference, from being criticized or coerced by those not involved in scholarly pursuits, the norm implies that it must abstain as a university community from attacking others.

The extent to which universities have differentiated themselves from society will, of course, differ. The Confucian ethic stresses the linkages between scholarship and the state. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars were civil servants and supporters of the state. They maintained a relationship with the state similar to that between the religious scholars and the church in the West. In more recent times, universities in the East, particularly state universities, have been expected to be agents of state purposes. Nagai concludes that the considerable involvement of students in the political life of these countries is to some extent linked to the continued strength of Confucian values.

Similarly, in many developing countries the national emphasis on economic development and modernization overrides the idea of the completely autonomous university. Various sections of the governing elite, as well as many faculty members and students, believe that the university should serve the national interest of fostering development. They do not think the nation can afford the "luxury" of supporting pure scholarship which is not related to development objectives, nor can students or faculty isolate themselves from active involvement in politics. These are, of course, highly debated issues in many of the countries, but insofar as the university is perceived as serving political objectives, it necessarily becomes a source of political stimulation.

The effort to separate the university from extramural influences has been most successful in the developed countries of Western Europe and the English-speaking world. The university gradually freed itself from political and religious interference in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In recent decades, however, the growing role of the university as the key center of research and development for the public sector has necessarily involved it in political controversy. Governments and scholars have broken down the barriers between politics and science by using academics as temporary government officials or as consultants. Scientists have not been able to escape taking responsibility for the social and political uses of their discoveries. Physicists have had to take a position on the various controversies concerning the military uses of atomic energy, academic economists have been called on to take part in the debates on national economic policy, and sociologists and

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psychologists are involved in issues concerning race relations, education, and the culture of poverty.

Seemingly, the process that brought about increased differentiation between the academy and other institutions has been reversed. The growing complexity of modern society has challenged the effort to segregate the university as an "ivory tower," seeking primarily to serve scholarly ends. As the university in the West becomes a "multiversity," to use Clark Kerr's term, it will continue to be a center of political agitation, as those who favor or disagree with specific endeavors seek to use or attack it. The growing involvement of the Western university as the research arm of the governing elite has, for example, led some critics to view it as a "tool" of the establishment. Universities have nevertheless generally remained as major sources of criticism, despite their growing ties to government. In France, where all universities are state controlled, faculty and students were in the forefront of the opposition to the Algerian war. In the United States many have been the principal centers of support for the Negro struggle for equality and an important source of protest against the Vietnam war.

Student politics is also affected to a considerable degree by the social position and political values of the country's intellectual community. The position of the English intellectuals vis-à-vis power in the political establishment differs from that of the French or the American intellectual. The English have been included in effective political life; the French are outside it. In the United States, intellectuals have great power as experts, but there is no intellectual political community comparable to that in Britain. In many ways, the "nonexpert" American intellectual, similar to the French, has high status but little power and views himself as alienated from the power structure, while the American academic "expert," like the English, has considerable status and power and is more likely to identify with the political-decision makers.

The attitudes of intellectuals and of students toward the national *status quo* are, moreover, not simply a function of their position within the society. More than any other group, intellectuals tend to have an international reference group. To use Merton's distinction between "cosmopolitans" (oriented to outside groups for standards of comparison) and "locals" (concerned with the evaluations of the community within which one resides), intellectuals are clearly more likely to be cosmopolitans. As such, they will be aware of the shortcomings of their nation compared with the standards of the leading

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countries. The intellectuals and academics of the underdeveloped countries generally realize that they are at the summits of nations or university systems that are considered "backward." This awareness heightens their desire to foster change within their own society and increases their resentment against local or foreign groups that inhibit modernization. The intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century regarded their countries as backward compared to France and Britain, and many of them supported radical political movements.

Intellectuals who are resentful of their society often stimulate rebellious "apprentice intellectuals"—students. In many countries professors see themselves as a deprived stratum, one which is not given the rewards of working conditions appropriate to their role. This sense of resentment will vary, of course, both within nations and among them. Students, particularly in the better universities, are more prone to rebel when the faculty are relatively incompetent in their teaching and show authoritarian tendencies. Student indiscipline in India has been linked with the low salaries, long hours, and bad working conditions of the faculty. The historic pattern of the "part-time" professor in Latin America is a crucial factor in the lack of commitment to scholarly endeavors and values by many students. The very bad faculty-student ratio of French universities and the low salaries of Japanese professors, which require them to find other sources of remuneration, have been cited as factors lowering the educational level of the institutions of higher education and encouraging protest movements.

Student political patterns are also determined, in part, by variations in political institutions. As Robert Scott points out, the lack of political stability in much of Latin America has stimulated student activism, since the possibility of successful agitation has been substantial, and students have occasionally been able to exert political leverage on weak governments. In Scandinavia, on the other hand, as Erik Allardt and Richard Tomasson indicate, the stability and legitimacy of the established political structures have discouraged student activism, and national politics is not generally seen as a legitimate domain of student concern. The same pattern can be seen in other politically stable nations.

Confrontation politics is characteristic of polities in which students, and other groups as well, lack legitimate channels of communication to authority. Clark Kerr has observed that political groups turn to activist demonstrations when they find themselves

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ignored by the adult power structure. Nevertheless, the existence of student militancy, in and of itself, does not necessarily indicate that such channels do not exist. Youth generally lack a long time-perspective; they tend to become quickly frustrated if their demands are not met immediately. Hence, even in countries with reasonably good channels of political communication, students may turn to confrontation politics if their political idealism has been activated by a major moral issue. For example, American students concerned with civil rights for Negroes or with ending the Vietnam war have not been satisfied with communicating with authority. Whether such alienation becomes pervasive and long-term will be related to the reality of the democratic institutions. In stable democracies, student unrest tends to be a temporary phenomenon.

The pressures on higher educational institutions to expand have have been tremendous, but countries have responded to them differently. The military government of Burma has used severe repressive measures to keep the university population limited. In other nations—notably, the Philippines, Korea, India, the United States, and Japan—rapid educational expansion has caused substantial strains on the educational system and may be a factor in student unrest. The arts and law faculties, which rely on lectures and do not need laboratories, can expand most rapidly. Classes are simply enlarged. The effect of expansion has varied considerably within university systems. Educational standards have fallen most rapidly in the liberal arts, as have elite occupational opportunities. In many countries, students in the sciences are often able to obtain remunerative jobs in expanding technological fields, while liberal-arts graduates face an oversupply, which has led to educated unemployment and political unrest.

There is no clear-cut simple relationship between size or rate of expansion of the student body and patterns of political behavior. The emergence of large student populations on one campus or within given cities, particularly national capitals, has facilitated student activism. It has become relatively easy to mobilize a visibly large protest demonstration. A small minority of the students in Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Berkeley, Calcutta, Tokyo, or Paris can constitute an impressive protest in absolute numbers. The creation of "University Cities" in places like Caracas or Paris has increased the potential for mass student action. On the other hand, in nations in which there is only one university and the student body is small and homogeneous, a small group of activists can have an

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impact on the ideological climate of the national student body and on political events. This was true in the Congo after independence in 1960. The growth of the student population increases the size of the minority available for activist protest and makes for a more heterogeneous student body, one which may sustain competing campus political groupings.

In many countries, the university system is completely state-financed; in others, both in the developed and underdeveloped world, the universities are divided among public, private, and religious schools. Such differences permit substantial variation in quality among institutions. Universities with religious affiliations not only tend to recruit from the most traditionalist sectors of society, but their administrations and faculties are more likely to ban politics than are those in secular universities. Nippon University, the largest private university in Japan, prohibits participation in the *Zengakuren,* the national student union. Other private universities like Waseda, which have a history of student activism, were originally established as a means of training opposition to the governmental elite educated in the University of Tokyo. In the Philippines, the extensive system of private colleges includes many "diploma mills" designed to get students, often from less-well-to-do families. through a nominal university education as quickly and easily as possible. As might be expected, there is little student politics in these institutions.

"Statistically significant" relationships found in one country need not hold up in others. There are, for example, interesting variations concerning the effects of different disciplines on politics. Disciplines tend to be identified with student activism and leftist ideas in some countries, but not in others. Medicine has a leftist aura in various Latin countries in the Americas and Europe, but is traditionally quite conservative in most of northern Europe and the Anglophonic world. In the Catholic world, this orientation seems to stem from the historic conflict between science and the church, a tension relatively absent from the politics of most Protestant countries. Where economics is taught as an extremely technical, mathematically based subject, those who concentrate in the field are less radical than where it remains concerned with qualitative and historical institutional analysis. Similarly, in some countries "law" means a pre-professional discipline or a professional field as it does in the United States; in other places, it denotes a broad social-science or philosophical training. Consequently, the behavior of

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law students may vary considerably from country to country.

One may also differentiate between subjects that lead to explicit role models and those which involve diffuse objectives. (Pre-professional subjects have explicit role models, while some of the humanities and social-science subjects have diffuse postgraduate role expectations.) Glaucio Soares has distinguished between students whose role image is that of the intellectual as against those who conceive of themselves as scientists or professionals. These images are highly predictive of political orientations. Those with an intellectual role identity are much more leftist and activist than those who identify as scientists or professionals.

This difference is, of course, a subjective one. In every discipline, those who think of themselves as intellectuals rather than professionals are more politically activist. It also works out objectively, in terms of the types of disciplines. Those disciplines that are thought of as "intellectual"—the humanities and most of the social sciences—are more activist and leftist than those that are oriented toward the professional or scientific world. In Puerto Rico, almost all the supporters of the radical and nationalist FUPI (pro-independence) movement have come from the social sciences and have seen themselves primarily as intellectuals, with strong ambitions toward writing and journalism. Chile and Argentina have demonstrated similar patterns. Most of the activists in the Indian and Indonesian student movements, particularly during the nationalist periods, came from the liberal arts. In the United States, the activists in groups like the Students for a Democratic Society tend to be in the social sciences and humanities and to see themselves as intellectuals rather than as professionals.

Thus, differences in the political behavior of students in different universities or countries may be linked to variations in the fields in which they specialize. Certain schools deal primarily with liberal-arts subjects; others, like the University of Moscow, are essentially institutes for technology and science. Most underdeveloped countries, particularly in Latin America, tend to have proportionally fewer students enrolled in technical and vocational subjects. (In some, however, like Israel and Nigeria, the proportion is quite high.) The Communist countries rank highest in proportions of students engaged in vocational and professional training, which may contribute to the relative political passivity of their student bodies.

The political orientations of professors and their students do

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not necessarily vary in the same way. There is a congruence in some fields. In such professional schools as engineering, education, or business, faculty and students are both relatively conservative. In other areas, such as mathematics or molecular biology, they tend to be relatively leftist. In still others, particularly sociology or political science and especially in the better universities, the students tend to be to the left of the faculty. Where discrepancies between faculty and student orientations exist, the student and the faculty often differ in their conceptions of the subject. Thus, students view some of the social sciences as fields concerned with remedying "social problems." As scholarly disciplines, however, they are essentially concerned with the elaboration of knowledge within scientifically rigorous conceptual frameworks and methodology. Since social scientists see crucial political questions as having complex causes and different solutions, they tend to refrain from endorsing simple solutions. Thus, political concerns motivate many students to major in the social sciences, while the canons of scholarship press social scientists to refrain from taking public political positions. Natural scientists or humanists, on the other hand, may take political positions without reference to their special roles as scholars. Politically motivated students who hold to an "ethic of ultimate ends," which requires a total commitment to furthering politically desirable goals, will not understand nor sympathize with Max Weber's insistence that introducing one's personal values into scientific analysis undermines the ability to understand the facts. Accepting Weber's position often places social scientists in conflict with their best students, who see any faculty reluctance to link scholarly and political roles as cowardly.

These are some of the issues with which any analysis of the role of students in politics and higher education must deal. The university is premised on the belief that "knowledge will make man free" and will increase his ability to control and to better his environment. Those interested in the role of students in politics are obligated to avoid using their special competencies and knowledge as weapons in ongoing campus politics. To separate one's role as scholar and citizen is often difficult. In this case, it is almost impossible.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This article is a condensation of an effort to sum up the various issues presented in the analysis of student politics that have arisen in the work of the Comparative Student Politics Project of the Harvard Center for International

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Affairs. I have drawn on various papers delivered at the San Juan Conference on Students and Politics, many of which are included in this issue of *Dædalus.* Papers reported on in San Juan which deal with Latin America are published in a special issue of *Aportes* (No. 5 [July, 1967]). Other publications of the project which contain articles and materials referred to here are S. M. Lipset (ed.), *Student Politics* (New York, 1967), and S. M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (New York, 1967). A detailed bibliography of articles, books, and theses is Philip G. Altbach, *Select Bibliography on Students, Politics, and Higher Education* (Cambridge, 1967).

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CLEMENT H. MOORE AND
ARLIE R. HOCHSCHILD

Student Unions in North African Politics

UNDER WHAT conditions do students constitute a social stratum that, in the words of C. Wright Mills, serves as an "immediate, radical agency of [social] change"? Paraphrasing Mills, we ask, under what conditions can a student union become a force for revolutionary political change and, reversing Mills, under what conditions can it re-enforce political stability in a new nation by transmitting the political values of the generation in power to the new student generation?

North Africa is a fertile field for comparison not only because its student unions have been among the best organized and most active of the Third World since the mid-1950's, but because the societies share certain legacies. Each of the countries has experienced French colonial rule, the intrusions of substantial numbers of European settlers, the expropriation of rich farmlands, the rise of new cities, the decay of traditional strata, and the imposition of a French educational system. Moreover, the countries have a common precolonial Islamic and Arab cultural heritage. Many differences do, of course, underlie these broad similarities. The intensity and duration of the colonial experience was greatest in Algeria, least in Morocco. Their post-independence political systems are based on different elite strata, and they pursue radically different policies. Thus, some features can be held constant while differences among the three countries are compared for their possible effects on the roles played by the three student movements before and after independence.

I

The Political Role of Students Before Independence

In the Third World, the most effective agency of anticolonialism was usually the intelligentsia, those who had been most exposed to

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the culture of the colonizer.[1] In North Africa, where the French presence had obliterated indigenous military establishments, the intelligentsia consisted of students and graduates of French universities. The undisputed leaders of Tunisian nationalism by the mid-thirties, they appeared to be the core of any future Algerian Muslim political elite.

The colonial situation and the pattern of colonial emancipation differed, however, in the three North African countries. Before independence, Morocco, the least touched by colonial rule, produced too few French-educated students to be an agency of change. (Those it did produce tended to be sons of the traditional elite.) The class that took power after Morocco's independence was largely traditional, and radical social change has yet to take place. In Algeria, on the other hand, colonial influence was more profound, the economic stakes higher, and the nature of the colonial conflict more violent. While the French educational system in Algeria produced a larger student body of more diversified class origins, the student independence movement was largely overshadowed by a more radical guerrilla insurrection. In Tunisia, national political activity was tolerated by the French, and, as in Algeria, more French-educated students, largely of the rising lower-middle class, were able to join the student union, child of the modernist Neo-Destour Party. In retrospect, despite a spectacular development of student organization in the mid-fifties, students *as such* were not radical agencies of historical change even in Tunisia, where conditions were most favorable.

To be sure, individual students and former students were among the first nationalists in all three countries. Though Muslim students at the University of Algiers were prohibited from forming an autonomous student union, they founded their first "cultural" organization in 1920. More important for fostering nationalism was the *Association des Etudiants Musulmans Nord-Africains* (AEMNA), founded in 1927 for the fifty-odd North African university students in Paris.[2] Here aspirations for a united and independent North Africa were vaguely articulated, and a number of future leaders acquired radical ideas through AEMNA's contacts with the French Left and with Chekib Arslan, a Druze expatriot who expounded pan-Arab nationalism. During the thirties, AEMNA represented the Gallicized face of nationalist and pan-Maghrib sentiment. Occasionally it was even permitted to hold its annual congresses on North African soil. Apart from moral support, however, it could

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contribute very little to the active agencies of political change, the parties and clandestine political organizations at home that developed contrasting responses to three very different colonial situations.

Because most North African students were enrolled in French universities rather than those of their respective homelands, Paris remained the crossroads of organized Maghribi student activity until the late-fifties. The student community expanded rapidly after World War II. In 1955-56, for example, approximately eighteen hundred Algerian Muslims were pursuing higher studies, more than two thirds doing so in metropolitan France rather than at the University of Algiers. During the same academic year, 862 Tunisians and three or four hundred Moroccans were studying in French universities, although centers of higher studies existed in Tunis and Rabat.[3]

In 1950, AEMNA established a permanent secretariat to draw up plans for a unified North African student union, but political events hindered their realization. After January 18, 1952, the Tunisian nationalist movement was driven underground, most of its top leaders were arrested, and the country was virtually besieged by the colonial authorities. Meanwhile the escalation of colonial conflict was avoided in Morocco until August 20, 1953, the date of Mohammed V's deposition, and in Algeria until November 1, 1954, the day the Algerian insurrection was launched. The Tunisian nationalists were in immediate need of a national union of students, and accordingly, the *Union Générale des Etudiants Tunisiens* (UGET) was founded at a secret congress in Paris during July, 1953, with the backing of the Neo-Destour Party. Two years later, eight months after the outbreak of the Algerian revolution, the Algerians followed suit, founding the *Union Générale des Etudiants Musulmans Algériens* (UGEMA). The Moroccan students remained disorganized until after independence, when the *Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains* (UNEM) was formed in the summer of 1956.

Morocco

Morocco came under French control only in 1912, thirty-one years after the French had established their protectorate in Tunisia and almost a century after the conquest of Algeria (1830-47). It was not fully "pacified" until 1934, when modern nationalism, re-

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flecting the interests and outlook of traditional urban strata more than those of the tiny French-educated stratum, took organizational shape.

Morocco was, therefore, the last of the three countries to benefit from a modern French educational system and had far fewer French-educated students than Tunisia or Algeria. Within what was later to become the Istiqlal Party, there were a few young radical students and graduates, but products of the traditional University of Qaraouiyine at Fez were more representative of the Party's conservative urban base. Students—especially radical modernizers, like Mehdi Ben Barka, who were of lower-class origins—could exercise their organizational skills in the Istiqlal before independence, but the cohesion of the nationalist elite obscured basic differences in outlook that became apparent with the scission of the Istiqlal in 1958-59. Before independence, neither students nor graduates could acquire sufficient prestige and authority to challenge the traditional Islamic values underlying Istiqlal nationalism. (Even traditional Party leaders failed to gain authority independent of their national symbol, the Moroccan monarch. After independence, King Mohammed V easily consolidated his power and neutralized the Istiqlal's bid to set up a one-party state.) Individual students did become leaders before independence, but any enumeration of these individuals must include Crown Prince Hassan, who succeeded his father in 1961, as well as Mehdi Ben Barka. Clearly, Moroccan students did not constitute a revolutionary stratum.

Tunisia

Tunisian students and graduates played a crucial role in the struggle for independence. They constituted the dominant stratum, the political class, the armature of the new Tunisian nation that developed in opposition to both the old society and the French presence. Virtually all of the Neo-Destour's top leadership were educated in French universities, and the Party's favorite recruiting grounds were Tunisia's modern French or Franco-Arab secondary schools. Though many of the Party's provincial cadres were educated in the traditional University of Zitouna, the Party took unequivocably "modern" stances against the "old turbans" (the religious elite) and other traditional urban strata long before independence.

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The tension between the old elite and the new French-educated one led in Morocco to the split within the Istiqlal in 1958. In Tunisia, it was resolved in 1937 in favor of the modernizers with the Neo-Destour's decisive victory over the Destour Party, Tunisia's older equivalent to the Istiqlal. In this sense, Tunisia was at least one generation more "advanced" than Morocco, where even today traditional elites frustrate the radical intelligentsia. One obvious explanation is that Tunisia succumbed to French rule and thus received French schools one generation earlier. Another explanation concerns the socio-economic status of Tunisian students. By the thirties, sons of the old urban elite were outnumbered in Tunisian *lycées* and French universities by those of the lower classes. Furthermore, a majority of the latter came from the Sahil, a distinctive geographic region noted for its ancient village civilization and the tenacity and industry of its peasant olive-tree cultivators. The Sahil gave its sons a basis for an identity other than that of the old urban elite and hence re-enforced the modernizing subculture of the lower-class university students. Indeed, when refracted in the new visions of these sons of the Sahil, regionalism stimulated a more radical nationalism than that of the old urban classes. While the old generations were content to argue legalistically for Wilsonian self-determination, the student generation led by Habib Bourguiba set out to create a new public by sustained political activity through the well-organized Neo-Destour Party.

The very power and organization of the Party, however, caused it to subordinate students as an organized force. Tunisian students, as such, played a secondary role in the Neo-Destour's twenty-year campaign against the French. UGET served political and diplomatic purposes during the first year of its existence (1953-54), when the Party was outlawed, but it was never more than a cover for the activities of its parent organization. UGET's clandestine role ended in the autumn of 1954 when negotiations were opened that led first to home rule and then to independence in 1956.

Tunisian students and former students were part of a revolutionary stratum dedicated as much to transforming Tunisian society as to gaining political concessions from France. Ironically, the indirect impetus to their dedication arose out of the success of the French educational system in instilling new values. But there were other important reasons for the Neo-Destour's success. Tunisia's old elite, discredited by compromises with French officials and economically undermined by French settlers, was already extremely

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vulnerable when the Party was founded in 1934. Furthermore, the French authorities tolerated the Party more than they did comparable Algerian formations, because the French economic stakes were lower in Tunisia than in richer Algeria. Periods of political repression served to legitimate rather than to liquidate the new Tunisian leadership. The decisive means of colonial emancipation were the arts of organization, polemic, debate, and negotiation—in short, the arts acquired by a French-educated elite—rather than the grenades and machine guns that leveled much of Algeria.

Algeria

Algerian students were ultimately a less significant force than their Tunisian counterparts not because the society was more "backward," as in Morocco, but because colonial rule had lasted too long and rested on bayonets. Students and graduates have fewer political opportunities in a militarized society, like that of Algeria after 1954. In fact, as early as 1937, the failure of the Blum-Violette Plan, due to settler intransigence, probably marked the end of the educated elite's dream of French assimilation and of any possibilities of a Franco-Muslim settlement short of violence.

The traditional elites were decimated and discredited by the French presence, and this disintegration of tradition deprived Algerian students of an identity or sense of national purpose. While the former student, Ferhat Abbas, chronologically of Bourguiba's generation, preached assimilation, Algerian workers in France, led by Messali Hadj, launched a more radical movement calling for independence. By the time a younger generation of university graduates was gaining control of this movement's political structure (the MTLD), the arbitrary practices of the colonial authorities had nullified moderate reforms and rendered Muslim political activity meaningless. Events again outran the intellectuals on November 1, 1954, when the secret Front of National Liberation (FLN) initiated a co-ordinated outbreak of terrorism. With the possible exception of Hocine Ait Ahmed, none of FLN's nine founders had been university students.

Nevertheless, the Algerian union of students, UGEMA, played a more significant role in the FLN's guerrilla war with France than the Tunisian or Moroccan student organizations did in their nationalist movements. The fragmentation of Algerian political and

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military organization meant that UGEMA, unlike UGET, enjoyed significant autonomy from its founding. At the same time, UGEMA made no secret of its solidarity with the FLN and its goals.

The young student union showed its strength by its call in May, 1956, for a general and unlimited student strike. Nearly all of the 520 Muslim students at the University of Algiers obeyed, as did most of the 1,300 Algerian Muslims studying in France. UGEMA launched a brilliant campaign in France and abroad to enlist the support of international student opinion for the Algerian cause. Under the leadership of Dr. Messaoud Ait Chaalal, the Algerian student organization withstood legal dissolution by the French authorities on January 28, 1958. From exile first in Switzerland and then in Tunis, it marshaled scholarships and political support from Communist and Western countries, despite the insistence of many Western unions upon maintaining a distinction between legitimate student interest and "politics." For UGEMA, of course, the distinction made by Western groups between student syndicalism and political activity could not be considered legitimate, given the turmoil of the Algerian war.[4] The union nevertheless was usually able to keep its own autonomy vis-à-vis the FLN, and its foreign policies were distinctly to the left of those of the FLN's Provisional Government (GPRA), founded in September, 1958.

After 1958, Algerian students were scattered, due largely to UGEMA's success in procuring more than 350 scholarships in at least twenty-six countries besides France and Algeria where UGEMA had been driven underground. The union consequently became highly fragmented, despite the efforts of its leadership in exile to apply "centralism" and "very strict discipline." On the eve of independence, the FLN's Provisional Government dismissed much of UGEMA's wartime leadership in an effort to consolidate control over the organization before the eventual power struggles began. As authority collapsed in Algeria after the spectacular French withdrawal during the summer of 1962, many of UGEMA's former leaders were recruited into the country's fledgling diplomatic service. Those who, like Ait Chaalal, were too disenchanted with politics to serve Ben Bella's government also withdrew from student politics. In the end, few remained to resuscitate the organization. When, on September 5, the Fifth UGEMA Congress finally opened after several postponements, civil war was still raging just south of Algiers. Though Algeria had no effective government that might suppress student action, the students were as fragmented as their

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society, the various segments being mouthpieces of political factions incapable of identifying a common student interest or electing new union officers. Despite its heroic exploits during the revolution, UGEMA disintegrated at independence.

The roles of North African student organizations before independence appear, on hindsight, to have been influenced largely by four general factors: the colonial situation, the strength of traditionalism, the organizational strength of other military or political forces in the struggle for independence, and the size, prestige, and composition of the student population.

The French had the greatest vested interest in Algeria. Consequently they were more intransigent against political activism in Algeria than in Morocco or Tunisia. French cultural, social, and economic colonial influence, too, was strongest in Algeria, somewhat milder in Tunisia, and weakest in Morocco. The colonial regimes in Algeria and Tunisia had, in a sense, sown the seeds of their own destruction and of modernizing reconstruction as well. Thus, there was a viable modernist alternative to colonial rule at the eve of independence to which a sizable group of students could lend support. Conditions were more ripe for student political participation in these countries than in Morocco. In Morocco, traditional values and social structure remained strong. At the other extreme, the extensive French influence in Algeria weakened Algerian cultural and political integrity to the extent that "assimilationism" became an obstacle to a unified independence movement.

The Algerian student union could enjoy autonomy, in part because of the fragmentation of other groups, whereas the strong and unified Neo-Destour Party actually created the Tunisian student union and kept it subordinate. The Moroccan Istiqlal Party was fairly united before independence, but there was then no student organization that it could subordinate, as in the case of Tunisia, or whose support it could enlist, as in the case of Algeria.

Moroccan students, unlike the Tunisian or Algerian, were simply too few in number and had too little prestige to become a strong organized force. Moreover, Moroccan students were not drawn, as in Algeria and Tunisia, from a variety of social classes. Thus, education did not constitute the radical restratification that it did in the two other countries, and consequently it failed to create a significant class of frustrated intellectuals whose careers were blocked by the colonial regime.

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II

The Role of Students After Independence

After independence the roles of student unions were radically reversed in the three countries. Their organizational bases were transformed when indigenous universities and political structures supplanted Paris as the main focus for student activity. Ten years after independence, it appeared that only in Morocco, where students had contributed the least to national independence, could students become an "agency of historic change." Each of the three student unions reflected its country's political processes since independence.

Morocco

The activities of the Moroccan student union closely paralleled those of outside political forces opposed to the regime. Soon after its founding in 1956, UNEM became a mouthpiece for Ben Barka's radical faction in the Istiqlal Party. Ben Barka virtually ran UNEM's Third Congress, held in 1958, from behind the scenes, thereby setting the tone for UNEM's future activities. UNEM indirectly attacked the monarchy, calling its major instrument, the Royal Armed Forces, a "parade" army. (The Chief of Staff was the Crown Prince, who in 1961 became King Hassan II.) When the split within the Istiqlal was formalized in 1959 with the creation of the *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* (UNFP), UNEM joined the rest of the Moroccan left in support of the new party. Shortly after massive arrests of the UNFP leadership in July, 1963, for an alleged "plot" against the monarchy, UNEM's Eighth Congress "declare[d] solemnly that the abolition of the regime is the necessary condition for extricating the country from the open or latent crisis which it has not ceased to suffer since independence." The calendar of the following year's events reported to UNEM's Ninth Congress boasted a total of twenty student strikes and six "occupations" of Moroccan embassies abroad.

The Moroccan government did not look kindly on the activities of the militant young student union. In 1963, a military tribunal condemned UNEM's president to death in absentia for expressing solidarity with Algeria's socialist government during the Moroccan-Algerian border war. In the autumn of 1964, the Moroccan govern-

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ment cut off the union's subsidies and unsuccessfully campaigned to abolish UNEM on a legal technicality. By this time, political strikes had become endemic at the University Mohammed V at Rabat, often spreading to the lesser campuses at Fez and Casablanca and into the secondary schools. Triggered by grievances of some secondary-school students and their parents, widespread rioting in Casablanca in March, 1965, shook the regime and was brutally suppressed at the cost of hundreds of lives. Soon afterward, the King granted amnesty to UNFP leaders condemned for the 1963 "plot," and he appeared, during the summer, to be preparing to collaborate with the UNFP. The kidnapping of Ben Barka on October 30, 1965, dashed all hopes of either an opening to the left or a reconciliation.

The Ministry of Education responded to a student strike held to celebrate the first anniversary of the Casablanca riots by closing the university *cité*. With the exception of the science faculty, the university was then paralyzed by striking students until vacation the following week. The government's "solution" to student agitation was to apply selectively a new law instituting universal conscription. Despite a provision for student deferments, all but one of UNEM's Executive Committee were drafted on the eve of its Eleventh Congress (July 25-27, 1966).

Ironically, the turbulence of Moroccan politics and the sharp administrative response to UNEM activities aided UNEM in developing its organizational strength during its first ten years. By the mid-sixties, UNEM had become a strong political force closely aligned with the radical activist wing of the UNFP.[5] The government occasionally consulted UNEM on educational matters, but the union was too politicized to confine itself to the role of a functionally specific interest group.

In retrospect, the Moroccan student union, unlike its Tunisian and Algerian counterparts, seems to be primarily an agency for enlisting and mobilizing radical student opinion against the regime. Still, only 27 per cent of a sample of 125 Moroccan students actually belonged to a student union.[6] Over half of the non-members, however, advocated more power for the union. Predictably, union members and, to an even greater extent, their leaders tended to be more interested in politics and more radical in their attitudes toward foreign capital, government intervention in the economic affairs of the country, and agricultural reform than non-members.

Moroccan students formed the most vociferous protest move-

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ments in North Africa, in part because the Moroccan political system was and remains a more likely target of student protest than that of Algeria or Tunisia. Behind the Moroccans' sloganistic condemnation of the "reactionary," "feudal," and despotic "personal power" of the monarch lies some realistic evaluation. Social restratification is relatively absent in Morocco, and students are unable to gain entrance into the inner political circle. The ruling class continues to consist primarily of elements of the traditional elite, together with commoners personally chosen by the King. Former students have a place in the independent regime only if they enjoy high traditional status or have caught the favor of the monarch, which they are unlikely to do. Although the King and a number of leading ministers and high Moroccan officials were once students in French universities, not one former student leader now belongs to the inner circle.

Tunisia

In Tunisia, restratification has proceeded further, and the generation gap is narrower. The process of restratification, illustrated by the victories of the Destour over more traditional political forces before independence, guaranteed that education would take precedence over family as the touchstone of both social status and political power. Though UGET was founded only three years before independence, its founders and subsequent leaders were rapidly integrated into the new ruling structure. Two general secretaries, Sayah and Chaker, became directors of the Neo-Destour's Political Bureau, an important position in any one-party state. Indeed, the fate of UGET's leadership gradually discredited it in the eyes of many students, as it became obvious that membership on UGET's executive board was a steppingstone for political careerists. Certainly the Tunisian political elite closely reflected the styles, outlook, and education of the student body. Generational struggles seemed inevitable after 1960 or so because graduates could no longer be automatically catapulted into responsible governmental positions. Nevertheless, the younger students did not represent an ideological outlook, a historical stratum, or even a socio-economic background too different from that of the Sahil peasant sons and their allies who had made good.

In striking contrast to student unionists in pluralist Morocco, those in Tunisia were stifled by the consensus elicited by the suc-

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cessful one-party system. UGET's essential task after independence was to maintain a constructive dialogue between the generation in power and the new student generations. The task was lightened by resemblances between the Tunisian elite and its potential critics. The Sahil, a coastal strip south of Tunis with 10 per cent of the country's population, was both the backbone of the ruling Neo-Destour and the home of more than one quarter of Tunisia's student population in 1960. Any conflict of generations in Tunisia is rooted in underlying social and intellectual similarities, rather than in vast differences. In Tunisia, there is no myth, as in Morocco, of a rising young revolutionary generation to fall back on; it arrived with independence. Tunisian revolutionary youth may feel like Miniver Cheevy, "born too late."

The Neo-Destour chose to exercise flexible control over UGET, allowing open discussion and political debate, but making sure that its political resolutions and activities were harmless to the regime. So far as is practicable, the organization is used as a channel for Party propaganda. Because of the close relationship between the two organizations before independence, the Party was able to maintain control of UGET without appearing to subvert its autonomy. During the first few years of independence, when the Neo-Destour remained popular and the average graduate's employment prospects were brilliant, the mechanisms of control functioned smoothly. The Neo-Destour's own student federations, staffed by a loyal, capable, and authentically student leadership, co-operated harmoniously with UGET and ensured the loyalty of UGET's sections to the Executive Bureau. UGET seemed to be an effective bridge between students and politicians. It occasionally took *avant-garde* political positions (such as advocating the recognition of Communist China) which saved it from the accusation of being a Party satellite.

But this happy state of affairs could not survive the post-independence rejuvenation of the UGET rank and file. As the reliable cadres of pre-independence vintage took their diplomas and passed on into government or Party jobs, a slightly younger generation took over the organization, which was vastly expanded by the increased number of university students. The new generation had no more revolutionary battles to wage; even practical "syndical" concerns like scholarships were amply taken care of by the government. UGET was losing its mystique and acquiring a reputation as a "training ground for cadres." The more rebellious students began to look elsewhere for sources of inspiration.

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Few Tunisian students actually became members of the Communist Party, either in Tunisia or in France, but many were frustrated by the Neo-Destour domination of their organization. These autonomists did not approve of one-party rule—especially when they considered that party "bourgeois." In February, 1961, a joint meeting of UGET and the Neo-Destour Youth, a tightly controlled organization of eighty thousand members, was called to protest Lumumba's assassination. At the meeting, fighting broke out between a Neo-Destour leader and some of the students, including an autonomist member of the Executive Committee. After this episode, the autonomist minority was no longer represented in UGET's Executive or the somewhat larger Administrative Committee.

The Bizerte crisis of July, 1961, momentarily resurrected Tunisian nationalism and gave UGET a cause. When in ensuing months a vigorous "socialist" policy of economic planning became the leitmotif of Tunisian politics, UGET, which had always advocated such a policy, was brought into the consultative process. The Neo-Destour thus captured the autonomists' political thunder, but UGET remained under Party control. The Neo-Destour's crackdown on autonomists—accused of being Communist, Trotskyite, "irresponsible," and "parasitic"—ruptured the delicate equilibrium theretofore maintained between the demands of Party supremacy and those of student-union autonomy. By UGET's Fourteenth Congress (August 9-14, 1966), Party control was so complete that the Neo-Destour Student Federation had become superfluous and was abolished. Though debate inside the Congress was still possible, the myth of UGET's autonomy had lost all credibility.

By toeing the Party line even to the extent of supporting Bourguiba's pro-American Vietnam policy, UGET lost the respect of many moderate Tunisian intellectuals and students who had signed critical petitions and manifestoes earlier in the year. Unprecedented student demonstrations at the end of 1966 lay bare some of the underlying antagonism toward the Party and government take-over of UGET. The demonstrations vividly testified to the students' complete loss of confidence in UGET and its leadership. According to the official diagnosis, most demonstrators were not anti-UGET, but hapless dupes of "outside agitators"—students who had recently returned from France. But even Bourguiba did not deny the substance of the problem in his New Year's Speech to the Nation:

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I have been told, in fact, that certain students, a tiny minority, consider UGET to be an emanation of the Destour Socialist Party and that, by virtue of this fact, UGET takes away their liberty. But they forget that the Party consists of patriots devoted to their country and that many of them have endured sacrifices, as attested by cemeteries of martyrs throughout the country, in order for it to be possible today for thousands of youths to study and prepare to take up their elders' responsibilities tomorrow.

Thus, while invoking memories of the independence struggle when student unrest had been encouraged, Bourguiba did not disavow UGET's subordination to the Party. In a curious attempt to prove its autonomy, the Administrative Commission of UGET condemned the strike and "outside" agitators, but for the first time criticized American policy in Vietnam.

Unlike the Moroccans, Tunisians did not have an obvious target, apart from their own union, against which to protest. The left-wing opposition was, by its own admission, weak, internally divided, and out of touch with Tunisian realities. No student organization could, as in Morocco, crystallize student opinion and guide it on a course of opposition.

Algeria

Despite the leveling effects of eight years of war, a pattern comparable to that in Tunisia has been evolving in Algeria. Under Boumedienne, at least to date, the former warring factions seem reconciled. Since the departure of Mahsas and Boumaza in 1966, the sovereign Council of the Revolution has contained only military officers and veterans, among whom only one is a former student, and he played no role in UGEMA. In a sense, their incorporation into the system merely neutralizes them. Those who apparently make most of Algeria's important decisions are the ministers and high officials whom Boumedienne appoints with the support of the Council, and a growing number of these, including the Minister of Education, are former leaders of UGEMA.

In the absence of an effective party, the central bureaucracy may become increasingly important. Unlike Morocco, which abounds with bureaucrats frustrated by political cross-pressures, Algeria has erected no systemic barriers against the administrative initiative of students and former students. With the consolidation of Boumedienne's power, the bureaucracy may gradually become insulated from political pressures. Thus, students are more likely to

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identify with the ruling class in Algeria than they are in Morocco.

Just as the FLN after 1962 lacked the mass base and cohesion of the Neo-Destour, UNEA always remained much weaker than UGET, although since FLN never enjoyed the coherent leadership of the Neo-Destour, the Party had greater difficulty controlling the students.[7] Until shortly before Ben Bella's fall, UNEA maintained a fair degree of autonomy under Houari Mouffok, a student who had attended an East German university and was a sympathizer, at least, of the outlawed Algerian Communist Party. Like the Communists, he supported Ben Bella's "socialist" policies while insisting upon the union's autonomy.

Mouffok's faction controlled the dominant Algiers section of UNEA over the opposition of a faction of FLN students and of other non-Communist groups at Algiers and abroad. Despite Ben Bella's apparent desire in the summer of 1964 to remove Mouffok, his opposition remained too divided to wrest leadership from him democratically. Had Ben Bella not been overthrown, however, it is likely that Mouffok would have lost control of the Algiers section to a growing faction of UNEA members organized by the Party.

During Mouffok's reign, UNEA does not appear to have mobilized the support or sympathies of many students, despite its militant socialist leadership. In 1964, the union claimed 2,500 dues-paying members, or roughly one third of the university student body—proportionately fewer members than UGET, but more than UNEM could claim. UNEA meetings and rallies—against "counter-revolution" at home and in support of "progressive" students fighting imperialism and neocolonialism abroad—rarely drew more than three hundred students. Though it organized occasional seminars, the socialist leadership of UNEA seemed even less capable of influencing student opinion than of retaining its own autonomy. Algerian students, like the population at large, had become immune to revolutionary appeals after eight years of war followed by the spectacle of fratricidal strife within the new elite.

As in Tunisia, the students were treated too well to nourish many concrete grievances. After independence, the government went further than Tunisia's by granting a "pre-salary" to all students in good standing and then increasing the wages paid science and medical students in order to divert as many as possible into these fields. Algerian students were probably as technically and scientifically oriented as the Tunisians; more Algerians studied science than letters in 1965.

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On the whole, the social composition of the Algerian student body was probably fairly similar to that of the Tunisian student body. In the first years of independence, the quality of education did not decline appreciably, and employment prospects for graduates were as favorable as they had been in the comparable early years of independence for Moroccan and Tunisian graduates. Apart from small factions of activists, students did not appear to take an active interest in politics.

When Boumedienne unexpectedly overthrew Ben Bella, however, there was a sudden upsurge of student activity. According to a correspondent of *The New York Times* who watched the students take to the street for Ben Bella, "the turn-out was not spectacular, never much more than 1,000 at best, but still far above those Algiers had seen for Cuba, Vietnam, or Angola." UNEA's demand that the Council of the Revolution liberate Ben Bella was met with the arrest of three UNEA leaders. Mouffok, who went into hiding and supported the pro-Communist clandestine opposition, was finally arrested on October 7. By this time, the new regime had enlisted some of the FLN student faction on its side.

Three months later, however, a three-day general strike erupted. On January 29, 1966, a demonstration over the Ben Barka affair against the Moroccan government spontaneously changed its nature when students started yelling "liberate Mouffok," "Boumedienne to the gallows!" While the Party dissolved the Algerian section of UNEA and had ten students dismissed from the university, the union's national leadership remained silent. The dissolved section called a strike, and nearly all the students respected it. Though the Party insisted it was the work of foreigners and "counter-revolutionaries," it replaced the UNEA leadership with another equally unrepresentative group.

An unlimited strike the following month dissipated after five days when university authorities told the students that four absences from classes would disqualify them from taking examinations. The bizarre series of incidents related to these demonstrations and strikes illustrated, as the Tunisian authorities were to discover at the end of the year, that Party-controlled student unionism was not a satisfactory mechanism for eliminating student grievances. Moreover, by overreacting, the respective authorities merely magnified the spontaneous outbursts of rebelliousness. In 1967, the situation improved. "Mobilization" to pursue the war against Israel provided a rationale for inducting five thousand students into the

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army for six weeks. The comments of students returning to Algiers in September suggested that the army was eliciting more loyalty, or at least interest, than the Party or union ever had. Weekend drills were planned for the coming year.

Algerian students, like those in Tunisia, will probably acquire a sense of belonging to a new national elite. Only in Morocco do politically minded students usually identify with a radical counter-elite. The role of the three student unions has been influenced not only by the political and social contexts of the three countries, but also by the development of their respective universities. Impressionistically, it seems that the quality of education has been the lowest and the strains of expansion the greatest in Morocco, while the quality has been the highest and the strains the weakest in Algeria.

Spectacular changes in the composition of all three student bodies since independence have created corresponding changes in the student subculture. At the University of Algiers, where student activities have sturdy roots in the colonial heritage, the "tone" and atmosphere of student life have suddenly ceased to be European, while the heterogeneity of the new Algerian student population makes it difficult to create new traditions of autonomous student activity. The tradition of a student subculture within which a union might flourish is even less developed at Tunis and Rabat. Hence, union activities in all three countries have taken on a national rather than a distinctly student flavor. In Algeria and Tunisia, where politically active students can more easily identify with the men in power, student activism has resulted in minor outbursts of solidarity or irritation with essentially like-minded governments. In Morocco, where the "feudal" order offers something to unite against and educational grievances are added to political ones, the student union has played a more active role. It remains to be seen what its impact upon the student body may be.

III

The Political Significance of Student Unions

Does membership in the student union foster interest in politics or in radical political change? Does it serve to recruit future politicians? To what extent are other aspects of student life and social background more important than union affiliation in politicizing students?

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Morocco

Our Moroccan data strongly suggest that UNEM is a principal agency for politicizing, radicalizing, and imbuing students with high expectations or hopes of a political career. Union affiliation "explained" interest in politics to a much larger extent than any other single independent variable, even when the effect of each of the others was held constant.[8] Socio-economic status was, however, more important than union membership for "explaining" radical attitudes of students. Union affiliation also "explained" more student political ambition than the other variables selected. UNEM is of extreme political significance in Moroccan student circles, though some of its shortcomings were also suggested by the data. Union membership and, in lesser degree, absence of religion are the two factors that apparently contribute the most to developing a Moroccan student's interest in politics.

The more deeply a student becomes involved in his union, the more likely he is to be interested in politics. This may either be because his union activities stimulate him politically or because the union attracts politicized students—or both. But other Moroccan university organizations are not at all associated with student politicization; indeed, it appears that members of one or more cultural, professional, or sporting associations are significantly less likely than non-members to be interested in politics. The contrast with the conventional image American sociologists have of "stable" Western pluralist societies could not be more striking. In the West, many relatively apolitical associations are supposed to attract politically interested people and help to socialize them; the "joiners" tend to be better informed and more active in politics than those who remain isolated.

It appears, however, that organizational experiences prior to entering the university significantly affect the Moroccan's interest in politics. One reason for this may be that Moroccan political parties have tried with mixed success to organize and control the various scouting and sporting associations open to secondary students. At the university level they have concentrated upon the student unions. Students who have belonged to secondary-school organizations tend, moreover, to join a university student union. The effectiveness of the Moroccan Party in eliciting student support is meager in contrast with the Tunisian situation, both at secondary-school and university levels.

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While the immediate influence of the university student union, political affiliations in secondary school, and attitudes toward the university appear related to student politicization, there are also more complex underlying factors. In Morocco, the most traditional of the three North African societies, Islam remains an inclusive way of life, the community par excellence, for most Moroccans. In traditional Islam, there is no separation of church and state, no basis for distinguishing political from religious concerns. It is therefore plausible to suppose that the student who has kept the faith of his fathers will have less interest in the profane world of modern politics. Conversely, the student who has broken or is breaking away from the traditional faith may search for a new community and seek new political commitments. The less religious a student is—as is indicated by his observance of Ramadan and daily prayers and by his own self-evaluation—the more likely he is to be interested in politics. Furthermore, the irreligious student is twice as likely as the very devout one to be a union member or leader. In fact, less religious students are more likely to be interested in politics whether they join the union or not.

To be a student in Morocco today is to belong to a privileged stratum, regardless of one's social background or career expectations. Students who come from the upper classes will not have experienced a sharp change in social status, but lower-class students will have broken with their past merely by virtue of being university students. Moreover, the very juxtaposition of rich and poor students within the university may sharpen the latter's class-consciousness and elicit political consciousness. It seems among Moroccan students that social class is negatively correlated with interest in politics. Upper-class students seem significantly *less* interested in politics than middle- or lower-class students. The student unions do, however, seem to attract proportionately more upper-class members. While one third of all upper-class students join the union, less than one quarter of the lower- and middle-class students are members. Differences in political interests between joiners and nonjoiners are greatest among the middle-class students. Possibly the concern of some students for politics is a substitute for traditional theological concerns; perhaps, too, politicization connotes a search for new, post-Islamic bases of community. But our findings also suggest that student unionism is hardly the exclusive answer; even controlling for union membership, low religious commitment appears independently to increase political interest. Union member-

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ship articulates or generates the most political concern among middle-class students, rather than among lower-class students of traditional background.

Interest in politics may also be a response from those who have made sharp breaks with their family background. The severing of religious ties seems to have this effect. The break with the past may be sharpest for those students who come from parochial towns or villages to the big university city. A simple breakdown of students from cosmopolitan cities and small towns shows no difference in interest in politics. If, however, we further divide the two groups into those who have received a traditional education (who neither speak nor read French well) and those who have received a French education, a difference in politicization appears. The poor linguists cannot share the veneer of French culture that marks Morocco's political and administrative elite; they are condemned to the second-rate Arabic sections of the university which provide fewer career opportunities.

Union membership also appears, with all other variables controlled, to be one of the two strongest predictors of "radicalism," while other organizational affiliations, either in university or secondary school, contribute almost nothing.[9] Socio-economic status, however, contributes even more to radicalism than union membership, and is quite independent of it. Since unions attract proportionately more middle- and upper-class members, there is a radical lower-class student constituency (which is also associated with rural backgrounds deprived of French culture) that UNEM has so far failed to mobilize.

The amount of exposure to the university culture does not appear to bear a strong relationship to a student's political attitudes. Nor is religious commitment, taken by itself, significantly related to student radicalism in the way that it is to interest in politics. Even controlling for exposure to French education (as inferred from a student's reading ability), religiosity does not appear to be associated with radical political attitudes. But just as lower-class students tend to be more interested in politics, they tend also to be more radical.

In fact, if we contrast the radicalism of union members and non-members within each class, the same pattern we found for interest in politics appears for radicalism. The difference in the likelihood of being radical is greater between middle-class members and non-members than between lower-class members and non-

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members. Thus, the student union may radicalize those students whom we might not expect, on the basis of their class origins, to be radical. Or, conversely, middle-class radicals may, unlike their lower-class brethren, seek out an organizational vehicle for their political concerns.

Like interest in politics, radicalism is a possible response for those who have made sharp breaks with their family backgrounds or social environment. Moreover, the break with one's past, irrespective of social class, is sharpest for the student who comes from a small parochial town or village to the big university city. The small-town boy is thrice as likely as his urban classmate to display radical attitudes.

Poor linguists are twice as likely to be radical as their Gallicized comrades, but their radicalism does not seem to go beyond verbal expressions of protest. They are neither significantly more interested in politics than French speakers and readers, nor more likely to belong to a student union or to other organizations.

To what extent does membership in a student union appear not only to politicize and radicalize students, but also to produce an aspiring political counter-elite? Possibly student activists consider their union experience as training for a career in politics. The close relations between unions and opposition parties in Morocco suggest that the former could be avenues of leadership for the latter. It does not follow, however, that most aspiring student politicians are in a student union. Radical students, who are more likely than non-radicals to be union members, are also more likely than non-radicals to have political aspirations—whether or not they are union members. Not all union members are radical, nor are all radicals union members, even though union membership is the strongest single predictor of radicalism. Many non-member radicals, who are predominantly of a lower-class and parochial background, plan to join a party or trade union, but for reasons of class and style do not fit in with the predominantly middle-class and upper-class union membership. Moreover, student unions exercise less influence upon radicals than upon non-radicals. Not only does a higher proportion of lower-class students take an interest in politics and become radical, but proportionately more plan to go into politics of all sorts. Among lower-class students, it is mainly those who have been deprived of a French education who plan to become active in trade unions and parties. Though students with lower mobility expectations tend, independently of present class, to be less interested than

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others in politics, they also tend to be more radical and more likely to plan to become active. But neither mobility expectations nor job prospects appear directly to affect political plans. Possibly it is the student's political convictions which deter him from expecting to rise above his parents' social class.

Our survey data suggest that membership in a student union, more than any other single factor, is associated with interest in politics, radical attitudes, and future political aspirations. Although, for the purposes of analyzing our survey data, "radicalism" was defined to include the fifth of the sample displaying the most consistent left-wing attitudes and thus excluded two thirds of the union membership, it is clear from the historical record that UNEM plays a radical role in Moroccan politics. It politicizes the student and encourages his political ambitions more than any other university experience. We can also assume that students who play an active role in UNEM acquire greater political skills than those who remain aloof from the union. But our data further suggest (though better data are necessary to clarify this point) that the union does not attract and politically socialize all of the potential student activists who may revolutionize Morocco's future. UNEM does not seem to attract the lower-class, traditionally educated student of parochial small-town background who, with the government's policy of Arabization, is coming to the university in increasing numbers. Ironically, UNEM espouses hasty Arabization, but so far seems unable to absorb its uprooted products. Unless the union begins to recruit these radicals, it may find itself outflanked on the left as the new stratum finds other ways of developing political ambition and organizational skills. By absorbing them, UNEM could well set the style for a more vigorous left-wing opposition to the monarchy and infuse its political allies outside the university with new blood.

Tunisia

Although our survey data were collected before the student riots of December, 1966, it seemed pertinent to ask in light of subsequent events whether UGET was succeeding in its prime function: maintaining links of communication between students and elite, and serving as an agency of socialization, transmitting the elite's values to the future Tunisian elite.[10] Given the Tunisian political context, it makes sense to ask not whether UGET fosters or is associated

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with student radicalism, but whether the union contributes to the support of the ruling Neo-Destour Party.

Our data indicate that UGET is an important vehicle or channel for politically interested and ambitious students, but other factors are operative in Tunisia that are of less significance in Morocco. Contrary to our expectations, UGET does not appear to inculcate loyalty to the Party. Its primary importance lies in its training functions for future politicians. Political recruitment in Tunisia remains relatively open to students who are somewhat critical of the Party.

A student's home town and his faculty appear to be more important influences than UGET in stirring an interest in politics. As in Morocco, however, the more involved a student is in his union, the more likely he is to be interested in politics. Yet compared to the Moroccan cohorts, a higher proportion of Tunisian students outside the union, as well as a smaller proportion of leaders, express an interest in politics. Possibly they were already politicized in secondary school, to which the Destour has devoted considerably more organizational efforts than parties in Morocco. Unlike membership in a nonpolitical university organization, membership in high-school organizations of all sorts appears to contribute to a student's subsequent political interest. The student who has belonged to either the *Jeunesse Destourienne* or the *Jeunesse Scolaire*, two quasi-political organizations designed to attract the youth to the Neo-Destour Party, will be especially likely as a university student to be interested in politics and to join UGET. Significantly, too, he tends to be among the minority of university students who do not read French well. This suggests that the Party's youth organizations are especially successful among traditional sectors of high-school youth. The student's course of study has even greater effect than his extracurricular ties, past or present, upon his interest in politics. Almost half of those who study law, a traditional steppingstone to a political career, are interested in politics, in contrast with only one quarter of those enrolled in other faculties.

Earlier influences—not only the youth organizations but also the student's regional and class background—may matter more than immediate nonacademic university experiences. One might expect students most interested in politics to come from the most politicized parts of the country—the capital, Tunis, and the Party's historic stronghold, the Sahil. These areas of the country experienced the earliest development of modern primary- and secondary-school edu-

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cation. But, in fact, the relatively sophisticated environment of Tunis breeds little political interest, whereas university students who come from less-developed parts of the country, where secondary-school education is a more recent phenomenon, are likely to be the most politicized. In Morocco, students from the relatively more backward parts of the country tend to be more radical but not more interested in politics than their fellow students; the reverse is true in Tunisia. While region appears more closely associated with political interest in Tunisia than in Morocco, class seems less so.

The most striking comparison between Tunisians and Moroccans concerns the impact of religion. In Morocco, nearly half of those who were not religious were interested in politics, in contrast to 9 per cent of the deeply religious. In Tunisia, 35 per cent of the nonreligious and 27 per cent of the devout were interested. There are good grounds for believing that religiosity and politicization are, indeed, less interrelated in Tunisia than in Morocco. The break between traditional and modern concerns—so sharp in theocentric Moroccan society—was bridged in Tunisia by a modernizing nationalist movement, the Neo-Destour, which successfully translated religious zeal into the political concern for independence, and by an intellectual elite capable of living in two worlds and of articulating a national synthesis of modern French and traditional Tunisian values. Thus, to break with one's traditional faith is not, as in Morocco, to become lost in a new wilderness, yet keeping the faith is not inconsistent with sharing modern political concerns.

A large majority of Tunisian university students, including the most politicized, support the Neo-Destour Socialist Party without serious misgivings. More significantly, the 30 per cent of our sample that appeared unsympathetic to the Party does not appear to be more interested in politics than other students—in part, perhaps, because organizations that politicize people in single-party Tunisia also inculcate political loyalty.

Independently of all organizational ties, lower-class Tunisians still seem politically more reliable than upper-class people. They have a stronger basis for identifying with the sons of Sahil peasants who wield power, and the latter continue actively to cultivate and to rule in the interests of the masses, not the upper class. The relative significance of a student's discipline for predicting his loyalty seems more surprising; the "pure" theoretical disciplines may breed a certain intellectual detachment that inspires the students to play a Socratic role, whereas applied disciplines like law, theology, or

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business administration are less compatible with free, rational inquiry.

In Morocco, union membership is a powerful predictor of radicalism, whereas in Tunisia UGET seems to breed neither political conformity nor systematic opposition to the Party. It would appear that UGET, to which more than half our sample belonged, is more broadly representative of student opinion than UNEM. Its members and leaders are only slightly more likely than non-members to support the Party. Despite the close control exercised over UGET by the Party, many unionists, including some of the leaders, manage to keep their distance.

The *Jeunesse Destourienne* and the *Jeunesse Scolaire* are overwhelmingly important in inculcating Party loyalty. Thus, it would seem that the Party's decision in 1963 to expand these high-school student activities was a wise insurance policy against future political opposition from university students. In fact, the three fifths of union members who had belonged to these youth groups before entering the university are the Party's most loyal supporters. The youth groups have had their greatest impact upon Gallicized, lower-class students and upon non-Gallicized or traditional members of the upper class. Similarly, joining one or more of these groups in high school seems to have had more impact upon irreligious students—whose iconoclasm otherwise tends to reflect itself in political matters—than upon their more devout colleagues.

Within the different faculties of the university, the highest proportion of the Party's critics are in letters and science. Tunisia's educational system has perhaps been more successful in encouraging students to go into science than in politically socializing them; possibly the gap between technicians and the political bureaucracy will widen with economic and educational development.

Upper-class students, who are twice as likely to come from Tunis as elsewhere, appear significantly more disenchanted with the Party than their comrades from the lower classes. Exactly the reverse seems true in Morocco, where lower-class students are more likely to express radical attitudes connoting opposition to the regime. Differences in class outlook among students are undoubtedly related to differences in the social origins of the respective political elites. Upper-class Moroccan students tend more to identify with, or at least not to oppose, Morocco's rulers, who are also upper class. Upper-class Tunisians, on the other hand, learn from their fathers to distrust the lower-status politicians and agitators of the Neo-Destour

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who displaced the old *Tunisois* elite during the struggle for independence. Neo-Destour economic planning, too, hurts upper-class interests. Possibly the fathers of upper-class students have greater influence than do lower-status fathers upon the attitudes of their children; significantly fewer sons of the *bourgeoisie* belong to Neo-Destour youth groups or join UGET.

Apparently union membership has a greater impact upon the political ambitions of middle- and upper-class students than upon those of their lower-class colleagues—the latter in any case being highly interested in future political participation. Membership in UGET also appears to affect students of differing linguistic and geographical background in different ways. UGET members who speak French poorly are much more likely to have political ambitions than their non-Gallicized brethren who are not members. Membership also seems to have a greater impact upon the ambitions of rural boys than upon those of their *Tunisois* colleagues.

Curiously, Tunisian law students, who are both more likely to be interested in politics and to support the Party, are not very much more politically ambitious than students of other faculties. Nor are students who consider themselves to be "intellectuals" significantly more ambitious than vocationally or scientifically oriented students, unless they are members of UGET. This finding suggests that UGET may be especially important as an avenue of political recruitment for the self-styled "intellectuals."

Tunisian and Moroccan students differ markedly in their attitudes toward the relative importance of professional (or technical) competence and "pull" in attaining success in their work. Sixty-one per cent of all Tunisian students and only 39 per cent of Moroccan students think competence a more essential ingredient than "pull." At first glance, such attitudes appear to be unrelated to plans to go into politics, possibly because many upper-class Tunisians who are critical of the Party and place personal contacts above professional competence are not politically ambitious.

While the vast majority of Tunisian students feel that competence and not "pull" wins rewards, the minority of the Party's supporters who disagree are precisely those who plan to go into politics. In Morocco, on the other hand, the majority of students think "pull" is more important, and attitudes toward the qualities that earn career rewards are unrelated to a student's plans to go into politics.

Prospective political activists appear to be fairly evenly distributed among students of different social class and regional back-

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ground. If anything, lower-class students are slightly more likely (44 per cent) to want to go into politics than middle- (42 per cent) or upper-class students (37 per cent), but the differences are very small. The same holds true for students from different geographic regions; 38 per cent of the *Tunisois* and Sahilians and 44 per cent of students from other regions plan to enter politics at the local or national level. On the other hand, deeply religious students are more likely to plan to go into politics than are non-religious students. Half of the highly religious but only a third of the non-religious students plan to become politically active. Religiosity is strongly associated with political ambitions only among students who come from Tunis. In Morocco, by contrast, the most religious students were the least likely to become politically active.

Even after ten years of increasing subordination to the Party, UGET attracts and encourages most of the politically ambitious students. It does not transform them into subservient Party hacks, nor does it, like UNEM, help to radicalize them. More than any other student experience, it seems to train the responsible political cadres constantly sought by Bourguiba and his Party. UGET's "bad" reputation as a springboard for political careers is perhaps also its major strength for the regime, in that the union continues to attract a disproportionate share of potential political talent.

Our Tunisian data have emphasized, however, that UGET is not the only organization that politicizes and socializes new student generations in this highly structured political system. In Morocco today, a modernizing elite, with forebears in the UNFP and other opposition parties, is apparently being shaped in part by UNEM. Conditions are comparable to those of Tunisia in the thirties, in that students and graduates of middle- and lower-class backgrounds are attempting to replace a decaying traditional elite.

Thus, as members of the lower classes are given increased educational opportunities, it may be possible for UNEM, in close cooperation with other political forces, to spark radical change. In Morocco, the student union politicizes, radicalizes, and instills political ambitions in its members more than any other student experience, but UNEM will have to make a concerted effort to attract the parochial, lower-class radicals into its fold if its revolutionary efforts are to be ultimately successful. The Moroccan student radicals of today come from more diverse social and cultural backgrounds than the French-educated Tunisian intellectuals of the thirties.

In countries like Tunisia or Algeria today, where political elites

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have broken with tradition and share an interest in rapid social change, the problems and aspirations of students become more complex. Once a social revolution has occurred—as it did gradually in Tunisia and violently in Algeria—students are no longer a self-conscious and isolated stratum with a unique interest in radical change. Student movements can no longer systematically politicize and radicalize their rank and file because there are no longer revolutions to perform, only the mundane tasks of implementing reforms. The Algerians remain disorganized, having not yet recovered from the crises of 1962 that fragmented the country's political infrastructure. But UGET suggests the roles a student movement can play in an established one-party system. It is not an exclusive organization, open only to the Party faithful, but rather a political arena that attracts large segments of potential political talent. Other experiences, especially in secondary school, seem more important in shaping a Tunisian's attitudes toward the ruling Party. Unlike the *Komsomol* or other student organizations in more rigid, ideological one-party states, UGET does not systematically indoctrinate students. Rather, allowing diversity and training the politically ambitious, the union helps the Party—though perhaps not enough—to remain adaptable and responsive to the aspirations of new political generations.

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1. Henry J. Benda, "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites," *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries,* ed. J. H. Kautsky (New York, 1962), pp. 237 ff.

2. By 1931-32, there were 11 Moroccans, 21 Algerians, and 119 Tunisians studying in French universities, according to a document of AEMNA cited by Monccef Dellagi in an unpublished manuscript.

3. It is difficult to find comparable figures. Helen Kitchen (ed.), *The Educated African* (New York, 1962), indicates that 261 Moroccans were studying in France in 1951-52. According to the *Statistical Yearbook for the Moroccan French Zone,* 250 Moroccans obtained the second baccalaureat, qualifying them to enter university, between 1952 and 1955. The Tunisian

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and Algerian figures are cited by Kitchen. According to *L'Algérie de Demain* (Paris, 1962), 589 Muslims studied at the University of Algiers in 1954-55; in an unpublished manuscript, David Ottaway claims there were 520 in May, 1956, when the French Ministry of Algeria, in *1957 Algérie,* claimed 686.

4. As the president of UGEMA explained: "It is not possible to understand the action and objectives of UGEMA unless they are placed in the framework of the national liberation struggle our people have been waging for the past six years. It is easy then to realize that all the specifically student and university problems are radically transformed by the givens of the colonial war imposed upon our people. By this fact, these problems become subordinate and contingent, yielding to the absolute imperatives dictated by the combat occurring on our soil." *IVe Congrès National de l'UGEMA* (26 July-1 August, 1960), p. 20.

5. The student union also included a strong Communist minority, among them two of the Executive Committee members drafted in 1966. The political resolution of the Eleventh Congress closely echoed the Moroccan Communist Party by calling for "unity of action" of "progressive and national forces."

6. Our Moroccan survey data have serious limitations. Of the original sample of 500, which drastically under-represented law and letters students, only 125 (25 per cent) answered the self-administered questionnaire, while 15 per cent could not be located, and the remaining 60 per cent refused to answer. The poor rate of response was due, in part, to the lack of experience of the Moroccan team that carried out the survey in the spring of 1964, and to the uneasy political atmosphere, even before the Ben Barka affair, at the university.

7. In the autumn of 1962, only seven students at the University of Algiers were members of the FLN, according to David Ottaway, whose extremely informative article on Algerian students is to be published in a volume on student movements edited by Donald Emmerson.

8. For lack of space, the numerical data have been cut from this article, though they exist in an earlier and lengthier draft to be published elsewhere. Our method for generating data substantiating the above proposition and similar ones below was that of "least squares," which estimates the independent effects of each of several variables upon a dependent variable, such as "interest in politics." For a description of this method, see Alan B. Wilson, "Analysis of Multiple Cross-Classifications in Cross-Sectional Designs," presented to the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Excelsior Springs, Missouri (May 9, 1964). Also see L. N. Hazel, "The Covariance Analysis of Multiple Classification Tables with Unequal Subclass Numbers," *Biometrics,* Vol. 11 (April, 1964), pp. 21-25; Frank Yates, "The Analysis of Multiple Classifications with Unequal Numbers in the Different Classes," *Journal of the American Statistical*

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Association, Vol. 29 (March, 1934), pp. 5-55. "Interest in politics" reflects high scores on the amount of time the student talked about national and international politics and his preference for being a politician rather than an academician, given that choice.

9. We designated as "radical" the 20 per cent of our sample who felt that foreign capital on the whole has bad effects, that the government should take full control of the Moroccan economy, and that economic inequalities should be reduced. These attitudes are more or less shared by the UNFP and other left-wing opposition groups.

10. Our Tunisian data are much more reliable than the Moroccan data. In the spring of 1965, when the survey was conducted, there were no political obstacles to scholarly research at the university. Moreover, an experienced sociologist of the university's Center for Economic and Social Studies and Research methodically directed the sampling and data collection. Replacements were anticipated for the many who could not be located and the 8 per cent of the original sample of 500 who refused to answer the questionnaire.

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DAVID J. FINLAY

Students and Politics in Ghana

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS in Ghana, like those in other developing nations, are an incipient elite destined to hold political power in the future.[1] Their role in politics has, however, been unlike that of their counterparts in many developing nations where students have been a significant force in making or breaking governments. Patterns of student political involvement are largely the result of systemic differences. After independence, Ghana experienced rapid educational expansion within an increasingly authoritarian political system. A conflict developed after 1959 between the relatively new and elitist university system and the government as the political regime questioned the purpose of education and sought to destroy university autonomy. This process is not unique to Ghana. Nevertheless, Ghana is a particularly interesting case of confrontation politics because the government, rather than the students, assumed the initiative. Thus, Ghanaian university students—a comparatively small and homogeneous group—were both spectators and secondary participants in the conflict growing out of competing demands of nationalism and university autonomy.

I

Africans have viewed education both as the key to the successes Europeans have achieved and as a primary means for African advancement. But it was not until after World War II, when Ghanaians began to play a major role in the government of the Gold Coast, that rapid expansion in public education took place.[2] Since 1950, education has been one of the largest single items in the national budget. Access to education was increased by removing primary school fees in 1952, by introducing compulsory primary education in 1961, and

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by providing scholarships for virtually all students in the universities.[3]

There are three institutions of higher education in Ghana—the University of Ghana at Legon, the University of Science and Technology at Kumasi, and the University of Science Education at Cape Coast. Total enrollment in the three universities was 4,286 for the 1965-66 academic year, and some 3,410 Ghanaians were studying in other countries (1,991 in the United Kingdom or the United States).

The University of Ghana, the nation's oldest and most prestigious institution, was founded in 1948 as University College of the Gold Coast upon the recommendations of the Asquith Commission in 1945.[4] By means of a special relationship, the University of London assisted University College with academic planning. Students were awarded London degrees until October, 1961, when University College assumed fully independent university status as the University of Ghana. Although the university reflects its British heritage, it is no longer merely a British institution in Africa. In recent years, it has been successful in Africanizing the curricula and in meeting Ghana's special training needs through the creation of Schools of Administration and Medicine, and Institutes for African Studies, Statistics, and Post Basic Nursing.

The university has grown from ninety students in 1948 to slightly over two thousand today. Its student body is largely male despite an increase in the proportion of women students from 2.8 per cent in 1953-54 to 12.5 per cent in 1965-66. The small number of women students is creditable in light of the traditional emphasis on the education of sons rather than daughters and the considerable preponderance of men in secondary schools.

The faculty at the University of Ghana has been predominantly British, although the number of other nationalities represented on the faculty has increased since 1961. Africanization of the teaching staff has been gradual. Africans constituted 13 per cent of the total teaching staff in 1959-60, but 47 per cent in 1965-66. The over-all competence of the staff is difficult to judge. Although some faculty members have international reputations, others are considerably less competent and qualified. While the ratio of faculty to students has always been high, the university found it increasingly difficult to recruit expatriate faculty after 1961, when relations with the West became strained and national politics intruded into university affairs. As a result, many senior positions were left unfilled, and, in a few instances, persons were hired whose applications had previously been rejected.

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Despite Ghana's progress toward realizing a system of mass education, entrance into the university is a privilege enjoyed by relatively few young people in Ghana. (Out of every 420 who start school in Ghana, one succeeds in reaching the universities.) The base of university recruitment has broadened in recent years, primarily as a result of the expansion of the entire educational system. The university is accessible to all applicants, and 90 per cent of the students are provided with bursaries or scholarships.

Although the range of socio-economic backgrounds among Legon students is broad, a disproportionate number come from urban, high-income, educated families. According to Ghana's 1960 census, for example, 23.1 per cent of the population live in urban areas of five thousand or more, whereas a 1966 student sample indicates that 69.4 per cent of Legon students are from urban localities (with 27.4 per cent coming from Accra). In 1965, per-capita gross national product was estimated to be $230, and average yearly wages (in establishments employing ten or more persons) to be $664. Sixty per cent of the 302 students responding to a question about their father's income judged it to be in excess of $995 per year. Although most university students have far surpassed their parents' educational attainments, their parents have more education than the general population (76 per cent of which was classified as illiterate in the 1960 census). As a whole, Legon students are from relatively high socio-economic backgrounds, although Ghana's social stratification is closer to a "semi-open status system" than to a class hierarchy.[5]

Unbalanced enrollments among the faculties at the university have caused concern among both government and university officials. The proportion of students in sciences and agriculture has declined steadily since 1953. In 1965-66, there were 1,238 undergraduates enrolled in the faculties of arts, law, and social sciences, compared with 325 in science, agriculture, and medicine.[6]

In terms of career plans, arts, science, and agriculture students are primarily oriented toward teaching, social-science students toward government, and law students toward legal practice. Virtually all university students on scholarships are bonded to teach or work in government for a while after graduation; apart from that, career expectations reflect a growing diversity of choices, increasing demand for professionally-trained personnel, and expanding training facilities at the university. As career opportunities have widened, teaching and government—the traditional careers of educated persons—have declined slightly in popularity. Five samples taken be-

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tween 1953 and 1966 show that students are increasingly interested in what they consider to be more desirable professions—law, medicine, research, university teaching, and executive and managerial positions. A student's career choice also reflects his socio-economic background. For example, in the 1966 study, the proportion of students planning teaching careers increased markedly with decreases in the degree of urban residence, and the education and income of the father. Teachers seem to be recruited from lower socio-economic levels, whereas students from homes where the father has at least some secondary education and a relatively high income expect to launch careers in the "higher" professions.

Since Ghanaian students are an elite whose skills are badly needed, they have always been optimistic about their future opportunities. They are decidedly career oriented, and this orientation is paralleled by an overwhelming preoccupation with attaining a university degree, the key to mobility and success. Certain aspects of the university reinforce the students' focus on degree and career. The university staff has always insisted that Legon be a "house of study" with high academic standards. Consequently, extracurricular and political activities have been discouraged. The campus was located outside Accra, in part to minimize student involvement in politics and other "distracting" activities.

Student life at the university centers around residence halls, each of which maintains an independent system of internal government. The importance of these halls in influencing the character of the university should not be underestimated. This decentralization impeded the development of all-campus student groups, particularly during the university's early years. Nevertheless, in 1953 students organized the National Union of Gold Coast Students, a weak vehicle for student opinion. That organization was succeeded in 1958 by the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), which provided a link with the other universities in Ghana and with student organizations abroad. During the 1960's, student government was strengthened by more campus-wide co-ordination through a Student Representative Council. Organizations of the Convention People's Party (CPP) catering to students both off and on the campus existed for some time, and in 1964 the Party created the Ghana National Students' Organization as a rival to and replacement for NUGS. But Legon lacked a tradition of student activism both on the campus and in national politics, especially in its early years. Being without the deep-seated dissatisfaction with the *status quo* that often leads

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to political militancy, students at Legon have been inclined to accept the system.

The university has been authoritarian, at least by American standards, both in structure and in staff attitudes. Status distinctions between faculty and students (maintained originally by such rituals as high and low dining tables, separate seating in chapel, and, in Sir Eric Ashby's words, other "fripperies of British academic life"[7]) have slowly diminished over time. The faculty still regulates student conduct, however, and virtually all sanctions reside with university authorities. Dissatisfactions that have arisen at Legon have been circumscribed and fragmented by the decentralized organization of the university and its authoritarian character. While a similarly authoritarian institution in another society might provoke student activism, the strong Ghanaian tradition of deference to authority has mitigated against student hostility and protest. The sense of political efficacy has been low among Ghanaian students, and student leadership has been slow to develop. The distance between faculty and students has never been so great as the gap between the university and the larger society. In their relations with each other, both the university and Ghanaian society have had difficulties communicating with, being understood by, and understanding the other.

II

After independence in 1957, Nkrumah used increasingly harsh repressive measures, including preventive detention, to whittle away the existing competitive political system and to quiet dissent. Independent organizations, such as trade unions and newspapers, were either brought within the Party structure as auxiliary organizations, neutralized, or destroyed. As a result, by 1961 the Party was virtually unchallenged in Ghana, and the University at Legon was one of the few major institutions that retained an autonomous character. Thus, conflict between the university and the CPP was perhaps inevitable, as the Party sought to mobilize the entire society within its own ideological framework.

The Party's philosophy of socialist egalitarianism conflicted sharply with the university's devotion to principles of meritocracy. But a much more important issue in the government-university confrontation concerned differing conceptions of the university. Tradition at Legon emphasized the *universalistic* nature of the university

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—a community of scholars pursuing knowledge in a center for learning, research, and innovation that looked beyond national considerations and loyalties. The university's conception of itself as an independent institution was reinforced by its constitution, which "guaranteed" autonomy from outside control. By contrast, the CPP viewed the university in *nationalistic* terms, stressing its obligations and responsibilities to society. The CPP claimed the university did not adequately recognize its obligations to Ghana's social needs and, more importantly, that students and faculty were hostile to the Party and, therefore, to the society. Party militants felt the university should give more attention to civic education and the training of "good" and "loyal" citizens, which—translated—meant supporters of Nkrumah and the CPP. Because the differing assumptions about the role of a university were not clearly focused, communication between the Party and Legon was difficult. Attempts by the Party to change the university and to mobilize student support were viewed by Legon as attacks on academic freedom. Conversely, in the minds of the Party stalwarts, defense of academic freedom at the university reflected a neo-colonialist mentality that had no place in the African Revolution.

Major differences in social composition and world views underlay the overt issues on which the conflict centered. In fact, the crux of conflict might be said to lodge in the mutual personal distrust each group felt for the values and life style of the other. In its early years, the top CPP leadership represented a marginal and decidedly non-intellectual sector of Ghanaian society, while the opposition parties were led largely by Ghana's educated elite and tribal leaders.[8] Although a number of well-educated men associated themselves with the CPP in later years, a certain anti-intellectualism persisted in Party attitudes and ideology. The Party argued that too many Ghanaians at Legon accepted alien values and social customs, and that Ghana needed experts to serve their own country, not intellectuals with foreign ideas.

On the other hand, the university community tended to resent the power of the semiliterates in the Party. They opposed the deification of Nkrumah as the font of wisdom and refused to take seriously the hodgepodge of ideas that passed as "Nkrumaism." The faculty wanted both the right to speak out on national issues when they wished and, at the same time, the privilege of remaining independent of all Party constraints. To the Party militants, this desire to have it both ways was academic irresponsibility in the name of aca-

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demic freedom. University attitudes were incomprehensible to the Party and, therefore, considered disloyal.

Relations between the Party and the university remained cool but formally cordial until 1959 when Nkrumah delivered a speech celebrating the CPP's tenth anniversary. He accused the universities of not "pulling their weight" in national development and of being a "breeding ground for unpatriotic and anti-government elements." He then threatened:

> We do not intend to sit idly by and see these institutions, which are supported by millions of pounds produced by the sweat and toil of the common people, continue to be centres of anti-government activities. We want the University College to cease being an alien institution. . . . If reforms do not come from within, we intend to impose them from outside, and no resort to the cry of academic freedom (for academic freedom does not mean academic irresponsibility) is going to restrain us from seeing that our University is a healthy Ghanaian University devoted to Ghanaian interests.
>
> It is intolerable that we should be training people, most of whom will eventually come into Government service, who will be permeated with an anti-Government attitude, that is to say an anti-Convention People's Party attitude, for our Party forms the Government and will continue to do so for many a long day to come. How can these people serve loyally the Government and the State?[9]

The Party continued to voice similar accusations and warnings, but the first major effort toward carrying out "reforms" came as the university was ending its special relationship with the University of London. In May, 1961, a memo from Nkrumah to the university stated that "all appointments of members of the academic staff [would] automatically be terminated" when the association with the University of London ended.[10] The university community interpreted the order as a direct effort by the Party to establish political control at Legon and to dismiss staff members it considered undesirable. Although the directive was deeply resented, the appointments of one Ghanaian and five European staff members were terminated. Soon afterwards, Nkrumah appointed a number of CPP stalwarts to the governing University Council. In his first address as the University's new Chancellor, he emphasized that colonial ideas and practices would not be tolerated and that a major task of the universities would be to further "complete mental emancipation and the education of the miseducated [so] that we can achieve . . . rapid transformation."[11]

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Efforts were also made to entice students into Party organizations.

> The future of Ghana depends upon the youth, and if the Party is to achieve any worthwhile results by making sure of the future national trend, then it must take positive steps to inculcate in the minds of the nation's youth the ideology of the Party. Only by this way can we envisage the continuity of our line of thought and action long after many of us are gone.[12]

Nkrumah believed that the reshaping of Legon students could only be accomplished if new generations of students received adequate training at a much earlier stage in their education. Thus, many of the "reforms" dealt only indirectly with the university. In 1960, Nkrumah dissolved the National Youth Council and established the Young Pioneer Movement, which was to inculcate youth with the ideology of Nkrumaism and to serve as a training ground for future Party members.

Party attacks on the university persisted despite the initial good will that accompanied the appointment of Conor Cruise O'Brien as Vice-Chancellor in 1962. Party organizers continued their efforts to entice students into CPP Study Groups and the university CPP branch, but they succeeded only in increasing and intensifying silent hostility among the majority of students and faculty. In the fall of 1963, Nkrumah openly attacked expatriate lecturers,[13] and Party publications began a series of articles "exposing" the universities, primarily Legon. Aside from creating an aura of fear at the university, however, these harassments achieved little. Although a few students courageously complained publicly of being "cowed into silence on every issue affecting national life,"[14] most university students deftly learned to separate their public utterances from their private views.

Tensions between the Party and the university began coming to a head in 1964 as a result of confrontations over the treason trials and the referendum on the one-party state. In December, 1963, three principal defendants charged with terrorism and the 1962 Kulungugu attempt on Nkrumah's life were acquitted by a Special Court. In anger, Nkrumah dismissed the chief magistrate of the Special Court, who also happened to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. NUGS issued a resolution condemning Nkrumah for the dismissal and for political interference with the judiciary. That resolution was followed in January, 1964, by another, protesting the deportation orders served on six senior faculty members at

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Legon. A student demonstration to protest the deportations was dispersed in its early stages by club-swinging policemen, and thereafter the government closed all three universities for seventeen days, allegedly to allow students to return home to vote in the upcoming referendum on a one-party state. The students believed, however, that the shutdown was merely a ruse to intimidate and disperse university-based opposition to the referendum. Again NUGS protested, and it appeared as though a few student leaders were ready to challenge the government. Leadership from NUGS was short-lived, however, for after the referendum the Party retaliated.

The Party press charged that the universities had become "the fountainheads of reaction and fertile grounds for imperialism and neo-colonialist subversion and counterrevolution."[15] The government then arrested five student leaders, detained one prominent senior faculty member, brought others in for questioning, and warned expatriates to "bow out of the scene" if they found the situation "distasteful."[16] Yet even with the university under full attack, the fear of preventive detention deterred the faculty from rising to its own defense. Silence at Legon was broken only by O'Brien's spirited defense of academic freedom at the 1964 spring convocation.

New assaults on Legon included developing Party cadre leaders at the university, establishing CPP student publications, requiring all entering students to take a two-week "orientation" course at the Ideological Institute, announcing that all scholarships would be reviewed annually on the basis of good performance and good conduct, and, with great fanfare, "inaugurating" (reconstituting) CPP branches in the universities. Nkrumah appointed an Inspection Committee to survey all bookshops and libraries, review their book orders, check their holdings, and remove publications not reflecting Party ideology or antagonistic to its ideals. With the chartering of the Ghana National Students' Organization at a conference appropriately convened at the Ideological Institute, NUGS was dealt a last but unnecessary blow, since the organization had virtually ceased to function. One interviewed student candidly described conditions at the university after the Party campaign:

> We are fed "Nkrumah" for breakfast, lunch and dinner. "Nkrumah à la mode" is not tasty and lacks essential vitamins, but it is the only food we can get, even though it gives us indigestion.

By 1965, the Party had organized an espionage system at the university using paid Party plants. At the 1965 spring convocation,

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O'Brien reported "with sorrow" that respect for the university's constitution and academic freedom had reached a low point.

> A strange and erroneous idea has grown up that the encouragement of critical and independent thought is a colonialist or neo-colonialist scheme whereas the enforcement of intellectual conformity is anti-colonial and conducive to the freedom and unity of Africa. The reverse of this is surely true.[17]

At the expiration of his contract in July, 1965, O'Brien left Ghana. William Abraham, a Nkrumah devotee and chairman of the Inspection Committee, was made Pro-Vice Chancellor and received a new Jaguar car from Nkrumah. The university had been brought to its knees.

A CPP university was in the offing, but on February 24, 1966, Nkrumah was ousted from power through the combined efforts of Ghana's army and police, and the CPP was declared a prohibited organization. Legon immediately came to life. Students sacked the Party branch headquarters, physically beat several CPP activists, and then marched through Accra clad in academic gowns to demonstrate support for the National Liberation Council. The academic community, as a whole, spoke of the Council in the most glowing terms.

III

A description of the nature of the University of Ghana and selected events in the confrontation between university and polity serves to present the context against which the role of students in Ghanaian politics must be assessed. Yet the students themselves must be considered, for their political roles are also by-products of individual levels of politicization, of ideology, and of legitimacy orientation—parameters of individual behavior intimately related to the nature of the educational and political systems in Ghana.

Politicization

Politicization refers to a continuum of individual awareness and involvement in politics and government extending from nonperception of the relevance of politics to one's own life, through perception, to active involvement. Thus, political roles may range from perceptually nonrelated to highly participant.[18] On the whole, Ghanaian students sampled in 1963 and 1966 evidenced a rather high

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degree of politicization at the perceptual level.[19] For example, over half characterized themselves as "actively" or "very" interested in politics, whereas only 8 per cent and 12 per cent respectively felt indifferent or not interested. About 18 per cent in both samples stated they intended to participate in politics after leaving the university; 52 per cent in 1963 and 37 per cent in 1966 said they would be candidates for public office if they had the opportunity. In addition, students exhibited considerable knowledge of public affairs. These measures of politicization indicate that students were attuned to the political world.

In light of Ghana's fluid social structure, it is not surprising that social backgrounds do not determine politicization. The most significant correlates of politicization are the faculty with which the student is associated and the degree toward which he is working. In 1966, the faculty of social sciences had the largest proportion of highly politicized students. It was followed by arts, law, and science and agriculture. The School of Administration and the Institute of African Studies included a greater proportion with low politicization scores. Students working toward B.Sc. (economics) and B.A. (honors) degrees tended to be highly politicized, in sharp contrast to students working toward certificates.[20]

Both the historical record and the survey data show that students have generally been perceptually-related nonparticipants in politics. In 1963, those who did participate were generally affiliated with the CPP, either through membership or intention to join. On the other hand, the fear of sanction and the vulnerability of those who rejected the CPP dictated acquiescent and inactive roles rather than oppositional activity. Thus, the 1963 politicization index was slanted in favor of CPP sympathizers not because they demonstrated greater perceptual politicization, but because participatory roles were open to them. Although perceptual and activity components of politicization were in alignment in 1966, measures of actual involvement and activity (in contrast to intended participation) were not possible because "politics" was banned at the time of the sample.

Ideology

A high degree of consensus is the most pronounced characteristic of the political views of Ghanaian students. Virtually all Legon students adhere to a liberal-democratic philosophy. The slight varia-

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tion among them depends upon, for example, relative emphases on socialism or capitalism, and neutralism or alignment. The intense left-right polarizations common among Latin American students simply do not exist among Legon students. What differences do exist center on social norms (means) and on particular issues rather than on social values (ultimate ends).

This consensus on basic economic and political principles was illustrated in 1966 by the students' attitudes toward foreign capital and the role of government in the economy, items often used to distinguish left-right divisions. Eighty-five per cent of the responding students felt that foreign capital brings more benefits than evils to Ghana (6 per cent held it brought more evils than benefits). At the extremes, 8 per cent saw only benefits and 2 per cent only evils. Regarding the economic role of government, 78 per cent thought the government should not only supervise the economic life of the country, but should own the basic industries. Only three students endorsed complete control of economic life by the state, and only fifteen felt the government should abstain from all intervention.

Ideological consensus tends to reduce ideological thinking. Political competition and debate, which might have heightened the students' ideological consciousness, was almost nonexistent for five years prior to the coup. Nor does it appear that ideological consciousness was intensified by disagreements with family or friends, for most students reported high levels of agreement with others on political issues.

Nevertheless, consensus has obviously not existed on all issues. In 1963, attitudes toward the CPP constituted a major area of disagreement. Students' relationships to the CPP (member or non-member) correlated with an additive index of items reflecting support or dissent from government policies and positive or negative views of the government itself.

The totals suggest a rather even distribution of student sympathies. Differences between Party and non-Party groups dealt primarily with regime evaluation, legitimacy orientations, and particular issues, such as the Preventive Detention Act. On international issues, such as coexistence and the efficacy of neutralism, Party membership made little difference, although some CPP Cold-War positions, such as support for Castro, were reflected in the responses of student Party members. On the whole, Legon students tended to view most issues pragmatically and to judge them individually and independently—quite apart from the tenets of Nkru-

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Table 1

Party Classification and Index of Support or Dissent from Government

	*Supporters**		*Dissenters**	
*Party Classification***	%	*N*	%	*N*
Party	71.4	(35)	28.6	(14)
Ambivalents	61.2	(30)	38.8	(19)
Non-Party	22.5	(18)	77.5	(62)
Totals	46.6	(83)	53.4	(95)

*No respondent received an index score unless he answered all items. Thus the "*n*" is 178 rather than 206.

**Party members are those who were currently members (45) or intended to join (14); ambivalents are non-Party members who were uncertain of their intention to join or remain outside (60); and non-Party are those non-members who were certain of their intention not to join (87).

maism or any other ideological line, even though their political vocabulary was consistent with the language of African nationalism.

Students who professed commitment to socialism in the 1966 questionnaire included both the younger and the more highly politicized; they also tended to be from upper-income and more highly-educated families. The relationship between social-class characteristics and congruence with socialist ideology is still more pronounced. Although the vast majority of students judged their lives to be "better" or "much better" than their fathers,' those who thought their lives were the "same" or "worse" were more likely to adopt a socialist ideology. The upwardly mobile and relatively less well-to-do students, who by virtue of their educational attainments are almost assured of future success, predictably have relatively conservative views toward the social and economic changes associated with socialism. Among the majority of students, politicization does not have ideological direction, other than an implicit acceptance of the fluid *status quo*. Although socialist identification correlates positively with both politicization and socialist congruence, the latter two are not similarly related.

The constant barrage of CPP propaganda before 1966 did, however, affect ideological socialization. Even after the coup, students with positive attitudes toward socialism assessed Nkrumah more favorably and were more inclined to accept the major tenets of Nkrumaism than were their nonsocialist colleagues. Yet even

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students who professed to be socialists had ambiguous attitudes toward social change and reform. For example, 76 per cent of the sample agreed that it is never wise to introduce changes rapidly in government and the economic order, but 47 per cent agreed that the government should introduce a program of rapid economic development even if it would result in great sacrifices for the population during the early years of its implementation.

Student commitment to democratic politics remains undetermined. In 1966, all students were looking for strong leadership, and students' political philosophies appeared, at least at the forensic level, to be mixtures of pragmatism and a welfare-state ideology.

Legitimacy Orientations

Evaluations of the political regime in power varied considerably in the two studies. In 1963, 43 per cent of the students agreed that a majority of Ghanaians supported the CPP, yet only 27 per cent thought that the government represented the will of the people. Students who were not Party members and did not intend to join were strongly negative toward the government, and even Party members showed considerable division in their evaluations of the legitimacy of Nkrumah's regime (59 per cent agreed that the CPP had majority support, and 49 per cent felt the government represented the will of the people). As Table 1 indicates, 28 per cent of the Party members dissented from government policy positions, which suggests that for some students, at least, Party membership did not necessarily mean support for CPP programs. In view of these responses, it seems fair to conclude that the CPP enjoyed only minority support at Legon. Attitudinal congruity between students and the political elite was low, yet students did not perceive themselves as "anti-government." The 1966 sample produced reverse findings: 96 per cent felt the NLC had the support of the majority of Ghanaians, and 93 per cent said they personally approved of the Council's actions and policies.

Students in both samples were asked to evaluate the existing regime's record of protection of civil liberties. In 1963, 76 per cent of the sample rated the protection of civil liberties under the Nkrumah government as "fair" or "poor," and only 5 per cent considered it "excellent" or "good." Eighty-six per cent felt that freedom of the press did not exist in Ghana, and 61 per cent held negative views on the Preventive Detention Act (13 per cent were

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positive). Those who did hold more positive views of the regime's record on civil liberties tended to be Party members, but even their evaluations were largely negative. For example, only 29 per cent of the Party group viewed the Detention Act affirmatively. After the coup, the protection of civil liberties was rated "good" or "excellent" by 54 per cent of the sample, "satisfactory" by 31 per cent, and "fair" or "poor" by 14 per cent. Seventy-one per cent felt freedom of the press existed in Ghana.

A majority of students in both samples held negative views about politics and politicians, particularly about Ghanaian politicians. These attitudes undoubtedly reflect the students' knowledge of and experience with the Nkrumah regime. New experience that might alter student opinion of politics and politicians may come with time and the restoration of civilian government. The 1966 sample was taken too soon after the coup for any such new political experience to have modified students' attitudes. In post-coup assessments of Nkrumah regime, 87 per cent of the students agreed that Nkrumah was a tyrant, 34 per cent that he was an able president, and 25 per cent that he was both a tyrant and an able president.

Student Activism

On the basis of past behavior, one would expect future student political activism in Ghana to center on particular issues rather than questions of broad social values, and to be fragmentary and transitory rather than extensive and sustained. Before 1964, students had voiced complaints to the government on specific issues, such as the renaming of the University in Kumasi as Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. With each successive CPP attack on the university and their own status, students directly and indirectly made their feelings known. At times, these feelings were expressed through hostility to Party representatives—even to Nkrumah himself—and at other times through sarcastic rebuttals to CPP criticisms.[21] In late 1963 and early 1964, student protests moved toward a more sweeping indictment of the CPP regime, and, at least among the active few, divisions between Party supporters and opponents sharpened. With the de-activation of NUGS, however, such activism was soon destroyed, and overt student leadership appeared to fall to the minority of CPP sympathizers.

Not all subsequent open activity was, however, the result of Party manipulation. After Ian Smith declared Rhodesia's independ-

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ence, Legon students met in the halls, denounced Smith, and criticized Britain. Virtually the entire student body then demonstrated their feelings by holding a rally in Accra on November 12, 1965—an unprecedented expression of student political opinion and that on an issue having little or nothing to do with Nkrumah. This incident was not so dramatic as student activity in Japan, India, or Indonesia, but it does indicate that Legon students were capable of expressive political activity despite their tendency to withdraw from politics during Nkrumah's reign. Some people may dismiss Ghanaian student activism during this period as minimal and ineffective, but it was responsive to CPP actions and extensive enough to effect a considerable reaction from the Party.[22]

Since the coup, student attitudes have not undergone major changes, and many student orientations still reflect Legon traditions. For example, 71 per cent of the 1966 sample felt that students should dedicate themselves solely to their studies, while only 26 per cent felt students should actively participate in politics. Ninety-three per cent of the students felt the university should be run by educators, and politicians should not tell them what to do or what to teach. Nevertheless, the coup lifted the constraints Nkrumah had placed upon the campus, and conditions now exist for the development of student activism.

One would not, however, predict such developments considering the elitist character of Legon and the high degree of congruity between campus and government in June, 1966. Moreover, the great ideological consensus and low ideological consciousness among students would not appear to be conducive to activism.

Spirits have been high among almost all the students since the coup, and the Vice-Chancellor has issued warnings against student indiscipline. Student demands have thus far been confined primarily to university matters—perhaps the first step toward political activism in national politics.

Before the February 24, 1966, *coup d'état*, Ghana's intelligentsia —including students and faculty at the University of Ghana—had become increasingly alienated from the regime of Kwame Nkrumah. The dispute over the proper social values of higher education was, in turn, exacerbated by cavalier attitudes among students and faculty and by the Party's hypersensitivity to opposition. Party "successes" in attacking the university's autonomy and redefining academic freedom were the result of forceful organizational tactics,

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rather than mass conversions at the university. The ousting of Nkrumah opened the way for participatory roles in politics for the Legon community, and there was a discernible shift from universalistic to nationalistic conceptions of the intellectual's responsibilities. Still unresolved, however, were the Legon students' views of the standards applicable to the conduct of political life in a modernizing society. The students, caught between the politics of absolutism and the politics of compromise, have yet to define their role in Ghana's future. In the Nkrumah period, they seemingly rejected the totalistic alternative of radical activism often found in student movements in developing nations. What future choices are made at Legon depend not only on Ghana's political milieu, but also on the nature of the students' commitment to politics.

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2. Growth of Educational Institutions and Student Enrollments

	Number of Institutions			*Number of Students*			*Percentage Increase in Number of Students*	
	1950	*1957*	*1964–65*	*1950*	*1957*	*1964–65*	*1950–57*	*1957–1964–65*
Primary	2,393	3,372	7,900	211,994	468,021	1,040,414	182	122
Middle	511	1,131	2,103	59,960	127,517	257,635	112	102
Secondary	56	60	90	6,162	12,119	33,071	96	173
Teacher-Training	42	76	58	2,722	9,032	15,002	231	66
Technical-Training	1	2	3	108	783	2,442	625	211
Universities								

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On the development of education in Ghana, see the excellent study by Philip Foster, *Education and Social Change in Ghana* (Chicago, 1965).

3. According to Nkrumah's Seven Year Development Plan (1963-70), enrollments in primary, middle, and secondary schools would have doubled and the universities expanded to 25,000 by 1970. After the coup, however, the plan was abandoned. Until Ghana's financial difficulties are corrected and the acute shortage of trained teachers is eased, further dramatic expansion in education is unlikely.

4. *Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies* (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).

5. As would be expected in light of the growth of education in southern Ghana, tribes from these areas predominate at the university; only a handful of students are from the northern regions. Yet tribal composition of Legon students seems to have little political significance in comparison to other variables.

6. The University at Kumasi has not shown a relative increase in enrollments in agriculture, for example, so it does not appear that a division of labor between the two institutions accounts for the decline in science students at Legon. A partial explanation may be the relative ease and lack of expense with which large numbers of students can be absorbed into the arts and social sciences. Probably as important, however, is the long-standing tradition of respect and esteem afforded graduates of the arts, humanities, and law in Ghanaian society.

7. Eric Ashby, *Universities: British, Indian, African* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 234.

8. See Margaret G. Kelly, *The Ghanaian Intelligentsia* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago).

9. Kwame Nkrumah, *Speech on the Tenth Anniversary of the C.P.P.* (Accra, 1959), pp. 24-25.

10. Quoted in Adam Curle, "Nationalism and Higher Education in Ghana," *Universities Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1961-62), p. 238.

11. Kwame Nkrumah, *Flower of Learning* (Accra, 1961), p. 11.

12. Kwame Nkrumah, *Guide to Party Action* (Accra, 1962), p. 6.

13. Kwame Nkrumah, "Speech at the Opening of the Institute of African Studies," *The Spark* (November 8, 1963).

14. Editorial, *Legonite* (Lent, 1963), p. 5.

15. Editorial, *Ghanaian Times*, February 6, 1964.

16. Editorial, *Ghanaian Times*, February 7, 1964.

17. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Vice Chancellor's Address to Congregation, 27th March, 1965," *Legonite* (Lent, 1965), p. 19.

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18. Daniel Goldrich, *Sons of the Establishment* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 11-13. This conceptualization was published in greater detail in Goldrich's "Toward the Comparative Study of Politicization, with Special Reference to Latin America," *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America*, eds. Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams (New York, 1965), pp. 361-78. Items used to measure politicization in the 1963 and 1966 questionnaires included: interest in politics; time spent discussing politics; intention to participate in politics; willingness to be a candidate for public office. The 1966 questionnaire also included choices among alternative roles for future political participation.

19. The 1963 data are based on a questionnaire distributed to 236 students in two political-science classes at the University of Ghana and filled out during class periods. Thirty of the questionnaires were disqualified by the respondent's nationality or unusable for other reasons. The resulting sample "N" is 206, which represents 17 per cent of all Ghanaian students at the university during the academic year 1962-63.

    The 1966 data are based on two questionnaires administered simultaneously by paid research assistants to a representative sample. Eighty per cent of the distributed questionnaires were completed and returned. The total number of respondents was 376, or 20 per cent of the 1,879 Ghanaian students at the university. Those responding to questions about politicization and political attitudes (asked on one of the two questionnaires) numbered 209. To test the representative quality of the survey, data were obtained on 400 students randomly selected from application forms in the Registrar's Office. Both sets of data were checked against aggregate statistics on enrollments by faculty, age, and home residence. The survey sample compared well on these dimensions.

20. Without longitudinal data, it is difficult to determine whether the faculties served as "socializers" or as "recruiters" of students with similar levels of politicization. They may, in fact, be both. Analysis of politicization according to year in the university shows that the level of politicization tends to increase by year among arts and social-science students (a socialization function), yet those faculties also include more students who are highly politicized when they enter the university (a recruitment function).

21. For example, one student publication referred to CPP attacks on Legon faculty in this way: "We know our lecturers and we know what they are worth. They are worth their weight in gold just as this paper [*Ghanaian Times*] is only fit for the clearing away of a dog's vomit." Quoted in Curle, "Nationalism and Higher Education in Ghana," p. 242.

22. Others have claimed that "any casual observer will tell you that academic freedom would have been abolished completely in Ghana but for the students of our universities." L. H. Ofosu Appiah, "Authority and the Individual in Ghana's Educational System," *The Legon Observer*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1967), p. 8.

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ROBERT E. SCOTT

Student Political Activism in Latin America

STUDENT ACTIVISM in Latin America's universities is well publicized, and with good reason. During the past several years, nearly every country in the region has experienced some sort of organized student activity that disrupted or, at the least, seriously disturbed the process of higher education and not infrequently the peace of the cities in which schools were located. Newspaper headlines and magazine articles notwithstanding, the majority of such manifestations are not concerned initially with national politics. Most stem from a sense of frustration growing out of real deficiencies in educational facilities or from a feeling of insecurity that magnifies government decisions which the students see as undermining their present situation or their future hopes.

Consider just a few of the many kinds of student action which took place during 1967. Bolivian students demonstrated in January against the opening of a "Catholic" university because they feared that both the quality of the education offered by the new institution and the superior social contacts enjoyed by students who could afford a private school might reduce the value of national university training. In June, Colombian students protesting a rise in bus fares clashed with police in Cartegena and Bogotá, resulting in military occupation of the national university. In Rio de Janeiro six persons were wounded during May as a result of student manifestations

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This paper includes some of the findings of a study on the role of Latin American universities in political change soon to be published by the Brookings Institution. No more than a small portion of the subject matter treated in that study is covered here, and little of the substantive data or analysis upon which the conclusions are based is offered. Generalizations beyond Peru and Mexico, which are the principal case studies of the Brookings project, reflect further investigation in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Venezuela, as well as a systematic review of the literature dealing with Latin American universities as a whole. Reproduction in any form is prohibited except on written permission of author.

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against Ministry of Education agreements with the United States for a study of reforms in higher education, and only two months later over a hundred students were removed from where they squatted in dormitories as a protest against crowded conditions that prevented their admittance to the University of São Paulo despite passing the entrance examinations.

The great majority of these and other student manifestations which have occurred during the past few years did not originate out of a desire to manipulate national partisan politics. Nor do my own or other studies substantiate the popular notion that all Latin American *universitarios* are highly politicized. Instead, they demonstrate rather clearly that the largest proportion of students are not political activists and do not relate strongly to any national political party. How is it, then, that university students have so widespread a reputation for political activity and, indeed, have forced governments to react so often to their political initiatives?

During 1966, for instance, many of the larger and more developed republics witnessed open clashes between government forces and students. An Ecuadorian military *junta* fell partly as a consequence of its attack upon central university students, which led to a general strike. In five other countries—Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico—government troops moved against university campuses to put down activities which may have started as protests against educational policies, but ended as serious challenges to the constituted political authorities. Several other countries—Panama, Uruguay, and Nicaragua, for example—found that student involvement in public policy disputes or national elections caused severe unrest.

Events of this sort reflect the peculiar role played by the universities and their students in Latin America's rapidly changing and consequently overburdened political systems. Almost in spite of themselves, students find that they are drawn into national political life, usually in some form of confrontation politics that sets them at odds with the existing power structure. To understand why this is so, we must know more about the value system that motivates the students and about the schools in which they study. We must also know something about the political systems of the region, for students do not operate in a political vacuum. The role they play, constructive or otherwise, reflects the ability of the other social and political structures participating in the political process to meet the needs of a changing society. Despite the very obvious dif-

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ferences that exist among the twenty-odd republics, there are enough similarities in the educational systems and the political environments, as well as among the *universitarios* in their reactions to the world around them, to permit some generalizations about student political activism.

Latin American Universities

Taking into account national differences in level and complexity of development, the forms of university organization and curriculum content in Latin America's institutions of higher education are remarkably alike. Historically, many of the same intellectual influences were at work simultaneously in each of these countries so the schools that evolved do follow a pattern.

Originally, most universities were modeled upon Iberian prototypes, but during the nineteenth century they were strongly influenced by French thought and the example of Napoleon's Imperial University. They are divided into professional faculties *(facultades),* which are self-contained and generally have a course of study that is quite rigid. Where permitted at all, electives are kept to an absolute minimum. Until very recently, the university's principal recognized function was professional training, particularly in the traditional fields of medicine, law, and engineering. General education and culture were the responsibility of secondary or preparatory schools; teacher training was left to the normal schools. Research or public service could hardly be expected of part-time university professors whose main source of livelihood was private practice or salaried employment outside the university.

Within the past few years, however, the training and educational functions of the universities have started to expand as a result of the growing recognition of the need for post-secondary general education and for diversification of offerings into university-level education courses, business training, and other "careers" suitable for serving a more complex economy and society. At the same time, the beginnings of attempts to perform research and offer public service activities can be noted, especially in the more developed countries and particularly at the central university as opposed to provincial public institutions and private schools. These changes can be classed as part of an expanding tendency to adopt some aspects of the United States system of higher education to meet problems that seem similar to those already encountered by that country.

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Clearly, none of the Latin American republics is so unaffected by change that its universities resemble those found around the turn of the century. At that time, the great majority of institutions of higher education were little more than finishing schools for the sons of the "comfortable" class. Small in numbers, aristocratic in bearing, often dilettantish in their approach to professional training, the preponderance of students came from the relatively cultured backgrounds of long-established landholding families. Most studied law or medicine, a few engineering. Many never really practiced a profession after leaving school, but devoted their time to administering their estates and pursuing eclectic intellectual interests as *pensadores,* wide-ranging social commentators who wrote in the style and spirit of the French essayists.

Neither at the university nor afterward was the traditional Latin American *universitario* deeply concerned with politics. His position was too well established to require active protection. Even the small, service-oriented middle sector of professionals who did sometimes act politically was so desirous of winning acceptance in the upper class, aping its mannerisms and way of life, that no real challenge to the established gentry was offered. When they did act politically, however, university students were accorded the status due offspring of the dominant social group.

Although the principal university-centered policy battle of this period was not couched in terms of national politics, it was a direct reaction to the social and moral norms under which government acted. Ultimately, it had an important effect upon student political views and activity. An academic power contest grew out of a humanistic revival sparked by the intellectuals' rejection of the cold-blooded social Darwinism, engendered by Comte's positivism, that so many regimes used to justify support for economic exploitation of large masses of their citizens. Given the region's Iberian cultural heritage, the humanistic upsurge became very nearly a return to scholasticism, affecting both curricular content and the intellectual approaches imparted by university education. In the long run, it influenced the *universitarios'* political style as well, for the resultant movement away from pragmatic norms freed the students from the limitations of reality just at the time when they began to discover that they had a role to play in national concerns.

A convenient date to mark the large-scale entry of university students into national politics is 1918, when the Córdoba Manifesto was adopted by Argentine young people speaking for their col-

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leagues in schools throughout the republic. Within the next few years, students from countries all over the continent picked up the call for university reform because they were all affected by the beginnings of social and economic change and the dilatoriness of university authorities in adjusting curricula to the new conditions. Fifty years have passed, and the students still are protesting, for most of the real goals of the Córdoba movement are not yet accomplished.

In a number of countries symbolic victories have been won, with the legal, sometimes even constitutional, granting of university autonomy and the establishment of student participation in academic affairs through *cogobierno* (student membership in all university committees and governing bodies). Most older universities have added new *facultades* and a host of new institutions have been opened to accommodate a larger student body, though the total number of young people registered seldom reaches 5 per cent of the college-age youth. But formal grants of autonomy mean little to institutions still almost wholly dependent upon government for economic support, particularly where part-time teaching staff and weak administrators have neither the incentive nor the means of implementing academic independence. Similarly, the mere existence of more schools, more careers, and larger numbers of students does not necessarily mean that the larger problems of university organization or of substantive content of course material have been resolved.

In point of fact, much of the change that has occurred in most universities is piecemeal and even contradictory, so that the education available in a majority of Latin America's universities does not begin to meet today's needs. The failure is due partly to the students, with their all-too-human tendency to utilize their organizational strength to oppose upgrading of standards and tightening of requirements. But most of the blame must fall upon the national educational systems themselves, for throughout his educational career, neither course content nor the academic environment prepares a student to operate in a real world. This is true of the highly value-laden, formalistic, and non-pragmatic primary and secondary programs, which are overburdened with multiple subjects (up to twelve in a single term in some secondary schools) and generally weak on experimentation and problem-solving. It is equally true of most types of university training, which continue to reflect a kind of sterile scholasticism.

One of the complaints that led to the Córdoba Manifesto was

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that university professors did not fulfill their obligations, in that they frequently missed classes, did not prepare adequately for those that did meet, and failed to keep up with contemporary scholarship. Equally important, the students felt that their teachers did not relate their course materials to the realities of the world around them. These problems were due partly to the influence of the new humanism and partly to organizational weaknesses in staff recruitment, both of which continue to the present day. Most professors who earn their living teaching must hold three or more posts to do so. The vast majority of university teachers, however, are not full-time educators, but individuals in private practice or employed by government or private organizations who offer classes in their spare time. Such an employment pattern inhibits development of academic disciplines that could encourage professional standards of preparation, teaching, and research, and almost insures that lectures will be presented from warmed-over notes or even from the original course in the subject taken by the professor when he was in school.

Absence of professional norms and lack of a professional educator's career pattern mean also that university professors may feel free to carry their political preferences into the classroom, turning their lectures on almost any subject into indoctrination sessions. This sometimes happens, especially with those teachers who are most closely related to radical reform movements which otherwise find it difficult to obtain a hearing. Such instructors often devote appreciably more time to the *universitarios* than do their more conventional colleagues, who may appear at the school to present their course material and leave immediately after the class meeting. Worse still, these "Taxi Professors," as the students call them, must get back to their full-time occupations so quickly as to make virtually impossible the frequent personal contact between teacher and pupil that is so necessary as adolescents face their identity crises, especially in countries where constant and speedy change interferes with the evolution of widely accepted norms of social and political conduct.

Dividing the universities into independent *facultades* complicates the staff-recruitment problem. If separate teachers of mathematics, chemistry, languages, biology, or any of a hundred specialties must be hired by each unit, no society would have sufficient economic or human resources to support full-time professors. But the pattern has educational and ultimately political developmental consequences as well. In a modern, complex environment neither knowl-

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edge nor the solutions to socio-economic problems segregate themselves conveniently according to the subject matter of conventional professional faculties. A few Latin American states have begun to recognize the insufficiency of the general education provided in secondary schools, and their universities now require a year or so of pre-professional training before a *universitario* enters a *facultad* like law, economics, or medicine. But even these university-level general-education curricula tend to separate students in "humanities" or "science" programs, depending upon the professional subject they intend to study. A student who has taken an inappropriate pre-professional program cannot enroll in a given faculty.

This limitation upon the exposure of young people to other modes of thought, either through formal classroom experience or through opportunities for informal interaction with students of other professional subjects, makes for over-specialization. In later life, the lawyer cannot understand the frame of reference within which the physician works, nor can the engineer conceive of a problem as a lawyer does. This makes for difficulties in their day-to-day professional relations, but much more so when they try to resolve the policy problems of an ever more diversified society. University training of this sort is hardly an adequate educational experience for the small portion of a country's inhabitants that must one day provide leadership in situations of rapid change. Even now, leading *políticos* educated in the "humanities" faculties (lawyers, schoolteachers, humanists) find it hard to organize solutions for the material problems of their country. Those from the "sciences" (physicians, engineers, architects) often act more like technocrats than political brokers representing the interests and aspirations of all their rank and file followers.

In the half century since Córdoba, student frustrations and insecurities have expanded rather than disappeared. Changes in student population add new sources of unrest, since the new student types are more insecure than the traditional *universitarios*. The wider range of university offerings suits growing social and economic diversity, but more than ever students are uncertain that they can complete their education or, if they do so, that they will be assured of acceptable employment. Larger enrollments take in a slightly higher proportion of lower-middle- and upper-lower-class youth, including some from outlying regions, and this increases the problems of confrontation concerning national integration. Having inherited much of the ascribed status of its more aristocratic fore-

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bears, the expanded student body moves into national politics with relative impunity as it struggles to resolve its educational problems and to demonstrate displeasure with the social-political system which it feels causes them.

The Córdoba reform movement and the similar activities it sparked in other parts of Latin America were the first examples of organized and continuing student pressure to influence national policy. Significantly, it combined an attempt to involve government in legislating curriculum reform with a demand for a formal statement of legal autonomy for universities. The students discovered, as have so many in a modernizing world, that they need the assistance of, as well as protection from, government. Unlike most other interest groups in the region, the university students were in an advantageous position to organize to protect what they deemed their rights. Usually they enjoyed high enough status to act safely, sufficient contact with one another to organize effectively, and adequate information to act promptly, so that they could maximize pressure on any regime that seemed indifferent to their views. The students entered the national political arena to challenge the rigidity of the university authorities and to fight for their own interests. From there it was a fairly easy step to involvement in non-university politics.

The Latin American Student Subculture

The relative ease with which university students become involved in national politics is a function of experience, which inclines them toward acceptance of some sort of political role and at the same time accentuates certain patterns of political action. Although relatively few students play a really active role in political life, except under special conditions, they all share a high expectation of having their political actions taken seriously. This was true before the Córdoba Manifesto of 1918, but it has become increasingly true since, as the dislocations of development expand the potential political functions of *universitarios* throughout Latin America. This proclivity for politics is passed from one student generation to another by a specialized student subculture.

The student value system is a product of many of the factors that make up the student's life experience, interacting to instill a broadly shared set of reactions to political stimuli. The frustrations in Latin America's academic environment and the insecurities felt

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by young people under the disrupting pressures of change combine with the formal authority patterns of home and schools and the highly normative content of education to inculcate a rather clearly defined set of political norms. Students tend to think in abstract, normative, and ideological terms. They seek immediate action and all-embracing solutions to socio-economic problems; they are impatient with pragmatic tests of policy suggestions, because they are suspicious that the ongoing political system that seeks them does so to avoid acting. Emotionally and in political discourse most *universitarios* are sincere democrats, but in political practice they sometimes support authoritarian movements whose ideology suggests a willingness to override the particularistic demands of established special interests in favor of a more general welfare.

Relatively few Latin American university students manifest all of these traits, but traces of them can be found in almost every member of the university population. Those students who share a higher proportion of these norms are more likely to become political activists in the sense of involvement with political movements outside the academic community. Given their marked dissatisfaction with both educational and general conditions, together with their bent toward direct action, such student activists look upon themselves as "agents of change." They tend, therefore, to be attracted to political groups that seek to dislodge the traditional power elements and restructure the political process. For their part, the challenging forces must find potential leaders who have some conception of the nation and its problems and exhibit enough of the outward characteristics of high status to treat successfully with the established elites, but who at the same time are willing to attack the *status quo*. The elements in Latin American society most likely to meet these criteria are found among the young, less committed, and frequently partially alienated intellectuals of the university environment.

Generally the minority of students who become identified with this sort of political activity do not succeed in changing the political system very much. Some accommodate themselves to the continuing pattern of politics, benefiting themselves and to an extent the interests they represent, particularly if those interests have become strong enough to pressure the older forces into compromise. Other student political activists cannot work within the existing political process, either because personality or ideology inhibits them or because the interests they lead are too weak to enforce concessions. Such student activists may become wholly alienated from the na-

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tional political system. A few may end up trying to subvert it through revolutionary political parties or even attacking it physically by means of a National Liberation Movement; others may withdraw into political apathy. In later life, however, as their political experience increases, many one-time student radicals do work out some sort of adjustment with the operating political mechanisms, renewing the possibility of playing a meaningful political role.

Surprisingly few university political activists affiliate with the established political parties. Apparently the student subculture endorses the concept of students as agents of change so strongly that neither the activists nor their potential followers are attracted in any numbers to the more "respectable" parties involved in the national political process. During recent decades throughout Latin America, student federation elections show a marked pattern of support for candidates favoring challenging reform parties over those speaking for incumbent or traditional parties. Even student *políticos* representing reform political movements lose influence once their party has attained government power. This has happened to student leaders of the *aprista*-type parties in Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and elsewhere; to Christian Democratic *universitarios* in various countries; to PRI supporters in Mexico; and to student politicians identified with successful personalistic reformers in a number of republics. Once a regime is in office, adolescent rebellion and normal student impatience with the *status quo* combine with the inability of any government to satisfy the rising expectations which accompany rapid change to produce an ever present nucleus of student support for opposition movements, particularly those associated with radical reform.

A majority of university young people never do become political activists, either in school or after they leave their studies. While at the university they tend to support those student leaders who fight hardest for what they conceive of as student interest—*cogobierno*, free tuition, food and housing aid, freedom to miss classes, restrictions on higher academic standards, and the like. Almost invariably the student spokesman for a challenging opposition movement can out-promise and out-perform the representatives of the governing group. Given the average student's image of himself as an agent of change, it is no very difficult task for the university political activist to convert support for movements advocating educational improvement into acceptance of (or at least neutrality for) politically inspired demonstrations against the incumbent government and its policies.

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Ironically, after separation from the university, the vast majority of one-time students quickly cease acting as agents of change. Some of them function within the operating political system, but more remain passive politically. Certainly they do not provide the leadership for modernizing political mechanisms, or even an active and informed participant membership that would strengthen the hands of those few political leaders who do seek to develop national political structures adequate to the needs of a developing country.

We know that not all students participate as political activists and that of those who do some devote much more time and energy than others. The amount and nature of political activity depends upon individual personality factors, the student political style of various *facultades* and universities, the general political conditions which obtain in each country, and a host of other variables. Those demanding better course content may tend to discourage recruitment of students who must work to support themselves, or to overwhelm those who devote too much time to extracurricular politics. The very nature of the subject matter in a given curriculum may tend to attract or repel those who have an interest in politics or to cause more advanced students to view the world normatively or, on the contrary, analytically.

At first glance, socio-economic class seems like a good indicator of potential political activism, because lower-status students seem more inclined to want to challenge the *status quo* than do their more favored colleagues. More careful analysis suggests, however, that this may be as much a function of recruitment into specific faculties where political activism is more rampant as it is of the "comfort quotient." The educational experience in certain academic fields imparts a stronger sense of professionalism, with a clearer awareness of career possibilities and job opportunities, than does training in other subjects. For the most part, these professionalized faculties are older and technically oriented, with more clearly defined educational requirements for their students and more obvious career patterns for their graduates in individual, corporate, or government employment. They include medicine, engineering, and the applied sciences, and their various offshoots—agronomy, veterinary medicine, architecture, and the like. Competition both for entry and for survival in such programs is great, favoring the student from the better (usually private) secondary school, from the more intellectualized home, and from the more secure economic environment which does not require that the student work full time to support himself. Thus,

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a kind of built-in bias favoring the children of the advantaged sectors of society combines with a more ordered and less frustrating academic environment to produce students who are less likely to have either the time or the inclination to challenge the existing institutions.

Faculties offering less professionalized and more unstructured training are often easier to enter and not so demanding intellectually or in terms of such academic formalities as class attendance and keeping current in course work. The student with weaker preparation or one who cannot, or does not wish to, devote full time to his studies can compete here, but he is much less apt to encounter a satisfying academic experience. Most training programs of this kind are quite new to the university setting (commerce and business administration, education, social sciences, journalism, fine arts) or are older ones undergoing fundamental changes in social or economic role (philosophy, law). As yet they do not have well-established professional norms or easily identified career patterns that lead to high-status positions. The materials taught are much less technical and exact than those in the hard sciences, much more liable to subjective and normative interpretation by both professor and student. In these *facultades,* where more students are likely to be upwardly mobile, with attendant emotional and economic stresses, neither the subject matter nor its manner of presentation, much less the professional atmosphere or career expectations, seems to offer young people a sense of security in the present or hope for the future. It is scarcely surprising, under the circumstances, that activism of the radical-reform type is more common among students in these fields.

These are generalities and should be taken as such. Individual student activists can emerge from any sort of background and from study in any faculty. Fidel Castro came from a well-to-do (though not long established) family and entered the law school in Havana; Che Guevara's economic situation was not so comfortable, but he studied medicine in Buenos Aires. Both became activists while in school. On the other hand, all over the continent large numbers of students with much more reason to resent and reject the society around them remain politically passive. Clearly, individual differences are important. But this should not obscure the fact that specific conditions in certain types of faculty do make for a predisposition toward political activism among the student body.

We should recognize, too, that just as differences among indi-

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viduals or among *facultades* produce variations in political style or intensity of political involvement, differences among the schools in a given country may affect the student political culture. Private universities, which usually means church-related schools, tend to maintain academic standards and to stress educational rather than political functions more easily than state-supported institutions. Students in the capital city are apt to be more politicized and sophisticated in their understanding of the policy process than those in provincial environments, no matter what type of university they attend. The particular "mix" that operates to produce the student subculture in any country can be understood only by study in depth of the local situation.

One can generalize, however, to the extent of saying that among Latin American students the educational experience reinforces the natural impatience that youth feels when it encounters the fumbling attempts of an older generation to resolve the world's problems, particularly as most young people have not yet had enough other experiences to accept the finite limitations imposed by a given situation. Both course content and style of imparting knowledge make for a maximum of memorization and a minimum of experimentation, with almost no opportunity for social analysis. This reinforces rather than counters the authoritarian outlook implanted by the broader social environment. The humanistic reaction against positivism enhances this pattern, leaving the student with little chance to "learn how to learn" about problem-solving.

At the same time, in Latin America the student's identity crisis is much more acute than in more stable countries. Within an environment undergoing rapid change, the young person has to adjust not only to an adult world, but to one in which values are constantly shifting, with the new norms always under attack by some portion of the population. Faced with such uncertainty, the student has limited opportunity to come into contact with individuals upon whom he can model his actions in unfamiliar social and political situations. Generational rebellion weakens parental effectiveness in this role, and the minimal contact available from part-time teachers reduces their potential influence.

As a consequence, unsuitable models for conduct are selected—perhaps motion-picture actors whose clever remarks and dexterous resolution of complex problems are the products of a scenarist's art; or national politicians whose real actions are so far removed from the student's immediate observation that only the vaguest and most

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distorted impressions are captured; or, nearer at hand, older students, including the "deans" and "fossils," as the professional political organizers who remain semipermanent students are called. Little constructive orientation to the real social and political world is available to guide the student political activist when he marches to save mankind or to assist his potential followers who must evaluate the worth of the crusade.

Should one wonder, then, that many students clutch at the kind of psychological support or instant integration offered by ideological movements such as socialism, Communism, or *aprismo,* which purport to offer a logical frame of reference within which to answer every problem? One intriguing aspect of this phenomenon is that although students, like other Latin Americans, find it easy to identify with a personalistic leader—Perón, Haya de la Torre, Fidel—they can also serve an abstract ideology like Communism or even Christian Socialism.

Although many student activists relate directly to national political movements, the student federation is their most effective mechanism for utilizing the special status students enjoy for political ends. In almost every school some sort of federation (usually composed of elected student delegates from each faculty who in turn elect a university-wide student governing council) speaks in the name of the student body. Where an institution accepts *cogobierno,* these delegates sit on official governing boards at each administrative level; at other institutions, their role may be unofficial, but potentially very influential. On educational matters, these student delegates usually perform conscientiously and constructively, frequently more so than the part-time professors who share responsibility for policy decisions. Because these student spokesmen do protect the educational interest of the non-activist majority of students in an academic world where neither government nor educational administrators and teachers always satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the *universitarios,* the politically passive members of the student body are not disposed to object very strenuously to the student activists extending their leadership to questions of national politics.

Difficulties arise, however, because of the affinity of most student leaders for those political movements that are least sympathetic to the traditional political system. To complicate the situation, because by no means all of the student activists support the same political movement, they are in constant competition to capture the student federation in order to identify the mystique of student

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support with their particular brand of politics. All this results in unending agitation, as each group of activists militates against authority—be it government or university—on national policy as well as educational questions, while attempting to outmaneuver its opponents. Every student-federation election becomes a national election in microcosm. Between campaigns, the activist factions wage a kind of guerrilla warfare against one another that disrupts the educational function of the university.

The University and Leadership Cadres for Nation-Building

Disruption of the university's educational function is only one of the significant consequences of political activity that results from the student subculture. Another has to do with the kind of direct political participation in which the students engage. The idea that a *universitario* has a responsibility to provide leadership as an agent of change is not novel, for throughout the world students have felt an urge to reform their society. What is new here is the degree to which the student's preconditioning toward political involvement is encouraged by a society that cannot absorb the kind of political activity the student leaders push. The question arises, why do student *políticos* find themselves playing so influential a role in Latin American politics, despite their disruptive tendencies?

It is no answer to recall that university students often are called the "conscience of the nation," a carry-over from the days when student idealism provided a kind of symbolic reassurance to the ruling sectors that someday the goals of social justice and political democracy cited by the *pensadores* would be achieved (but not quite yet, as St. Augustine would have had it). With the advent of development, a new, unexpected, and wholly unofficial function has been thrust upon Latin America's universities and their students. This "phantom" function, not generally identified as a prime university responsibility, is that of providing leaders for nation-building.

Student involvement in the process of producing cadres of leaders is not quite the same as student activism in outside political movements, although almost every university political activist working with a challenging reform group is also very much a part of the dialogue within the academic community that seeks broadly acceptable norms around which an integrated nation might evolve. Even those

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students who are not usually activists in national political terms do get caught up in the discussions, the disputes, and the open interruptions of regular course work that mark the search for some common definition of the proper functions of government and the means of fulfilling those functions. In this particular context, university students can hardly avoid considering themselves as agents of change, for this is how society looks upon them.

Outside Latin America, this cadre-building function is not so strongly associated with universities because other social or political institutions are available to perform it. In a more developed country—the United States, for example—a broad consensus about the legitimacy of government and the norms which operate to regulate public activities has evolved over many years, probably centuries. These values are inculcated in the citizens through the family, reinforced by the common schools, mass media of communication, and most of the other institutions of society. Moreover, they are supported continuously by the strong ties of economic interdependence which bind such a country together. The need for leaders in the nation-building process does not arise because the nation already exists.

In the less-developed states of Africa and Asia, the history of the anticolonial struggle included a breakdown of the traditional social and economic power structures, which permits a more flexible approach to the problems of national integration. Although not all of the social institutions support norms which are receptive to change, those most likely to oppose it have been weakened. In many such countries, a single dominant political party that symbolizes the movement for national independence provides leaders who shared the experience of organizing against the colonial power and therefore also share some understandings about what the free government they sought ought to do. At the very least, they can communicate their disagreements using more or less the same political symbols. If the disagreements become too great, there is a tendency for Nasserist-style military leaders to assume the leadership role. The latter situation has obtained in the increasing number of countries where the liberation movement has been unable to convert its freedom fighters into effective post-colonial political leaders who can resolve the hard problems of development and national integration.

In all of these countries, the tasks of national integration are made easier if conditions are in sufficient flux to break down the traditional social patterns or deeply ingrained political practices.

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They are more difficult if tribal differences, regional competition, or other divisive elements are at work. Almost everywhere, however, some prestigious or powerful combination of social, economic, and political institutions is operating to supply leadership in the nation-building process. At the same time, in few of the ex-colonial states has the European tradition of elite higher education broken down to such an extent that large numbers of semi-educated students dissatisfied with academic life, future job opportunities, and the general political environment await an invitation to provide leadership for change. This is not to suggest that such a pattern could not emerge in either Asia or Africa, but that in most cases the combination of conditions is not yet ripe. Even in the few countries where faltering leadership and a large, discontented student body seem to presage such a possibility—in India or Indonesia, for example—class distinctions, religious differences, and regional competition act as divisive factors to weaken student initiative and to give the older politicians an extra lease on their political lives.

In most Latin American countries, the situation is quite different. As in other parts of the developing world, there is relatively little consensus about the proper functions of government, and social and economic relations are not very harmonious. Social change and economic diversification are occurring, but while change is speedy, it is not so drastic that the traditional power of the aristocracy and oligarchy has been broken, except partially in a few countries, such as Mexico, Cuba, and perhaps Bolivia. Instead, mounting pressures for popular participation in the political process, desire for greater social acceptance of the emergent modernizing middle sectors, and demands for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth clash with the recalcitrance of well-established traditional elites. Nor can the challenging elements always agree on a common set of national goals, much less upon the means through which to achieve such goals.

In the face of deep disagreements about values that reflect cultural, social, economic and political differences, some way of infusing a sense of the nation into the whole population must be discovered. At a certain stage of development, this need to inculcate a more universally shared set of norms becomes a real social necessity. If the political and social structures which deal directly with the citizens do not meet the need adequately, society is likely to work through any appropriate institution available to do so, with or without conscious decision by the policy-makers.

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Neither Latin America's formal governmental units nor the informal and extra-constitutional social and political mechanisms have provided much leadership in the nation-building process. Government agencies and such older institutions as the church and the army are either dominated by traditionalists or involved in the same value conflicts as the remainder of the society. This is not to suggest that certain bureaucrats (usually technically oriented), parish priests, and military men do not see a need for national integration, but that they are usually too low in their respective hierarchies to exert much general leadership from within the system. Those who resign to work outside lose the status their former roles conferred. Even the successful businessman who translates his perception of the advantages of a national market into a conception of true political integration thinks twice before he acts to upset the *status quo* in which he has so great a stake. Most of the "mass" media also reflect the special views of region, class, or functional interests, thus inhibiting any small cry they may voice for integration of the nation.

Much the same is true of most political parties, not excluding such national-integrating, mass-oriented political movements as the so-called *aprista*-type parties or their newer Christian Democratic rivals, both of which oppose and are opposed by the traditional power elites. Even though their programs make much of integrating the "popular" classes into national life, the most active militants in such parties are members of lower-middle- or upper-lower-class factions who seek to improve their personal social-economic positions by political means and are not particularly anxious to weaken their own claims by carrying along large numbers of politically passive members of the masses. Latin America's national-integrating parties lack the recent total commitment to independent national life that marked the anticolonial struggles of Asia and Africa, giving symbolic status as nation-builders to the revolutionary party leaders and permitting them to override the traditional vested interests to some degree. The sole exception is Mexico's Revolutionary Party, which for over thirty years has provided leadership for national integration not only in the political sphere, but in most of the social and economic structures which operate in the republic.

The university is the only social institution that seems to bring together citizens from every region of the country, from the challenging middle- and upper-lower class as well as the established privileged class, from groupings representing all shades of political and social opinion. This confrontation comes just at that period in

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their lives when young people are most likely to question established patterns and to reject the answers provided by their elders, a tendency strengthened by the iconoclastic nature of university education. Finally, the *universitarios* are accustomed to think in terms of political participation and are accorded a high degree of status by most of their fellow citizens, but at the same time they feel discontented with both the academic and the national environment. By default as much as by acclamation then, the university students assume the role of leaders in the process of national integration.

Many Latin American universities, therefore, find themselves co-opted into a situation in which they perform a necessary sociopolitical function—providing the training ground in which cadres of leaders in the nation-building process prepare themselves. This reduces their effectiveness in satisfying the other important functions for which they were established. Their students, particularly that small portion of the student body that is most politicized, seek to forge a nation, hammering out on the anvil of political discourse a common set of values or at least a core of shared understandings about the proper role of government in shaping the destinies of man in society, economy, and polity. The vacuum resulting from a paucity of other political structures which supply leaders or implement nation-building policies encourages the students to move out of the realm of discussion into that of direct political action. Disorder results, as students struggle among themselves, engage in politically motivated strikes, riot in the streets, withdraw to the mountains to precipitate guerrilla warfare, and otherwise substitute political activism for serious study. All this plays havoc with the educational and training functions of the university. The quality of preparation deteriorates, the number of persons winning degrees drops, and the supply of adequately prepared manpower to service the needs of society dwindles.

The cause-and-effect relationship between the onset of rapid change and the growth of political activism among Latin American university students is clear. In at least one country, Mexico, there has also been a tendency toward reduced student political activity as other political mechanisms become available to perform the nation-building function and as the amount of political consensus shared by the general population grows. Here a beginning of reversal of the student role was possible because improved academic conditions and growing career opportunities for the *universitarios* gave them a greater stake in the operating political system, so much

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so that in 1966 a *fidelista*-inspired "reform" group decried the students' lack of revolutionary zeal. Mexico is the only state in the region where the pattern has run full circle—first student recruitment as nation-building leaders, then active involvement in the national integration process, and finally the beginnings of withdrawal from political activism. There is enough evidence of student recruitment and involvement in other countries to permit us to project the existence of a kind of three-stage cycle of Latin American student activism.

What cannot be foretold is whether in these other countries the entire cycle will take place successfully, as it has in Mexico. There, a long history of relatively slow change, joined with fundamental shifts in the political value system encouraged by the "official" Revolutionary Party, allowed the *universitarios* to move through the three stages of the activism cycle without completely disrupting the educational functions of the universities and without forcing the students into open opposition to the government. Over a period of fifty years, a system of higher education that once was a bastion of conservatism moved into the cadre-building function, producing successive generations of students who shared common experiences and who developed a similar vocabulary with which to discuss the problems of national development, even if all their goals were not identical. Simultaneously, Mexico's Revolutionary Party was evolving as an extra-constitutional mechanism for translating nationalizing norms into political reality.

Today, enough educated persons—both in and out of government—share sufficient national outlook to ease Mexico's need for university-oriented nation-building leaders. These people man the mass media, much of the educational system, key positions in both the private and public economic sectors, the government agencies, and most of the socializing and operating political mechanisms in the country. At the same time that the university's cadre-building function recedes, rapidly expanding social and economic complexity calls for more highly trained and competent manpower at the professional level. As a consequence, in Mexico's institutions of higher learning the educational and training functions have begun to reassert themselves. The cycle has moved from the transitional toward the modern stage, as national integration becomes a reality.

Entering this new stage does not mean necessarily that Mexico's students have ceased to agitate or that the educational functions became predominant overnight. The traditional student subculture

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called for low academic performance, and the long cadre-building phase encouraged activities that diverted the students from concentration on course work. Attempts to meet the Mexican society's demand for more effectively trained graduates by increasing the amount of preprofessional education, by raising standards in the *facultades,* and by imposing greater discipline upon both teaching staff and students led to some of the disturbances at the national university and several state schools during 1966 and 1967, as did continuing student irritation at inadequacies in educational resources, especially in the provincial schools.

Despite enormous gains over a half century, Mexico's political system is not yet fully modernized and democratized, particularly at the state and local level. It is not impossible, therefore, to encounter examples of university students still providing leadership against imposition of unpopular or unqualified candidates for public office. This occurred, for example, in the state of Sonora before the 1967 elections. Compared with what they were only a decade or two ago, however, Mexico's students are much less politicized as radical activists and much more academically oriented, with the nationalizing function performed less in the university and more in other social institutions throughout the country than ever before. The same cannot be said for most of the rest of Latin America.

None of the region's university systems is in the pre-transition, "aristocratic" period, but some are not yet in the mainstream of the development process. Even where the consequences of speedy change have not accumulated to such an extent that the internal political system is in crisis and the search for leadership has forced a cadre-building function upon the schools, the example of neighboring countries has stirred the imagination of the students. In Honduras, Paraguay, and other republics where development is less evident, the *universitarios* have begun to take an interest in politics, bringing pressure on military regimes or on governments that fail to respond efficiently to the most obvious needs of the populace. As yet in such countries the students have not become a major factor in the political process, but if our thesis about the cyclical nature of the university's role in supplying leaders for national integration is correct, they soon will.

In well over half of Latin America, however, university *políticos* already are an important political force, for the pressures of society have carried the students past the stage of recruitment into that of involvement in national-policy questions. It is, of course, misleading

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to assume that students have equal influence, or the same sort of influence, in these countries. Amount and rate of change are important variables; so is the degree to which formal and informal structures outside the university supply leadership in the integration process or act as forces counter to it. The kinds of frustrations students feel in school and in career expectations, and the existence of a sense of alienation from the ongoing political system must be considered.

It remains an open question whether each of these countries will pass successfully through the three stages of university cadre-building, as Mexico did. Not all have the same physical or human resources, and few have had the sort of revolutionary experience that weakens the traditional interests opposing modernization. None of the other Latin American states enjoys the luxury of time, for modern communications speed up and lump together the multifold problems of socio-political adjustment on which Mexico could spend years and even decades evolving solutions. To cap these difficulties, many of the activities which the student activists carry on in the name of national integration have an opposite effect, exacerbating the crises of development rather than easing them. For these reasons, some other unexpected form of leadership for change may well appear—a truly modernizing political movement perhaps, or a military clique that can overwhelm the forces of national diversity and return the universities to their educational functions. Or it may be that for the time being conditions will remain essentially unchanged, with student political activities locked in the second stage of the cycle, at terrible cost to the academic role of the university and with no foreseeable benefit to the political system. The possibilities are different for each republic. Meanwhile, however, the psychological yearning for spokesmen who can personify the national identity continues unabated, and *universitarios* answer the call.

Some of the Latin American countries are just entering the leadership-cadre-building stage, so the other functions of their universities have not yet been seriously or continuously disrupted. El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Chile probably fit this pattern. Other republics are already in the midst of serious political maladjustment problems, of which university unrest is an obvious symptom. Some states in this category seem to be making progress in evolving nation-building structures outside the university, but have a long way to go before the pressures on the cloister and its inhabitants ease.

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Peru, Venezuela, and perhaps Uruguay and Brazil might be examples. Other states seem to be stuck on dead center, with too many limitations on effective modernizing and institution-building to permit hope for early easing of the pressures on the university to supply leaders. Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, possibly Brazil, and a few others fall into this group.

Level of economic or social development does not seem to be a particularly good indicator of the amount or success of student involvement in nation-building. As José Luis de Imaz has suggested, in Argentina a fast rate of economic change and (for Latin America) an extremely high standard of social development could not counteract the effects of a static socio-political system that hindered evolution of political structures adequate to rationalize the new conditions for all sectors of society. In the Dominican Republic, with relatively weak economic development and very low indices of social growth, the same pattern of inadequate political structures emerged. In both cases, the students became very active until the traditional forces reacted to restrict their political role, after which the *universitarios* became alienated from the ongoing political system.

In assigning countries to these categories, Bolivia and Cuba seem to be cases apart, because the recentness of their revolutions does not permit one to judge the permanence of the institution-building attempts. Given the fall of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR, nation-building in Bolivia is at least temporarily sidetracked, and student agitation can be expected to grow. The 1967 instances, however, reflect frustration over immediate university needs and student insecurity with the future rather than reaction to national integration problems. In Cuba, those who do not reflect Dr. Castro's version of the nation are not allowed to participate in politics, in or out of the university. On the other hand, like all schools on the island, the universities are a principal indoctrinating mechanism for those who do accept the Cuban Revolution, and students work closely in and with the political structures enforcing the new nationalism.

Students and the Ongoing Political Process

Well-meaning as most student political activists are, their participation in national politics frequently seems counterproductive.

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Certainly one can see a growing tendency on the part of policy-makers, both domestic and foreign, to deplore such activity and to act against it. This is true not only of the military despot who strikes out at the challenge to his regime emanating from the university, but also of the more liberal and modernizing national leadership elements who are often a product of student political experience. Those responsible for government and foundation aid from abroad, who once saw education and participation in political life by the intellectual sectors as the best hope for constructive and evolutionary political development, are beginning to recognize that general assistance programs to universities can have unexpected political effects.

Considering the way in which student political activism diverts not only student *políticos,* but also their less-politicized university colleagues from their technical and professional studies, it is hardly surprising that responsible policy-makers react negatively. Any interruption in the orderly supply of physicians, engineers, schoolteachers, or even lawyers can have serious and immediate effect upon the rate and balance of development. Yet it would be manifestly unfair to suggest that the majority of Latin America's educators and politicians reject student politics out of hand, simply because it is inconvenient. That students are engaged in a cadre-building discourse and involved in national politics does not mean automatically that the political values they espouse, the political style they adopt, or the political actions they perform are compatible with the ongoing political system or contrived to hasten the modernization of that system. On the contrary, much student political activity in Latin America today is out of phase with the contemporary needs of the society in which it takes place, harking back to an earlier, more traditional era or looking so far into the future that it has little relevance for the present.

In most republics, the economic, social, and political systems represent at least the earlier stages of modernization, with increasingly differentiated structures to perform more specialized functions, and in a number of countries the systems are far more complex. Given the nature of education and the resulting student subculture, student values and the action patterns they motivate simply have not adjusted to the new conditions, so that university activist incursions into the operating political process tend to disrupt already heavily burdened machinery.

However ineffectually the constitutional agencies work to en-

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force compromise for a general welfare, however inadequately ideological political movements and class- or interest-bound parties act to perform the extraconstitutional functions of aggregation, however reluctantly the old-style oligarchies accede to the more challenging new interests, day-to-day politics has become more pragmatic and problem oriented. A system for adjusting differences has evolved—one based not only on the amount of pressure the emerging interests can bring, but also on the degree to which the leaders of these challenging groups can commit their followers to assume the obligations inherent in participating in the operating political system. The student activist's approach to policy questions is very different, leaning on the emotional, the normative, the all-embracing and often simplistic solutions of abstract ideology. He does not ask what can be done, but what should be done, and insists upon doing it immediately. If his unrealistic demands upon the government are not met, he may resort to violence. He will certainly denounce the incumbent administration as abandoning the interests and needs of the masses.

It is not simply sporadic violence that bothers the policy-maker. Many of the present-day liberal leaders—Betencourt, Frei, Haya de la Torre, and the rest—began as student *políticos* who did not hesitate to resort to force to make their points. That such men did make their points to some degree has, however, altered the conditions under which politics takes place. Once the students were one of a very few organized or semi-organized groups which sought to influence politics from outside the closed circle of an oligarchy composed of landowners, incipient manufacturers, and those who benefited from co-operation with foreign-dominated extractive industries and plantation production for export (petroleum, copper, bananas, and so forth), together with their collaborators in the church, military, and government hierarchies. The university intellectuals took upon themselves the role of spokesmen and leaders for the inchoate interests of urban labor, landless *peones,* sharecroppers, and day-wage farm workers, providing a certain amount of symbolic gratification to their unwashed clientele, but relatively few immediate material benefits that might reduce the economic advantages enjoyed by the ruling elites.

Today, in the more developed countries a new set of conditions obtains. The unionized portions of the city workers, lower-range bureaucrats, small merchants, and even rural laborers in large-scale commercial agriculture are beginning to produce their own lead-

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ers. Within the traditional oligarchy, new and conflicting interests have appeared, marking the expansion of consumer-goods industries; these seek domestic markets, which require different fiscal policies than does the export trade. New, modernizing elements in the clergy and officer corps provide moral support and, to a limited extent, physical security to the challenging elements in the society and economy. A plethora of demands—for general fiscal reform, for improved social conditions, and for immediate adjustment of labor-management relations, among others—tends to overload the political systems, even if the claims are limited to representatives of interests already well enough organized to be self-sustaining politically.

The students, with their tendency to seek instant solutions to all of the country's problems, bring heavy pressure upon government to incorporate emerging, poorly-organized, and frequently not very productive elements into the competition for allocation of limited resources. Neither the students' old allies, who are now better able to fend for themselves and who fear the demands of a new order of claimants, nor the older oligarchy, who once saw university politics as a relatively harmless means of easing the clamor of rising interest groups, welcomes this kind of participation in the national political process, particularly when it may be accompanied by the activities of a National Liberation Movement supported vocally and perhaps financially and with arms by an outside power.

Interest-group and political leaders are trying to sort out the relationships among labor, management, landowners, farm workers, street-corner venders, shopkeepers, bureaucrats, and all the rest. To do so, they have begun to evolve a kind of semicorporative pattern that represents the earlier stages of modernization, with functional differentiation just beginning and the unifying structures not yet operating very smoothly. The students push mass representation in politics and all-inclusive solutions to national problems, a pattern that might suit a diffuse and unspecialized traditional society or a very modern polity with fully developed political structures to absorb and transform undifferentiated demands into workable policy alternatives. The pattern is not suitable in the current political context of most Latin American republics.

As the number of self-sustaining interests which relate pragmatically in this corporative political process grows, the student *políticos* see their long-cherished influence waning. One-time dependent groups work out a *modus vivendi* with the traditional

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parties, affiliate with newer groupings, or pressure the political process without formal alliance with an organized political movement. In almost every case, when rapid change commences, the students withdraw whatever support they may have given the traditional political parties because to youth such parties represent specialized rather than all-inclusive national interests. With the evolution of a corporative decision-making pattern that excludes the unorganized masses and the student leaders who claim to represent them, not even the older challenging, national-integrating parties can hold all their student followers. The nucleus of such movements generally includes previously dependent popular-interest groups—organized labor, farm workers, storekeepers—under former student politicians. Although they recognize the theoretical need for complete national integration and social justice, and preserve a façade of nation-building in their party platforms and slogans, the rank-and-file members of the component units making up the older national integrating party are not terribly eager to incorporate new participants in the political process until their own very recent gains are fully consolidated.

To the students, this is betrayal of the abstract ideal of universalism. The politically less active students, especially those who reject the more radical parties and violence, tend to withdraw from politics, becoming alienated from the existing party system, which they see as a mockery of their idealistic expectations. All too often this carries over into later life, in terms not only of leadership in party politics, but of responsible political participation as well. If such persons relate to the ongoing political process at all, it is almost always through the specialized functional interests which are its component parts. Thus, they support a continuation of interest-group politics rather than an expansion of national integrating movements within the working political system.

Members of the most radical student-activist minority work outside the government system, turning more extreme in their demands so as to attract support that can satisfy the messianic political role they assign to themselves as *universitarios*. The national goals they announce become more and more amorphous, and the followers they try to recruit less politicized and much less amenable to organization and discipline for a common political end. Without any real base in numbers or influence, these radical activists seek to increase their chances for success by resorting to spectacular demonstrations of power through organized violence and other indications

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that they reject and hold in contempt the operating political-decision-making system.

Whether or not they act with this end consciously in mind, such actions place the student radicals beyond the pale of legitimacy. In the eyes of national political leaders, liberal or otherwise, these extreme manifestations of student political values represent a subsidiary system that is attempting to destroy the more general system from which it draws nourishment. Inevitably the rulers of the system under attack turn upon the subsystem, causing the student activists to become even more alienated and the less involved students to withdraw still another step from political participation. Occupation of university campuses by troops in Caracas, Bogotá, Rio, or Buenos Aires may be a necessary step in restoring the educational function to institutions of higher learning, but unless the action is accompanied by changes in the educational system and recognition of the need for effective national integration by the political system, it is a step that will be repeated over and over again until its causes are recognized and remedied.

Bibliographical Note

Most of the material in this study is a product of my own investigation and interviewing, but there are other sources that can add depth to what is offered here. In this bibliography, I shall limit reference to a few of the most relevant sources available in English.

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MYRON GLAZER

Student Politics in a Chilean University

Luis and His Friends

LUIS, ALONG with one hundred other students, enrolled in the School of History of the Pedagogical Institute (*Pedagogico*) in March, 1964.[1] Like the great majority of his peers, he had had little contact with political groups in secondary school, although he was aware of the struggles among the different national parties. He had even considered studying in the School of Law, the breeding ground of politicians, but feared that the entrance requirements were more difficult and the competition was keener. He also thought his lower-middle-class background would not afford him the contacts that were so useful in starting a professional practice. In the end, he decided he would have a more successful career in the teaching profession.

During his first days at the *Pedagogico*, Luis observed the spirited atmosphere in which advanced students gathered in front of the school to have long discussions, many of which derived from political agreements or differences. Luis was almost immediately beset by partisans of various political groups which handed out literature presenting their point of view or calling attention to articles in the national press. It was obvious to him that the divergent ideas were taken very seriously by the student groups in his school. These groups, student miniatures of national parties, were highly competitive.

Luis and all other first-year students were approached by the Christian Democrats, whose organization impressed him, as did their efforts in helping him with any problems in registering or getting oriented. Students of the University Leftist Movement (*Movimento Universitario Izquierdista* or MUI), who described their group as a leftist coalition including Communists, Socialists, and Independents, seemed to be less efficient in reaching incoming students. Luis was told, however, that they had a file on every history student and his political preference.

At the time Luis entered the university, the 1964 national presidential campaign had officially just begun. The candidate

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of the incumbent conservative coalition, the Democratic Front (*Frente Democratico*), had withdrawn in the aftermath of a defeat in a local election. There remained only the center-left Christian Democrats and the Socialist-Communist-dominated Popular Front (*Frente de Accion Popular* or FRAP) on the ballot. The two competing forces differed less in policy than in style and reputation. Their platforms were strikingly similar, especially in their general emphasis on the need for sweeping social change. Both, as opposition parties, could freely attack the incumbent regime.

The Christian Democratic Party adopted the slogan, "revolution in liberty," and stressed the need to democratize and modernize state and nation through extensive reform in all areas. It accused the FRAP of espousing a "revolution with dictatorship." The Party proposed participation by workers in industrial ownership and management, the fullest use and control of Chile's natural resources, and an end to the "power and privileges of accumulated money." Its program did not, however, advocate the nationalization of American-owned copper mines, as the FRAP's did. The FRAP claimed that Chile had too long been bled by North American copper companies whose operations were blatantly imperialistic. As long as foreign capitalists controlled the country's most vital resource, the leftist coalition bitterly predicted, Chile was doomed to remain a servant nation.

As the campaign progressed, Luis realized how difficult it was to remain neutral or aloof. The great contest stepped up the tempo of student political life and stimulated the recruitment and propaganda activities of student partisans, who worked to organize support not only in the university, but also in metropolitan Santiago.

Luis's friend Jaime was one of these ardent campaign workers. Jaime, who had been active in a political group in high school, decided, even before entering the School of History, to join the university affiliate of the same group. To Jaime, the highly politicized atmosphere of the school was a great attraction. An admirer of the FRAP candidate, Senator Salvador Allende, and strongly influenced by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, Jaime believed that student radicals had an important part to play in the modernization of his country. He reminded Luis that the Student Federation (*Federacion de Estudiantes de Chile* or FECH) had been very active in politics for over fifty years, struggling to overcome the inequalities and injustices of Chilean society. Jaime argued that the student's privileged position in Chile, a country with so many pressing problems, *obliged* him to engage in social and political action; for a student to concentrate on his studies and professional training could only be a betrayal of the suffering masses. Jaime rejected the view that student organizations should only be concerned with school issues, such as housing or financial

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aid. He denied that university political groups were merely party tools. He also disagreed with those who believed that students could never be politically relevant and, to illustrate his case, reminded Luis of the front-page newspaper coverage recently given a meeting held between a high government official and the leaders of FECH to discuss the nation's border dispute with Argentina. Jaime also maintained that student political work in the urban slums and rural areas could help awaken the people to their needs and rights. Urging Luis to accompany him on such a mission the following Saturday, Jaime said: "See the waste of our precious resources and tell me that Chile does not need a social revolution. Look at the poverty and try to side with those who speak of 'democracy' and moderation. Talk to our Chilean *rotos* ["broken ones"] and tell me you cannot fight our exploiting aristocracy. Don't discuss the rights of the 500,000 who live in the gracious Chile known by tourists and visitors. Speak instead of the millions who go hungry in spite of rich soil, who drown in squalor while we attend our lovely schools."

Rosa, another good friend of Luis, responded quite differently to the campus political environment. Unlike Jaime, she came from a secondary school in the northern province of Coquimbo, and the world of politics was strange to her. She realized it was difficult not to identify with a political group, but her inherent dislike of political activity was so strong that she was alienated by all the attempts to recruit her and by the political chicanery she saw going on in the school. Although she was aware of the many problems facing the teaching profession—the lack of good jobs in the cities, the poor pay, and the low prestige—she rejected political agitation as the answer. A conscientious student, she was disturbed by the chronic strikes that plagued the *Pedagogico;* good training, she thought, was most essential if she were ever to help her future students.

Luis understood the two opposing views of his friends and felt caught in the middle. He began to understand better the great rivalry between the two major groups. They seemed to have almost the same number of members and were continually battling for the sympathies and votes of the uncommitted.

Through his many conversations with other students, Luis became aware that although few actually joined the groups, about one half were strong sympathizers. As he began to spend more and more time in political conversations, he saw that in the School of History the MUI appeared slightly stronger than the Christian Democrats. This was somewhat unusual, for, both in the *Pedagogico* and in the university-wide offices, the Christian Democrats retained most of the major positions. The strength of the MUI in his school, in fact, had led a few of his classmates to identify more closely with the Christian Democrats than they ordinarily would have; some had even become members primarily for this reason. One of his friends explained: "The Marxists are very strong in

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this school, and since I am in sympathy with the Christian Democrats, I feel I should actively support them." The competition between the two major groups markedly increased the high degree of politicization of the school. Since each feared the other would gain an undue advantage, both tended to define all issues on the campus in highly political terms.

This situation was intensified as the presidential campaign became a widening spiral of claim and counterclaim, charge and countercharge. Under the pressure of such exchanges and because of the similarity of the two programs, partisan allegiances were personalized. Each candidate—Eduardo Frei for the Christian Democrats and Salvador Allende for the FRAP—had developed a substantial personal following over the years. Although there were some instances of personal attacks on the candidates themselves, much more energy was devoted to villifying the supposed "real powers behind the thrones." There was a strong attempt to associate the FRAP coalition with Communist domination and to depict the Socialist Allende as a pawn whom the Communists would soon dispose of, were he elected, in order to set up their own dictatorship. Guilt by association also became a major FRAP weapon, particularly after the right-wing parties gave their support to Frei. A flood of headlines in the Communist press linked various *latifundistas* (large landowners) and "exploiters" with Frei and his party. Attempts were even made to associate the Christian Democratic candidate with Fascism and with a small Nazi group that supported him as the lesser of two evils. Not only were drastic attempts made to discredit the opposition, but also each group worked to widen the base of its own support. Ideological consistency became far less important than victory. Each national coalition attempted to build its own positive image, by portraying its opposition as representing narrow and alien interests.

As he followed the course of the campaign, Luis, like many of his peers, became increasingly aware of Chile's social and economic problems and the programs proposed to remedy them. Yet, none of the current student groups attracted him. He would have preferred a group with an independent approach and without a commitment to a national political leader. He believed that Chile needed students dedicated to solving national problems, but not overly committed to any particular party. In the relatively partisan atmosphere of the School of History, Luis's views were in the minority. In many other schools, however, a majority of the students believed that all the existing groups were too involved in *politiqueria* ("dirty politics") to merit the students' support. They felt they should try to make their contribution as intelligent, unaffiliated critics of society. Many were simply uninterested in politics. Others were politically concerned, but critical of the

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politicians' behavior and unconvinced by the campaign rhetoric. They thought that little was to be gained through partisan action on behalf of an existing political alternative.

Luis's good friend Hector, who was studying in the School of Engineering, observed that very few students at his school had actually joined a political group and that the number of the sympathizers seemed relatively small. The School of Engineering seemed to lack the "leftist" flavor of the School of History, for the Christian Democrats controlled the elective student offices and enjoyed much more sympathy than the MUI. In both schools, a few ideologically committed activists set the tone for a large majority of sympathizers and noninvolved students. This led Luis and Hector to complain about the overpoliticization of the schools. Even many of the sympathizers of both major groups felt that the political activity had deteriorated into machinations, factionalism, and manipulations, instead of leading to serious efforts to solve university and societal problems. Generally, however, Christian Democratic and noninvolved students believed overpoliticization and *politiqueria* to be more of a problem in the university than did the FRAP supporters.

As Luis's experiences in the School of History differed from those of his friends in engineering, so did they diverge from those of young Chileans entering the School of Medicine. Roberto, a first-year medical student, was well aware of the social problems of his country. This was, in fact, one of the reasons why he had decided upon a career in medicine. Yet, it was also obvious to him that his major challenge in the next few years would be to learn the basic materials in the biological sciences. Together with the majority of his classmates, he realized that becoming a good doctor had to be his primary concern.

From what other students had told him, Roberto knew that professional commitment and political interest were kept quite separate at the Medical School. The classroom was a place where medical knowledge was imparted and learned. Politics had to be put aside at the door. While other schools might be affected by strikes, the medical students had to remember that their major responsibility was to their work.

Roberto was not, however, oblivious to the political activity going on around him. He listened to many discussions in the cafeteria and read the propaganda posted in the halls. As in all other schools, when the FECH elections approached, heated arguments broke out between MUI supporters and the Christian Democrats. Roberto learned that in recent student elections his school had voted for the Christian Democrats, but that more than one class delegate and sometimes even the school's student president had come from the opposing group.

Roberto also noticed an important change in the attitudes of many medical students as they advanced through the school. They tended to become more confident of their ability to com-

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plete the required work and surer that some day they would be doctors. They grew more concerned with the broader problem of effecting change in the society, and began to think that they could make only a limited contribution through technical competence alone. As students went through the medical training program, their interest in politics sharpened, and they moved to the left. Increasingly, they found it difficult to separate the professional from the political, believing that government policy strongly affected medical progress throughout Chile.

Indeed, when asked whether it was more important to gain technical competence or to participate in attempts to bring about social change, a high percentage of student-doctors chose the latter. Students at the end of their medical or engineering training seemed the least convinced of the primary importance of their studies. Chilean students, generally, saw the intake of technical knowledge as the primary rationale of university study (Table 1). Yet as they drew closer to accepting full professional responsibilities, many became less sure that this was the best way to contribute to social progress.[2]

Student Political Partisanship: Origins and Content

Several characteristics influenced the nature and degree of a student's political involvement. Among the more outstanding factors were religion, socio-economic background, and previous political participation in secondary school. It is quite clear, for example, that those who defined themselves as practicing Catholics had a strong tendency to identify with the Christian Democratic Party and to indicate little preference for the FRAP. Conversely, students who had no religious affiliation, and who were politically involved, tended to give their support to the FRAP.

Furthermore, those who had joined political youth groups in secondary schools were much more likely to continue such involvement in the university. A number of students indicated that they had first become interested in politics through the social-action programs sponsored by the Catholic high schools.

Both inclination toward involvement and political preference were influenced by social-class background. Recruitment of children from lower-middle- and working-class families to the university tends to increase the number for whom university politics is an important concern.[3] This relationship does not, however, necessarily result from their inability to accommodate themselves to university life. More likely, politics is seen as an important means of changing an iniquitous social order and, simultaneously, as a way

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Table 1

Preference for Student Roles: Trainee vs Activist by School and Year

	History	*Engineering*	*Medicine*	*Physics*	*TOTALS*	*1st year*	*2nd–3rd years*	*4th–6th years*
Trainee	65 (61)	72 (68)	65 (64)	67 (20)	67 (213)	82 (84)	66 (70)	55 (59)
Activist	27 (25)	24 (23)	29 (29)	17 (5)	26 (82)	15 (15)	27 (29)	35 (38)
Others*	9 (8)	3 (3)	6 (6)	17 (5)	7 (22)	4 (4)	7 (7)	10 (11)
TOTALS	101 (94)	99 (94)	100 (99)	101 (30)	100 (317)	101 (103)	100 (106)	100 (108)

*Includes those who did not answer and those who rejected both roles.

of gaining a place in it. In countries like Chile, student politics is an excellent way to belong to society and yet be, or believe oneself to be, engaged in its transformation.

Students from lower-middle- and working-class families supported the Christian Democrats more than they did the FRAP. This was particularly true among those who had gained admission to the schools with high social prestige, such as engineering and medicine. These students seemed to be influenced by the promise of substantial economic comfort and social recognition.

Our most important finding concerning student political affiliation is the consistency between the fathers' political views and those of their children. Of the students who said their fathers supported right-wing parties, 71 per cent were neither for the Christian Democrats nor the FRAP (Table 2). Many said they favored no political group in the forthcoming national election, but indicated in subsequent questions positive support for the incumbent conservative government of Jorge Alessandri. Sons of right-wing fathers were the single largest group implicitly or explicitly supporting the Alessandri regime.

Striking generational continuity can also be seen in the case of the FRAP and Christian Democratic supporters. Sixty-one per cent of the students whose fathers favored the FRAP had the same preference. Significantly, among those whose fathers identified with the Christian Democrats, only 4 per cent hoped for a FRAP victory; the

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Table 2

Students' Political Preferences* by Fathers' Political Preferences

STUDENTS	*Christian Democrats*	*Center*	*Right*	*Radical*	*FRAP*	*Independent*	*Unknown or Unavailable*	*TOTALS*
	FATHERS							
Christian Democrats	57 (41)	33 (1)	21 (9)	21 (12)	20 (10)	10 (1)	32 (27)	32 (101)
FRAP	4 (3)	— —	7 (3)	35 (20)	61 (30)	40 (4)	13 (11)	22 (71)
None or Other	39 (28)	67 (2)	71 (30)	44 (25)	18 (9)	50 (5)	55 (46)	46 (145)
TOTALS	100 (72)	100 (3)	99 (42)	100 (57)	99 (49)	100 (10)	100 (84)	100 (317)

*Students' political preference here and in Table 3 means preference for a national political group.

majority (57 per cent) duplicated their fathers' political position.

The children of supporters of the Radical Party represent a special case. Over the past decade, the Radical Party had lost almost all its influence among university students and had grown increasingly inept on the national scene, though it continued to maintain a tight grip over the large bureaucracy through very extensive patronage. Frequently, the children of Radical fathers rejected the Radical Party not because of its ideology, but because of its ineffectiveness. It was not inconsistent with their fathers' reformist ideology that many of these students embraced the programs of the left-wing parties. This was, no doubt, a major factor among many of the 35 per cent who supported the FRAP. Given the strong secular tradition among the Radicals, allegiance to the Christian Democrats was predictably smaller (21 per cent).

Our findings fully support a conclusion of Frank Bonilla's study of FECH leaders during the mid-1950's.[4] He noted a strong coincidence between the political affiliations of Chilean student leaders and those of their fathers.

> [This coincidence helps] to explain the generally moderate tone of university politics and FECH action in this final period. The powerful psychic charge of intergenerational or parental conflict does not seem to be an important motivating factor behind the political activities of

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most of today's student leaders. Insofar as this works in favor of a more rational and unemotional attack on political problems, it favors the development of the technical, managerial approach associated with the "bargaining interest group" or the reformer rather than the intransigence of the agitator or revolutionary.[5]

Students reflect in their political attitudes both the current center-left trend in Chilean politics and the relatively substantial influence of their fathers. Contemporary student politics, strongly reformist in tone, enjoys considerable support in Chilean national life. The integration of student with national politics in Chile both mirrors and serves to reinforce political stability while simultaneously inhibiting independent student action.

Student Political Attitudes: A Profile

Although Chile is one of the most developed countries in Latin America, it suffers from severe agricultural problems, growing urban slums, and serious health and educational deficiencies. The difficulties of economic development are aggravated by Chile's precarious position in the international market. Most students were deeply aware of this situation, but differed in their selection of the most important factor inhibiting national development.

Respondents were asked to list what they considered the most formidable barriers to national progress. Their selections can be loosely clustered into four groups: deficiencies inherent in the character of Chilean people; the significance of personal contacts rather than competence; foreign imperialism; and an internal monopoly by an elite, requiring basic structural changes amounting to a social revolution.

Students consistently emphasized structural causes for Chile's impeded development; in fact, 44 per cent considered this the most important factor. There were no striking differences in this result by school, but entering students tended to stress these aspects less than their more advanced colleagues. Only 19 per cent of the total sample blamed the actual character of the Chilean people, while 25 per cent pointed to a still potent remnant of traditional Chilean society—the ascriptive, highly personal character of national life. These students urged a shift toward achievement as the sole criterion of personal advancement. The overwhelming majority felt that performance and competence should be the prime criteria in attaining professional success. Many were aware that the realities of the Chil-

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ean marketplace diverged greatly from this ideal, which accounts for the very large number of students who cited this as a major problem.[6]

Finally, only 8 per cent named imperialism as the major obstacle to Chile's progress.[7] The much-publicized controversy over the United States-owned copper mines would have led one to predict far greater emphasis on this factor. Attacks on imperialism were, however, associated with the extreme partisan left, and especially with the Communists, during the 1964 electoral campaign, which may have led many students to shun this choice.

The largest segment of the students fell into a center-left category. They emphasized basic structural factors as the greatest obstacle to Chilean progress, but not to the exclusion of other, less radical causes. These responses indicate that there existed a void between students' beliefs and their degree of political involvement. While many students were quite aware of the severity of national social problems, they strongly resisted the call for political action. Some students were cynical about the possibility of implementing proposed solutions. Others were suspicious of the motivations of the activists. Nonetheless, the widespread belief in the necessity of social change certainly strengthened the position of those students who saw no alternative to direct political action. Their control of major student organizations and their ideological fervor were reinforced by the political tendencies of the large majority of their fellow students. Even though this majority may have been uninvolved and, in some cases, highly critical of certain aspects of student politics, they still provided the proper climate for the dominance of activist influence during a time of national political crisis. In their over-all goals, the student activists represented most of their peers.

Further evidence of the center-left tendencies of the student body came in response to a question asked of those with a stated national-party preference: "What should be the general policy of the government of your choice should it come to power?" The students divided almost evenly between those who preferred a policy of "substantial" reforms (45 per cent) and those who desired a more radical alternative of "structural" changes (43 per cent). Only 12 per cent believed "moderate" reforms would suffice.[8] By political preference, the FRAP students (65 per cent) most often proposed "structural" changes. Among the Christian Democrats, on the other hand, "substantial" reforms (52 per cent) were more frequently supported than "structural" changes (34 per cent). Thus, the students gen-

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erally viewed Chile's problems as largely structural and called for changes in the social order that ranged from the substantial to the sweeping.

Students with a stated preference for a national political group were asked to recommend a course of action for their party should it fail to win power through the ballot box in the near future. Only 7 per cent advocated the use of extra-electoral means, and almost all of these students were FRAP supporters. Ninety-nine of the 101 Christian Democrats, whose party went on to win the presidential election in 1964, preferred to remain in the legal opposition in the event of a failure at the polls.

A second question testing commitment to the democratic process divided the students far more sharply. They were asked: "Do you think that any group, no matter how detrimental you believe its policies to be, should be allowed to assume office if it wins the next presidential election?" Again, a majority chose to respect the outcome of the election, but 38 per cent answered negatively or were undecided (Table 3). Although the students were not formally asked to specify which groups they would deprive of electoral victory, informal conversations showed the objectionable groups to be the Nazis and the Communists. For some students, particularly in the School of Physics, the prospect of any Nazi in power was complete anathema. Some of these students were sons of Jewish refugees who

Table 3

Should Any Group That Wins Be Allowed to Take Office? By School and Year

	History	*Engineering*	*Medicine*	*Physics*	*TOTALS*	*1st year*	*2nd–3rd years*	*4th–6th years*
Yes	61 (57)	56 (53)	69 (68)	57 (17)	62 (195)	57 (59)	61 (65)	66 (71)
No	22 (21)	25 (23)	18 (18)	33 (10)	23 (72)	26 (27)	22 (23)	20 (22)
Undecided	15 (14)	19 (18)	13 (13)	10 (3)	15 (48)	16 (16)	16 (17)	14 (15)
Other	2 (2)	— —	— —	— —	0 (2)	1 (1)	1 (1)	— —
TOTALS	100 (94)	100 (94)	100 (99)	100 (30)	100 (317)	100 (103)	100 (106)	100 (108)

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had fled from Hitler. Although the Nazis were not an issue in the 1964 presidential election, Jorge Prat, an extreme right-winger associated with Fascist ideas, had been a candidate for a short time. This threat, perhaps heightened by the history of an active Nazi movement in Chile in the 1930's, did generate some fear on the part of those already sensitive to this issue.

There is little doubt, however, that the major group at issue was the Communist Party. The victory of a Communist-supported coalition (the FRAP) in the presidential election was a real and frightening possibility to some students. Many of those who felt that Chile could never recover from a "Communist-type" government were willing to exclude the Communists from their definition of democracy.

A breakdown by degree of political activity is particularly revealing in regard to a student's commitment to democracy (Table

Table 4

Should Any Group That Wins Be Allowed to Take Office?
By Position on Political Activity-Attitude Scale and Political Preference

	Active Partisans[a]	*Critical Sympathizers*[b]	*Non-involved*[c]	*TOTALS*	*Christian Democrats*	*FRAP*	*None or Other*
Yes	69 (61)	62 (94)	51 (40)	62 (195)	73 (74)	63 (45)	52 (76)
No	19 (17)	26 (40)	19 (15)	23 (72)	15 (15)	24 (17)	28 (40)
Undecided	10 (9)	11 (17)	28 (22)	15 (48)	12 (12)	11 (8)	19 (28)
Other	1 (1)	— —	1 (1)	0 (2)	— —	1 (1)	1 (1)
TOTALS	99 (88)	99 (151)	99 (78)	100 (317)	100 (101)	99 (71)	100 (145)

[a]Students who stated they were leaders in, members of, or sympathizers wholly in accord with a particular university political group.

[b]Those who sympathized with one group, but expressed strong reservations either about it or about the usefulness of any kind of political involvement, or who did not sympathize with any university group, but voiced a distinct preference for one of the national parties and voted for its campus affiliate in the student elections.

[c]Those who claimed no political affiliation, defined themselves as having no interest in politics, and showed no consistent voting pattern.

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4). The activists (69 per cent) are the most democratic, while the politically uninvolved students are both the most uncertain (28 per cent) and the least affirmative (51 per cent) in upholding the electorate's right to decide. This pattern undoubtedly reflects strong anti-Communist feelings among the politically inactive students. There were also significant differences between the FRAPists and the Christian Democrats. We had predicted that the former would have most strongly defended the democratic process since they stood to lose the most by the hardening of a "military coup" mentality. On a national level, the FRAPists had attempted to expose every form of this kind of thinking. Yet, paradoxically, 11 per cent of the FRAPist students stated that they were "undecided," and 24 per cent answered negatively. The intense struggle for political power seems to have had a detrimental effect on Chilean democratic thought. The FRAP supporters apparently feared that a "reactionary" government could destroy the power which they had struggled so hard to attain. The nonaligned students would have presumably preferred a temporary limitation on democratic action rather than risk the dangers of an "extremist" government. The Christian Democrats, whose ideology precluded the use of force, resisted somewhat more successfully the expedient of denying political opponents the prerogatives which one cherished for oneself. The students' responses to the two questions on political means accurately reflected Chile's democratic political system and its simultaneous history of occasional military intervention and repressive government action.

Although the intensity and extent of student involvement vary considerably by school, three basic groups can be identified in the Chilean university: a minority of leaders and activists, a much larger group of sympathizers, and a third group, roughly equal in size to the activists, with little interest in politics. A considerable number in all three groups are concerned with the overpoliticization of the university.

The effectiveness of student political groups in asserting their power is very much affected by the nature of the learning experience in each school. Thus, political activity is limited by the difficulty of a medical student's course demands, the obligations of hospital work, and the insistence by many professors that politics be kept out of the classroom. In the School of History, on the other hand, the disadvantageous position of the student's future career as a teacher, the subject matter of the courses, and the free time

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resulting from limited academic requirements reinforce the attractions of politics. Our findings support the hypothesis that the greater the curricular challenge, the lower the probability of student political activity. Thus, less demanding programs can allow increased political activity. This is especially true when political action can effect social change that will directly benefit relatively underprivileged professional groups.

Our data also lend weight to the view that the student political role is strongly influenced by the characteristics of transitional societies and their political institutions. The quality and amount of student political involvement seem to reflect the responsiveness of political institutions and the strength of the various groups representing major interests. The more rigid the institutions and the weaker the established interest groups, the greater is the students' political involvement. Students as a political force can be most effective in crisis situations. When political institutions fail or a vacuum in public leadership occurs, student leaders may suddenly find themselves enjoying national prominence and a real opportunity to influence the course of events.

In 1964, a wide variety of Chilean political parties were permitted to vie for political power without fear of repression. There was no dictatorship and no need to "mount the barricades." Major sectors of the population, including the most underprivileged, had important spokesmen at the national level. These leaders articulated the policies to which student activists responded. Disruptive action was not encouraged.[9]

Many students were active in the presidential campaign. The more astute among them were alert to the realities of political life in Chile and the shortcomings of its leaders. Should reforms—demanded by the students, promised by the politicians, and desperately needed by the people—fail to materialize, these active, dedicated students and their presently nonaligned peers may well serve as the fulcrum of future political change.[10]

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References

1. Although Luis, Jaime, Rosa, Hector, and Roberto cannot be found among the real life students of the university, the attitudes and experiences they typify can.

   Data on Chilean students were gathered in several ways. Contemporary Chilean newspaper and journal articles, as well as scholarly and government sources, were used to secure a picture of official and popular thinking on educational problems in general and the student's role in particular. Persons well acquainted with Chilean education, including social scientists, university professors, professional practitioners, and university students, were also relied on as informants. Finally, a lengthy interview schedule, drawn up during the first few months after our arrival in Chile in September, 1963, was utilized to tap the attitudes of a representative sample of university students.

   The interview schedule covered family and educational background, professional training experiences and attitudes, political background and experiences, and political attitudes. The political questions were developed almost entirely from our observations of Chilean life and politics in 1963-64. The schedule was pretested and discussed at great length with Chileans of all political persuasions to ensure that our queries focused on those matters considered most relevant by local observers.

   The actual interviews were conducted—over half by the author and his wife, the remainder by Chilean assistants—with students in four schools of the University of Chile, the largest and most important university in the country. These schools train students in fields that are essential for national development: medicine, engineering, secondary-school (history) teaching, and physics.

   Seventy-five per cent of the School of Physics' 40 students were interviewed. History had approximately 250 students; the number interviewed there was somewhat less than 40 per cent. The sample in Medicine represented about 8 per cent of 1,225 students. In Engineering, with almost 1,500, the sample represented around 6 per cent. All samples were stratified by year and randomly drawn. The interview schedule appears in Myron Glazer, "The Professional and Political Attitudes of Chilean University Students" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), Appendix II. Chile has seven state-recognized universities with a total enrollment of over twenty-five thousand students. The University of Chile accounts for almost half of this number. The bulk of the universities are concentrated in the major cities of Santiago and Valparaíso, although the University of Concepción is located well to the south. The Roman Catholic Church supports two universities whose combined en-

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rollment consists of one fourth of the higher-education enrollment. In the past, the most important student political activity has been in Santiago, although left-wing influence has been quite strong in Concepción. A comparable study there might well find a high degree of student political involvement. An investigation at the Catholic universities, however, would probably yield findings indicative of the higher social-class background of the students and of their more conservative political views. For an overview of Chilean higher education, consult Clark C. Gill, *Education and Social Change in Chile* (Washington, D. C., 1966). Our analysis will focus on students in the Schools of History, Engineering, and Medicine. For further discussion of the School of Physics, see Myron Glazer, "Field Work in a Hostile Environment: A Chapter in the Sociology of Social Research in Chile," *Comparative Education Review,* Vol. 10 (June, 1966), pp. 367-76. Professional socialization in these schools is discussed at length in the author's article, "El proceso de socializacion profesional en cuatro carreras chilenas," *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología,* Vol. 2 (November, 1966), pp. 333-67.

2. In the study of comparative student activity, there is a dearth of material collected over time. Since the drop-out rate is usually quite high, statements about the differences among students at different points of their training must be made with great caution. Panel studies would also be extremely useful in shedding light on the factors separating the successful from the unsuccessful degree seekers.

3. S. M. Lipset, "University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries," *Student Politics,* ed. S. M. Lipset (New York, 1967), p. 29.

4. Frank Bonilla, "The Student Federation of Chile; 50 years of Political Action," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* Vol. 2 (July, 1960).

5. Frank Bonilla, *Students in Politics: Three Generations of Political Action in a Latin American University* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), p. 257. Major sections of this work are soon to appear in Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer, *Students and Politics in Chile,* to be published by Basic Books.

6. For further discussion of this point, see M. Glazer, "The Professional and Political Attitudes of Chilean University Students," *Student Politics,* pp. 335-37.

7. The nature of the question may partially explain this result. While three of the twelve problems suggested fell into the "structural" category, only one cited imperialism. Of those students who did cite imperialism, 64 per cent were in the School of History. Many contemporary students, social scientists, and politicians are obviously concerned with the extent of United States influence in Chile. The type of suspicion which many students expressed about our project was one clear indicator. See M. Glazer, "Field Work in a Hostile Environment: A Chapter in the Sociology of Social Research in Chile." For an elaboration of this theme which focuses on the problems resulting from the demise of Project

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Camelot and the military sponsorship of overseas research, see M. Glazer and P. M. Glazer, "Los Chilenos y Los Gringos: Social Science Research and the Real World," *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología* (forthcoming).

8. The students were asked to choose one of three alternative answers: "make mild reforms"; "make major reforms, but preserve the general structural framework of Chilean society"; and "make major structural changes in the society."

9. This was most readily evident during the general strike in March, 1964, and the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba in August. Both the Christian Democrats and the FRAPists were intent on maintaining order to preclude any excuse for military intervention.

10. For an expanded treatment of the Chilean student situation, see the author's article in *Students and Politics in Developing Nations*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (to be published by Praeger in 1968).

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A. H. HALSEY AND STEPHEN MARKS

British Student Politics

The Significance of Activism

On a long view there is nothing novel about student involvement in civil disturbance. Histories of the medieval universities in Europe abound with records of violence. Here, taken almost at random, is an account of one such riot in Oxford—the battle of St. Scholastica's Day in 1354:

> All night the citizens from surrounding towns and villages poured into Oxford, thirsting to crush the hated clerics once and for all. . . . They caught certain scholars walking after dinner in Beaumont, killing one and wounding others. Then on into the University quarter itself, where the scholars defended themselves desperately, fighting from street to street, pouring their bolts and arrows from the windows of beleaguered houses. But the army of townsmen was not to be denied. The students were overwhelmed; their ranks broke, and the fight developed into a total rout. . . . For two days the mob rioted and pillaged and slew. . . . When the pillage was over, the University had vanished, seemingly never to return.[1]

This example of the traditional rift between "town and gown" serves as a reminder that the conflicts in which intellectual institutions are involved have taken many forms. Recent student newsworthiness is neither typically generated by such "town and gown" conflicts nor akin to the licensed horseplay of a panty raid on a sorority at Wisconsin. What is at stake is the legitimacy of university authority and a social system in which the university can promise privilege in exchange for what have been widely agreed to be minimal, reasonable, and undemanding conformities. These terms are acceptable to most students most of the time. The attention of the newspapers is, however, focused not on the majority, but on two minority cultures—the hippie and the activist.[2] Both are more or less radical rejections of what is pejoratively termed "the system."

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They stand together against a conformist majority oriented to a way of life the hippie would withdraw from and the activist would change. Though political scientists are concerned primarily with the activists, the withdrawal phenomenon has basic relevance to modern movements based on a theory of the impotence of politics.

The significance of activism is not one of simple arithmetic. It involves typically a "tip of the iceberg" conception of politics and centers on the legitimacy of the values the universities present and the functions they perform on behalf of the larger society. In this century, not only has the basis of recruitment widened, but the professional and managerial requirements of the industrial work force have been served more directly. In this sense, the university both represents "the system" as an opportunity structure and encompasses a medley of conflicting values in politics, religion, and sex. The university not only represents, but *is* the world for young people, as ever increasing enrollments make the campus the center of intergenerational conflict.

The more explosive of the recent disturbances seem to have occurred where internal friction allowed easy generalization to broader social discontents. It is for this reason that the British case is instructive: The twentieth-century history of student politics in England has been notably peaceable. Such imprecise evidence as is available suggests that a greater proportion of students were politically active in the thirties than are now. The characteristic internal organization—the English idea of a university—and the recognized existence of an organized political left together account for a relatively low level of campus activism, although both these "protections," internal and external, are weakening with consequent signs of an unfamiliar type of student movement.

The English Idea of a University

The English idea of a university is rooted historically in a combination of medieval commensality (the college) and the humanistic education of the governing classes.[3] This traditional form of educational institution provides for maximum solidarity between teachers and taught through the absence of a separate administration and an emphasis on close personal relations, achieved by means of tutorial teaching methods, high staff-student ratios, and shared domestic life. The ideal of university life embodied in this form of education precedes both the rise of specialization in scholarship and

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the widened social recruitment to professions associated with an industrial society. In its recent adaptation to the demands of industrialism, the English university has moved toward larger scale, more specialization, more impersonal instruction, and less collegiate social life. At the same time, the older traditions have resisted modernity: This resistance has been most successful in the ancient universities and least in the colleges of advanced technology. The student role, when defined in terms of these traditional norms, promotes a close identification with the college. More recent "meritocratic" tendencies in selection for the prestige universities have served to merge college identification with adherence to the intellectual purposes of the institution and, in this way, to heighten identification with the don.

The organizational changes associated with mass higher education—for example, the "multiversity" described by Clark Kerr—are scarcely in evidence in England yet. Apart from London, which is in any case a federal structure of more or less autonomous colleges, no universities approach the scale of the larger American campuses, the Sorbonne, or the University of Moscow. Student alienation from "Berkeley" conditions is not, or at least not yet, a feature of the English scene.[4] The traditional norms of staff-student relations seem to be threatened less by size and bureaucratic organization than by the changing career patterns of dons in relation to the expectations and mode of recruitment of the modern student.

But over and above these cohesive influences within the universities, there is a marked recent increase of political activism among students that is directed not so much against their teachers as against what they take to be incipient tendencies in governmental policy toward reduction of the autonomy of higher education, its functional separation in the interests of manpower needs, and expansion of student numbers by dilution of established standards of amenity and financial support. (There is a good deal of left-elitism in the British universities.)

Student Politics Before 1956[5]

The principal British student organization is the National Union of Students (NUS) with 366,000 members. There are also three main political organizations connected with the major national political parties: the National Association of Labour Student Organizations (NALSO), a federative organization of Labour and Socialist

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clubs with a membership fluctuating between seven and ten thousand and, until recently, a bilateral agreement with the Labour Party; the Federation of Conservative and Unionist Organizations (FUCUO); and the Union of Liberal Students, which claims a membership of ten thousand. These last two, unlike the first, are closely integrated with their parent parties, both ideologically and structurally.

The distinctively English idea of the nature of a university has affected the way in which the NUS has carried out its task of representing the interests of its student membership, and the views of its more political organizations concerning the relevance of their political positions to students. The contrast between the older universities, which have approximated the norm, and the relatively vocational realities of the "redbrick" universities provided the background from which the NUS emerged after World War I and in which it developed its combination of moderate methods and a purely university-limited orientation. This pattern of activity lasted almost unchallenged until advocates of student unionism on the European model recently demanded that NUS adopt methods similar to those of professional associations and white-collar and industrial-trade unions.

The work situation of the student can, of course, be described by reference to common location, ease of communication, and common economic situation. The weight of these factors is modified, however, not only by the transient nature of student status, but also by the special features of the student role in British universities. In contrast with the American or continental situation, entry to student status in Britain is formally selective; the role is sponsored in the sense that maintenance and graduation are almost universally guaranteed by a national system of scholarships. Few students drop out from the short (three years), full-time, and closely supervised program of study. The scope for "perpetual" or "professional" students as a "continuity staff" for student organization is, therefore, highly restricted.

The early history of the NUS clearly reflects these conditions.[6] Before 1914, the British Universities Congress had met annually in different universities, but was replaced after the war by the Inter-University Association. Both were entirely confined to "redbrick" universities and had no representatives from Oxford, Cambridge, or London. The NUS was formed from the IUA in 1922, a year after the first Prague conference of the *Confederation International des*

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Etudiants (CIE), from which English students had returned with the intention of forming a union that would combat the intransigent anti-German feelings of the French Union.[7] NUS, unlike the IUA, was "formed to include the student unions of every university and every university college in the country. Such an organization is novel to England only because the great majority of the universities are almost equally novel."[8]

From the outset, concern with concessions and reduced fares for foreign travel was a staple of NUS activity. (Even today this is the only reason most British students have any contact with their union.) The English Union took responsibility within the international organization for all travel arrangements, but apart from this confined itself to fostering various welfare services, a sanitarium, and a vacation employment scheme.[9]

In this early period, students as an organized body developed little or nothing in the way of a coherent theory of the role of the university or of the student. At their 1927-28 session, the Council and Executive of NUS did discuss "the formidable question of the purpose and value of a university education, and indeed of all education as practised in England at the present time,"[10] but the somewhat prim and hesitant turn of the phrases seems to indicate that this was considered an exceptional innovation for the Union.

Indeed, the topic had not come up for discussion at any time during the previous five years. Moreover, this occasion seems to have been an opportunity for an exchange of views rather than an attempt to formulate any general position on the part of the Union. No decisions were recorded, although the Union presidents attending voiced "a general complaint of prevailing apathy among undergraduates toward anything not strictly relevant to the acquisition of a degree; a too concentrated attention to the letter of the syllabus and an almost complete lack of imaginative purposeful enterprise in fields of inquiry not falling within the orbit of the final examination." This situation was thought to be the result of "the desire to obtain a final qualification that raises social status and probably remuneration; the necessity for reaching or maintaining scholarship standards; the need to have done as quickly as possible with preliminary training and become self-sufficient."

Some change in the narrowness of British student unionism appears to have taken place during the 1930's. This was partly a reflection within the universities of the heightened political consciousness of the period and, more specifically, a reaction to the economic

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depression. The minority of activists was almost certainly proportionately greater in the thirties than it has been at any time since (with the possible exception of the climax of the CND campaign in 1960). Activism of the left, led by the Communist Party, included attempts to define the student role as a vital element in the "class struggle," while that of the social democratic center was closely linked to support and criticism of the Labour Party platform. There was a complex series of splits, popular-front combinations, and realignments. Though students certainly participated in politics, they did not do so as students or for students. For example, in the General Strike of 1926 many volunteered as strikebreakers, but there is no evidence that they viewed this action as a distinctively student intervention. It was, rather, a response to "national emergency" by young citizens, and the participants were supported by university authorities. Thus in Oxford, which together with Cambridge was the main source of volunteers, university examinations were postponed to assist student strikebreakers.[11] While the university authorities forbade student involvement in the dispute in Oxford, as the local strike committee had requested them to do, they did not prevent nearly two thousand students from volunteering to work as dockers, busmen, or special constables in London and the provincial cities. There was also, it should be noted, a nucleus of university support for the strike, organized by G. D. H. Cole and his University Strike Committee. One undergraduate, Hugh Gaitskell, volunteered as a chauffeur between the Oxford Council of Action and the T.U.C. in London.

In the thirties, left-wing passions frequently reached a high pitch. The Oxford Union resolution of 1934, "That this house would in no circumstances fight for its King and Country," is well known. What is less often remembered is that this debating society also later passed the motion that "this house recognizes no flag but the Red Flag."

NUS affairs did not escape some influence from this general background of a politically "heroic" period. Insistence on the need to join NUS was, for example, a standard issue for the activist left in the Oxford and Cambridge colleges. Nonetheless, there were no fundamental changes in the aims, methods, or activities of the NUS. Brian Simon, a former president of the Union and a member of the Communist Party, came nearest to a new formulation, but it was not officially adopted as a policy statement even though it had been written at the invitation of the NUS.[12] Simon emphasized that the

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traditional system of higher education harbored a dichotomy between the narrow vocationalism of the "redbrick" universities and the "pure scholarship" in nonvocational academic subjects of the older universities. Student apathy was again decried, and the 1939 NUS Congress report stated: "In a university of about 2,000 students, only about 300 could be said to take a real interest and an active part in student activities."

According to Simon, this apathy derived partly from the student's situation in the university—the allegedly deadening nature of the curriculum and the effects of a nonresidential system on student social life. Also considered responsible were the class-biased nature of the selection system and the importance of university performance for future job prospects. Given this situation and the attitudes about the proper role of students implicit in the "English idea," student participation in organized political activity tended to appear only when external issues of national or international politics spread to the university or when developments directly affected the students themselves, albeit not in their capacity as students.

After World War II

The immediate postwar period saw a considerable increase in the numbers of students, due chiefly to an unexpected volume of applications for places by ex-servicemen. In October, 1945, a joint congress of the NUS and the Association of University Teachers demanded more, and more adequate, maintenance grants for students. This demand was largely met by 1947, except for a parental means test which the NUS continued to oppose. Periodic negotiations with the government about the financial value of state scholarships and discussions of them at NUS councils now became a regular feature in the activity of the Union.

By 1953, the trough of the postwar ex-servicemen "bulge" in university applications, the total number of full-time students at UGC-aided institutions had settled at 80,000, a considerable increase over the 1938-39 figure of 50,000.[13] The postwar period was one of right-wing trends in the universities, in reaction against the 1945 Labour Government and the egalitarianism associated with it.[14] This may have been linked with the recrudescence of a perennial strand of hostility among some British undergraduates toward student representative organizations that are seen as providing an opportunity for bureaucratic careerists to bury themselves

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in a form of activity associated more with industrial disputes than with the cloistered calm of the traditional English university.[15] These attitudes are found more frequently in universities than in other institutions of higher education. Thus, there was a spate of disaffiliations from the NUS in the early fifties, when the Manchester and Southhampton unions disaffiliated in protest specifically against the presence in the NUS of unions from colleges other than universities and university colleges.[16] (In the case of Manchester, the expense of affiliation was also mentioned.)

The New Left

The postwar decade, then, saw no student political movement that was based on the situation of the student in the university or was other than the activity within the university of national political organizations. Nor did the economic climate outside the university and its effects on graduate prospects serve to motivate student action, as it did during the 1930's. After 1956, however, new trends emerged on the national political left, and young people played an important part in them. Both the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the New Left declined before the emergence of the current wave of student radicalism,[17] but the organizations and attitudes they left behind had a considerable influence on student reactions to changes in the nature and role of the universities during the early 1960's.

The British New Left movement, as it existed between 1957 and 1962, had its origins in the political events of 1956 and grew in the atmosphere created by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the years after 1958.[18] The Hungarian Revolution and its suppression led to the foundation of the *New Reasoner* by a group of dissident Communists in northern universities who left the Party in protest. The Suez crisis generated considerable radical feeling among students, and from it emerged the Oxford-based *Universities and Left Review*. The two magazines merged in 1960 to form *New Left Review*. At its height, the movement associated with the *New Left Review* numbered some thirty or forty clubs in centers outside London and a variety of lecture, discussion, and study groups in London.

The main orientation of the movement was theoretical rather than practical. Politically, a running battle was waged with the chief theoreticians of Gaitskellism on such questions as the nature of modern capitalism, the workings of the Labour Party, and the theoretical perspective it should adopt. Culturally, the movement con-

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cerned itself with a critical analysis of the functioning of the mass media. This was most fully developed in the work of Raymond Williams and the report of the government's Pilkington Committee on radio and television, which appeared in 1962 and was strongly influenced by the New Left.

The subsequent development of the movement can perhaps be clarified by comparison with the American New Left. This latter movement, springing partly from the Negro struggle, has been influenced deeply by both the concurrent student reaction to the "multiversity" and the absence of any independent political tradition in the labor movement (particularly that of traditional socialism). These can be seen as causally related to the American New Left's alienation from established political institutions and also to its lack of any clear theoretical perspective. The British New Left, by contrast, generated and reinforced by a single-issue nuclear campaign that ultimately lost impetus, was confronted by the enigma of the Labour Party. The failure to follow up the momentary capture of the Party conference in 1960 and the decline of CND after 1962 led to a crisis in the movement. The absence of any mass base outside intellectual circles forced the different elements within the movement to come to terms with the Labour Party in one way or another, especially after the election in early 1963 of a reputedly left-wing leader of the Labour Party. The network of Left Clubs was disbanded or fell apart.[19] *The New Left Review* fell under the direction of a small group of intensely theoretical Marxist intellectuals, most from Oxford where some had been associated with a New Left student journal called *New University*. Modeling itself to some extent on Sartre's *Temps Modernes*, the magazine now consists almost exclusively of theoretical essays in neo-Marxist sociology and philosophy, together with detailed historical and sociological analyses of particular countries. Thus, its immediate political influence is not what it was in 1962, though as the chief English contact with West European Marxism, it may have a more diffuse and intangible influence.

The existence of a politically independent Labour movement is, therefore, one of the crucial factors differentiating student activism in Britain. Student concern about the subordination of higher education to the requirements of modern industrialization and a dissociation from the conventional channels of political action became important only in the last year or so. This change was a result of the joint impact of the post-Robbins expansion in higher education

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and the disillusion with the performance of the Labour Government. By that time, however, the influence of the New Left had dissipated.

NALSO and the Labour Party

Among the consequences of this change was a shift in the role of NALSO, which was taken over by the Left in 1958[20] and lost its former role as a recruiting ground for future members of the Labour Party elite.[21] The New Left period saw a growth in NALSO's strength from 1,500 in 1956 (mostly concentrated in Oxford and Cambridge), to 4,760 in 1960, and to some 6,000 or 7,000 by the mid-sixties.[22] Unlike the two other party organizations, NALSO was not formally integrated into the constitutional structure of the Party. It remained an independent organization with a bilateral agreement with the Labour Party and a financial grant subject to certain conditions. Because the organization is a loose federation of constituent clubs, its strength at the center is a function of the external provision of financial and administrative assistance and of the need felt by college activists for a national organization to co-ordinate radical student action. With the decline of CND and the concentration of the left on securing the return of a Labour Government, the need grew for increased assistance from the Labour Party if the organization was to consolidate the expansion that had taken place in the New Left period.

Here NALSO ran up against the Labour Party's perennial suspicions of all its youth organizations. This suspicion was reinforced by contemporary experience in the newly-founded Young Socialist movement, whose brand of radical politics was a source of embarrassment to the Labour Party's leaders.[23] This factor no doubt contributed to the Party's refusal to respond to NALSO's demand for assistance in reorganization, first put forward in November, 1963. Small clubs cannot survive without outside help, while the large ones have little need of NALSO as they are almost self-sufficient. Yet the interests of the national organization encourage recruitment of members from larger clubs where they can easily get assistance and encouragement, as well as political and administrative experience. The solution was seen to lie in a greatly improved system of regional organization, for which extra grants from the Party were requested. An appeal was made to the Party to give a new status to its student section:

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The universities are expanding both in numbers and in student population *now;* when Robbins' recommendations are enacted, expansion will of course proceed much faster. Nor are the new generation of university students the socially selective bunch they were as recently as 1939. The field for Labour Party proselytisation is no longer just the colourful and eccentric revolt of a few upper-class scions; university students represent a growing class, and a class whose votes are of great importance to the Party. They are now, or will be, the professional, managerial, and scientific middle class; they represent the new middle class in the affluent society [whose] votes were so significant in Orpington and Luton.[24]

These demands were not met. In the period between 1963 and the General Election of 1966, the Party gave extra assistance only when this was necessary to improve NALSO's contribution to its election work. After that, the Labour Party became even more unwilling to help. Thus, NALSO's attempts to call meetings in London on the future of the left, with Labour MP's and trade unionists on the platform, could not be publicized effectively and led merely to empty halls. Moreover, posters, circulars, and campaigns on any issue opposed to Party policy could not be sent out through the official administrative and secretarial facilities in Transport House. Consequently, there was no nationally effective student socialist movement after the return of Labour, a period of general disorientation among left-wing students and of expansion in higher education, which together stimulated a new wave of political activity in NUS—an organization recently changed beyond recognition and previously ignored by all but a handful of radical students.

NUS and the Radical Student Alliance

While the attention of the left in the universities shifted from CND to the return of a Labour Government and thence to directionless disillusion, the consequences of the Robbins Report began to be worked out as a fundamental reappraisal of the scope and size of higher education. Expansion of the system as a whole and the redefinition of status for Colleges of Education (for teacher training) and Colleges of Advanced Technology (as technological universities) led to a phenomenal increase in the membership of NUS—from 150,000 members in 250 colleges and universities in 1962 to 366,000 members in 700 colleges and universities in 1966.[25]

This increase in numbers was also accompanied by an increase in the scale of NUS activities. In 1962, the clause in the Union's constitution limiting discussion to student issues was altered to permit

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a general consideration of the whole area of education, although it still prevented the introduction of politics. *The Times* reported considerable feeling at the 1962 conference against the government's decision to cut back the rate of expansion of education as a part of the current economic freeze.[26] In the following period, the Union acquired or confirmed an expansionist and radical set of policies. It demanded the abolition of the means test on student grants, the crediting of students with national insurance, and expansion of student accommodation, health services, and extracurricular and recreational facilities. As new charters were prepared for Colleges of Advanced Technology to be transmuted into universities, the NUS drafted revised charters providing for student representation on disciplinary boards. This led to similar demands from older institutions, and the NUS adopted representation as a demand, issuing a pamphlet on "Student Participation in College Government." The 1966 NUS executive report refers ten times in different places to the question of participation.

Thus, a future treasurer of NUS could write in one of the irregularly appearing issues of NALSO's journal:

> The NUS is clearly changing its role from that of a club arranging cheap travel and varied concessions for its members to that of a union organized to defend and advance the interests of its members in all fields. Such a transformation successfully followed through could make a decisive difference to the British student movement, which has traditionally been one of the most apathetic and conservative in the world.[27]

This expansion of the scope of NUS policy represented, however, a "shift to the left" as a response to the expanded scale of education. The methods of action on which the Union relied remained unchanged, still emphasizing personal contacts with ministers and "respectability." Indeed it was over methods rather than objectives that the newly founded Radical Student Alliance clashed with the NUS executive.

The first issue over which radical opposition made itself apparent was the untypical question of the Union's international affiliations. IUS came under Communist control in 1948, and the NUS left it in 1950, after which the Union took an active part in the pro-Western International Student Conference. This was a loose federation of independent unions rather than a membership organization, and the question of the NUS joining it did not formally arise until 1965. The opposition to ISC did not come only from the small minority of Communists who had at various periods in the 1950's advocated

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a return to the IUS. A much broader spectrum of neutralist opinion felt that the political objectives of ISC (a general condemnation of "imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, militarism, and totalitarianism") were, however laudable, incompatible with the NUS ban on political commitment. Dispute also centered on the question of whether ISC was not just as firmly committed to the Americans as IUS was to the Communists. ISC defenders pointed out that a large majority of ISC affiliates were from developing or uncommitted countries, but opponents replied that most of these were members of IUS as well, a compromise course of action that was one of the widely canvassed alternatives to the executive's policy.[28]

More significantly, this controversy drew attention to the connection of past officers of NUS with the ISC and the Labour Party's administrative machinery. Both Transport House, especially its international department, and the ISC were alleged to provide jobs for retiring officers of the Union, and it was inevitably claimed that this affected the attitudes of NUS officials both to ISC and to the government.

The international issue marked the beginning of an *ad hoc* "popular front" of Labour, Liberal, and Communist students that led early in 1967 to the foundation of the Radical Student Alliance. All radical students found themselves acting together and against the Labour Government on such issues as Vietnam and Rhodesia, both as subjects of joint campaigns by the three organizations during 1966. The initiative for these joint campaigns came from the now thriving Union of Liberal Students, which benefited greatly from the disillusion with the government among left-wing students and from the periodic crises and general ineffectiveness of NALSO. Like the Conservative, but unlike the Labour students, the Liberals are well integrated into the structure of their parent Party. The weakness and heterogeneity of the Liberal Party enable the students in alliance with the Young Liberals to have a greater effect on the policies of that Party than either of the other two have on theirs. With the help of some adroit manipulation in the selection of delegates, this youthful influence succeeded in pushing the 1966 Brighton Conference into more left-wing positions on a number of issues (especially workers' participation in industry, which was central to the semisyndicalist inclinations of what are called the Liberal "Red Guards").

The beginning of February, 1967, saw the founding conference of the Radical Student Alliance, a demonstration at the London

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School of Economics protesting the principal's ban on a meeting called to consider direct action against the appointment of Walter Adams as the new principal, and a lobby of Parliament by four thousand students against a government decision to raise the fees charged to visiting students. The first of these events has been linked with either or both of the other two.

The events at the LSE were due, at least in part, to factors peculiar to that institution. The LSE is unique in England, as it is perhaps the only significantly "new" university of the post-Victorian period. It has always attracted a minority of left-wing students with serious political and intellectual preoccupations. These students are anxious to translate political ideas into immediate action and are, therefore, apt to become disappointed in their environment and their seniors. They are, for example, especially proud of the multi-racial traditions of "the School," and are likely to consider it a betrayal of LSE's values to appoint anyone but the most extreme and militant opponent of racial discrimination as Director of the School. At the same time, the LSE is a college that approaches more nearly the anonymity of the American "multiversity" than most other English institutions and suffers from a breakdown of student-staff relations. As one observer wrote:

> To counterpose those *in loco parentis* and *in statu pupillari* is outdated in the same way as, but rather more than, the simple model of the "two sides of industry." If students are the academic proletariat, one can distinguish a salariat in the form of lecturers, technicians, research workers, and other "staff"—and a managerial class distinct from the ultimate employers. With students lobbying (as they did last year) to demand more pay for lecturers, and with vice-chancellors now opposing Mr. Crosland on the issues of overseas students' fees, the lines are less clearly drawn than they might seem to those who think in terms of "authorities" and "rebels." If the idea of the academic community is valid, this is how it should be.[29]

The connection between the issue of overseas students' fees and the central "student syndicalist"[30] concerns of the Radical Student Alliance is closer than may appear at first. The method of implementing the increase alarmed many senior members of the universities. They felt it impinged on the independence of the universities, while many students saw it as a dress rehearsal for the introduction of loans as a partial substitute for, or alternative to, grants. The government tried to justify the increase in terms of the necessity to give priority to British students, but opponents objected to this rationale because more British students were studying in

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foreign universities than foreign in British. They considered the action not only a concealed cut in overseas aid, but also a sign of the increasingly vocationalist spirit in the government's rationalization and expansion of higher education.

The binary system of nonuniversity and university institutions of higher education was attacked as if Mr. Crosland had invented it to replace the invidious differentiation of secondary schools that progressive supporters of expansion were determined to eradicate. These developments were thought to be symptomatic of the trend toward a subjection of traditional university freedoms to the needs of a more complex, more technological and increasingly planned and integrated society. The definition of this conflict takes an extreme form when expressed by one RSA supporter as resistance to the conversion of institutions of higher education into "battery farms for broiler technicians." But the sense of crisis is conveyed even in the official NUS newspaper:

> British students have always been remarkably unpolitical. . . . This tradition will end; universities and colleges are having to account for themselves to the public, to answer the nation's needs. . . . There is a very great choice to be made. Are the people we produce to answer the public need going to be technicians, executives with enough "liberal culture" to talk with their bosses' wives or to "understand" how the workers feel?. . . Or are we to make full use of a new opportunity. . . with students in a more public setting able to attain a broad accomplishment, a political and cultural awareness and activity?[31]

RSA and NUS agree upon broad aims, but the former is concerned more with the "grass-roots" and the mobilization of mass student support through demonstrations and petitions. This difference was well brought out in an exchange at the April, 1966, NUS Council:[32]

> "As NUS policy categorically condemned the system in higher education, it might have done more to make it public. There were two sides to any campaign against the binary system; one was to try and get the public on their side," said Mr. Fisk (vice president). "The brief statement against it circulated at this council would afterwards be published in a form suitable for the public."

Or as a member of the RSA Council put it:

> One of the fundamental weaknesses of the Executive (and RSA's corresponding strength) is its refusal to think in terms of mass political action. The NUS leaders have an elitist and very over-dimensional picture of the student's little slot in society. . . . There is an indefinable middle-aged quality about the NUS leadership which alienates the young student.

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Changes in the origin and destination of the British student would by themselves be sufficient to pose a profound challenge to the traditional "English idea" of a university.

> Second World War students engaged in higher education only constituted 2.7 per cent of their age group. By 1967, however, this had risen to 11 per cent. Students are still an elite group, but their social destination has shifted. The university no longer provides the almost automatic entrance into an elite professional class. Now a much larger and less exclusive social strata demands degree qualification. The prewar university pre-eminently prepared its members for law, medicine, church, or civil service. In the modern university, the predominant goals of students are bifurcated between industry and further academic research. This changing social function of the university is partly reflected in the growth of new subjects—in particular, sociology, a discipline still socially unmoored from professional needs. It is significant that much of the leadership in the LSE revolt came from students in the sociology faculty.[33]

Radical students have interpreted these changes as symptoms of a subordination of higher education to the manpower needs of a changing industrialism. Their impact on the immediate situation of students has provoked both local and national conflict.

In the most widely publicized of these local conflicts, that at the London School of Economics, original demands and grievances of a limited and "liberal" kind mushroomed into widespread feeling among the students that broader political and social trends were at stake.[34] The exact mode of this generalization was affected by a number of factors highly specific to the LSE, which may suggest that the events, however spectacular, will remain unique. These factors include the peculiarities of the administrative structure of the LSE, which places full power in a board of governors, none of whom were fully engaged in the work of the School and large numbers of whom had outside contacts in industry and commerce; the physical layout of the School; overcrowding and lack of student-staff contact; and the various tactical mistakes of the authorities. Nevertheless, the factors peculiar to the LSE do not restrict the relevance of the events there. Radical students, both at LSE and at other colleges and universities, interpret these special factors not as "causes," but as common conditions clearly visible within LSE, though less immediately perceived elsewhere. Thus, generalization from the LSE example is a possibility. A noticeable feature of the LSE conflict was the participation of students from other universities and colleges. Definitions of the situation "imported" by foreign students, especially Americans, were acceptable only

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because they corresponded with existing fears about the future development of policy toward higher education in Britain and with the immediate needs of the conflict in LSE. For example, a proposal for a "free university" in the LSE buildings during the vacation was organized and particularly advocated by a group of American postgraduates. The suggestion was taken up at a particular stage in policy discussions in the Union meetings because it was useful to counter the extreme demand for continuation of the sit-in through the vacation without advocating what seemed like a retreat.[35] It also continued a previous student concern with control over the content of the syllabus.

The "political culture" shared by student radicals in institutions of differing kinds and the organizational links between them will determine, to a great extent, whether a local conflict will develop into a national issue. There is no sign as yet of any tendency for the attitudes of student radicals in any of the constituent groupings of RSA to be differentiated by the type of institution.[36] This can, to some extent, be attributed to a common political background shared by many activists before arriving in their respective institutions—CND, Young Socialists, or Young Liberals. As one member of the RSA Council said at the founding convention: "We all cut our political teeth in the New Left." As yet no research has been done on this aspect, nor is it clear what consequences might result from the decline of CND and the New Left, from the Labour Party's purging of the Young Socialists, or from the apparent spread of the apolitical hippie culture among teen-agers at the possible expense of the active political concerns of their immediate predecessors.

Recent changes in higher education have begun to undermine the traditional English notion of the university and its normative hold over student conduct, but no clearly stated alternative concept of the status and purpose of higher education has taken its place. The ability of the British Radical Student movement to be anything more than a spasmodic reaction to the period of transition is connected with its ability to elaborate its own alternative concept of a university. It has not yet done so. Meanwhile, there is a tendency for the traditional idea to be defended along left-elitist lines against the impact of "technocratic reform."[37]

Even if such a critique were elaborated, its political and organizational consequences could vary between the "American model" and the "French model" of an "official" students' union captured by the left.[38] Trends are present in both directions, and the future

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is indeterminate. But because student radicals consider their conflicts with university authority part of the question of the legitimacy of the total social system, the development of the British radical student movement will ultimately be bound up with both the future shape and organization of higher education and the future of the British left.

REFERENCES

1. N. Schachner, *The Medieval Universities* (New York, 1962), pp. 204-05.
2. It is necessary to use the term *culture* here. Conformists, hippies, and activists are styles of persona available to the young at and around the university. They may adopt each in turn, wholly or in part, or vacillate between them.
3. A. H. Halsey has examined the English idea of a university in "British Universities," *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1962), pp. 85-102; "University Expansion and the Collegiate Ideal," *Universities Quarterly* (December, 1961); "A Pyramid of Prestige," *Universities Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (September, 1961); "The Academic Hierarchy," *Universities Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (March, 1964).
4. See, for example, Bryan Wilson's description of "Berkeley" conditions: "Freedom Under Clark Kerr," *The Spectator* (February 3, 1967). It may be, however, that such definitions of the situation have been imported by some American scientists at the London School of Economics.
5. An adequate history of British student politics has yet to be written. The notes in this article are no more than the minimally necessary background to understanding of developments in the fifties and sixties.
6. See *NUS: A Survey of Seven Years of Development* (London, 1930), *passim* for all references.
7. This was not to be the last time that foreign examples were to lead to new initiatives in British student organization.
8. *NUS: A Survey of Seven Years of Development*, p. 4.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
11. Richard Hyman, "Oxford Workers in the Great Strike" (Oxford Centre for Socialist Education pamphlet, 1966).
12. Brian Simon, *A Student's View of the Universities* (London, 1943), p. 142.
13. UGC Returns, 1964-65.

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14. See W. T. Rodgers, "Politics in the Universities," *Political Quarterly* (1959), for trends in the relative memberships of three political clubs in Oxford during this period.

15. See, for instance, Peter Marris's findings (P. Marris, *The Experience of Higher Education*, p. 98, and *passim*), especially that Union officials were thought of as much more radical than they in fact were.

16. NUS Council Report, 1953-54. See also *The Times* (March 20, 1954), p. 3, for a report of the Manchester University decision. *The Times* correspondent was told that the intention of the movers of the motion for disaffiliation was to set up a new organization restricted to universities and university colleges, and "on a less formal basis than that represented by the NUS"—presumably a return to the old Inter-Universities Federation that preceded the NUS

17. Though activism on the left, as always, was particularly conspicuous among the minority of students involved in politics, it may also be noted that Tory radicalism was also vigorous and influential at the end of the fifties and remains very much alive in such Conservative organizations as PEST.

18. Satisfactory sources on the history of the New Left movement are scarce, as opposed to contemporary polemics against it in the established periodicals. The most satisfactory is Peter Sedgwick, "The Two New Lefts," *International Socialism*, Vol. 17 (Summer, 1964), a critical account from a political position close to that of the Independent Socialist Club at Berkeley. James D. Young, "The British New Left," *Survey* (January, 1967) has much useful material, but seems patchy and confused in its account. We have drawn mainly from the former article for this account.

19. The last appearance of the list of Left Clubs was in *New Left Review* for December, 1963.

20. This is, of course, a short perspective. NALSO was originally founded as a breakaway from the Communist-controlled SLF and has a history of oscillation in relation to the leadership of the Labour Party.

21. Several of its chairmen in the early and middle fifties entered Parliament as Labour MP's in the 1964 and 1966 elections.

22. *News of NALSO*, No. 1 (November, 1961), for the first two figures and conference reports for the last.

23. The three main tendencies among the Young Socialists in the early sixties were known by the names of their respective journals. *Keep Left*, a Trotskyist group, was the medium of an ultimately successful takeover by the Socialist Labour League. *Young Guard* was the youth paper produced by those sympathetic to the views of the magazine *International Socialism* who were later the main left-wing group after the expulsion of *Keep Left*. *New Advance* was the name of the official Young Socialist journal and supported the leadership. The second of these two groups also

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became strong in NALSO as those who had been active in CND and the Young Socialists came up to university, and most NALSO executive committees from 1961-67 were made up about equally of supporters of this group, independents still using the New Left label, and adherents of the traditional Labour Left.

24. "Memorandum on the State of NALSO for the December Meeting of the Youth Sub-Committee," Angus Calder. Document in NALSO secretary's files.

25. NUS Executive Report, 1966.

26. *The Times* (April 17, 1962), p. 6.

27. Roger Lyons, "The NUS Is Our Trade Union," *Labour Student* (Winter, 1964-65).

28. For a debate between the two sides of the controversy in Oxford, see articles and letters by Peter Wilenski and Hannan Rose, *Isis* (February and March, 1966). The issue of NUS's international affiliations may yet revive in view of recent disclosures as to the influence of the CIA; the financial dependence of ISC on various American foundations was, in any case, a chief plank in its opponents' platform.

29. Mervyn Jones, "What's Worrying the Students?" *New Statesman* (February 7, 1967).

30. Some leading activists in RSA object to the phrase *student syndicalism* as an overly literal translation from the French and prefer the more accurate *student unionism*.

31. That these sentiments were expressed in the official journal of the NUS was the result of some intensive lobbying of the editor by two officers of CUCND who wrote the article quoted above, and one of whom has since become press officer of RSA.

32. NUS April Council Meeting 1966, Minutes and Summary of Proceedings.

33. G. Stedman-Jones, A. Barnett, T. Wengraf, "Student Power: What Is to Be Done?" *New Left Review*, Vol. 43 (May-June, 1967). No exact analysis exists as yet of the composition of political activists by social, ethnic, or religious background or by disciplinary attachment, year, or type of course. That activism is centered in the social-studies faculties needs no special explanation. It is partly a matter of self-selection among schoolchildren and is reinforced by the political outlook of the typical university teacher in the social sciences. Sociology is, however, particularly interesting in Britain as the most recent vehicle of political awareness for the young. There is also a traditional stereotype of the political radical whose views have affinity with a highly theoretical intellectual orientation in mathematics or physics: He is epitomized by such figures as Bernal, Russell, or J. B. S. Haldane and is often a left-elitist. Another possible source of radical recruits is from experience of marginalism and mobility, but the patterns are undoubtedly complex and await systematic investigation.

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34. The most detailed single sources for the events at LSE so far available are both published by students, though from slightly different positions. The first is a pamphlet, "LSE: What It Is and How We Fought It," produced by *Agitator*, the journal of the LSE Socialist Society. The second is an article by Alexander Cockburn and Ben Brewster, "Revolt at the LSE," *New Left Review*, Vol. 43. Brewster was a member of the Graduate Committee headed by Marshall Bloom, one of the two suspended leaders. The description of events in the two articles and the theoretical analyses are broadly similar, though there are interesting differences in the conclusions for future student action.

35. See LSE pamphlet, p. 13.

36. The one apparent exception to this is in the teacher-training colleges which are known to be staunch supporters of the executive at NUS conferences. This absence of political activism may be connected with the ban on political clubs in many of these institutions.

37. For one attempt at this from a left-wing position, see Alasdair MacIntyre, "On Bureaucratising a University," *The Oxford Magazine* (No. 3).

38. This difference in approach seems to underlie the difference in interpretation of the LSE experience between the pamphlet referred to above, which is continually suspicious of the official Union hierarchy and emphasizes grass-roots initiatives, and the two articles in Vol. 43 of the *New Left Review*, which stress the role played by the Union in crystallizing student opinion, praise the role of the student leaders, and outline a strategy for RSA based on capturing the NUS. Disagreement within RSA on whether to aim at taking control of NUS is similarly based.

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FRANK A. PINNER

Tradition and Transgression: Western European Students in the Postwar World

On June 2, 1967, eight hundred young people, most of them students, demonstrated in the streets of West Berlin against Reza Pahlevi, Shah of Iran, who had come to the city on an official visit. Similar mass demonstrations took place in nearly all German cities visited by the Shah. In each case, the Iranian ruler's visit was preceded by the arrival of a group of about fifty young people who claimed to be Iranian students in Germany and whose patriotism and loyalty to their king prompted them to greet him with shouts of enthusiasm and to carry signs extolling his reign.[1] The official organization of Iranian students in Germany disclaimed any connection with the activities of this group, and some of the German newspapers believed that the enthusiasts were members of the Iranian secret police who had been given the double role of body guards and claque.

The Berlin demonstration will be part of German history for some time because of its tragic ending. After the Shah had been accompanied to the Opera House by the Mayor of Berlin and by other officials, the police turned upon the demonstrators who were just about to disperse and made indiscriminate use of their night sticks.[2] Demonstrators who tried to escape the beatings were pursued into the streets and the passageways where they sought refuge. Finally, a member of a Protestant student group without any political commitment was shot in the back of the head and killed by a police detective in civilian clothes. Prior to the fatal shot, he had been beaten by several policemen armed with night sticks.

Public reaction to this incident was understandably violent. Independent newspapers and weeklies, such as *Frankfurter Rundschau, Die Zeit,* and *Der Spiegel* were alarmed not only by the

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brutality of the police intervention, but also by official attempts to give the incident various innocuous interpretations. The Mayor of Berlin declared a few hours after the shooting and before any investigation had taken place that the demonstrators alone were responsible for this death and that he thoroughly approved of the police action.

The response among student organizations was virtually unanimous. The *Verband Deutscher Studentschaften,* official head organization of all German student associations, called for strikes and silent demonstrations on the day of the interment. Even the *Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studenten* (Union of Christian-Democratic Students), which usually aligns itself with official policy, joined in the protests. On June 8, the day of the burial, most lecture halls in West Germany were empty—in many universities with the consent of the faculty.

The demonstration of June 2 was only one of the many protest actions that have taken place at the Free University and in the streets of Berlin during the last two years. Indeed, the tragedy of June 2 was the result of at least three years of escalation, in the course of which the relations between the students and the university administration, city government, police, and a large segment of the public steadily worsened.

The Berlin drama illuminates with particular clarity the conditions that enable a relatively small minority to mobilize masses of students and a sizable portion of a country's public opinion. The *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentendbund* (SDS) and the Federation of Iranian Students in Germany had initiated the demonstrations as a protest against a "bribed dictator" who had done nothing for the Iranian population. These objectives appealed only to the more politically minded. Student groups and public opinion in general were aroused only after a grave injustice had been committed. This is not to say, however, that SDS lacked a responsive public among the students.

Since 1961, when the Social-Democratic Party expelled it from its ranks, SDS has been moving steadily to the left. SDS has two hundred members at the Free University of Berlin, and other organizations that might be expected to make common cause with it have a total of 230 members; on the other hand, the traditional *Korporationen* (student fraternities with predominantly conservative social and political attitudes) and various religious groups together have about six thousand members.[3] Thus, the leftist politi-

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cal groups form a very small minority at the Free University. Nevertheless, these groups, particularly SDS, dominated the Berlin scene before and after the Shah's visit. Indeed, under the pressure of events, most of the representatives of fraternities in the Berlin student government made common cause with their left-wing colleagues.

The ability of small but organized minorities to set student populations in motion and to define the issues has been noticed by other writers.[4] It is sometimes inferred that student participation in demonstrations and other mass actions expresses not the real moods and attitudes of students, but their temporary response to incitements. The Free University case does not corroborate this reasoning. During recent years, the constant conflict between students and the administration and faculty has steadily increased the left-wing vote. In late 1966 when the last election for the student parliament took place, 53 per cent of the university population participated, and they chose forty-four left-wing candidates, twelve rightists, and five independents. In April, 1967, about two thirds of the students participated in a referendum organized by the student government to show student support for their left-wing leadership. Of those voting, 46.1 per cent supported their leaders, 43.4 per cent opposed them (10.5 per cent cast invalid ballots). The left-wing groups, with SDS as their catalyst, clearly enjoy the support of a constantly widening student public.[5]

Similarly widespread support for a relatively small radical leadership can be observed in other countries. The leaders of the *Union Nationale des Étudiants de France* (UNEF), which since the end of World War II has styled itself as a student "trade union," come from political and social groups embracing only a very small proportion of French students. Yet, this nucleus of activists has been able to organize large-scale demonstrations and strikes against the Algerian war, against the insufficiencies of government appropriations for higher education, and, occasionally, against the government's educational policies.

The ability to set the agenda of student politics is, of course, not confined to groups whose social or political ideas place them to the left of center. In pre-World War II Germany and Austria, student masses were first activated by the conservative and nationalistic *Korporationen* and then by the numerically weaker Nazi student groups. In Austria today, the content of student politics is determined to a large extent by the *Wahlblock* (Electoral Bloc), which

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consists of all important Catholic and Protestant organizations, including the Catholic *Korporationen.*

Types and Causes of Participation

For leaders and activists, participation in an organization or movement constitutes an important part of life, while the involvement of sympathizers is much less complete and demanding. Sympathizers may find themselves in general agreement with an organization's point of view, or they may participate in demonstrations because of an acute sense of crisis that calls for immediate action. Rarely, however, do they share the ideological commitments of leaders and activists.

The program of the UNEF illustrates the basic credo of all student trade-union movements in Europe. It calls for the student's active participation in the political life of the country so that the structures of both the university and society may be reshaped. It demands democratization of all social structures and the substitution of humane for technocratic values.[6] The leaders of the student trade-union movements range from progressive Catholics to Communists. They may differ in their views of the future society, but they all want to alter the role of the student. Instead of a transient oriented only to his future destination, they envisage the student as a resident of society here and now and think that he may, by work and serious effort, become a contributor to social progress. Their demands for student salaries and participation in the social-security system and the administration of both the university and the country's politics are more concrete translations of their general demand for a change in the student's role.

This insistence on an independent role doubtless reflects the preoccupations of leaders and activists. UNEF's most successful actions were not, however, clearly linked with these general objectives. The organization saw its finest days when, as a result of careful maneuvering, it was able to rally large numbers of French students in opposition to the Algerian war. In 1962, the UNEF was again able to call large masses of students out on prolonged strikes when the overcrowding of the universities made the conditions of life and study in French universities unbearable. The influence of the UNEF waned, however, with the improvement of conditions.

A search for new and effective programs met with the apathy

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of the students and created doctrinal schisms of the most severe kind among the UNEF leadership. Attempts were made to reform the structure of the university through creation of "Student Work Groups." These would have established a closer link between learning and research, brought the content of study closer to life, and reduced excessive individualism in the process of learning. At first, they were accepted with reservation, but they ultimately proved futile. The Work Groups fell apart when the demands of state examinations proved more potent in motivating students than were their dissatisfactions with an antiquated system of academic pedagogy. In March, 1966, a strike movement against the Fouchet Plan for the reform of higher education ended as a Pyrrhic victory that came close to destroying the organization. While the strike order was followed in most Paris faculties and provincial universities, meetings were poorly attended; students had simply left for a three-day vacation instead of registering their opposition to the impingement of "neo-capitalism" and "technocracy" upon the university.

The experiences of the Dutch *Studenten Vakbeweging* (SVB) follow a similar pattern. Demands for a student salary or protest demonstrations against the war in Vietnam bring out only the committed members of the movement and its strongest partisans, even though many students doubtless sympathize with the SVB on both of these issues. Opposition to the exclusiveness of the traditional elite, as represented in the *Studenten Corps*, and protests against the reduction in government stipends or the desperate conditions of student housing in Amsterdam elicit much stronger responses among Dutch students.

The tendency to support "idealistic" causes or to protest grievous wrongs is particularly noticeable in postwar Germany. The violent suppression of the East German Insurrection of June 17, 1953, and the Soviet intervention against the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 generated the greatest amount of activity in the student body and everywhere led to silent demonstrations by thousands of students.[7] German rearmament and the introduction of atomic weapons into Germany have many opponents among the generally antimilitaristic students of the post-Hitlerian period. The various political groups have, however, been unable to reach an agreement on a common program, particularly with respect to relations between East and West Germany. Mass demonstrations, in 1965, against the insufficiencies of public funds available for higher education brought out much larger crowds of students. These demonstrations soon took

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the form of abstract protests against the German *Bildungsnotstand* (emergency in education) and failed to blame anyone in particular or to propose any specific remedies. Heribert Adams notices a tendency for the specific political demands of German students to dissolve into moral protest which "in a certain way anticipates the ineffectiveness of [their] . . . efforts."[8]

In general, students may be aroused when they see a major injustice being committed or when their personal interests are at stake. The specific issues that are thought to compel moral resistance or legitimate defense vary from country to country. They are probably determined more by cultural traditions and political antecedents than by the student's position in the university and society. The Algerian war can be regarded as a prototypical case: It stirred strong feelings of revulsion against the atrocities committed by the French authorities in Algiers and, at the same time, threatened the students with the possibility of military service in an unpopular war.

Tradition and Transgression

For the student leader or activist, the organization is a way of life, and the movement is likely to have a significance that goes far beyond specific issues featured for public consumption and arousal. No student expects to remain a student forever, and no matter how he looks upon his organization, it must in some way permit him to pass from his current status to a different one, and from his present role to others. A student trade union, for example, cannot have the same significance for its active members as an industrial union has for its workers. The worker normally expects to spend his life in a particular occupation or trade, and his union aims to make that life as rewarding as possible.

Two broad possibilities are open to the student: He can either prepare himself to occupy a position in society, or commit himself to a restructuring of society that would make new roles and new positions available. Student organizations follow this dichotomy: "Socializing" organizations educate their members so they will be prepared for their future roles in society, while "transgressive" ones aim for social and political change.

Some socializing organizations prepare the student mainly for his future occupation, while others prepare him for status positions in society. The latter will be termed *traditional,* because they help to mold future social and political elites by inculcating traditional

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values. In this process, systematic indoctrination tends to be of secondary importance.

All traditional organizations—for example, the *gezelligheidsverenigingen* (social associations) in Holland and the *Korporationen* in Germany and Austria—have certain objectives and techniques in common. An *esprit de corps* is fostered in these groups by their selectivity in recruitment, by pre-emption of the student's time (particularly during his early years of study), and by elaborate rituals that emphasize the uniqueness of the particular group and the distinctiveness of the social stratum to which it belongs. Conceptions of hierarchy and its importance are fostered both within these organizations and without. Sharp social distinctions tend to separate the older students from younger ones inside the organizations, and "older" or "better" fraternities from less prestigious ones on the outside. Specific orientations toward conflict are generated through institutionalized behavior designed to challenge the wit or the courage of the young student.

There are telling differences between the Dutch and the Germano-Austrian fraternal organizations. The Germanic *Korporation* is usually a small group, having up to fifty active members. Conflict between fraternity brothers is minimized and considered undesirable, while conflict with outsiders is ritually encouraged. In Holland, on the other hand, the *gezelligheidsverenigingen* are generally larger structures comprising several hundred active members, and all challenges of the young members originate *within* the organizations. The archetypical, although no longer the most widely accepted, form of conflict in German student fraternities is the *Mensur*, a modified and relatively harmless form of the duel, in which the contestants' steadfastness and ability to take adversity without fainting or flinching are tested. In the Dutch fraternity, the challenge consists primarily in a matching of wits, a degenerate form of the medieval disputation. The novice is challenged further by having his opinions contradicted and ridiculed on every occasion in order to make him realize that his views are without foundation and that he still has to learn.

These practices are clearly related to different role images. The German image of a worthy member of the elite still retains some of the attributes of the military aristocracy whose standards were eagerly adopted, often in their most corrupt form, by the middle classes in the second half of the last century. The Dutch role image is that of the *academicus*, a respected member of an urban society

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in which economic success rests upon cleverness in business and the ability to maintain a certain decorum.

In both Holland and Germany, the most prestigious fraternal organizations contain unexpectedly high proportions of students in the fields of medicine and law; here role images are the clearest, and pre-industrial forms of practice are jealously preserved.[9] The less prestigious an organization is, the larger is its share of students preparing themselves for business or teaching. A social-science student is seldom a member of a fraternity. In the nontraditional organizations (which have been labeled *transgressive* above), the situation is reversed. A student of medicine is a great rarity, while sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists are encountered in proportions totally out of keeping with their relatively small representation in the university populations. The role images of social-science students, whose curriculum leads to no clearly defined career, are bound to be vague or nonexistent, and their choice of specialty betrays some critical attitude toward society.

Thus, for the typical members of transgressive organizations, role images are either unavailable because of the uncertainty of their professional future, or unacceptable because of their opposition to the traditional system of social roles. These organizations all tend to transgress social boundaries. By declaring in the Charter of Grenoble that "the student is a young intellectual worker," the UNEF proposed to abolish the boundaries separating intellectuals from workers and young people from the world of work and responsibility. The alliance of Christians and Marxists that has governed the UNEF during most of its existence was itself an act of transgression for which both the young Communists and the young Catholics were disciplined by their Party or church.

In Germany, the most sacrosanct boundary (even though West German authorities officially and strenuously object to its existence) remains the Wall and the border fortifications separating the two republics; accordingly, the most extreme act of transgression consists of crossing that line by establishing links between the East and the West. Most of Germany's political student organizations and, to some extent, its official student representations have done this repeatedly, to the great dismay of their elders in political parties, government, and university administrations. These tendencies have become strongest and, for the official leadership, most embarrassing in Berlin, symbol of the East-West conflict. The perennial free-speech conflict at the Free University of Berlin has constituted

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the students' attempt to obliterate the traditionally strong distinctions separating student and professor in Germany. The charter of the university, written deliberately as a democratic response to the suppression of academic freedom in the East, had explicitly defined the new institution as a "community of scholars and students" *(Lehrende und Lernende)* and installed student representatives with voting rights in most of the university's decision-making organs. Thus, the students' demands once more struck particularly sensitive nerves in the administrations of the university and of the city.

To some degree, a social role system always reflects the system of social segregation—the division of society into groups constituted on the basis of social class, religion, ethnicity, and so forth. A wish to change the system of social roles may lead to the belief that the system of social segregation needs to be changed. Young people tend to be greatly concerned with the choice of roles, because it is through them that they try to establish their identity. In each age group, some young people will reject both the present and future roles that society assigns to them.[10] During certain periods such young people may come to reject not only these roles, but also the group structure that corresponds to them. Clearly, such transgressive tendencies are less likely when social boundaries effectively limit the social horizon. Thus, the German youth movement, which arose at the end of the nineteenth century as a protest against urban life and the corruption of middle-class society, never got beyond a program of inner renewal through communion with nature and through cultivation of the horde spirit. The movement failed to ally itself with the organizations of young workers that appeared at the same time as part of the socialist movement, since the boundaries between social classes were too sharply drawn and too much taken for granted.

Transgression seems to occur when the members of a movement perceive the future—their own or that of their group—as either particularly barren or particularly promising. To the young Russian intellectuals of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, for example, all avenues toward a rewarding future appeared blocked. The chances were slim that they might become effective members of their society as either professional men or social or political leaders. Thus, they felt the need to ally themselves with other groups of the population in order to achieve the downfall of a regime that frustrated all legitimate ambition. Young intellectuals in colonial countries have often reacted in a similar manner to the strict limi-

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tation of their opportunities. As nationalists aiming to achieve the independence of their country, they frequently transgress lines of class or caste in order to ally themselves with other social classes.

The second condition of transgression—the perception of an expanding social universe—is often associated with the end of a war or with pre-revolutionary gains in economic well-being and political freedom. After the end of the Napoleonic wars and again in the period preceding 1848, sizable groups in German universities attempted to ally themselves with other groups in the population. At the end of World War II, French students who had shared the experience of the resistance movement with young people from all walks of life intended to remain actively engaged in a common effort of all young people to rebuild and reshape their country. The Charter of Grenoble expresses their aspiration to play a role in a process of social transformation made possible by the common experience of a catastrophic past and the common hope for a brighter, more humane future. Toward the end of the last decade, the thaw following Stalin's death and the growth of modern trends in Roman Catholicism once again encouraged optimism concerning the possibility of productive co-operation among groups previously separated by social and ideological barriers. Herbert Marcuse, to whom many leaders of the Berlin movement look for intellectual guidance, has repeatedly expressed this philosophy of hope by pointing to society's tremendous technological potential and to the need for a new social structure capable of realizing that potential. Such rising expectations have made for discord between youth groups and their parent organizations and have furnished the impetus for the spread of the trade-union movement from France into Belgium and the Netherlands.

Depending on the conditions just discussed, one transgressive movement may differ from another in important ways. If frustration and despair preside at its birth, its members are apt to display tendencies toward ideological orientations that help to interpret and to render psychologically tolerable the marginal and precarious situation of the membership while strengthening its internal cohesion. Unable to hope for success in the present or the immediate future, such a movement will look forward to a total destruction of the social fabric, and the only payoff in the present will be the stubborn and self-reinforcing hope for the *dies irae*. It may adopt conspiratorial attitudes and practices and thus accentuate its separate-

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ness from society. Hence, it may be called an "ideological protest" movement.

A transgressive movement born of optimism will, on the other hand, tend to de-emphasize ideological divisions and stress the values that unite its members and followers. Thus, the UNEF emphasized the value of social obligation, an element common to the philosophies of Marxism and Catholicism, rather than the individualistic liberalism that had dominated the Third Republic. Since a movement of this kind seeks achievements in the present, it must take a position on specific current issues. This is not to say that such a movement is necessarily "reformist," in the sense that term has acquired in Marxist literature. During the period when the so-called *syndicaliste* wing was in command, most of the UNEF leaders were profoundly critical of the socio-economic and political order, but thought that this system could be transformed radically if young intellectuals, in alliance with other progressive groups in the population, could actively participate in the process of policy formation by assuming responsible roles in society. For this reason, such a movement is best designated as "role seeking." Indeed, a central point in the internal debates of the UNEF has been the search for an adequate definition of the student's role.

By their very nature, the two types of transgressive movements are bound to have different political effects. Having nothing better to do, ideological protest movements often exhaust themselves in internal debates and in sporadic but mostly ineffectual action. In revolutionary situations, however, they are likely to furnish dedicated leaders for a popular movement. Role-seeking movements, on the other hand, are impatient: They constantly search for points of contact with other groups and with the happenings of the day, and they are likely to experience periods of discouragement if such points are not found.

Dissidence

Role-seeking movements are frequently alliances of dissidents from established parent organizations. If young Communists and Catholics in UNEF work together in their student trade union, they rarely do so with the approval of their parent organizations. Both the Catholic and Communist hierarchies tend to regard their student groups as auxiliaries whose main tasks are spreading the organizations' beliefs, attracting young supporters, and prepar-

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ing them for their future role as full-fledged members. The youth organizations, however, tend to insist on autonomy in their beliefs, actions, and alliances. The last of these demands regularly meets with the determined resistance of the parent hierarchy, which feels that their young supporters are likely to be lost to the organizational opponent.

Both the *Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne* (JEC) and the *Union des Étudiants Communistes* (UEC) have suffered repeated crises precipitated by the adult organizations' attempts to regain control of student groups that had, in their opinion, gone too far afield. The JEC experienced its first major crisis in 1956, when the Catholic hierarchy forced the dissolution of the *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* (ACJF), and its second in 1965, when the officers of the JEC were forcibly removed from their positions. In both cases, the point at issue was the role of the so-called "lay apostolate." The hierarchy insisted that the sole task of young people in Catholic Action was to evangelize their milieu and to combat godlessness by spreading the teachings of the gospel. The JEC leaders countered these demands by saying that Christian charity means helping others to understand better their own situations. They held that the success of evangelism depends on the lay apostle's ability to participate in the struggles of his social group and generation, and that such participation necessarily requires close co-operation with non-Catholics, particularly Protestants and Communists.

The crisis of the UEC lasted from 1962 to 1966. The ideological issue, which initially served to disguise more prosaic concerns with organizational control, dealt with the Marxist concept of class. Contrary to the wishes of the Party, the UEC had written a programmatic statement which described students as a progressive force in society. In a full-scale discussion of this definition, the Party theoreticians pointed out that most students belong to the *bourgeoisie* or *petite-bourgeoisie* and are, therefore, not to be considered natural allies of the working class. To these doctrinal objections, the president of UEC had a rather unorthodox answer: He affirmed that a person's class membership is not determined by what he is, but by what he does; that because most students act as progressives, they belong to the progressive forces in society. This debate with the Party leadership enabled the young Communists to increase their prestige among the students and, thereby, to play a greater role within the UNEF. Continued efforts by the Party's Central Committee to recapture control of the Communist student organization

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did, however, succeed in the end. The Party was aided in its efforts by a general resurgence of political sectarianism during the mid-sixties. The UEC soon became prey to intensive internal squabbles among "Italians" (followers of Palmiro Togliatti), neo-Stalinists, neo-Troskyites, Maoists, and a variety of opposition groups within each of these major denominations. By 1965, the Party regained control of the organization, and, as a result, most of UEC's talented leaders withdrew.

Similar phenomena of dissidence and transgression are clearly observable among the student groups of German political parties. The SDS, currently the most influential left-wing student organization, was originally the official student group of the Social-Democratic Party. Because of continuing disagreements over German rearmament and contacts with East Germany, the Party created a second organization in 1960. In 1961, the Party declared that membership in the SDS was incompatible with Party membership, thus excluding in effect the entire SDS membership and withdrawing all subsidies. This separation from the Party eventually redounded to the political benefit of SDS, which could now ally itself with other left-wing groups and thus become the most vocal and most effective member of the "extra-parliamentary opposition."

The *Sozialistische Hochschulbund* (SHB), the successor of SDS as the official Social-Democratic student organization, has traveled approximately the same path as SDS. From a rival, it has become an ally. The organization opposes the Party on nearly all important issues, such as support of NATO, projected emergency legislation (which would suspend basic rights whenever the government declared a national emergency to exist), and the current policy of coalition with the Christian-Democratic Party.

Nearly everywhere, the student organizations of political parties are to the left of the officialdom, often considerably so. Commonly, the disagreement is over the kinds of associates the group may select for political company. Thus is replayed, in political terms, the old drama of parents and children, with the parents trying to restrict and the children trying to widen the range of their contacts. The Dutch socialist students, organized in a club called *Politeia,* are far to the left of the Labor Party and tend to associate with elements much further to the left; the student trade-union movement has given them increased opportunity to do this. A recent revolt in the socialist student organization of Austria has given control to a group that rejects the establishmentarianism of the Socialist Party,

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takes a self-consciously "Marxist" stand, and tends to embarrass the Party leadership by exposing its bureaucratic tendencies.

The recurrence of dissident movements and of periods during which control of the adult organization is restored has its origins in the rapid changes in the memberships of youth organizations. Once rebellious leaders of a youth group have been disciplined or removed by the parent organization, the group usually experiences a severe loss in members, vitality, and influence. When the crisis is over and new members begin to join the youth club, the process of dissidence is apt to start all over again. Organizational memories are short, in any event, where "generations" span only a few years. New recruits join a party-related group for the same reasons as their predecessors did: Politics may appear to them as an opportunity to participate responsibly in making social decisions. Once they discover that the party will not admit them to full citizenship in the organization, renewed efforts toward organizational independence and transgressive tendencies are likely to occur.

Effectiveness and Stability

Among student groups with social or political interests, the party-related or church-affiliated organizations are usually the least effective. This indicates that students do not see the need for special political or religious student organizations if these have nothing more (and possibly less) to offer than the parties or churches themselves. Before 1962, the numerically rather weak political and religious student organizations at the University of Amsterdam had joined forces in order to present candidates at student elections and to allocate seats among themselves. Indeed, shortly before the student trade-union movement came into being, these groups had managed, with the help of some of the more modern fraternal organizations, to elect a socialist as president of the student council. The tide was obviously turning in the direction of greater political engagement on the part of students and of greater support for political action. Yet, the formally independent student trade-union movement, rather than the political groups, reaped the benefits of this change of mood in the student population. A similar development is observable in Germany, where the influence of SDS is clearly out of keeping with its numerical strength. SDS leaders claim, probably with some justification, that separation from the

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Social-Democratic Party helped rather than hindered their activities.

Clearly, role-seeking movements can be more effective than conventional political-party or religious organizations, particularly if effectiveness is defined as the ability to mobilize student masses; and that, after all, is the measure of success most commonly applied by leaders. A role-seeking movement that has been able to set masses into motion will sometimes even be able to gain the limited support of traditional groups, as happened in France during the campaign against the Algerian war, in Holland on the occasion of protest against the reduction of student government scholarships, and in Germany during the recent controversies and demonstrations in Berlin.

In spite of this ability to lead student masses into action, the role-seeking movement is typically unstable. If political circumstances do not furnish issues that can engage widespread interest, or political repression seriously inhibits mass action, the movement will find itself in serious difficulty.

The process can be most easily demonstrated in France. The campaign against the Algerian war carried the UNEF to its apogee. The organization had proved its ability to organize strikes and demonstrations and to play a significant part in uniting the French trade-union movement in opposition to the government's war policies. Internal factionalism had been reduced to a minimum. At the end of the war, the organization found itself without an issue and seized upon the disastrous conditions in the French universities. In the fall of 1962, the UNEF organized a series of protest strikes and demonstrations against governmental neglect of higher education. This campaign collapsed by 1963, however, because the government rapidly initiated a building program and created new centers of higher education. After this crisis had passed, the leadership attempted a systematic analysis of the possible bases of a stable student trade-union movement. The result of their "reflection" was the so-called *orientation universitaire*. The theoreticians of this strategy argued that a student trade union must concern itself chiefly with the problems students encounter as they do their work of studying, and that the chief objective must be the transformation of the social structure of the university in order to make it an agent of change in society.

These theoretical considerations resulted in the establishment of the *groupes de travail universitaire* whose collapse indicated to

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the UNEF leadership that a trade unionism based on "university work" could not be achieved, and that a restructuring of the university, let alone of society, through action from within was an impossible goal. The Catholic student movement lost much of its influence on the destinies of the UNEF at this time, and the UNEF became the arena for sectarian squabbles among a variety of more or less dogmatic factions, most of them committed to one or another Marxist doctrine. By 1966, the UNEF had lost half of its membership (in spite of rapidly increasing enrollments), probably because of the antagonisms within the organization and the ill-conceived campaign of strikes and demonstrations against the government's university reform.

By comparison, traditional movements exhibit much greater stability. Indeed, viability and continuity are the chief principles that inform the structure of traditional organizations. The German *Korporation* is prototypical of such structures.

With virtually no exception, all *Korporationen* consider themselves *Lebensverbände* (unions for life), so that it is, in principle, impossible for a member to resign. At the end of his studies, the fraternity "brother" becomes an *Alter Herr* (old gentleman). He is expected to remain in contact with his *Korporation* and, above all, to make financial contributions to it. In almost all cases, the *Alte Herren* own the house and other assets of the fraternity, and in many of them they can vote on important issues. Thus, by material contributions and by their emphasis on tradition, the *Alte Herren*—more perhaps than the active members—insure the continuity of the *Korporationen.* Indeed, the rather surprising comeback of these fraternities in postwar Germany is due almost entirely to the zeal of the *Alte Herren,* many of whom began to rebuild their organizations and to recruit new members during the Allied occupation when the *Korporationen,* burdened by their pro-Nazi past, were still illegal. From 1950 to 1966, the *Alte Herren* fought and financed a series of court battles to force the official recognition of the *Korporationen* by the universities.

Party- and church-related organizations, insofar as they are loyal to their adult sponsors, enjoy similar, although not quite so extensive, advantages. These groups are, however, probably less stable than the fraternities, because the commitment of the adult sponsors is less personal and is often merely a reflection of political and organizational necessities. Even so, the most effective pressures in party- and church-related organizations operate in favor of the

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traditional ideological positions and comply with official policy. While intellectual disagreement is frequent, officers of such organizations avoid steps that might lead to a break with the parent organization, for this entails loss of subventions, office space, and various other forms of support. Political student leaders who find themselves at odds with the policies of their party also tend to argue that independence from the party would condemn the student groups to political ineffectiveness and that, so long as the bonds are not broken, the students have at least a chance to expose their views within the party councils and thus to work for a modification of party policy.

Student Organizations and Historical Change

The changing fortunes of student organizations are doubtless related to historical events. The parallelisms in the rise and fall of student organizations in the same country and in different ones are too striking for this not to be true. At the end of World War II, most students believed that the old exclusive fraternities would never be resurrected. In the Netherlands, plans had been laid for social organizations and clubs open to all, and the revival of *Korporationen* in Germany and Austria seemed inconsistent with the establishment of republican regimes. Yet, as the structures of social relations became stabilized, the old forms of traditional organizations reappeared and largely regained lost ground. There have been changes, to be sure. The German *Korporationen* now officially endorse the Republican regime that they had vigorously combated throughout the life of the Weimar Republic, and anti-Semitism is just as officially banned. In Holland, a variety of less exclusive social fraternities and sororities have developed alongside the traditional *Corps,* and the *Corps* itself is at pains to deny accusations of status-consciousness. The extent to which the traditional organizations have been reconstituted and their traditions reinstated reflects rather faithfully the extent to which the social distinctions of the prewar era have re-emerged.

Not only in France, but also in Holland and Austria, the first years following the war saw the initial efforts at creating role-seeking movements. Their first blooming was to be short, for the rigidities introduced into all political systems by the Cold War and the painful dissolution of the colonial empires gave little encouragement to such movements. The UNEF survived under the management of

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its more moderate, apolitical wing, while organized activity of students reached a low in the other European countries. A resurgence of role-seeking movements occurred toward the end of the fifties as the colonial wars subsided and the thaw in the Communist and Catholic worlds made social and national boundaries seem less forbidding. Yet the movement was soon to encounter new obstacles: the reappearance of international tensions and the determination of governments and university administrations to set limits to a movement that tended to interfere with the structure of authority.

As a result, transgressive student movements everywhere have now assumed a more ideological and sectarian character. This retreat may be temporary, but for the moment the belief in the malleability of the social structure has weakened, and more and more militants have become convinced that social change can only be achieved through violence. This posture is bound to reduce the popularity of transgressive organizations among students. At the same time, a polarization of minorities on the right and left might occur, producing all the disruptive effects such a change entails.

The great sensitivity of student movements to the political atmosphere of each period is doubtless a result of the rapid turnover in members and leaders. A generation of leaders usually lasts no more than three years, and the memory of student organizations, particularly of the nontraditional ones, rarely stretches further back than the preceding generation. Those who grew up in a movement under yesterday's leadership and who today realize its shortcomings and defects are likely to look for new ideas and strategies, unbridled by vested interests or long-standing intellectual commitments. Only the traditional organizations attempt to maintain continuity. To the extent that they are able to place their members in leading social positions, they tend to insure a certain uniformity over time of the character of social and political elites.

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1. The facts reported in this section are taken chiefly from *Der Spiegel*, Vol. 21, No. 25 (June 12, 1967) and *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Sonderdruck, June, 1967). I have also had the opportunity to consult various student publications and the weekly *Die Zeit*. The sources are in substantial agreement on all the facts here reported.
2. Photographs of the events published in the German press leave little doubt about the behavior of the police in this instance. Several pictures show the "jubilant Iranians" attacking demonstrators with their signs and with blackjacks, while policemen look on; others show demonstrators lying on the pavement and being "worked over" by several policemen swinging night sticks.
3. These include primarily the *Sozialistische Hochschulbund* (SHB), which succeeded SDS as the official student group of the Social-Democratic Party, but which now is in opposition to the Party on most important issues; *Liberale Studentenbund Deutschlands* (LSD), which also is in opposition to its sponsoring Party; and various minor groups, such as the Humanists, the German-Israeli Union, and certain peace groups. The membership figures were compiled from the official records of the university by *Die Zeit* (June 30, 1967), pp. 17-18.
4. Cf. Seymour Martin Lipset and Philip G. Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States," *Student Politics*, ed. S. M. Lipset (New York, 1967), pp. 199-201.
5. *Der Spiegel*, No. 24.
6. The basic Charter of Grenoble as well as elaborate interpretations can be found in Michel de la Fourniere and François Borella, *La syndicalisme étudiante* (Paris, 1957); and Pierre Gaudez, *Les étudiants* (Paris, 1961).
7. Heribert Adams, *Studentenschaft und Hochschule, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen studentischer Politik* (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 83-111.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
9. Cf. Bernard Oudin, *Les corporations Allemandes d'étudiants* (Paris, 1962), pp. 99-111.
10. A series of pamphlets published in Munich under the title "Braune Universität" can be regarded as a symptom of the profound doubts many German students have about the preceding academic generation. The editor of the series, Rolf Seeliger, has culled lengthy quotations from the writings, published during the Nazi period, of professors now occupying chairs in German universities. The editor has asked each of the professors to express his current views concerning the quoted writings. The object of the exercise, according to Seeliger, is not to expose or unmask, but to help the current generation understand the past. Few professors have refused to answer this request. The published replies, which range from self-castigations to tortured interpretations, are painful to read. They are bound to raise questions in the reader's mind not only about the persons involved, but about the roles of academicians and the functions of universities.

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ERIK ALLARDT AND RICHARD F. TOMASSON

Stability and Strains in Scandinavian Student Politics

A HIGH degree of differentiation and a low degree of "confrontation politics" have marked student politics in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. There are, nevertheless, unmistakable signs of strains between the students and the traditional social forces. Very generally, these strains have resulted from the students' sense of deprivation due to their rapidly rising expectations. The expectations have been high, both in regard to the ability of the universities to produce and present new and significant knowledge and the possibilities to use scientific knowledge for social improvements. Moreover, students, and perhaps youth in general, are in most countries socially more competent than ever before. The difference between what they know and what the adults know about society and the world has clearly been decreasing. From this point of view, the students' demands for representation and participation in university affairs can be understood.

Factors Reducing the Likelihood for Mass Activism

There is a strong element of trade unionism in Scandinavian student politics.[1] The Scandinavian universities do not have any jurisdiction over the students except in a narrow academic sense. The student bodies are, to a large extent, responsible for social welfare among the students. At most Scandinavian universities, for example, student groups administer the housing arrangements. The student bodies often own property, and thus student government assumes a considerable amount of economic and social responsibility. Moreover, the student bodies can negotiate directly with the national government concerning loans, support for students, and their general welfare.

Even though there are differences among the Scandinavian countries, they all tend to grant student representation in policy-

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making bodies of the universities. At an international student conference held in 1965, one of the principal speakers concluded: "There are still relatively few countries in Europe that allow student participation in governing bodies. The countries most advanced in this field seem to be the Scandinavian."[2] This principle of participation and representation has been implemented more systematically in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark and Finland, but in all four countries institutionalized channels exist for the expression of demands and grievances. According to a recently released report of the Swedish National Union of Students: "Student influence on the activities and policy of the universities and other vocational schools and institutes is significant and considerable. It is one of the main tasks of the national union of students to promote it and to widen it to all categories of members."[3] The main channels through which student influence is exerted are the departmental boards and the educational committees of each faculty.

The influence of the students in running the universities is, of course, partly the result of skillfully played student politics. There is, however, in the Scandinavian pattern of student participation also an element of co-optation—or, as Philip Selznick has defined it, "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining strata of an organization as a means of averting threats to its existence or stability."[4] Students are represented in some of the policy-making bodies, but do not have decisive power. Innovations in the university system are nevertheless occasionally introduced by the students, and it seems reasonable to say that the Scandinavian pattern of student influence and participation makes for a certain stability in student politics. There has been some resistance to demands for increased student influence, but on the whole the Scandinavian university authorities have been responsive.

Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out the effects of the differential status of intellectuals on the character of student politics. In countries with many free unattached intellectuals outside the academic and political establishments, students tend to search for ideas and models of behavior outside the universities.[5] In the Scandinavian countries, there is little or no difference between the intellectuals and the academic experts, and Scandinavian intellectuals are generally included in effective political and cultural life. Although Norway, Sweden, and Finland (together with Great Britain) appear to have the highest proportion of working-class

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youth in higher education in Western Europe, Scandinavian students definitely belong more to the center than to the periphery. Students are generally considered to constitute an important voice in the social and cultural affairs of the nation. This is related to the observation that ratings of occupational prestige clearly indicate that university education is the strongest single criterion of high prestige.

Harry Eckstein has pointed out that the authority of decision-makers in Norway is based largely on specialized competence and functional deference.[6] This observation is probably true for all Scandinavian countries. Whenever social authority patterns are based on functional deference, there tends to be a stress on specialist knowledge and competence in higher education.

General liberal education is little emphasized at Scandinavian universities, and the students are enrolled in specific faculties, although subjects from different faculties can be combined in the final academic degrees. Students usually associate with students from their own faculty and do not form a diffuse mass.

Students in Finland and Sweden are still organized on a territorial basis in so-called "nations," which correspond to the different provinces in the country. These nations, centers for traditional student activities, must compete with both political and professional student associations for the interest of the students. Thus, the existence of many kinds of associations creates crisscrossing cleavages within Scandinavian student life. The structure of the universities thus inhibits the easy mobilization of students for mass action.

The comparative calmness of Scandinavian student politics also reflects, of course, the homogeneous social composition of the countries and the absence of any large deprived social groups.

Strains in Student Life

Even though the Scandinavian university and student life contain structural safeguards against mass activism, sources of strain and expressions of discontent exist among the students. One source of strain is the strong hierarchical, traditional form of the universities. Compared with their colleagues in many other countries, Scandinavian university professors constitute a strongly conservative force in society. Although political radicalism among university teachers has been more common in Norway than in the rest of

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Scandinavia, the Norwegian university system has the same traits of traditionalism as the university systems of the other countries. There is a clear discrepancy between the comparatively strong democratic freedom of the students and the traditional organization of the universities. Innovations introduced by students on the faculty level, for example, can be effected differently than intended and at a slower pace on the departmental level. Interaction between students and teachers on the departmental level depends very much on the personal qualities of the few full professors in each subject.

The development of the system of higher education has been a major political issue in Scandinavia during the last decade. Plans have been implemented to some extent, and the number of students has been rapidly increasing. Nevertheless, planning for the future means promises for the future, and it is often difficult to keep the promises in a way that corresponds to the expectations. It is hard to plan curricula so that the teaching provides a continuous flow of new knowledge and new experiences. New and significant knowledge is offered in the introductory courses in the humanities and social sciences, but it is not easy to maintain this pace throughout the career of the student. This is, of course, a world-wide problem. Even in first-rate universities, there is often a discrepancy between the expectations of new knowledge and experiences and the ability to provide them within the framework of university teaching. The disillusionment that results from this discrepancy can lead to apathy, on the one hand, or extreme ideological activism, on the other.

Some features in the Scandinavian educational system make the discrepancies easily observable. Students at Scandinavian universities are usually at least a year older than their counterparts on the continent and about three years older than undergraduates at Anglo-American universities.[7] Thus, introductory courses are conducted at a fairly sophisticated level, and it is a constant problem to maintain the same flow of new and significant information.

As elsewhere in the world, programs for the development of higher education in Scandinavia have contained detailed plans for the improvement of the teacher-student ratio. In many respects, the plans have been carried out, but not with the speed and in the manner that would seem to be justified. There is, therefore, a gulf between the expected teaching efficiency and the actual teaching efficiency.

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The Political Interests of Scandinavian Students

The Scandinavian countries have well-developed welfare systems, and thus interest has focused not on domestic programs, but on the problems of the developing nations, issues related to peace, and the fight against all forms of authoritarianism and inequality. Student unions at Scandinavian universities are not bound to any political party, nor are they committed to any ideology other than that of democracy and internationalism. Still, at the larger Scandinavian universities, a predominantly two-party political system organized along conservative-radical lines has developed in the student-union elections.

At the University of Oslo, the students elect one member to the eleven-member senate, three of the five members of the Oslo Student Welfare Organization (the other two members are representatives of the Ministry of Church Affairs and Education and of the university), and two of the eight members of the National Union of Norwegian students.[8] In these elections, a two-party system has emerged.[9] The Conservative Party is made up largely of the members of the Conservative Student Association, while the left spans from the Liberals to the Communists. (The Liberals do, however, from time to time run their own candidates.) Students from the faculties of law and philosophy are most active in these elections: The former are predominantly on the conservative side, the latter on the left. Recent elections have clearly been victories for the left.

The biennial elections for the sixty-member senate that runs the Student Union of the University of Helsinki attract nationwide attention. In the 1965 election, 57.3 per cent of all Finnish students voted. The two main parties have been the Academic Coalition, made up of the "nations" (organizations of students from particular provinces), and the Coalition of Professional Associations. In the past, the nations have completely dominated student life and determined the allocation of the Student Union's large budget. In general, the Academic Coalition leans to a conservative position and the Coalition of Professional Associations to a radical one. With the exception of some left-wing student associations, the specifically political organizations have remained outside the politics of the Student Union. In the elections held in 1965, the Coalition of Professional Associations, as well as the United Socialist Association, gained strongly over the more conservative Academic Coalition. At the outset of the election late in 1967, a new cleavage emerged. The

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United Socialist Associations now oppose both the Academic Coalition and the Coalition of Professional Associations.[10] Nevertheless, the main division remains that between conservatism and radicalism.

At Uppsala University, a political-party system in student-union elections began in 1963. One party, Uppsala University Students (UUS), was founded to support candidates who adhered to a moderate position, and they have obtained most of the seats. The party claims to be "a moderate association for progressive union politics . . . dedicated to an effective student union with an emphasis on adequate student service and active trade-union activity."[11] The minority radical students also came together and formed the Uppsala Radical Democrats (URD) to work "as a party in the Uppsala Student Union for a radical union politics based on openly proclaimed values and free of trade-union mindedness."[12] As in Finland, the political element in these elections is a fairly new one, differing substantially from the essentially nonideological role of the student unions during the 1950's. In striking contrast to the high turnout in the Helsinki election, however, only 8 per cent of the Uppsala students voted in the Student Union election of 1965, but this increased to 22.3 per cent in 1966 and to 24.7 per cent in 1967.[13] Party politics of a similar sort are to be found at Stockholm University. There the political situation is more complex: Two major parties and six minor parties obtained seats in the 1966 elections. Election participation was around 20 per cent in 1962-64, 15 per cent in 1965, and 24 per cent in 1966. The main political dimension at Stockholm also is related to the split between conservatism and radicalism.

The fairly strong stress on the dividing line between the conservatives and moderates, on the one hand, and the radicals, on the other, is, in a sense, a sign of stability. Even if internal debates are at times lively, the dividing lines among students correspond to the political dividing lines in the country at large. Because of this correspondence, it is hard to imagine that the students could be mobilized to support any single political cause. Strong pluralism prevails and adds to stability.

The face of student politics that is turned toward the community at large is very different from the one displayed in internal student politics. The radical students have been more active and vocal than the others. They dominate discussions in magazines and periodicals and constantly organize debates on political and ideological issues.

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Conservative students almost seem unable to articulate their views on such issues. Some Swedish student societies, such as *Verdandi*, are traditionally devoted to cultural radicalism and opposed to authoritarianism in all forms. They vigorously question traditional, established patterns. In Finland, the weekly organ of the Helsinki Union of Students has been important in the general cultural debate. This weekly, although uncommitted to any political party, strongly promotes egalitarian and internationalist values. It has taken an *avant-garde* position on questions of literature, the arts, and sex. In Norway, the students have been much more critical than the Social Democratic *Arbeiderpartiet* of Norway's commitment to NATO. The issues brought to debate focus not only on the traditional themes of cultural radicalism in sex, literature, and religion, but increasingly on new ideological problems. Opposition to the Vietnam war has, of course, stimulated many activities.

Active students on the left have also begun to criticize structural features and problems in their own society much more than they did during the 1950's. It has been almost a self-evident assumption—particularly, perhaps, in Sweden—that the old class society has disappeared. Young intellectuals and students have, nevertheless, begun to raise demands for absolute equality and to criticize severely what they call the Swedish class society.[14] The whole radical debate in Sweden has changed character in the last two or three years. Without any real Maoist influence, demands for a radical cultural revolution have become common. Welfare is not thought to be enough because there is a lack of equality both in ownership and opportunity. Significantly, the leadership of both the Social Democratic and the Communist Parties is charged with traditionalism and thus lacks the ability to implement equality. This trend is clearly observable throughout Scandinavia. Thus, absolute equality is usually associated with the New Left. As elsewhere, the New Left is not an organized collectivity, but a state of mind with a highly symptomatic character.[15] Signs of counteractivities have appeared among both the moderates and the conservatives. As demands of the radical students have become progressively more radical, students adhering to a moderate or conservative position have become more articulate. In any case, the radical students are usually much more radical in their discussions than the working class now supporting the Social Democratic Party. For the workers, issues related to daily bread are still the salient ones, while the students on the left have carried on a strongly ideological discussion.

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This increased emphasis on "ideological issues"—the strength of which is impossible to indicate at present—is definitely a sign of strains in Scandinavian university life. In most aspects it is hardly unique, as parallel tendencies are present among student populations throughout the world.

A Typology of Political Student Activity

There is as yet no reliable statistical information on the political preferences of Scandinavian students. The existing data are from an earlier period, and are not useful in a description of the present situation, as student politics has changed considerably.

The social background of the Scandinavian students does not seem to influence greatly the choice between a conservative, moderate, or radical position. Fields of study, however, seem to have a considerable effect on a student's choice of political line. According to many indicators, students in the social sciences tend to be more radical than those in other fields. Although social scientists are gaining more and more acceptance, they have met resistance in traditional circles. They are, consequently, apt to question the legitimacy of the traditional order. In a sense, this situation bears out Seymour Martin Lipset's proposition that radicalism tends to be strong in countries where major groups do not have access to the political system during the transitional period or where their demands go unrecognized.[16]

The flow of new information also seems relevant to a student's political line. Such fields as physics and sociology are exposed to a constant flow of new information, primarily of an international kind. This is not true of law or national history.

By cross-tabulating these two variables—the traditional position of the field of study and the amount of the flow of new information in the field—one obtains a typology that roughly captures the crucial variations in the political activities among Scandinavian students. For the sake of simplicity, the variables are dichotomized.

To some extent, the typology accounts for the groups of students that seem to be relevant in Scandinavian student politics. Many of the types Richard Peterson has found among American student populations are difficult to identify in Scandinavia. Neither the collegiate, committed to popularity, play, and sex, nor the hippie is easily isolated. Sexual behavior is not a criterion for distinguishing different types of Scandinavian students or their relation to poli-

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Established traditional position of the field	Exposure to new and primarily international information: *Weak*	*Strong*
Strong	1. Traditionals, conservatives Typical case: law students	3. Professionals, often moderates Typical case: chemistry, medical students
Weak	2. The passive, the apathetic Typical case: students concentrating on general subjects (often humanistic) without clearly professional intentions	4. Left-wing radicals Typical case: social-science students

tics, even though radicalism on the moral issues related to sex is a clear mark of a radical. The style of living of the hippies is also very rare in Scandinavia, even though patterns related to the hippie culture, such as the use of drugs, are strongly defended by some of the actively radical students.

The above typology does not contain anything about radicalism on the right, because right-wing radicalism has been very rare in Scandinavian student politics since World War II. The potentialities for right-wing radicalism would tend to be most common among students from fields that traditionally have had high prestige, but are now declining in importance.

The ways in which the social background of the students molds their political preferences have not yet been analyzed. Student radicalism in the Scandinavian countries today is ideological and based more on principles than on the official politics of the established parties, and justifies an attempt to search for the sources of student political behavior in factors related to the university organization and student life itself.

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14. See, for example, Andreas Murray (ed.), *Det svenska klassamhället* (The Swedish Class Society; Halmstad, 1967) which is a book based on a teach-in organized by *Verdandi.*

15. A leading intellectual who appeals to radical students throughout Scandinavia is Jan Myrdal, whose books and essays have appeared in many languages.

16. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1960), p. 78.

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Students and Politics in the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe

DESPITE THE control of the population exercised by the highly centralized political systems in Eastern Europe, student activism is a significant phenomenon within Communist systems. The more obvious manifestations of student political behavior were seen in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Study of this subject, however, is severely circumscribed by the difficulties in undertaking empirical research in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the available statistical data on social and political problems in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe are extremely limited in scope and content, and often suspect as to reliability. Despite these inadequacies, one can piece together from available sources an incomplete, but useful, picture of the political life of students in the East European countries.

Student political activity in Eastern Europe has usually taken the form of opposition—to an antiquated ecclesiastical system, to outside political domination, to oppressive political regimes, or to attempts to organize, regulate, direct, and control student life, thought, and activity.

The turn to national self-determination and the breakup of old empires throughout Eastern Europe after World War I greatly affected student movements. Students in the new countries formed at the war's end continued their involvement in politics, albeit in terms of the partisan political differences found in each country. Vestiges of the long fight for national self-determination existed among the national minority groups that remained in the new states, but the major thrust of student activities in the interwar period was directed toward improving living conditions and educational facilities.

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The formation of Communist youth and student organizations dates from the immediate post-World War I period.[1] For the most part, these organizations were composed of young unemployed workers and idealists—the alienated and the radical who by nature supported the Bolshevik methods as the best means for destroying the existing order. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the Communist youth and student organizations in Eastern Europe were forced to operate under illegal and clandestine conditions for most of the period preceding the Communist assumption of power after World War II. In Bulgaria, the Communist youth organization was by far the largest youth group on the left until an abortive coup in September, 1923, after which it was suppressed. In Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, and Poland, the Communist youth groups were banned in the early 1920's. Despite the difficulties of promoting activity among students, however, the Communists had established a tradition of organizing the youth in the East European countries by 1944. By the late 1940's, youth and student organizations in the now Communist states of Eastern Europe were fairly complete reproductions of the Soviet *Komsomol.* This condition has changed somewhat as a result of the increasing nationalism in Eastern Europe. At least in Poland and Hungary, the Parties have made more realistic appraisals of what can be expected from the younger generation. Nevertheless, a similarity in organizational structure, basic goals, and policies persists among the youth and student movements in the East European Communist countries.

Even in the Soviet Union, the students are part of the broad youth organization subject to Party control, but in most countries the Party has thought it advisable to create a separate "autonomous" student organization. Those "separate" student groups are actually under the control of the Party-approved leaders of the youth organization.[2] The existence of at least the façade of separate student organizations provides a means through which membership can be claimed for the national student bodies in international student organizations, such as the International Union of Students. The existence of a separate organizational framework for students may, in time, serve as a channel through which student interests may be aggregated and pressure may be exerted upon the decision-making organs within the Party. Fear of such a development seems to be behind the Czechoslovakian regime's refusal to submit to continual demands for a student organization outside the framework of the youth organization.[3]

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The University and the Educational Process

The universities in the East European Communist countries, and the educational process in general, have been an extremely important influence on student behavior and political activity. Since 1945, the primary aim in education in these countries has been to expand the system so that it not only raises the educational level of the society to a point adequate for the development of a modern industrial state, but transforms the culture of the society—its values and belief system—along Marxist-Leninist lines in such a way that the Party's monopoly of power is not challenged, and the population identifies actively with the goals set by the Party for the entire society. Party efforts to reach this goal have created a distinct environment in which students must pursue their studies. Student political activism is in large part a reaction to this environment.

Pursuance of the "material development of Communism"—the creation of an industrial state—by the Parties has meant the eradication of illiteracy and a vast expansion in educational facilities. As was the case earlier in Russia, the nature and functions of the universities in Eastern Europe were altered drastically as a result of the Communist accession to power. The traditional liberal and universal education of the "bourgeois" past was eliminated or drastically altered, and the educational system was adapted to fill the needs of the society as determined by the Communist Party. The diversity in historical traditions and in cultural backgrounds among the East European countries made for a varied pattern of development. The greatest growth in secondary and higher education occurred in Bulgaria and Romania, where the new Communist regimes had to overcome a higher level of illiteracy. (The pre-World War II literacy rate was 31.6 per cent for Bulgaria and 20 per cent for Romania.[4]) Extensive school systems had been built up before the war in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

While the Communist Parties were not the first to use the educational system as "an agency for political socialization," they were the first to do so in a dedicated, organized, and persistent fashion.[5] All Communist movements have had, almost as their *raison d'être*, the objective of a complete transformation of society. Essential to this purpose, or perhaps the end result, is the creation of a "new socialist man."[6] This vision supposes that a radical transformation of human nature will take place, that man will relate spontaneously to his neighbor in a harmonious fashion.

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Some of the East European Communist regimes, notably that of Romania, have recently modified their efforts at cultural change in a nationalist direction. These Communist Parties have sought to identify themselves and their objectives with the national traditions and culture and have included in the tasks of the educational system the transmission of the society's cultural heritage, most of which is not now seen as being "bad." They depict themselves as the historically necessary synthesizers of all that is "good" in the national past. The future will be assured by the Party's creation of the "new socialist man."

Of more immediate consequence are those elements in this imposed pattern of values that are directed toward the preservation of the leading role in the society for the Communist Party. Thus, the educational system initiates at an early age a process of socialization that seeks to instill in the younger generation the accepted values of the Party leaders.[7] The universities, together with the mass organizations concerned with youth and student affairs (*Komsomol,* Pioneers, Little Octobrists), must carry on this process once it is set in motion by the Party. It is not surprising, therefore, that the institutions of higher learning in all Communist countries are organized for strictly utilitarian purposes—the consolidation of "socialist power" and the development of a "socialist society."

Student Life

Although the Communist regimes like to emphasize the free, universal nature of their educational systems, higher education is not open to all, nor is the selection process always based on merit.[8] Competition for the available places in the institutions of higher learning is extremely sharp. For the academic year 1966-1967 in Poland, for example, there were 90,000 candidates for 34,000 places.[9] The first step toward admission is a very rigorous examination. Then, in most East European countries, preference is given to those who have the "proper" references from their local Party or youth organizations and have shown their "socialist-mindedness" by participating in industrial production work. In Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union in the years after the Revolution, the "class origin" of the applicant has been an important factor in deciding admission. Students from "working class" families receive far higher quotas, proportionately, than students from "bourgeois" backgrounds. This is slowly changing, however, as it did in the Soviet Union—perhaps

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because of the demands of a modernizing industrial society. Changes made in the admission requirements for institutions of higher learning in Hungary in 1962 have resulted in an emphasis on individual ability and motivation rather than class background.[10] Similar changes were instituted in Czechoslovakia in 1964, when class origin ceased to be a formal criterion for admission to a university. While it is no longer necessary to belong to the youth organization in Czechoslovakia in order to be admitted to a university, it still helps.[11]

With the decrease in importance of social class, political conviction has become more significant for university acceptance. The 13,289 students selected in 1963 from among 30,000 applicants to Hungarian institutions of higher learning were chosen on the basis of aptitude, talent, knowledge, and "attitude." Each applicant had to supply records evaluating his behavior while in secondary school, his participation in communal work, his ideological outlook, and his outside interests. Nevertheless, this desire for ideological conformity continues to be balanced against a concern for the need for trained personnel in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the latter appears, at least temporarily, to have outweighed the former.

The Party attempts to channel the activities of all young people toward Party-defined goals, and the youth organization performs four essential functions in support of Party objectives: It stimulates young people to learn so that the personnel necessary to run a modern industrial society will be available; it provides an effective organization through which a corps of workers can be mobilized for special projects; it affords a general training ground from which the Party can draw new recruits; and it serves as an instrument of political socialization through which the accepted values, as determined by the leadership, are instilled in the younger generation. In performing all of these functions, the youth organization makes no distinction between students and other young people. No organizations for students other than those sanctioned by the Party are allowed. The approved organizations are not the product of student initiative, nor are they administered by the students themselves in furtherance of their own interests.

The interests of the youth organizations even extend to the use of the students' free time. A Central Committee Vice-Chairman stated in a report to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish youth organization (ZMS) in November, 1966:

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> Youth is not always the best master of its own free time. It often betrays an inability to make the right choice and looks for outside help. In order that the Central Committee and our entire organization can properly concentrate on the task of managing the free time of youth, we must try to answer these key questions: How well did we reach the majority of youth with our programs, our activities? . . . How well were we able to achieve ideological saturation?[12]

The Hungarian youth organization would also like to organize the leisure-time of youth, but has concluded that it has "relatively little influence on young people's use of leisure, and fails even to make use of existing opportunities."[13]

If the Eastern European Communist regimes have been successful in controlling the organized forms of student activity, they have been unsuccessful in attracting students and other young people to the official organizations. The response has varied in Eastern Europe. The Soviet regime has probably had the most success, but even there membership is rather passive.[14] The Polish, Hungarian, and East German regimes have had the least success. In Hungary, for example, the official youth and student organization was a leader in the revolutionary events in the fall of 1956. The official organization that was re-established in early 1957 had considerable trouble recruiting members. Only 50 per cent of the total university enrollment in Hungary were members in 1960.[15] The East German regime has openly admitted that the official youth and student organization, the *Freie Deutsch Jugend* (FDJ), has little influence on youth.[16] The university students join the FDJ only as a prerequisite to graduation.

A combination of pressure and concessions has led to a limited revival of the official organizations in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, but the relationship between youth and students and the Party remains one of "peaceful coexistence." A recent Yugoslav study of students in that country concluded:

> The very fact that a large number of students has not been able to satisfy its normal need to live and act politically within the framework of the existing socio-political organizations [youth and student organizations] and self-managing bodies is, above all, an indication of the fact that these institutions are such that they are not able to offer such possibilities to the students.[17]

Student Politics in the Communist Countries

In the early years after the accession to power by the Communists, first in Russia and later in the other countries of Eastern

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Europe, a significant portion of the younger generation exhibited considerable enthusiasm. In this period, the Party's identification of its actions with the interests of the entire society found wide acceptance. The prominent role the Communists played in the underground resistance movements in the German-occupied or German-allied countries of Eastern Europe during World War II contributed considerably to their popularity in 1945. The failure of the Communists in Eastern Europe to provide a free, democratic alternative to the prewar authoritarian regimes, however, has led to disillusionment.[18]

Young professional people have been increasingly critical of restrictions imposed by the system on free expression and the free exchange of ideas. Young writers have been the leaders of protests against the dogmatic approach to life that is so characteristic of the Communist regimes. They are demanding new themes for literature, an abolition of propaganda themes in fiction, and an end to the rigidity of "socialist realism." The desire for more individual freedom—both intellectual and physical—an end to censorship, and more travel abroad are the most frequently observed demands of young students and intellectuals. The large mass of young people, who are neither products of the higher educational system nor young intellectuals, are equally disillusioned. Although their horizons do not prompt them to protest or issue demands for more self-expression, they do have their own means of expressing discontent.

The Party presses continuously lament the failure of students, young intellectuals, and youth in general to identify their interests completely with the policies of the Communist Party. This condition is a direct consequence of the environment the Parties have imposed on these groups—an environment in which there is little prospect of fulfilling individual interests.

Student Attitudes

Student attitudes, as distinct from the behavior to which these attitudes lead, are extremely difficult to ascertain in a Communist country. Limited survey research in Poland, the U.S.S.R., and elsewhere, along with the impressions of outsiders who have lived among students in a Communist society, have provided some direct evidence of student attitudes.[19]

The attitudes most relevant to student political activity clearly

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reflect the failure of the Communist regimes to make much progress in building the "new socialist man." Strongest evidence for this comes from surveys made in 1958 and 1961 on the world outlook of Warsaw students.[20] They show a decrease in the acceptance of the moral principles of Roman Catholicism as the best guide in life. This could be taken to indicate some success in the Party's efforts at the eradication of old values and the instilling of new, but other evidence does not support this supposition. In Czechoslovakia, for example, "the students have a tendency to derive general moral rules from religious ethics or from bourgeois humanism and to apply them as criteria for history"[21] at the expense of "Communist morality."

The Polish surveys of 1958 and 1961 also showed a rise in the acceptance of some form of socialism, but a socialism that tended to be identified with certain economic and social-welfare programs associated with Western social democracy (state ownership of industry, free medical care). An identification of socialism with Marxism-Leninism was much less evident, and Marxism-Leninism tended to be correlated with ideology. Yugoslav surveys in 1960 and 1965 indicate that in each case about three fourths of the sample expressed a "completely positive or partly positive attitude toward the fundamental elements of the system."[22] No information was given, however, on what constituted the "fundamental elements of the system." The Communist regimes will probably continue to have problems in building a new mode of thinking as long as they fail to develop in the minds of young people a correlation between Marxism-Leninism as an image of an ideal society and a cumulative body of practice.

The Polish surveys, as well as other evidence, show that young people are increasingly less committed to sacrificial, revolutionary programs. Sixty-eight per cent of the 1958 survey respondents said they did not think one should risk one's life for a social ideology. Young people appear by no means inspired to support grand schemes for constructing a radically new society. Their real concern is for more opportunity for self-expression and the satisfaction of personal goals and wants. This runs counter to the desire of the Party for acceptance by youth and students of Party policies and for a commitment among students to carrying out these policies.

The public-opinion survey center of Radio Warsaw conducted a survey in 1959 of recent secondary-school graduates.[23] When asked the question: What are the most general aspirations of youth?

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the large preponderance replied: "high professional status and a happy family life," or a "wealthy, fascinating life." A very small number gave the desired reply of a high post in productive work.

Further illustration of this emphasis on personal goals and personal freedom can be found in the following quotation from the Hungarian *Vas Nepe* (Szombathely) of February 26, 1963:

> The word "impatient" is used to describe those young poets and writers seeking to break into literature with new works. The words "angry young men" are being applied to the young technicians who would have greater readiness for discussion *plus the encouragement of personal* initiative. [Italics added.]

Hungarian youth, also, are striving basically for more knowledge and sound professional training and show little concern for grand, idealistic projects initiated by the Party.[24]

That expression of student attitudes that most reflects the failure of the Communist regimes to show any real progress in building the "new socialist man" is the student aversion to becoming "involved"—ideologically, politically, or socially. This was demonstrated quite clearly in the Polish surveys of 1958 and 1961. The reported frequency of political discussion among students, for example, decreased markedly between 1958 and 1961. Later Polish surveys show that students appear better informed on the activities of the major political parties in the United States than on politics in Poland itself.[25]

Soviet commentators have recognized this unwillingness to become involved and have labeled it *indifferentism*.[26] It expresses a desire on the part of many young people to be left alone, to be free from the constant exhortations and demands imposed by the Party. The popular Polish weekly *Swiat* has described these young people as "the passive ones" and has criticized them for their expressions of disillusionment with reality and their avoidance of politics and all organized activities. Interestingly, they are looked upon as neither demoralized individuals nor "hooligans," but rather as young people whom the Party has failed.

The Yugoslav survey previously cited provides an analysis of student attitudes that, with some modification, might well be applicable to all of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. It distinguishes three groups of students according to their political behavior: a not very numerous group of young enthusiasts "who are exercising their desire to change social relations in a progressive [ideologically approved] direction through countless forms of con-

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crete and just activity," a somewhat larger group that are characterized by "conformist adaptation" and give priority to their own personal interests, and a much larger group whose political behavior is distinctly reserved. Within this latter group, a further fourfold distinction of ascending size is made: first, a small group that is clearly politically and ideologically indifferent; second, those who concentrate their activity on their own technical training; third, the skeptics, the cynics, the nihilists; and fourth, those who are politically reserved and resigned, but not to the extreme. This latter group has social and political views, but hesitates to express them, for its members do not see the possibility for "socio-political activity." They have a feeling of helplessness in the face of social forces. For this reason, they withdraw into narrow circles and engage in non-political activities.

In terms of the political socialization process in the Communist countries, the persistence of youth and student attitudes other than those of the "young enthusiasts" can be considered a setback to the regime. Forthright recognition that the majority of their students do not measure up to the "ideal" is in itself a commentary on the changing nature of the Yugoslav regime.

To a significant degree, young people in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe are iconoclasts; they have come to "reject all slogans and to look with distrust upon heroes, leaders, sportsmen, and saints." They fear "fanaticism, blindness, and untruth."[27] There is also evidence of a generational conflict. Polish sources have admitted a strong tendency among youth to blame the older generation for the war and the accompanying destruction, for the society's misery and unemployment, for the fear of a new war, for "senseless iron curtains and boundary barriers," and for unsettled racial conflicts.[28] In the Soviet Union, the more sophisticated students criticize the older generation for having been involved in, or permitting, the Stalinist excesses.[29] The young people are tired of hearing about the sacrifices the older generation made in order to create a new social order.

Student Political Behavior

The political activities of students and young intellectuals in a Communist society reflect opposition to their essentially negative and imposed role as objects of Party policy. For some time, the efforts of the Party to mobilize and direct student and intellectual

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life have conflicted with the urge for self-expression and assertion characteristic of students everywhere. Students have resisted the direction of their life by the Party—overtly, covertly, and passively.

The latent alienation from and hostility to the new Communist regimes in Eastern Europe first broke out into the open in 1956. Since 1956, Eastern Europe has witnessed student-led riots, demonstrations, parades, meetings, discussions critical of the regime within the classroom, and, in East Germany at least, flights from the country. A demonstration of student political views recently took place in Poland. Dissident students of Warsaw University were accused in the fall of 1966 of organizing or voicing "negative criticism" at a stormy student meeting, when the noted young Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski attacked curbs on free discussion.

Less evident, but still to be found, are the more covert political activities—the underground organizations, the clandestine publishing and dissemination of anti-regime propaganda, the tearing down of official posters, and the writing of slogans on walls. References to such activities and groups are periodically found in the press in Eastern Europe. Strict controls over the right to organize and the access to communications media, and severe punishment of "anti-state" activities make covert activities difficult to develop and maintain. Furthermore, relatively few students and other young people are so alienated from the regime and so motivated that they are willing to risk involvement in covert activities. Unless a crisis should develop, as it did in 1956, these young people pose no real threat to the East European Communist regimes.

By far the most significant political manifestation by students in the Communist countries in Eastern Europe is their passive refusal to accept the role delineated for them by the Party. A passive, apolitical attitude is intolerable in the Communist system, and in this sense, the less dramatic forms of student opposition become as political as demonstrations and clandestine activity.

The passive resistance of students and young intellectuals to Party direction has taken many forms: refusal to join the officially sanctioned student organization; rejection of the Party's demands that they accept or internalize the regime's policies as to tastes, political views, or religion; intellectual skepticism; the reading of prohibited literature; the expression of discontent by young artists through their work; excessive drinking; "hooliganism" and juvenile delinquency; and, at the extreme, a kind of internal migration. These reactions—observable in one form or another, to one degree

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or another, in all of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe—are political. They signal opposition to the demands of the system and are of continuing and grave concern to the Communist Parties.

A survey conducted by the East Berlin paper *Wochenpost* showed that despite the pressure exerted in East German schools, universities, and places of work, about half of all young people are successful in avoiding the premilitary training designed to prepare them for military service.[30] Many university graduates never appear for work at the places assigned to them—a serious situation, since a rational allocation of manpower is essential to the economic plans of Communist countries. Indeed, in most of these countries, university graduates are under obligation to take the job assigned to them for at least three years. Even Poland, which unlike the other East European regimes had avoided assigning graduates to specific jobs, had to take such steps in 1963-64 in order to get trained personnel where they were needed.[31]

Despite the regulations, the avoidance of assigned jobs remains a continuing problem for the East European regimes. The reasons are not hard to find. The President of the Polish Students Association (ZSP) was reported to have said not long ago that among Polish students "there is a great fear and apprehension of work in the countryside."[32] Jobs are increasingly being located in areas outside the large cultural centers, and many students want to avoid at all costs the cultural barrenness of country life. Another factor seems to be the unnecessary hardships, caused by bureaucratic inefficiency, that must be endured—inadequate housing and recreational facilities, low pay, and so forth.

Students also express their dissent and opposition by the avoidance of, or cynical attitude toward, lectures and discussions on subjects related to politics or policy. "Very often they know in advance what they will be told, what the answers will be, and what questions will not be answered at all."[33] The students' cynicism or skepticism about official ideology is often expressed in their work assignments. Complaints have been heard that students were not reflecting the "Marxist-Leninist position" on various issues in their term papers.

The search for new ideas and new forms for expressing themselves has led students in Communist countries to the new currents of thought and artistic expression in the West. There is also a tendency among East Europeans to be attracted to nonconformist Soviet writers.[34] Casting aside the dogmas of the Party, students

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and young intellectuals strive to satisfy their intellectual and artistic curiosity by borrowing from other societies. Many of the Communist regimes struggle continuously to restrict and limit this with campaigns against the intrusion of harmful "bourgeois ideology." In most of the East European countries, the press often carries the complaint that young people are being led astray by Western influences, by an attempted ideological subversion of Communism by the Western, bourgeois countries. Early marriages, deviant social behavior ("hooliganism"), cynicism toward *Komsomol* activities, and even serious crimes have been attributed to the "unhealthy" Western influences to which so many young people are exposing themselves.[35]

Concern for the effects of "bourgeois ideology" varies from country to country. The more "liberal" of the East European regimes —Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia—have managed to reach some sort of *modus vivendi* with the students and young intellectuals. By loosening the bonds on the cultural life of the society, by tolerating the introduction of many heretofore banned Western films, plays, and books, by allowing intellectuals more opportunity for experimentation, and by permitting the students to have their own "clubs," the regimes may hope to provide a less politically damaging outlet for student and intellectual dissent. Events at the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovakian Writers' Union have shown this to be a fragile and highly unstable relationship.

To the degree that a student movement can be defined as "an association of students inspired by aims set forth in a specific ideological doctrine, usually, although not exclusively, political in nature,"[36] it seems clear that there are no student movements in the countries of Eastern Europe. The official student "movements" have been formed by the parties for the purpose of creating a situation in which all students are inspired by a specific ideology. The Communist Parties have not been without some success in this area. Party control over the formal processes of socialization has affected the development of spontaneous socialization forces and over the years has produced attitudes and orientations derived in considerable measure from the imposed ideology.[37] On balance, however, the Parties have failed to make significant progress toward inculcating ideological uniformity among the students or inspiring them to pursue the Party-defined goals.

In spite of the absence of student movements from Eastern

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Europe, students in these countries have continued to perform many important political functions for their societies. The events in Hungary and Poland in 1956 demonstrated that students can topple governments and play a leading role in forcing changes in policy when their dissatisfaction becomes great enough and is part of a broad societal discontent. Apart from such circumstances, however, student participation in social change takes less dramatic forms in Eastern Europe. Unless Party control over political life has broken down, as it had in 1956, the opportunities for concerted and direct action by students are nonexistent.

The "liberalization" that has characterized most of the regimes in Eastern Europe since 1956 has allowed more scope for individual, non-Party activity. Students and young intellectuals are clearly playing a growing role in cultural developments. To the extent that the Party feels it necessary to conciliate students by making concessions in cultural matters, one might say that the students are acting as agents of social change. It should be remembered, however, that at least at this time the social change observable in Eastern Europe is Party-initiated and Party-controlled.

Very few comparisons can be drawn between the leadership role students play in the "national-liberation" movements, the political parties, and the trade unions of new nations and the leadership role they play in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Even though new societies were imposed, or are in the process of attempted imposition, on the countries of Eastern Europe after 1945, these countries had a fairly extensive history as social entities—certainly so if one compares them with many of the new nations of Asia and Africa. Thus, there was no elite or leadership vacuum in Eastern Europe which student activists could fill. Furthermore, students were in no way part of the leadership of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 and of the East European Communist regimes.[38] All political, social, and economic organizations were and are clearly under "adult" Party control. The future prospects for students to participate in the leadership of society are also limited. The path to political leadership remains essentially outside the educational system, since full-time Party work is the basic route to political (and thus social, economic, and cultural) leadership. Institutes under direct Party control provide the advanced political and ideological training required for higher leadership. The educated, intellectual elite is increasing its control over the economic and social administrative apparatus, which is becoming increasingly influential

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within the Party, but the professional Party *apparatchik* is still the dominant influence.[39]

The continuing effort to develop the "new socialist man" in the Communist countries runs counter to the increasing need for more rationality in the educational process and for more incentives for development of a technical intelligentsia. In a society where rapid industrialization is given first priority, where the development of skilled personnel to carry out this process is essential, and where an *active* commitment to the policies of the regime is necessary for further development and for the maintenance of the regime's monopoly over the decision-making process, firm political control over the educational process and student life becomes self-defeating. The Communist experience in Eastern Europe shows that a monopoly of political power by one party or regime is difficult to reconcile with the desire of students to express themselves freely.

Ideologically based student movements in the developed countries seem to be coming to an end. Students have accepted the principles of the welfare state, but the old, ideologically connected economic issues no longer seem important to them. Certainly, this appears evident when one observes student activism in Eastern Europe. Indeed, students throughout Eastern Europe are increasingly reacting to an imposed environment by turning to individualistic pursuits.

References

1. Richard Cornell, *Youth and Communism* (New York, 1965), Chapter 1.
2. The student groups usually exist as "student councils." In some cases, these are hierarchical organizations formed by the sending of delegates from faculty student councils to university student councils to a national student council. At each level, the youth organization unit plays the controlling role. In this form, the student councils are best seen as having the same relation to the *Komsomols* as the non-Party mass organizations (such as the youth organizations and the trade unions) have to the Communist Parties. In other cases, the student council is an "advisory body" of the central committee of the youth organization. See *Czechoslovak Youth* (English language monthly of the Czechoslovakian Communist youth organization), No. 10 (1960) pp. 10-11. An exception is Poland, where a distinctly separate student organization (the ZSP) exists, still under Party guidance, however.
3. See *Rude Pravo* (Prague; July 31, 1964); *Mlada Fronta* (Prague; May 19, 1964); *Youth and Freedom* (bimonthly publication of the Institute for International Affairs, New York), Vol. 8, Nos. 1 and 2 (1960), pp. 20-22.

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4. *East Europe* (January, 1964), p. 20.
5. See James S. Coleman (ed.), *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), Part 2.
6. Herschel and Edith Alt, *The New Soviet Man* (New York, 1964).
7. See Edmund King, "The Concept of Ideology in Communist Education," *Communist Education* (New York, 1963); George S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education* (New York, 1957), Chapters 5 and 6; George L. Kline (ed.), *Soviet Education* (New York, 1957).
8. See C. L. Wrenn, "Higher Education," *Communist Education;* Nigel Grant, *Soviet Education* (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 117-20.
9. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw; June 30, 1966).
10. *Youth and Freedom* (Institute for International Youth Affairs, New York), Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 19.
11. *Rude Pravo* (Prague; June 29, 1964).
12. *News Features,* Vol. 7, No. 2 (December 8, 1966), p. 6.
13. *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest; May 17, 1964).
14. Allen Kassof, *The Soviet Youth Program* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 120-25.
15. Ladislav Szeberrenyi, "Hungarian Youth Under Communism," *Sudeten Bulletin,* Vol. 11, No. 9 (September, 1963), pp. 277-82.
16. ADN (East German news agency; February 11, 1961).
17. Manojlo Brocio, "Attitude of Yugoslav Students Towards the Socio-Political System in the Country." Paper presented to the Sixth Congress of the International Sociological Association, Evian, France (September, 1966), p. 26.
18. For an interesting evaluation of the changes in mood of Polish youth since 1945—from revolution (a cynicism and contempt for the adult world that brought on war), through a nonconformism opposed to the regime (for having failed to fulfill its promise of equality and social justice), to the withdrawal which took place after 1956—see Zbigniew Jordan, "The Ideologies of Polish Youth: From Revolution to Withdrawal," *East Europe* (January, 1964), pp. 2-11.
19. The discussion in this section is based, for the most part, on the following sources: the materials on the poll taken by the Institute for Public Opinion as reported to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (January 11, 1961), p. 3; (January 26), pp. 2-3; (February 24), p. 3; (March 16), pp. 1-3; (April 28), pp. 2-3; (July 21), pp. 1-4; (July 22), pp. 3-4; the analysis of this poll by G. F. Akhminov, "The Aspirations and Hopes of Soviet Youth," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR,* Vol. 10, No. 1 (January, 1963), pp. 3-17; Emilia Wilder, "Impact of Poland's 'Stabilization' on Its Youth," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall, 1964), pp. 447-52; Stefan

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Nowak, "Factors Determining Egalitarianism of Warsaw Students," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1960), pp. 219-31; Darrell P. Hammer, "Among Students in Moscow: An Outsider's Report," *Problems of Communism* (July-August, 1964), pp. 11-18; S. Nowak, "Social Attitudes of Warsaw Students," *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* (January-June 1962), pp. 91-103. See also A. Pawolszynska and S. Nowak, "World Outlook of Students in a Period of Stabilization," *Polish Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (February, 1962), pp. 38-50. While there are no recent studies, nothing available through other sources would indicate that the conclusions from this data are outdated.

20. Wilder, "Impact of Poland's 'Stabilization' on Its Youth." It has been difficult to ascertain very much about the sample used in most of the various surveys discussed in this paper. Those used in the 1958 and 1961 Polish surveys are discussed in Nowak, "Social Attitudes of Warsaw Students," p. 91, fn. 1. In 1958 a random sample of 838 students (from approximately 25,000) was drawn from all ten university-level institutions in Warsaw. In 1961, a random sample was taken only from students in the College of Technology. Comparisons thus show changes in attitudes only for this one institution. The *Komsomolskaya Pravda* survey involved a questionnaire to which all readers were encouraged to reply. The sample, therefore, was not randomly selected. A total of 17,466 replies were studied by the Institute of Public Opinion. For the other surveys there is usually no information provided concerning the sample used.

21. *Youth and Freedom*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June, 1959), p. 3.

22. Brocio, "Attitudes of Yugoslav Students Toward the Socio-Political System in the Country," pp. 6-8.

23. *Radio Warsaw* (October 3, 1959). This was a poll of 2,404 students who had graduated in 1959 from secondary school; there is no indication of how the sample was drawn.

24. There is evidence of an increasing nationalist tinge to this pressure for more personal freedom. Reports indicate, for example, that there are demands from students and intellectuals in Slovenia for a cultural freedom emphasizing Slovenian nationalist values (*Kommunist* [Belgrade; July 9, 1964]).

25. Survey of students at the Cracow Metallurgy and Mining Academy, and survey by the Political Science Studies Center at the Jagellonian University, Cracow. See *East Europe* (December, 1966), pp. 51-52.

26. Hammer, "Among Students in Moscow, An Outsider's Report," p. 12.

27. *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Cracow; May 24, 1959).

28. *Ibid.* For Hungary see *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest; March 23, 1965).

29. Hammer, "Among Students in Moscow: An Outsider's Report," p. 13.

30. *Informationsburo West* (West Berlin; June 20, 1966).

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31. *Youth and Freedom,* Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 10-11. See also *East Europe* (April, 1964), p. 46.

32. *The New York Times* (March 5, 1965).

33. *Polityka* (Belgrade; June 19, 1964); *Magyar Ifjusag* (Budapest; February 5, 1958); *Youth and Freedom,* Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 1.

34. "Yevtushenko's Influence on Hungary," *East Europe* (October, 1964), pp. 14-17.

35. *Youth and Freedom,* Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 7.

36. Philip G. Altbach, "Students and Politics," *Comparative Education Review,* Vol. 10, No. 2 (June, 1966), p. 180.

37. For the Soviet Union, see Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How The Soviet System Works* (Cambridge, 1956), and Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Boston, 1966), pp. 110-11. Much more research needs to be done on this issue in the other East European countries.

38. While it is true that the Bolsheviks appealed to the students in Russia and found much support from them, the Bolshevik leaders were hardly students.

39. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR,* Ch. 6. See also H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (New York, 1966), pp. 82-84.

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LESLIE L. ROOS, JR., NORALOU P. ROOS, AND GARY R. FIELD

Students and Politics in Turkey

IN TURKEY, as in other countries, the role of students in politics has varied from historical period to historical period, from one political regime to another, and from one university to another. Turkish students have been associated with both arch-conservative causes and radical movements. They have rioted against politically repressive regimes and demonstrated in opposition to moderately progressive ones.

The place of students in Turkish political life also varies widely according to the period being studied. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire, particularly between 1850 and 1920, students were frequently the most active and effective political force. They deposed sultans and plotted revolutions. On the other hand, student political activity was much less important during the years between the founding of the Republic in 1923 and the beginning of multiparty politics in 1946. Students were so inactive during this period that it is difficult to find even a mention of them in any of the standard historical accounts.

Since the beginning of the multiparty period, students have shown a new interest in politics. This involvement reached its peak in the days before the 1960 military coup with riots at the Law and Political Science Faculties and a march demonstrating the antigovernmental sentiments of cadets at the Army War College. The students' moment of glory was, however, shortlived, and although students have remained more active than they were during the long single-party era, the level and importance of student political involvement would seem to be much less in present-day Turkey than in many other developing countries.

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Students and Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire

By the nineteenth century, the deterioration of the Ottoman religion-based education system was almost complete. The *ulema* who served the Empire as both judges and teachers were ignorant of conditions in their own empire and, especially, of events in the outside world. They stressed the unquestioned superiority of Islam and an absolute rejection of anything foreign. The *ulema* and the students whom they were training to follow them were both threatened by any change in the traditional Islamic system and well situated to block reforms, since they and the military caste of Janissaries held the balance of power against the sultan in his own capital city. Thus, it is not surprising that when Selim III, the first sultan who could be accused of imitating Frankish ways, was faced with a Janissary revolt in Rumelia and an *ulema*-organized mob in the capital, the infidel reforms were quickly suspended. Although Selim's successors were very effective in undermining the power of the religious and military opposition to reform, they were not able to neutralize the theological students' opposition to change. It finally became necessary to ward off conspiracies by limiting the number of theological students in the capital.

In 1876, the political activity of the students was more direct. A student strike was called and spread from one *medrese* (religious school) in Istanbul to another. In addition to buying arms, the students organized mass meetings at the mosques and heard inflammatory speeches about the weakness of the government in the face of rebellion by its subject populace and threats from Russian influence.[1] The students prepared a petition calling for the dismissal of the grand vezir and the head of the religious establishment *(şeyhülislam)*. In direct response to the student agitation, the offending officials were dismissed.

Although political activities of the theological students were usually associated with extremely reactionary causes, one should note that the riots in 1876 were in sympathy with the aims of the reforming Young Ottomans. Members of this Western-educated group were intent on limiting the powers of an incompetent sultan, Abdülaziz. Since the Young Ottomans were committed to saving traditional Ottoman values, they were at times able to enlist the support of certain theological students who also revered these values, even if from a slightly different perspective.[2]

Unfortunately, the perspective of the theological students was

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narrow, and they found many of the Young Ottoman reform efforts, such as agitation for a constitution and parliament, totally unacceptable. The continuing political unrest of the theological students during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was, however, understandable in their terms. They were observing the progressive deterioration of the Empire and blamed it on the Westernized reforms that were changing the traditional basis of the Ottoman state. The Young Ottomans and their successors interpreted the Empire's troubles in a quite different way. These students came from the newly Westernized schools and felt that the reforms had not gone far enough. They objected both to the lack of implementation of a constitution and to the arbitrary power exerted by the sultan.

Westernized education was brought into Turkey in the late-eighteenth century by sultans intent upon their armies' learning the secrets of the West in order to save the Ottomans from increasingly disastrous defeats. Although these secular schools met outspoken hostility from the conservative Janissaries and the traditional religious educational structure, they were so obviously successful that many other secular institutions were added over the following years. The contact with Western culture that instruction in French allowed had a predictable impact on this new elite group. Feelings of sensitivity to Turkish cultural and political backwardness led to an intense commitment to structural changes which the students felt necessary to revitalize the Ottoman Empire. Overt political activity by these students was slow to develop because at first they were few in number and operating in a potentially hostile environment. In addition, the most promising graduates of these new schools were so welcomed by the reformist sultans that they had unique opportunities for wielding influence at the highest military and governmental levels.[3]

The results of the graduates' participation within the system were, however, so disappointing in actual practice that a new form of covert revolutionary planning began in many of the new schools. According to one source, the first organized opposition was formed in 1889 by four medical students in the garden of the military's medical college.[4] The new group won support in all the higher schools in Istanbul, eventually taking the name of the Society of Union and Progress. The Society unsuccessfully attempted a coup in 1896, and despite the failure of this effort, the Society continued to attract adherents, particularly among the military cadets. One writer describes the military academy at this time as a "hotbed of

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sedition" where "every officer seemed to be a revolutionary."[5] The strategic positions assumed by these students made their political activities especially significant; as they graduated, they formed new revolutionary cells among all arms of the far-flung Ottoman military establishment.[6]

Although the political activities of students from the newly Westernized schools and students from the theological schools were generally at cross-purposes, the conditions that encouraged their involvement seem to have been similar. Both types of students felt the lack of a strong, confident Ottoman leadership that could meet the innumerable crises facing the Empire and restore the dignity and glory their predecessors had known. In a society in which education traditionally entitled one to entrance into the elite, the political decay threatened the students' futures. The challenge that Western reforms posed to the Islamic foundations of Turkish society directly affected the job opportunities open to the theological students.[7] Similarly, students in the Westernized schools saw a daily deterioration in the Ottoman military situation, and if total disaster was to be avoided, change had to be brought about.

The more permissive attitude toward political discussion that evolved during this period encouraged both groups of students to voice their dissatisfactions with the *status quo*. Official policy varied from sultan to sultan, but with the rise of the literary-journalistic movement in the 1850's, new ideas were being discussed and debated. The once-accepted solutions to problems had been challenged, and students were eager to involve themselves in this debate.

From a cross-national perspective, it is interesting briefly to compare the role of students in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire with the role played by students in China under similar political conditions.[8] In both countries the students had a historical sense of national grandeur that was frustrated under weak, inept traditional regimes. By 1900, this frustration was aggravated by the introduction of a more modern university system. Moreover, Chinese students abroad absorbed radical new philosophies and were shamed by the realization of the backwardness of their own country. The great allure which Sun Yat-sen's ideas had for Chinese students was comparable to the adulation accorded such Young Ottoman writers as Namik Kemal. But, in Turkey at the critical historical period, the main revolutionary stimulus was found in the military schools, and the military provided an organization through which revolutionary

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efforts could be effectively channeled. In Turkey, no rival to this organization developed, while in China lack of respect for the military was coupled with the existence of both the Communist and the Kuomintang alternatives.

Under the brilliant leadership of Atatürk, the Turkish army was successful in driving out the foreigners, and subsequently the traditional antipathy of the Turks toward the Russians made Communist ideology less of a threat to nationalism than was the case in China. In Turkey as in China, "a century of national humiliation and a succession of thwarted reforms imparted an irresistible allure to radical solutions,"[9] but the radical solution adopted by the Turks was very different from the course upon which the Chinese eventually embarked.

Students and the Republic's Single-Party Period (1923-1945)

Between the founding of the Turkish Republic in the early 1920's and the beginning of the multiparty period in the mid-1940's, student politics appears to have entered a quiescent state. The government, dominated by Atatürk's Republican People's Party, apparently met very little open opposition from university students. Their lack of activity is the more striking when contrasted with the opposition expressed by other groups in society during this period. A number of journalists, intellectuals, and politicians, along with certain religious and tribal elements were opposed to many aspects of the People's Party government, and they vented their opposition in various ways. For example, when in the 1930's there was a brief unsuccessful attempt to introduce a second political party, each of the above groups was quick to come to the new party's support. A comprehensive discussion of this period makes, however, no mention of any student participation in this effort.[10] In order to understand the supportive role that students appear to have played during the first years of the Republic, it is necessary to examine Atatürk's unique position as a revolutionary leader. In the short course of five years (between 1922 and 1927), he legislated the political and social order of the Ottoman Empire out of existence. This was no simple task, and frequently he stood alone against the vested interest of enemies and the more cautious counsel of friends. Although the reforms were not uniformly adopted throughout Turkish society, Atatürk was extremely successful in his onslaught upon the values

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of the elite. Such was the main aim of his program—the transformation of society from the top down.[11]

An analysis of students and politics in other developing areas suggests that "dynamism" is one of the most important qualities that students look for in their leaders.[12] According to any such criteria, Atatürk was extraordinarily dynamic, and each of his reforms was justified in terms of making Turkey a truly modern society. More important for our purposes, Atatürk completely destroyed that part of the educational system (the theological schools) which would have provided opposition to his actions. At the same time, he placed great stress on the rapid expansion of secular education. Through these new schools he planned both to modernize Turkish values and to convince his countrymen that the path he had chosen for them was the correct one. Atatürk was eminently successful in this task.

If one were to compare the conditions that tended to dampen student political activity in the single-party period with those that had encouraged such activity during the previous century, a number of generalizations might be made. The most important difference was the changed political situation. While the Ottoman students operated in an unstable political environment, not knowing who would be successful in the next coup or counter-coup, the early Republican students looked to a vigorous leadership that successfully met every challenge. Similarly, Ottoman students were anxious about their personal futures, while students in the Republic anticipated promising careers in government, in politics, and in an expanding industrial sector. Finally, while the rebellious spirit of the Ottoman era encouraged opposition from journalists, the political situation during the early decades of the Republic did not. Atatürk's reforms had been too drastic and too unpopular to allow any criticism of them to be voiced. The only basis for political discussion of any kind was a fundamental acceptance of these reforms, and deviation was strongly discouraged.

Students and the Multiparty Politics Period (1946-Present)

The thesis that students were inactive during the the single-party period because they were unified behind Atatürk and the dynamic modernization program upon which he embarked is supported by the events that followed the termination of single-party dominance. The 1946 decision by the Republican People's Party leadership to

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allow another party to compete for the support of the rural masses meant an inevitable relaxation of some of Atatürk's most unpopular religious reforms. The call to prayer could once again be recited in Arabic (rather than Turkish) and a Faculty of Theology was re-established. Many of the nationalistic youths interpreted such actions as a grave threat to the entire Kemalist revolution. An analysis of the Turkish press indicates that such concern stimulated students to political protest at the beginning of the multiparty period.[13] Thus, in 1946 students denounced the fanatical religious behavior evident during the funeral of Marshal Çakmak (a former military figure with conservative support) and the activities of a sect that demolished statues of Atatürk.

Turkish student politics are largely confined to national issues. The above-mentioned content analysis of student political concerns between 1950 and 1964 gives the following breakdown: 7 per cent of the statements were on student affairs, 15 per cent on ideological issues (mainly protests against the actions of Turkish Communists), 41 per cent on domestic affairs, 17 per cent on international affairs (the Cyprus conflict), 17 per cent on the protection of Atatürk's reforms, and 3 per cent miscellaneous. These domestic concerns of Turkish students set them off sharply from such student movements as the Nigerian and the Scandinavian, which tend to take stands on the problems of other countries.

One of the few overt protests of official governmental activity in the pre-1960 period followed the dismissal of Political Science Faculty Dean, Turhan Feyzioğlu. He had bitterly denounced the government's refusal to promote a faculty member who was critical of government policy.[14] Approximately three hundred students walked out of their classes at the Faculty in protest over the government's action.

This protest was mild, however, compared with the involvement of university students in the 1960 coup ousting the Menderes government. Menderes had led his Democratic Party to an overwhelming victory in the first free election in 1950, and he was supported by an apparently unbeatable combination of peasants, businessmen, and members of the free professions. His unco-ordinated free-spending policies precipitated a spiraling inflation which especially hurt such salaried groups as the bureaucrats and military men. Their alienation was particularly intolerable because the Democratic Party was accused of winning the support of the rural peasantry by sacrificing many of Atatürk's religious reforms. Since bureaucrats and military

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men had long formed the backbone of the Republic's elite, their frustration was understandable.[15]

Menderes' repression of political opposition had grown increasingly strict and onerous during the late 1950's, while tension in the major cities continued to rise. In 1960 he granted sweeping powers to an investigating committee that would have acted to destroy all open opposition, whether from other parties, newspapers, or other organizations. This act touched off a general student protest. Students gathered at the Law Faculty in Istanbul and at the Political Science Faculty in Ankara. When police were sent to break up the demonstrations, serious clashes occurred in which one student was killed. Following these clashes, the universities were closed for a month, but almost every night students helped to incite riots on the main boulevard of Ankara. While these riots were not major affairs, the students continued to provide the major overt opposition to the Menderes regime. This was dramatically underlined by the spontaneous march of a thousand Military College cadets on the presidential residence. They were dissuaded from completing the march by their commanders, but the Turkish student had proved himself to be heroic in his battle against a repressive political regime.

It is important to remember that while the student demonstrations aroused public opinion against the regime and created an intolerably tense political atmosphere, they were not directly related to the May 27 coup that toppled the regime just one month later. Most accounts indicate that the coup was the result of long planning and deliberation by a group of military men.[16] If anything, the student demonstrations were unwelcomed by the coup planners, since they served to warn Menderes and persuaded him to take counter-measures that he might not otherwise have taken. But the coup was successful, and the students' interpretation of their own role gave them a heady sense of power and righteousness. This experience appears to have altered the pattern of student political participation.

Before the coup, most student statements were meant only to be informative, but after the coup they became "much more dynamic, requesting quick action, containing warnings and sometimes even threats."[17] Student actions immediately after the coup also demonstrated this new-found power. In 1960-61 they walked out to protest unpopular teachers, shortages of books, and poor food in university canteens. In almost every case (even when it was a protest over defining acceptable academic performance), the students pre-

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vailed.[18] Explicitly political demonstrations were held by students in 1962 when they wrecked two newspaper offices in Istanbul and the Justice Party headquarters. (This Party is the most direct successor to Menderes' outlawed Democratic Party.) In 1963, about fifteen hundred students demonstrated in Istanbul against the release of ex-President Bayar for medical treatment.

A period of normalization seems to have set in after the burst of student political activism in the early 1960's.[19] Student views are now expressed largely through press statements, various meetings, and occasional demonstrations. The main vehicles for the expression of their opinion are the large student organizations that recruit from various universities. Since 1960, the two major organizations—the National Turkish Students' Federation (TMTF) and the National Turkish Students' Union (MTTB)—have been supported by funds from the national budget.[20] Both are legally obligated to remain politically neutral, although TMTF has long sympathized with the leftist parties—first with the People's Party and increasingly with the outspokenly Marxist Turkish Labor Party. MTTB has recently taken a much more pro-government position, roundly criticizing its rivals for dabbling in politics.

There appears to be some relationship between the level of student involvement and other significant dimensions of the political environment. The political atmosphere in Turkey was extremely tense and uncertain both before and immediately after the 1960 coup. Journalists were jailed, elections were thought to be rigged, and the two chief Parties were almost incapable of civil communication. Although the political climate was generally considered intolerable, no clear solution was in sight. Students, by openly demonstrating their protest, had an obvious impact on so fluid a situation. As in the earlier Ottoman period, students were encouraged to take matters into their own hands because none of the acknowledged political leaders was able to provide the direction that could assure them about their own personal future and about the future of the nation.

The political climate changed, however, when the Justice Party was elected to office with a large majority in 1965. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel won a personal triumph over the reactionary extremist elements within his own Justice Party and thus gained the support of many moderates of various political sympathies. He has neutralized the potential opposition of the military by choosing the former General Chief of Staff (another acceptable moderate) to

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serve as President, and has also proved to be surprisingly successful in the economic field. The capable leadership provided by Prime Minister Demirel has tended to reduce the political impact of students. They have not, however, been silenced, and the open climate for political discussion encourages them to make their voices heard.

The continuation of relatively restrained behavior on the part of the students is by no means certain. The leaders of Turkish student political organizations tend to be considerably more leftist than the student body,[21] and thus may be motivated to lead other students toward more radical activism. The success of such efforts and the future role of students in Turkish politics are likely to be linked to political developments within the system as a whole.

Political Socialization in the Turkish Educational System

Any attempt to understand the role of students in Turkish politics since the founding of the Republic in 1922 must deal with the Kemalist legacy. Atatürk explicitly created the secular-nationalist system of education to win support for his ideological revolution, and his political successors have continued to use the schools as a means for inculcating a national identification into the traditionally privatistic rural populace. All political parties have made this a central goal of education. Atatürk's bust occupies a prominent place in every school, while history courses emphasize both Republican accomplishments and the achievements of the Turkish "race."[22]

The effectiveness of such an educational system is clearly shown in the answers to a question asked on a 1963 national sample survey, "Who is the person in all the world, living or dead, whom you admire most—and why?"[23] With each increase in the level of education, the respondents were more likely to identify Atatürk as the person they most admired and less inclined to choose a religious figure. Only 15 per cent of the respondents who had never attended school named Atatürk as the person most admired, while 53 per cent of those with a university education chose him. The proportion of those saying they most admired a religious figure declined from 16 per cent of those with no education to 1 per cent of the respondents with a university education. Similarly, with almost every increment of education, people tended increasingly to admire a specific person because of his "usefulness to the nation," rather than his religious beliefs.

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The data also support the idea that nationalistic values are instilled early in the educational process. The proportion of the people choosing Atatürk as the person they most admired rose 33 per cent between those with no schooling (15 per cent mentioned Atatürk) and those with a middle-school education (48 per cent chose Atatürk). After middle school (middle school consists of three years following five years of primary education) the increase was slight, with only 5 per cent more respondents with some university education mentioning Atatürk than did people with some middle school. Additional evidence supporting the hypothesis that Turkish students acquire national allegiance during their first eight years of education, before they reach the *lycée*-level schools, is provided in a study by Frederick Frey.[24] He compares the attitudes of students in their first year of *lycée* study with those in their last year and finds that no consistent changes in the politically relevant items can be observed. Such a finding indicates that relatively little political socialization takes place after a student enters the *lycée*.

Since political socialization in Turkey occurs at such an early educational level, all students seem to acquire similar political loyalties no matter what type of secondary education they receive. This is important, since an individual proceeds from middle school into one of the various secondary schools, which train their students for very different career paths. Although one might expect students in the less privileged schools to be less committed to the values that define the modern Turkish elite, this is apparently not the case. Students in different types of secondary schools are equally likely to say they would be willing to make a great personal sacrifice for national goals, that children must be taught loyalty to the nation, and that one should definitely vote in national elections.

Although attitudes toward the political system differ little among students in the various kinds of secondary schools, students in the elite regular *lycées* are more inclined to take an active role in politics. They are likely to feel that "participation in activities directed toward national improvement" would afford them more satisfaction in the future than their career or family life; they expect to be most interested in national affairs; and the subject they most frequently discuss with their families is national problems.[25] Additionally, the political tendencies of *lycée*-level students might be expected to influence their choice of faculties. Since much of the research on students and politics has found that students in humanities and the social sciences tend to be both more participant

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and more radical than students in commerce, the natural sciences, and technical fields, different sorts of *lycée* students might be recruited to the various faculties. These generalizations are relevant to Turkey, since the Law and Political Science Faculties have furnished the greatest number of politically active students.

The differential recruitment of political activists does not, however, seem to be responsible for these inter-faculty differences. There are no obvious differences between the political attitudes and behavior of those students attracted to the politically activist faculties (Law and Political Science) and those attracted to other faculties. The *lycée* students who plan to attend the Law and Political Science Faculties are no more interested in national affairs, political careers, or political discussion than are students planning to enter other faculties.

Political Socialization at the University

By the time a *lycée* student has entered a Turkish university, he has been socialized to a high degree of national identification. While this nationalism remains very strong and might even increase during his first year at the university, there seems to be some value reorientation during the following years. Privatism increases, as does an emphasis on international rather than strictly national interests,[26] while political activity decreases. The longer students remain at the university, the more likely they are to assume the role of a political spectator—interested in politics, but taking no active part.[27]

An extreme sense of nationalistic zeal and a dedication to national service would seem to accompany the first-year students' awareness of their elite status. The first-year class may also be under less academic pressure than are students in the later classes. Under the Turkish educational system, at the end of each academic year students are examined in various fields to determine whether they will be allowed to pass on to the next year. While the yearly exam can be repeated, there is a rigorous selection process. Those who survive this process may develop a more professional orientation and feel it necessary to decide between devoting their time to political activities or to studies.

Additionally, the Turkish students' feelings about religion are profoundly affected by their university education. The longer a student remains in the university, the less likely he is to feel the need for religion in order to achieve a full philosophy of life. None

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of the *lycée* students planning to enter the Political Science Faculty felt they could do without religion. Twelve per cent of the freshmen at the Faculty felt they had no need for religion, but by the time they were ready to leave the Faculty, fully one fourth of the students had renounced the need for religion. Another study conducted in 1966 using a different sample confirmed this secularizing tendency in the Turkish university system. When asked "How important is religion in your life?" the proportion of each class giving one of the negative responses "of little importance" or "not at all" was as follows: 20 per cent of the freshmen, 35 per cent of the sophomores, 42 per cent of the juniors, and 49 per cent of the seniors.[28]

The political relevance of the Turkish students' attitudes on religion should be particularly stressed, since the role of religion has been one of the main issues of Turkish politics during the multiparty era. The Parties which have won the popular support of the country (first the Democrats and now the Justice Party) have the reputation for liberalizing the stringent religious reforms introduced by Atatürk. As the table below records, a student's attitude toward religion

TABLE 1: The Relationship Between Students' Attitudes Toward Religion and Various Politically Relevant Attitudes

	Importance of Religion		
	High	*Moderate*	*Low*
"Very much interested in politics"	18%	16%	29%
Describing selves as leftists or moderate leftists	36%	51%	80%
Defining government as government *for* the people	38%	42%	55%
Number of Respondents	269	184	214

predicts fairly well his feelings about other important aspects of politics in Turkey.[29] Secular students are more likely to be interested in politics, to be "leftist," and to support an elitist view of the governmental process.

Additional insight into the role of Turkish students in politics can be had by comparing students at different types of university-level institutions—at, for example, the Political Science Faculty and Robert College, a private institution founded under American auspices about one hundred years ago. Political Science Faculty

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students have traditionally entered high-level political and governmental positions, while the Robert College students, going to a foreign school located in a suburb of Istanbul, come from a more cosmopolitan background and are more likely to make their careers in the private sector.[30] The Political Science Faculty students were more likely to have had fathers in governmental or military positions, and less likely to have had fathers in commercial occupations or in the professions.

The values of students at the two institutions are also quite different. The Robert College students demonstrate a higher commitment to internationalism as opposed to nationalism, than do the Political Science Faculty students. These differences appear to be reflected in the type of political activities in which the two schools have been involved. At the height of political tension just preceding the 1960 coup, there were bloody student riots at the Political Science Faculty. A few days later, the government closed Robert College after one hundred and fifty students took part in an orderly and peaceful demonstration.[31]

Other differences among faculties have important implications for political behavior. It is generally agreed that students at the Ankara Law Faculty and particularly the Political Science Faculty were by far the most politically active during the disturbances leading up to the 1960 military coup. These differences in political involvement are reflected in a 1959 survey contrasting the leisure-time activities of students at these two Faculties with those of students in the Administrative Sciences division of Middle East Technical University.[32] Middle East Technical University, a new institution founded with United Nations aid, is characterized by its modern curriculum, smaller classes, and emphasis on technical subjects, as well as by the fact that English, rather than Turkish, is the language of instruction.

There were regular differences in political interest among the three groups of students. Generally speaking, Political Science Faculty students, followed by students at the Law Faculty and Middle East Technical University, were the most interested in political news. Another difference among the Faculties, and one which has important political implications, concerns the students who spend their free time strolling on the streets. Such students are a common sight in downtown Ankara and can be readily mobilized for political demonstrations. Here again the 1959 survey showed the same rank order among Faculties as was discussed above. Sixty-one per cent of the Political Science students said they spent some of their free time

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strolling; the corresponding figures for the Law Faculty and Middle East Technical University students were 47 and 30 per cent respectively.

An elite status, as defined by social background, is also associated with a set of attitudes and behavior supportive of political activity. Having a relative in politics or government provides one indicator of "eliteness," although it is probably also a measure of political contact. Law students with relatives in politics or government are more likely to be activists than are those who do not have similarly placed relatives (44 per cent of those with relatives in official positions are categorized as activists as compared with 34 per cent of the other law students). Analysis of the Law School data on social-class origin (as defined by father's occupation) indicates that the proportion of activists increases with social class, while the proportion of apolitical individuals decreases.[33]

Since the beginning of the multiparty period, Turkish students have become an active force in the political life of the Republic. Their most dramatic involvement was an important stimulus to the 1960 revolution, and Atatürk's proclamation that youth is "the owner and guardian of the revolution" is taken very seriously by many elements in the student population. Nevertheless, while the students are important as an efficacious pressure group and as self-conscious members of the educated elite, it is very difficult to say how politically "active" they are in comparison to other student populations. An impressionistic observation would be that Turkish student political activity (during normal times) takes place within the general bounds of the legitimized political system and uses both what E. W. Bakke[34] calls "conservative measures" and mass demonstrations. Student groups make their positions known through press conferences, letters, declarations, and by direct involvement in such activities as labor disputes. Their organizations are supported by government funds, and there appears to be a relatively low level of antisystem activity.

While Turkish students are undoubtedly more politically active and efficacious than their American counterparts, they would also seem to be less involved and less revolutionary than students in some of the other developing countries. Although completely adequate data are lacking, several features in Turkish society and the Turkish educational system might be expected to dampen student political activism. Two of these are the persistent elitist bias in the

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educational system and the low level of unemployment among the educated classes.

It is necessary to clarify what is meant when the term *elitist* is applied to the Turkish educational system. For example, Frederick Frey suggests that there has been an elitist dynamic to the Turkish educational system during the Republic because there has been a more rapid expansion of the upper levels of the system (particularly *lycée* and university education) than of the lower, primary levels.[35] Such an educational investment policy results in a higher number of university graduates compared with developing countries that choose to invest their money differently. This aspect of the educational system would, however, not make it elitist according to one aspect of Seymour Martin Lipset's classification system. Lipset suggests that a distinction be drawn between elitist systems where admission to the universities is difficult and mass systems where "almost anyone who wants to enter a university may do so." He goes on to say that as a result of such mass admissions policies in Egypt, Japan, and India, attendance at the university has "skyrocketed" and far surpasses the rise in suitable job opportunities. In order to see how Turkey ranks relative to the other systems which Lipset has termed "mass" or "elitist," comparative figures on the size of various countries' higher educational systems are presented below.

If one considers Turkey's position relative to that of other developing countries, on this indicator it would seem to rank closer to

TABLE 2: Classification of Countries According to Proportion of Students Enrolled in Higher Education[36]

	Higher Education Enrollment per 100,000
Mass Education Systems	
United States	1983
Puerto Rico	1192
Philippines	976
Argentina	827
Japan	750
Egypt	399
Turkey	225
India	220
Elitist Education Systems	
Britain	460
Sierra Leone	19
Nigeria	4

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the mass systems of India and Egypt than to the elitist systems of Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Turkey nevertheless possesses many other attributes common to elitist educational systems. A relatively high degree of selectivity through examinations ensures that only a small proportion of the populace gains access to the university preparatory *lycées*. Only 3 per cent of all students entering primary school can hope to enter one of these *lycées*, although once this hurdle has been overcome, approximately 55 per cent will go on to the university.[37] About 40 per cent of Turkish students entering the university eventually graduate.[38] This compares favorably with the records of many developed countries. For example, in Sweden 32 per cent of those entering get degrees, in France 38 per cent, in the United States 45 per cent, and in Britain 65 per cent.[39] Comparable data from developing countries are generally lacking, but Philip Altbach notes that "well over half of those who enter college in India do not finish their degree programs."[40]

Perhaps a more important indicator of the relatively healthy nature of the Turkish university system is the low level of unemployment among its graduates, and the satisfaction that its graduates find in their work. According to the 1960 census, only 157 of Turkey's more than 47,000 university graduates reported that they were unemployed.[41] Moreover, Turkish university graduates also seem to be relatively happy in the jobs they find. A recent survey reported that 65 per cent of the people who had graduated from the Political Science Faculty between 1946 and 1961 were satisfied with their jobs.[42]

The role of the student in Turkish politics is perhaps no more complex than the role of students in the politics of any other state, and the Turkish student's level of political involvement has fluctuated widely over the last century. During periods of uncertain leadership, students have been much more likely to take political initiative into their own hands. Regardless of the time period concerned, however, the correspondence between student attitudes and those of the national leadership seems to have had an important effect upon student activity.[43]

References

1. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963), p. 326.

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2. For a perceptive interpretation of this period, see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), especially pp. 216-25.

3. Early examples of graduates of these schools who held high-level positions were Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa, who received some training at the early Westernized Translation Bureau and then went on to become grand vezir when he was only thirty-seven, and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Paşa, who studied at the new medical school in Istanbul, then the Translation Bureau, and eventually occupied the position of foreign minister. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*, pp. 84-90.

4. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), p. 192.

5. Irfan Orga, *Phoenix Ascendant* (London, nd), p. 32.

6. The most prominent cadet to follow this path was Mustapha Kemal Atatürk. In 1904 he was sent to Damascus, where he immediately began to organize a new branch of revolutionaries.

7. This is discussed more thoroughly in Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 74-75.

8. The comparisons with China are based on the paper by John Israel, "Reflections on the Modern Chinese Student Movement," in this volume.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

10. George S. Harris, *A Political History of Turkey, 1945-50* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), pp. 95-99.

11. Frederick W. Frey, "Education," *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), p. 217.

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13. Nermin Abadan, "Values and Political Behavior of Turkish Youth," *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1963* (Ankara, 1965), pp. 92-93.

14. Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961* (Washington, 1963), p. 11.

15. See Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, 1965), for further discussion of the social backgrounds of political elites.

16. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 19 (Spring, 1965), p. 175.

17. Abadan, "Values and Political Behavior of Turkish Youth," p. 90.

18. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-61*, p. 58.

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19. The authors have examined the daily publication *The Pulse* between May, 1966, and February, 1967. (This is a summary of the Turkish Press published by a Turkish news service in Ankara. While it is difficult to determine how representative and complete the coverage is, major papers are included and each issue runs from four to eight pages.) Our general impression is that many of the major student statements are at least mentioned, and most of the more overt demonstrations and speeches are covered. This examination documents a trend toward normalization.

20. TMTF receives 180,000 TL and MTTB 120,000 TL (respectively, about $20,000 and $13,300). Abadan, "Values and Political Behavior of Turkish Youth," p. 88.

21. Özer Ozankaya, *Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri* (Political Attitudes of University Students; Ankara, 1966).

22. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, pp. 220-21.

23. These data are taken from a re-analysis of a national sample survey conducted in 1963. For a description of this study, see J. Mayone Stycos, "The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 (Spring, 1965), pp. 120-30. Professor G. W. Angell, field director of the study, kindly helped us to obtain these data.

24. The findings presented in this section were obtained from a secondary analysis of the Turkish *lycée* study conducted by F. W. Frey, G. W. Angell, and A. S. Sanay in 1958. Some of the preliminary results of this analysis are presented in Frey, "Education," especially pp. 224-29. We would like to thank Professor Frey for making the study available.

25. One notable exception to this trend should be mentioned. There was no difference between the various schools in the response to the question, "Would you be personally interested in a political career?" The affirmative response to this question was high—approximately 55 per cent.

26. These results are noted from a secondary analysis of survey data collected by Herbert H. Hyman, Arif Payaslioğlu, and Frederick W. Frey in 1958. Their original analysis is described in Herbert H. Hyman, Arif Payaslioğlu, and Frederick W. Frey, "The Values of Turkish College Youth," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (Fall, 1958), pp. 275-91.

27. This was noted in a survey conducted by one of the authors in 1960, among male students at the Faculty of Law, Ankara University.

28. These are preliminary results from a study conducted by Gary R. Field in 1966. The sample includes interviews from three university-level institutions: the Faculty of Political Science, the Economics and Business Sciences Academy of Eskişehir, and the School of Social Welfare in Ankara. A total of 673 men were interviewed.

29. The table is also based on the Field study which includes students from three university-level institutions. "Importance of religion" is derived

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from responses to the question, "How important is religion in your life?" People who answered "extremely important" or "quite important" are listed as high; people who answered "of little importance" or "not important at all" are listed as low.

30. These findings were available from a secondary analysis of the survey reported in Hyman, Payaslioğlu, and Frey, "The Values of Turkish College Youth."

31. "Chronology," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 14 (Spring, 1960), p. 315.

32. The results are reported in Nermin Abadan, *Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Serbest Zaman Faaliyetleri* (Free Time Activities of the University Students; Ankara, 1961).

33. The upper-class respondents (31 per cent) are those whose fathers are high government and military officials, or members of professions such as law, medicine, and engineering. The middle-class category (32 per cent) is composed of children of proprietors, salespeople, public and private clerical workers, and the like. This middle-class group is basically an urbanized, salaried, white-collar group. The lower-class respondents (36 per cent) are those whose fathers are agriculturalists, service workers, craftsmen, or laborers.

34. E. W. Bakke, "Mass Demonstrations," Paper presented at Conference on Students and Politics held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 27-31, 1967.

35. Frey, "Education," p. 219.

36. Data for this table are taken from Bruce M. Russett, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, 1964), pp. 214-16: higher education universities and post-secondary professional schools, including higher teacher-training.

37. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, p. 171.

38. *The Mediterranean Regional Project—Turkey* (Paris, 1965), p. 118.

39. Russett, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, p. 214. Similar data for several other countries are included in his tabulations.

40. See Philip G. Altbach, "Students and Politics in India," in this volume.

41. Turkey, Bureau of Statistics, *23 Ekim 1960 Genel Nüfus Sayimi, 1960* (General Population Census of October 23, 1960; Ankara, 1963), pp. 219-20, 488-89. The figures are based only on the "faculties," not on the other higher schools which are also listed.

42. See Leslie L. and Noralou P. Roos, "Secondary Analysis in the Developing Areas," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (Summer, 1967), pp. 272-78. Data taken from a survey by the authors.

43. The authors wish to thank the American Research Institute in Turkey for their help in providing funds to support the 1965-66 survey research reported here.

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MICHIYA SHIMBORI

The Sociology of a Student Movement— A Japanese Case Study

WASEDA UNIVERSITY—a private institution founded in 1882 in Tokyo as Tokyo Semmon Gakko (Professional School)—is one of Japan's Ivy League universities. The University of Tokyo, the first national university, was established in 1869, and Keio University, a private institution, opened in the preceding year. Since the beginning of the Meiji era (1868-1911), these colleges have been among the major higher educational institutions in Japan. In contrast with the public universities, Waseda and Keio were founded by private individuals according to a clear ideal (Keio by Yukichi Fukuzawa, a leading democrat, and Waseda by Shigenobu Okuma, a liberal politician). Enlightened and inspired by Western ideas of democracy and liberalism in their study abroad, they took a lead in the movements for civil rights and liberty and called for constitutional government in the early Meiji period, when a substantial number of feudal elements remained, both in and out of the government. They founded their schools in opposition to the University of Tokyo, which was mainly aimed at educating high government officials and stressed technology and science. Keio had a utilitarian slant and trained leaders in business, while Waseda was intended to be superior in political economics, journalism, and literature. Before Japan's rapid industrialization, the most prestigious positions available to university graduates were in the government and army. Thus, the divided market—training for government available primarily at Tokyo, business at Keio, and representative politics and journalism at Waseda—produced little conflict among the graduates of the three schools, although the Tokyo graduates had an advantage in the Japanese society as a whole. The government did not like the liberal, and therefore somewhat antigovernment, spirit of the private

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universities. Indeed, the government did not designate private colleges as formally equal to public universities until 1918. Waseda was suspected of being a training center for revolutionaries and from time to time was suppressed by the government. Among Waseda graduates there have been many liberal politicians, writers, and journalists who criticized the political elite and orthodox policies. Okuma, its founder, resigned his post as cabinet minister and became a leader of the Kaishinto (Progressive) Party.

During the prewar years, Waseda was the main center for student movements and within the past several years has again become the scene of student militancy. On December 20, 1965, the Board of Trustees decided to raise substantially the entrance fees and tuition. The student government opposed this increase and resorted to a strike, during which students refused to attend classes and to take examinations. After unsuccessful negotiations between the university authorities and the leaders of the student body, the students occupied the administration building on February 10, 1966. Alumni groups were unsuccessful in their attempts to mediate the dispute. Finally, at the request of the university, twenty-five hundred armed policemen invaded the campus on February 21, removing barricades the students had set up around the buildings. As soon as the policemen withdrew, the students reconstructed the barricades. In the meantime, the annual entrance examination, one of the main sources of income for private universities, approached, and the Waseda authorities were anxious to settle the dispute. Negotiations failed, but the arrest of 203 student leaders made it possible to hold the entrance examinations in a regular hall guarded by policemen. The struggle reopened after the examination, however, and the commencement and term examinations had to be postponed. The president resigned his office on April 23, to be followed by the members of the Board of Trustees. The new authorities made many concessions and showed a willingness to communicate with students. The students, in turn, voted to stop the strike, thus ending the six-month struggle.

Factors other than the traditional anti-establishment sentiment at Waseda were responsible for the general support this dispute evoked among the students. Private universities in Japan—supported neither by donations from corporate wealth and alumni, as in the United States, nor by the national budget, as in England—must depend almost completely upon student tuition. Fees and other expenses at private universities are, therefore, much higher

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than the standard expenses at national universities. According to a nationwide survey by the Ministry of Education in 1961, 46.3 per cent of the total income of private universities came from tuition and entrance fees, 17.8 per cent from loans, and 21.7 per cent from university-owned enterprises, such as hospitals; subsidies from national budget contributed only 3.2 per cent and donations from outside agencies 5 per cent. As a result, tuition at a private university is about four times higher than at public institutions. In addition, there are other expenses, such as entrance fees and parents' donations, that do not exist in national universities.[1]

Concomitantly, the private universities must enroll the maximum number of students in order to survive. To attract more students, they have to provide such amenities as modern buildings and make examinations easier by eliminating certain required subjects (like the natural sciences) that are disliked by high-school graduates. Some private universities often enroll students who are rich, but not necessarily able, and emphasize the humanities and social sciences which require less elaborate facilities than the natural sciences and medicine.[2] In this manner, many "mass" and "mammoth" private universities have developed—Waseda among them with its 36,000 students, in comparison to the 15,000 enrolled at the University of Tokyo, the largest national university. Nippon University, the largest school in terms of enrollment, has 68,000 students and is called the "Department Store University" or "University Industry."

Private universities also tend to employ fewer teachers per student in order to meet their budget requirements. There are twenty-six students per professor in the private schools, in contrast to eight per professor in the public ones. In most private universities, the professors have little right to participate in administration and, thus, often have a negative attitude toward it. Like the students, they are, in a sense, the victims of poor financial conditions. They are poorly paid, have inadequate facilities, and suffer from heavy teaching loads. They give their lectures through microphones to a large audience, and there is little opportunity for teacher-student interaction.

Moreover, expenditure per student in private universities is less than one third of that in the United States, where—in contrast to Japan—the state universities, like Berkeley, Michigan, and Wisconsin, are mammoth, and the private institutions, like Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford, are small.

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Greater financial burdens, poorer educational facilities, impersonal relations between students and faculty, the sentiment that students are treated as a source of income—all lead to resentment and antagonism against the university authorities as well as the governmental policies concerning higher education. This subconscious resentment can easily be brought into the open whenever there is an overt incident. Moreover, "professional" student leaders who are experts in agitation and organization co-operate in the search for issues around which to agitate.

At Waseda, the former president and the trustees underestimated both the students' resentment and their ability to organize a strong mass movement. They thought the student movement involved only outside "nonstudents" and a small group of campus radicals. Nor had the administration maintained good communication with the faculty, which generally has a more adequate understanding of the campus atmosphere. The professors had not even been informed of the plan to increase fees.

Before the beginning of the Waseda struggle, there was little communication among students, professors, and administrators. This evil may be inherent in the bureaucratization of the "mass" university, but the Waseda authorities had done little to improve communication or to know the general feeling among students and faculty. Because the campus is the traditional sanctuary of academic freedom, the administration's request for police intervention outraged many who had not previously been involved in the struggle over tuition. Once this occurred, the number of students supporting the strike and taking part in the demonstrations increased substantially. Given their initial point of view, the behavior of the Waseda authorities is understandable. They assumed that the opposition movement was run by a handful of politicized leaders, many of whom were "nonstudents," and that it was not supported by many students. Consequently, they felt that the only effective way to end the disturbances was to suppress this small minority decidedly and forcefully.

Since the so-called *Ampo-Toso* (Struggle Against the Revision of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) in 1960, *Zengakuren* (All Japan Federation of Student Governments) had, in fact, been seriously weakened. It had split into a vast variety of factions, each claiming hegemony, competing with the others, and remaining aloof from the general body of students. This factional strife blunted the effective-

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ness of the movement, even though all groups oppose the present political regime and university administrations.

The names and ideologies of the various factions confuse the general public as well as the ordinary student. In general, most of the factions are far more radical than the Communist Party (except *Heimin-Gakuren* [Student Federation for Peace and Democracy], which is under the control of the Party). They are against all the established, "bureaucratized" political parties and opposed to every kind of power elite and source of authority. It is impossible to negotiate with them, since they refuse any compromise.[3] Shortly before the Waseda struggle of 1965, the student leaders demanded that the student union building be administered directly by a student committee. The Waseda administration assumed that this was an attempt by the militant student leadership to use the fee issue to mobilize and agitate the student population for broader purposes, and that, as such, it was a preparatory exercise for a struggle for a "student governed university." On the one hand were militant student leaders opposed to everything and, on the other, hard-headed administrators accustomed to deciding everything according to their assumptions. In between were the majority of students and faculty, generally uninformed, yet vaguely dissatisfied with their life at the university.

One can see that many issues were involved in the Waseda struggle—the poor financial situation of private universities, the inherently bureaucratized character of mass universities, and the radical objectives of the leaders of the student movements. The Japanese universities must solve these key problems if they are to function adequately as centers of scholarship and education.

A Typology of Student Movements

Was the Waseda struggle a student political movement in the strict sense? Seemingly, it was an outgrowth of such academic issues as fee increases and the dysfunctions of impersonal mass education. Moreover, the agitation appears to have been confined to a particular campus, although some sympathizers and professional "nonstudent" leaders assisted the Waseda students. Nevertheless, the struggle must be called political, if radical leaders took up academic issues merely as a means to awaken a broader political consciousness and to unite the student body into an active anti-establishment organization.

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Owing to the widespread system of higher education and the ideology of student leaders, a student movement can easily become political and national in scope in contemporary Japan. Any issue peculiar to a particular institution can be linked to broader political issues. Common in the national universities today are struggles for the right of student administration over dormitory and other facilities built with national funds. Students in private universities consider fee increases the result of governmental policy toward these institutions. Such university issues are thought to be products of the reactionary character of the capitalist system. A refusal of students' rights to control dormitories is a result of the desire of the imperialist elite to hinder and weaken student power; poor support for private universities reflects the government's policy of promoting industrial capitalism while ignoring the educational needs of the poorer classes. According to this logic, any trivial issue must be interpreted in a broader context—from the perspective of an evaluation of the social and political order, or even the state of international politics. Since this logic is unfamiliar to and cannot be accepted by the majority of students, the leaders must use every issue that is clearly relevant to the campus situation as a starting point in the process of "educating" the majority into an "enlightened and awakened" perspective. Accordingly, the student movement must continue to struggle until the present power structure comes to an end.

If one defines politics as a system or mechanism of power distribution, student political movements function along at least three dimensions: the intramural, national, and international. Student political movements or organizations can be classified into three categories as well: those, such as the Waseda struggle, that are confined to a particular university and within a campus; the national federations, like *Zengakuren;* and the international organizations, like the International Union of Students. In an age of organization and of close international interrelationships, intramural groups are easily absorbed by larger national or international federations. Thus, the ideology of local leaders tends to become influenced by national or international issues and ideas.

The impact of national and international ideologies on student movements was not great in their early history. The older universities of Europe were content to maintain their own freedom of inquiry. But the universities founded more recently in developed nations were established by secular powers, political or economic,

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in order to modernize the nation. Students at such institutions have been as concerned with secular matters as they have been with academic ones; they have been as much nationally-politically minded as intellectually-academically minded.

Whether student movements are intramural, national, or international in outlook is a function of the relationship of the academic community to the outside world. When universities are controlled largely by local boards of trustees with specific, particularistic educational orientations, the student struggles are often entirely intramural. When national issues—such as the unification of the country or constitutional and academic freedom—predominate, politically minded students do not show much interest in the struggles of students in other countries. The general concept of an international student movement did not arise much before World War II, except in a few cosmopolitan universities with students from many countries. Students, like workers, are more apt to respond to intramural sources of grievance, so that even where national and international organizations exist, student political leaders tend to seize upon local issues around which the less politicized students may be mobilized. Once students are drawn into the struggle against intramural "reactionaries," their horizons can be widened to include the nation, and even the world. Significantly, the largest continuous student movement, the University Reform of Latin America, began in Cordoba as a struggle over conditions in rooming houses.

In sum, student movements—whether intramural, national, or international—are essentially political in the sense that all the problems they tackle are, or are interpreted as, resulting from or related to the power structures of campus, nation, or world. At present, it is proper to say that international student movements do not exist—even though international student organizations have been formed, and many students are actually oriented to international politics—because a political movement must have a concrete object, and international issues have not yet provided such a clear focus. Thus, student movements can tentatively be classified into three categories—namely, intramural, intermural, and extramural—omitting the international aspect.[4]

The Waseda case was a typical intramural movement, although its leaders were professional and the ultimate concern of the leaders was political. As far as the form of the movement and the consciousness of the general participants were concerned, it was intramural. The movement was carried on within the campus, and it

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attacked the university administrators on the specific issues of raising fees and impersonal mass education. Although the Waseda struggle ended after six months of conflict, the problems inherent in the poor financial arrangements of private universities and in mass instruction cannot be said to have been settled. Thus, the Waseda solution may represent only a temporary armistice. As students have become aware of the similarity of their complaints, intramural or intermural movements have begun to appear. There are, however, enormous difficulties involved in building a national organization devoted to solving these problems.

National organizations are unlikely to retain the sympathy of the faculty and general public, who often tend to give stronger support to genuinely local intramural issues. Faculty grievances against administrators and the general support of adults for youthful idealism help to encourage intramural movements and thus to increase the possibility of their success. In contrast to an intramural movement, an intermural movement needs a bureaucratized organization like *Zengakuren*, with its liaison office and headquarters. Indirect democracy is a necessity, and representatives or delegates must be elected. Because these organizations are formed in order to solve the problems common to most universities, their dominant ideology tends to be political rather than academic. Thus, their leaders are professionals not only in organization and leadership, but also in political ideology. While an organization formed for the successful functioning of an intramural movement is easily dissolved once the initial objective is attained, an intermural organization, which is much more formal and bureaucratized, usually tries to survive the end of the given issue around which it was formed. It must create, invent, or discover, continuously and successively, new problems if it is to have a *raison d'être* and to attract the interest of ordinary students. Usually, "spontaneously formed" intramural movements precede intramural organizations. The reverse is true on the intermural level. In a national student organization in which political ideology is formed by professional leaders who are not always familiar with the sentiment of the wider student body, the more radical and more clear-cut ideologies are likely to be adopted. Principles that can guide movements on a nationwide scale must necessarily be more universal and general than those in a local movement.

The efforts to set up a national organization inevitably suffer because the distance grows between the leaders and their potential

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public as the ideology of the organization becomes more political, radical, and abstract and the leadership more professionalized and bureaucratized. In a circular process, the more unsuccessful the effort is at creating mass movements, the more radical and militant are the tactics adopted. When movements initiated by an intermural organization become purely political and not directly related to campus matters or to student life, the leaders tend to seek help from nonstudents, particularly the political parties and trade unions with ideologies similar to theirs. Since in most countries students are—not only in number, but also in organizability, mobilizability, and group identity—one of the largest politically conscious social groups, political parties and other organizations want to make full use of them. Hence, there is often close interdependence and co-operation between national student movements and other politically relevant organizations. Such joint efforts may be described as *extramural.*

Extramural movements have few standing organizations, because they are combinations of two independent groups, students and adults. They may be part of common federations and have common headquarters, but they do not have a unified organization. There always seem to be a struggle for hegemony and competition for power between students and their nonstudent allies. Sometimes a political party completely dominates a student organization; at other times, various party-linked factions in a student organization take over political movements. In many cases, the students become so much more radical, militant, and independent that the co-operating or sponsoring political parties cannot discipline them and are highly embarrassed by them.

In general, student movements in free societies are political and critical of the *status quo* and the present power structure, whether it be intramural or national. They are, therefore, against all university administrations, the ruling class, central government, and even leftist bureaucratic party organizations. Another type of movement is, however, not against the ruling powers, but allied with them. Pro-establishment movements or organizations are often seen in a totalitarian state (for example, Hitler *Jugend* in Nazi Germany and *Hokokudan* [Patriot Student Body] in wartime Japan). They are quite often organized artificially and intentionally by the government or the university authorities in order to counteract the oppositionist sentiments and illegal student groups. Since they are manufactured from above, they are supported by power

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and not by ideological principle. The majority of the students are indifferent or even antagonistic to such organizations or their sponsors even though they hold compulsory membership. Teachers or official leaders often have the role of supervisor or spy, and are suspected by the membership, so that the distance between them is greater and less intimate than in intermural organizations. Anti-establishment groups, although forced underground, get the greatest share of the spiritual and moral support of the student populations.

The nation of Japan consciously opened the door to outside influences during the imperialistic world situation of a century ago. At that time, the Western powers were struggling with one another for the world market. It is not difficult to understand why nationalism became important in Japan in this situation. The fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate regime in the 1860's meant the defeat of conservative isolationism. Progressives who held that Japan could survive only if it were modernized put through the Meiji Restoration in the name of the Emperor. Technology and material civilization could, however, not be assimilated independently of traditional Japanese ideology and philosophy. Soon after the new government was established, it founded Tokyo Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo), at which future leaders could assimilate Western technology and be trained. For some forty years after its establishment, this institution almost monopolized higher education. Because its graduates were relatively few in number, they could expect speedy upward mobility in government. Thus, as prospective national leaders, the majority of the students of Tokyo closely resembled the elite in their value system. They were politically minded, but did not question or oppose the ruling ideology. As indicated earlier, Waseda and other private institutions were established in opposition to the national university by leaders who were out of power and antagonistic to the government, or who wanted to expand the influence of Western ideology. An antagonism developed in this period between national and private universities, the latter becoming centers of an antigovernment movement, the so-called *Jiyuminken Undo* (Movement for Civil Rights and Liberty). *Aikoku-sha* (Patriot Party), the first national organization of this movement, was formed in 1875 with Fukuzawa and Okuma as its chief leaders. It prospered until 1890, the year of the first Diet. The government sought to suppress it by passing the Association

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Act (1880), the Meeting Act (1882), the Press Act (1883), and by prohibiting political discussions and gatherings of any kind. Many law schools, including that of Waseda, were founded during this period in order to train lawyers and journalists critical of the government. Under such circumstances, students, especially those in private schools, were ardently interested in politics and became proponents of the antigovernment movement. The first student strike occurred in 1879 at Keio University. Political lectures in schools and in the streets were in vogue, and many students were arrested for participating in political meetings.

Even at the national University of Tokyo, built on the model of Western universities and thus the ideal of academic freedom, students opposed the suppression of the antigovernment movement. A political study group called *Oto-kai* was organized at Tokyo, and some of its members became active in the *Kaishin-to* (Reform Party) of Okuma. In protest against the government's supervision of discussions, students of the University of Tokyo boycotted commencement exercises in 1883.[5]

The first phase of Japanese student movements lasted until the end of World War I and was characterized by the social atmosphere of Meiji nationalism. There had previously been no national federations nor organized student movements. The majority of students, especially those at the University of Tokyo, viewed themselves as a prospective elite and did not participate in any opposition movements, although a few were involved in such groups as a counter-elite. Student activism did not last long and was rather spasmodic. The concerned minority of students were nationalists and humanitarians, regardless of ideological differences.

The second stage in the history of Japanese student movements took place in the Taisho democracy. During this period, the opposition between national and private universities and the manifest psychological distance between students and workers disappeared or at least diminished. Activist students attempted to establish a common front with the masses. They were attracted to international revolutionary ideology, particularly Communism. World War I brought about a rapid development of industrialism, the growth of big business and urbanization, as well as a strengthening of the world-wide democratic current. Shortly after the war, the great Tokyo earthquake (1923) and depression (1926) resulted in social disorders that the party-based parliamentary government of Japan could not solve. The impetus for improving the

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working conditions of the laborers and for universal suffrage became greater.

In this chaotic atmosphere, higher education expanded greatly. The University Act of 1918 provided an important stimulus to university expansion. Four new universities were founded in 1917, sixteen in 1920, and thirty-one in 1923. According to Michio Nagai, the functional distinction between the national and private universities broke down as a result of this expansion. Both became training centers for the needed growth of the salaried white-collar classes. The private universities, formerly the champions of academic autonomy and counter-elite ideology, began to suffer serious financial problems. The national universities, more secure financially, took over the leadership in the struggle for academic freedom.[6]

During the same period, the growth of the labor movement accompanied industrial expansion. To illustrate, in 1912 there were 49 strikes involving 5,736 laborers, while in 1919 there were 497 strikes in which 63,137 workers participated. Shortly before the formation in 1918 of the first national association of students, *Shinjin Kai* (New Man Society), *Rogaku Kai* (Laborer-Student Society) was created through federation between the workers in *Yuai Kai,* the first national organization of workers, and the students of various universities in Tokyo and in Kyoto. *Shinjin Kai* was an offspring of *Rogaku Kai,* and it acted as the intellectual leader of *Rogaku Kai,* publishing the periodical entitled *Democracy* and organizing many branches in other schools. The Russian words *V Narod!* (To the Masses!) were adopted as its slogan. Students tried to co-operate with workers for their emancipation, although the latter did not identify themselves with the students. *Minjin Domei* (Union of Common Men), a similar leftist organization founded in 1918 in Waseda, attracted various students who supported the goal of democracy by working for universal suffrage and in trade-union movements. Under the growing influence of syndicalist doctrines, its activities grew more radical, and some of its members were dismissed from the university. Accordingly, some of those ex-students formed in 1920 a new organization, *Gyomin Kai* (Society of Pioneers), which was based near the campus. While most of these societies were oriented to off-campus leftist social movements, *Sodai Bunka Kai* (Waseda Culture Society), organized under the influence of *Gyomin Kai* in 1921 with more than two hundred members, was concerned only with the campus mat-

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ters. It advocated dismissing incompetent professors, boycotting lectures of reactionary and militarist teachers, improving educational techniques, and decreasing tuition.[7]

Most of these organizations were limited to the students of a particular institution. In 1922, *Gakusei Rengokai,* a federation of these independent organizations, appeared under the leadership of *Shinjin Kai.* It had forty-six member institutions (including the high schools) and an individual membership of 1,600 (in 1924).[8] The federation initiated a campaign against three proposed laws—the Act Prohibiting Radical Social Movements, the Labor Union Law, and the Conciliation Act for Tenancy Disputes.

Both the ruling elite and many of the student body feared the student political organizations and their consolidated federation, with its radical leftist orientation. The ruling elite, alarmed that the Communist Revolution might spread to Japan, soon suppressed these organizations. Freedom for student political activities lasted under the Taisho democracy until 1925, when the notorious Law for Maintaining the Social Order (*Chian Iji Ho*) was promulgated, and *Gaku Ren* was declared an illegal organization. At the end of 1925 and in 1926, the so-called *Kyoto Gakuren Jiken* (Kyoto Gaku Ren Affair) occurred. Thirty-seven members of the *Gaku Ren* in Kyoto were charged with violating the law and arrested. Soon afterwards, thirty-eight members in other cities were arrested. Some distinguished progressive professors at Kyoto and other universities were also taken into custody. After this affair, the oppressive actions by the government and the university authorities increased. Many other student organizations were prohibited. Some went underground or disguised themselves. Others pretended to be purely academic—that is, nonactivist groups for the study of social thought. Still others channeled their activities into more moderate and humanitarian areas—such as the Student Settlement House Movement and Student Co-operative Store Movement. Some students concentrated on intramural movements, instead of participating in off-campus political activities. Many students enthusiastically supported campus demonstrations against military training—the most famous of which occurred at Waseda University in 1923 and at Otaru Commercial College in 1925.

Intramural movements, called *Gakko Sodo* (school riots or school disturbances) and led by university student activists, took place in many institutions, including the high schools. Every potential source of discontent was used to organize students against

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the campus authorities. Authoritarian administrations, poor diet in the dormitories, incompetent professors, and increases in fees were some of the issues that led to student strikes and other agitations. Intramural movements increased rapidly after 1925, as is shown by the following table.[9]

Year	*1925*	*1926*	*1927*	*1928*	*1929*	*1930*	*1931*
Number of school riots	15	7	13	75	117	223	395
Number of students arrested	45	–	29	120	292	950	1,119

After the suppression of political groups in 1925, student activists found a refuge in intramural movements. The Student Cooperative Store Movement appeared first in the Waseda University in 1926. It attracted many students and expanded rapidly into other schools. The Student Settlement House Movement, begun in 1923 after the great earthquake, ran labor schools and medical clinics in slum areas. Activists often tried to turn these moderate and humanistic movements into *sub rosa* leftist ones. As a result, these movements, too, were suppressed around 1930. By the beginning of World War II, almost every kind of student movement had been dismissed from the campus. Except for the officially sponsored organizations that supported the government's militaristic and imperialistic effort, student movements had gone underground.

There were always struggles in terms of ideology, power, and direction within the student movements and organizations, especially after 1925. Study or activity, revolution or parliamentarianism, Bolshevism or anarchism, humanitarianism or Marxism, pragmatism or ideology, politicalism or academism were vigorously debated. In general, the more radical and thorough ideologies seem to have attracted the activist students. Faced with the increasingly radicalized and sophisticated movements, the government and school administrators made every effort to suppress them forcefully. By encouraging sports and establishing guidance offices, they hoped to involve the student body in more "healthy and safe" organizations. They also sponsored and supported pro-establishment organizations. *Kokoku Doshi Kai* (Society of Patriotic Comrades) was formed at the University of Tokyo in 1919. Its members had a markedly militaristic and reactionary orientation, and it was led by

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conservative professors. In the 1930's, similar student groups were formed in many schools. These rightist organizations rarely had national federation or the support of many students. Shortly before World War II, all student governments and extracurricular organizations were dissolved in favor of a purely official organization called *Hokokudan* (Patriot Student Body). All students were formally made members of this organization.

Zengakuren

In the history of student movements, the period after 1925 is described as the dark ages. Bloody struggles went on between a small number of militant activists and the police. The majority of students may have been concerned about the fate of the nation, the growing militarism, and the decline of democracy, but they were voiceless and powerless. The military defeat in 1945 emancipated the nation from the repressive political order. Just as in the *Jiyu-minken Undo* (Movement for Civil Rights and Liberty) of the 1880's and the Taisho democracy of the decade after 1910, the new postwar age of social emancipation witnessed a nationwide spread of political concerns and movements, including student organizations. While *Shinjin-Kai,* or its offspring *Gakuren,* was the core of the prewar federated student organizations, the now famous *Zengakuren* took the lead in the postwar period.

In the early postwar period, there were many demonstrations in institutions, including the high schools. The first student demonstration after the war, in fact, took place in the Ueno Girls' Middle School at Tokyo, in October, 1945, demanding that the militarist principal retire. This affair proved to be the precursor of the demonstrations insisting on the "democratization of the campus." The student protest called for purges of the militarist, "war-criminal" teachers, demanded that the liberal or progressive professors who had previously been dismissed be brought back, encouraged the participation of students in school administration, advocated self-government of dormitories, recommended the abolition of official student-guidance systems, and the like. "Defend the students' life," another slogan of the time, implied a struggle for better conditions, decreased tuition, increased scholarships, more school buildings and dormitories, and a discount for student travel. In the broader polity, the Law for Maintaining the Social Order was repealed and its servant, the *tokko keisatsu* (special police for po-

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litical thought), abolished. The Communist Party was openly recognized, and labor unions were encouraged. The inflation, the scarcity of food and shelter, the heavy destruction from the bombing, and the economic isolation of the nation—all contributed to the destruction of normal life. And it is not surprising that most students seem to be concerned with social and economic issues and participate enthusiastically in political movements.[10]

The most important of Japanese student movements, the *Zengakuren* (an abbreviation of *Zen Nihon Gekusei Jichikai So Rengo,* All Japan Federation of College Student Governments), was organized on September 18, 1948, with affiliated units in 168 national, 31 municipal, and 61 private universities. *Zengakuren* had 300,000 members in 1948, when the total enrollment in all the higher institutions was about 440,000. The first central committee was controlled by the Communist Party.[11] The agreement adopted at the foundation assembly of *Zengakuren* in Tokyo read as follows:

> *Zengakuren,* with the objectives of realizing all justifiable demands of all students by democratic methods and of contributing to the foundation of a democratic Japan through movements for restoring education, shall emphasize the following programs: 1) security and improvement of student life, and equal opportunities for education; 2) defense of academic freedom and national culture; 3) thorough democratization of educational administration; 4) security of right of autonomy of faculties; 5) unification and enlargement of students' fronts; 6) defense of peace and democracy; and 7) support of all other kinds of movements necessary for realizing the federation's objectives.

In October, the Ministry of Education issued to each institution a circular entitled "On Student Political Movements." This circular declared that the study of politics and freedom of criticism should be encouraged on the campus, that individual students should be free to belong to a political association, but that educational institutions should be places for study and order and not centers of political struggle. Educational institutions should be politically neutral, and branch organizations of political parties and co-operation between workers and students should be discouraged. This statement reflected the government's attitude toward the student movement. The new plan for boards of trustees proposed, under the University Act, the introduction of outside powers into the academic administration. Students opposed this change with the slogan, "movement for defense of education," and progressive professors, schoolteachers, workers, and journalists assisted them

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in their efforts. Widespread political disorders linked to international tensions followed demonstrations around this university issue.

The opposition between the Occupation Forces and the government, on the one hand, and the workers, students, and "progressive intellectuals," on the other, became increasingly clear. The former pressed for a so-called "Red purge" in all spheres of the nation, especially education. The proposal to establish boards of trustees and to transform the national universities into local public institutions on the American model was interpreted as an attempt to weaken academic autonomy and freedom. In an order of July 15, 1950, the American General Headquarters prohibited a students' strike and demonstration. These actions stimulated the students' anger and led to more militant activities. Defense of freedom, democracy, and peace against "American imperialism" became the slogan of the movement. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, followed in 1951 by the signing of the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, which contained a U. S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact, could not but involve the nation in the Korean conflict. The international tensions of the period helped, therefore, to polarize Japanese politics inside as well as outside the university.

Except for the first few postwar years, there has been a continuous history of student political movements both on and off the campus. The movements have seized on every possible issue. These range from purely institutional matters—for example, increased fees and the University Act—to purely political or international matters, such as the Vietnam war and the nuclear test ban. Each of these issues has led to general and enthusiastic movements. *Zengakuren* became well known because of its violent demonstrations in 1960 at Tokyo's Haneda Airport against the Mutual Security Treaty, an event which made it impossible for President Eisenhower to visit Japan. The slogans, "Down with Premier Kishi" and "Against *Ampo*" (the Pact) were heard everywhere. Almost every day, over ten thousand students demonstrated at the Diet, in the streets, or at the airport. Violent struggles went on, and many students were arrested or injured. About half of Japan's students participated in the general strike against *Ampo*. In spite of strong student opposition, the Security Treaty was finally renewed, although Premier Kishi was forced to resign his post.

Since 1960, the student movements have declined in strength, perhaps because of the economic prosperity or the more effective university administration, the factional conflicts in *Zengakuren* or

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the general sense of failure that followed the *Ampo* struggle. Students have recently resembled a politically apathetic mass concerned only with their individual lives.[12] The professional leaders have tried to awaken the students' political consciousness. Although they have had some success from time to time, no mass movements on the scale of those in 1960 have taken place since. The Waseda situation discussed earlier did not stimulate comparable movements at other schools. One would be rash, however, to see in the present situation more than a period of transitional armed peace. The strains caused by the Vietnam war and the tension between the U. S. and Red China are becoming more difficult for the Japanese to deal with. The explosive U.S.-Japan Security Treaty will come up for revision in 1970. Campus-based political struggles will necessarily reappear in the near future. The rapidly increasing numbers of students face economic uncertainty as to their future, and many will prove receptive to political radicalism.

It is difficult to compute the frequency of student unrest, but the following table demonstrates the three stages of postwar student movements up to 1960.[13] It can be readily noted that intermural

	1st Period (1945–47)	*2nd Period (1948–50)*	*3rd Period (1951–60)*
Intramural Movements	117 (90%)	217 (59%)	137 (26%)
Intermural Movements	9 (7%)	119 (32%)	379 (51%)
Extramural Movements	4 (3%)	27 (9%)	124 (23%)

and extramural movements increased relatively as well as absolutely over time.

A high frequency of demonstration in a given period, however, does not necessarily indicate that there is more enthusiasm or more intensity in movements. It is also important to note that the number of universities and students increased radically during this period. Demonstrations may be small and may occur separately in many places on diverse issues. The attraction of a movement for the general student population can, however, be seen by the number of students participating. Since the main types of activity are meetings, demonstrations, and strikes, it is necessary to estimate how many students participate in various types of movements. There are little reliable data available, but I have tried to make some estimates based on various reports.

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Name of Happening	*Number of Student Participants*		
	Meetings	*Demonstrations*	*Strikes*
I. *Intramural movements*			
A. Student Festival, Waseda (May, 1947)	3,000		
B. Restoring Private Education, Waseda (April, 1946)		6,000	
II. *Intermural movements*			
A. Restoring Education (June, 1948)	10,000 (100)		
B. Against Raising Fees (June, 1948)			200,000 (150)
Against Raising Fees (Feb., 1956)		6,000	
C. Defense of Education (Nov., 1948)	4,000 (50)		
D. Against University Act (May, 1949)	35,000 (23)		200,000 (140)
E. Against Eells Speech (Sept., 1950)	5,000		10,000 (40)
F. Against Students' Suffrage at Home (Oct., 1953)		3,000	
III. *Extramural movements*			
A. For Overall Peace Treaty (Oct., 1951)	8,000 (16)	7,000	
B. Against Rearmament (Feb., 1952)		5,000	
C. Against Law Prohibiting "Destructive Activities" (May, 1952)	8,700	3,000	8,700
D. Against U.S. Asama Base (June, 1953)		3,000	
Against U.S. Sunagawa Base (Oct., 1956)		3,000	26,000
Against U.S. Okinawa Base (July, 1956)		2,500	
E. Against Two Educational Acts (May, 1956)	10,000	10,000	250,000 (150)
F. Against Law Evaluating Teaching Efficiency (April, 1958)	4,400		21,000 (60)
G. Against Institution for Moral Education, Nara (Sept., 1958)	1,300		

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H. Against Law of Police Activities (Oct., 1958)	3,500	1,000	29,280 (60)
I. Against Nuclear Testing (May, 1957)	1,000 (30)	18,000	43,700 (168)
J. Against Revision of U.S.-Japan Security Pact (Oct., 1959)	20,000	5,000	300,000 (90)
K. Down with Kishi (Oct., 1959)			350,000 (90)
Down with Kishi (April, 1960)		35,000	250,000 (90)*

* ( ) indicates number of schools that participated.

It is clear from these figures, which are far from complete, that students can be interested in and mobilized for various kinds of movements.

The number of students formally under the control of *Zengakuren*, when compared with the number of students engaged in activities and the total student population, constitutes some sort of index of the intensity of the various movements. The number of students under *Zengakuren* control is, however, difficult to estimate. The percentage of schools and students holding membership in *Zengakuren* is presented in the table below:

Year	*A*	*B*	%(*A*/*B*)	*C*	*D*	%(*C*/*D*)
1948	110	592	18.6%	220,000	453,917	48.5%
	or 272		or 45.9	or 300,000		or 66.1
1949 Feb.	312	769	40.6	300,000	398,340	75.3
May	394	769	51.2			
1950 May	200	884	22.6		405,310	
June	210	884	23.8			
1952	57	516	11.0	132,215	501,912	26.3
1953	57	454	12.6		511,124	
1956		496		190,000	624,397	30.4
				or 200,346		or 32.1
1957		500		250,000	637,591	39.2
1958 May	111	503	22.1	285,000	649,314	43.9
Sept.	110	503	21.9	300,000		46.2
1959	110	511	21.5	266,000	673,394	39.5
				or 300,000		or 44.6
1960		525		300,000	709,878	42.2

Note: A. Number of schools affiliated with *Zengakuren*
B. Number of all institutions of higher education
C. Number of students affiliated with *Zengakuren*
D. Total number of students in universities

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Roughly speaking, about a fifth of all higher institutions and about a third of all college students in Japan are at least formally or nominally affiliated with *Zengakuren*. This means that the colleges with larger enrollments are more likely to affiliate and that about half of all Japanese students may have participated in a *Zengakuren* movement, such as the struggles against the revision of U.S.-Japan Security Pact.

Factionalism is inevitable in most political movements, but it is perhaps most common in student movements, because students tend to be idealistic and puritanical and to cling to ideological principles. Strong national organizations require bureaucratization and an emphasis on formalism and professionalization of leaders. These, in turn, lead to a greater distance between the leader and the follower. The factional struggles for internal hegemony stimulate increased radicalization, dogmatization, and further factionalization. Each leftist political party seeks to exert control over the student movement, thereby increasing the sources of factionalism and internecine disputes within the movement.

Postwar Japanese student movements are not an exception. Various factions in *Zengakuren* depend, to a considerable extent, upon sponsoring political parties, which are in turn influenced by changes in the international political situations. This is especially the case with Communist-oriented students. The balance of power between the U.S.S.R. and Red China, between Stalinism and anti-Stalinism, has had considerable effect upon the factionalization within *Zengakuren*. In 1950, the theory of peaceful revolution was criticized by the Russian Party as contrary to Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Party split into two main factions, with the victory for the militant revolutionaries. After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Russian Party gradually became more moderate, while the Chinese Party began to insist upon armed revolution. At the general meeting of the Japanese Party in 1955, the principle of "beloved Communism" was adopted. These changes in world Communism had great impact on the direction of the student movement. In *Zengakuren*, the armed revolutionists defeated the peaceful ones, so that the conflict between the Japanese Communist Party and *Zengakuren* became clear cut. The leaders of *Zengakuren* were dismissed from the Party as Trotskyists.

This consideration of the Japanese student movement indicates that student movements are likely to arise during periods of rapid

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social and political change. In Japan, students were particularly active during the Meiji period, in the Taisho democracy, and after Japan's defeat in World War II. All these were periods of considerable social stress and change in Japan. Progressive intellectuals, workers, and students have co-operated with one another to resist the ruling elite. Students have been especially conscious of their own power either as prospective leaders or as a mass movement. They consider themselves an *avant-garde* social-reform movement. As their ideal or objective becomes broader and harder to attain, their movements are liable to become more radical. This can be seen typically in the history of the *Shinjin Kai* and the *Zengakuren*. The type of movement that attracts the greater number of students must be concerned directly with campus matters, such as fees, military training, or academic freedom.

Thus, there seems to be a cycle in Japanese and other student movements. Campus-based issues, particularly those involving threats to academic or political freedom, frequently stimulate widespread participation in student movements. The leaders of such groups are inevitably led to see wider, more radical national objectives. As they build a national movement, they lose contact with their local bases of support. Inevitably, therefore, the national movement declines and fractionates, and a period of relative weakness and passivity eventuates. This may in turn be followed by a new cycle involving new generations of students.

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1. Mombusho (Ministry of Education), *Waga Kuni no Koto Kyoiku* (Tokyo, 1964), p. 141.

2. According to a national survey of annual income of the families of college students made by the Ministry of Education in 1963, the distribution of students among national, municipal, and private universities in terms of their economic level can be seen.

	less than 300,000 yen	*300,000–900,000 yen*	*more than 900,000 yen*	*average income*	*total number of students*
national	13.0%	60.8%	26.2%	763,843 yen	192,290
municipal	6.5	58.3	35.2	912,486	29,980
private	5.2	44.1	55.9	1,329,485	434,210
total	7.5	49.7	42.8	1,000,480	656,480

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Adapted from T. Kawaguchi, *Shin Elite Shiritsu Daigakusei* (Private University Students, The New Elite; Tokyo, 1966), p. 125.

It is one of the problems of Japanese higher education that students in so-called *Bunka-Kei* (humanities and social sciences) are more numerous than those in *Rika-Kei* (physical sciences and medicine), who are needed more in the age of industry and technology. The opposition between these two categories of science is discussed in C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures: A Second Look* (Cambridge, 1964). The proportion of students in the two *Keis* is different in different kinds of colleges in Japan, as shown in the following table for 1958.

	Bunka-Kei	*Rika-Kei*	*Others*	*Total*
national	90,405	86,808	19,316	196,529
municipal	16,063	12,570	3,995	32,628
private	370,026	133,379	30,187	533,592
total	476,494	232,757	53,498	762,749

Adapted from Mombusho, *Higher Education in Japan*, pp. 34-35.

3. See "Ununderstandable Motives of Student Movements," *Asahi Journal* (July 19, 1964), pp. 12-17; also M. Nemoto, "Logic of Waseda Barricade," *Keizai Orai*, Vol. 18, pp. 172-79.

4. In my article, "*Zengakuren:* A Japanese Case Study of a Student Political Movement," *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 37, pp. 229-53, and also "Comparison Between Pre- and Post-war Student Movements in Japan," *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 37, pp. 59-70, I classified the types of student movement into three groups: in-campus, co-campus, and extra-campus, which are the same as those used here.

Type	*Origin*	*Field of Activity*
1. intramural	spontaneous and natural	within a particular campus
2. intermural	intentional and deliberate	with students in other universities
3. extramural	intentional and deliberate	with non-students off the campus

Type	*Degree of Organization*	*Size*	*Relative Number of Participants in the Student Body*
1.	least-organized	small	great
2.	most-organized	large	smaller
3.	less-organized	large	smallest

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Type	*Duration*	*Concern*	*Object of Ultimate Attack*	*Radicalness*
1.	short	immediate and academic	university authorities	moderate
2.	longest	academic and political	government	most radical
3.	longer	political and social	political regime	radical

Type	*Leader*	*Distance Between Leaders and Followers*	*Chance of Success*
1.	amateur	small	great
2.	professional	greater	smaller
3.	professional	greatest	smallest

5. Some 1,700 publications relevant to student movements in Japan were classified and listed in my article, "Bibliography of Student Movements in Japan," *Educational Studies of the Faculty of Education, Hiroshima University,* Vol. 11 (1963), pp. 97-143.

6. M. Nagai, *Nihon no Daigaku* (Higher Institutions in Japan; Tokyo, 1965), p. 47.

7. S. Inaoka and S. Itoya, *Nihon no Gakusei Undo* (Student Movements in Japan; Tokyo, 1961), p. 54.

8. Mombusho, *Gakusei Shiso Undo no Enkaku* (History of Student Ideological Movements, 1931), p. 35.

9. Adapted from S. Takakuwa, *Nihon Gakusei Undo Shi* (History of Student Movements in Japan; Tokyo, 1955), p. 156. A lot of surveys of the participant students by the Ministry of Education and other offices during the second stage are available. In general, the students involved in the movements in the prewar period came from the middle class and had better achievement. See for example, T. Okada, *Shiso Sakei no Genin oyobi sono Keiro* (Causes and Processes of Getting the Leftist Ideology; Tokyo, 1935).

10. According to a survey done by the Ministry of Education in 1948 among 6,801 samples of college students, 63.8 per cent said they found great difficulties in continuing their schooling mainly owing to economic reasons. T. Arai, *Kiki no Gakusei Undo* (Student Movements in Crises; Tokyo, 1952), p. 39.

11. Gakusei Mondai Kenkyusho (Institute for Student Problems), *Sengo Nihon Gakusei Undo Shi* (Postwar History of Student Movements in Japan; Tokyo, 1960), p. 15.

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12. Professor Tsuyoshi Ishida of the Hiroshima Institute of Technology conducted research into the college students' attitude toward student movements in 1966. Some of the findings are cited below (unpublished data).

	Strongly agree	*Slightly agree*	*Don't know*	*Slightly disagree*	*Strongly disagree*	*No answer*
In general, student movements are run only by a few activists.	20.9%	31.1	29.1	10.5	4.2	4.2
Students should not have demonstration parades for political matters.	14.8%	27.4	24.9	21.1	8.5	3.3
Students should not strike for political matters.	18.5%	31.8	24.4	15.5	6.2	3.6
(Total—1,769)						

13. See Shimbori, *"Zengakuren."*

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JOHN ISRAEL

Reflections on the Modern Chinese Student Movement

THE STUDENTS of the Sung dynasty (960-1279) would scarcely recognize their modern descendants. The former were seasoned scholars whose erudition secured their place in society. Through mastery of the prescribed classics, they aspired to the highest rungs of officialdom. Even degree-holders who failed to gain governmental positions became members of the "gentry" elite, entitled to special privileges and charged with numerous social responsibilities. Intellectuals were also expected to criticize officials—even emperors—who failed to live up to the standards of the Confucian ethos. For two thousand years, the scholar-official elite served the Chinese state well.

By the time of the Opium War (1839-42), however, the traditional scholar had become an anachronism. The classics failed to prepare China for the multifaceted challenge of the modern West. Beginning in the 1860's, the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty sought reinvigoration through a series of reforms, but none were equal to the need. By the end of the nineteenth century, the combination of external pressure and internal decay had proved too much for the rulers of the sprawling empire. In 1911 the dynasty collapsed, and a republic was established. Republican aspirations were quickly crushed, however, under the despotism of Yüan Shih-k'ai. From 1916 to 1949, national reunification eluded warlord rulers, the Kuomintang (KMT) government, and the Japanese. Throughout these years, reformers in various parts of the Chinese subcontinent followed in the footsteps of their Ch'ing forebears. In retrospect, even their boldest efforts were but preludes to the measures of Mao Tse-tung.

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Youth and Revolution: 1895-1949

The Chinese student movement was both conditioned by and a condition of this historical transformation. Bridging traditional and modern movements was the Memorial of the Examination Candidates at the close of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). More than twelve hundred scholars, who assembled in Peking for the triennial examinations, demanded a protracted war against Japan. In so doing, they played the historic role of heirs to their twelfth-century predecessors and forerunners of their twentieth-century successors. A truly modern student movement could, however, develop only with modern educational institutions. The first Western-style missionary college (St. John's) was founded in Shanghai in 1879, and the first modern public university (later to be called National Peking University, or "Peita") was officially established in Peking in 1898. But a certain ambivalence clouded educational reform: How could modern colleges prepare candidates for the traditional examinations? The contradiction was resolved in 1905, when the desperate dynasty abolished the thirteen-hundred-year-old examination system.

Thereafter no careerist incentive remained for memorizing the classics, nor was there assurance that alternative courses of study would bring success. The modern student thus felt an unprecedented degree of insecurity. His personal dilemmas were compounded by a pervasive sense of national shame stemming from China's backwardness and helplessness vis-à-vis the imperialist powers. Many resolved these problems by going abroad for study, hoping to return with the prestige of a foreign degree and a technological or philosophical understanding of the modern world. The Manchu dynasty, in its declining years, encouraged students to follow this path, assuming they would come home both skillful and grateful. By September, 1906, fifteen thousand Chinese were studying in Japan. From the government's point of view, the reform was a disaster; uprooted youths, free of Chinese controls and exposed to inflammatory ideas, provided an educated following for such radical reformers as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and rebels like Sun Yat-sen. Students from all over China came together in Tokyo and returned to foment revolution. Recipients of government scholarships helped bring down the Manchus in 1911.

Deriving its energy from the unstable combination of China's historic grandeur and modern humiliation, the student movement

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developed an explosive potential. Its targets were oppression from abroad as well as inept government at home. It seemed increasingly obvious to young patriots that both would have to be eradicated if China were to become a strong modern state. The new education reinforced these sentiments. Reformers prescribed a stridently nationalistic course of study, conveyed to the younger generation through chauvinistic textbooks taught by patriotic teachers. Hence, the anti-imperialist theme of 1895 resounded with growing intensity in the twentieth century. In 1905 students joined merchants in an anti-U. S. boycott protesting discriminatory American immigration policies. When Japan presented Yüan Shih-k'ai with the infamous 21 Demands in 1915, Chinese students in Japan returned home by the thousands to join demonstrations against this threat to their nation's sovereignty.

The 1915 movement was a prologue to the Peking demonstration of May 4, 1919, which marked the emergence of students as a major force in national politics. The impetus for this historic demonstration was another manifestation of foreign imperialism, but its full significance can be understood only in the context of China's accelerating social and intellectual revolution. In the cities of China's eastern seaboard, where foreign-style institutions flourished under the protection of the unequal treaties, new social classes were emerging: bilingual merchants, financiers, and industrialists; an urban proletariat; a foreign-educated intelligentsia; and modern students. In the homes of the latter, a "family revolution" ensued as the experience, teachings, and institutions of the older generation became increasingly irrelevant to the needs and aspirations of the young. Revolutionary ideas were nationally disseminated through a multitude of popular magazines, newspapers, and political societies. The effects of these changes were felt both in cosmopolitan Shanghai, hub of economic modernization and refuge for China's political and intellectual rebels, and in Peking, which remained the nation's cultural capital.[1]

On December 26, 1916, National Peking University acquired a new chancellor, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei. This remarkable man, who has been called "the moral leader of the new intelligentsia and one of the greatest educators and liberals in modern China,"[2] promoted the startling idea that a university should be a forum for the free development of diverse views. To the horror of traditionalists, he brought to the Peita faculty such men as Hu Shih, who advocated replacing the time-honored literary language with the vernacular,

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and Li Ta-chao, who shortly later eulogized the Bolshevik Revolution and helped found the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ts'ai's Dean of the School of Letters was Ch'en Tu-hsiu, later the CCP's first secretary-general, but even in 1917 a cultural radical who supported the slogan "Down with Confucius and sons!" and recommended science and democracy as panaceas for China's ills.

The iconoclastic doctrines of these teachers found a receptive audience. Peita's students had ample reason to feel rebellious: Their personal futures were uncertain; the republican revolution had ended in chaos; the country was at the mercy of corrupt militarists and foreign aggressors; and their own parents persisted in preaching obsolete notions of virtue and filial piety. The halls of Peita resounded with a cacophony of names and isms: Dostoevski and Kropotkin, Russell and Dewey, Shaw and Isben, Wilson and Lenin; democracy, equality, science, socialism, individualism, self-determination, nationalism, internationalism, and Bolshevism.

China's young rebels contrasted China's dreary present with a hopeful future. As war ended in 1918, they heard Woodrow Wilson promise equality to nations and dignity for mankind. They felt certain that the Versailles Conference would recognize the claims of their country, which had sent two hundred thousand coolies to aid the allies on the Western front. Principles of justice demanded that China regain her sovereign rights to the province of Shantung (birthplace of Confucius), seized by Japan in 1915. But youthful hopes proved illusory. By the end of January, 1919, reports reached Peking that Great Britain, France, and Italy had signed secret treaties agreeing to support Japan's claims to Shantung. On the heels of these tidings came even more foreboding news: The Japanese had used the $74 Nishihara "loans" to bribe China's warlord government into acquiescence. Outraged by these events, representatives of various student groups gathered at Peita and planned an orderly protest demonstration for May 4. The demonstration began peacefully, but ended in violence when a group stormed the home of a pro-Japanese official, beat alleged traitors discovered within, ransacked the house and set it afire. News of May 4 reached China's new social classes via her modern communications. Students demonstrated in Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, and other cities. Workers staged sympathy strikes. Merchants joined an anti-Japanese boycott. Professors demanded the release of arrested agitators. Local student groups proliferated, and on June 16, 1919,

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delegates gathered in Shanghai and formed the National Student Association.

The organization of a national body was a formidable accomplishment, for the unifying influence of a common written language and shared nationalistic sentiments were counterbalanced by powerful centrifugal forces: mutually incomprehensible dialects, regional loyalties, and the country's size. Considering these obstacles and in view of China's lack of experience with representative democracy, it is not surprising that the national body came to function in a highly elitist manner. City and provincial congresses were composed of delegates popularly elected at constituent schools, and these groups in turn sent delegates to meetings of the national union. The structure operated, however, in a Leninist fashion, more centralist than democratic. Even at the local level, professional and amateur agitators skilled in propaganda, oratory, and controlling mass meetings were generally able to dominate the majority of less interested and less adept schoolmates. The absence of democracy notwithstanding, the National Student Association had become by the mid-twenties one of the most influential voices of public opinion in China. It was less effective, however, as an organ of control, and even during nationwide movements, the nature and intensity of student political activity continued to vary according to local educational, political, geographical, and cultural conditions.

The May 4 Movement was the turning point in China's cultural upheaval. Just as the revolution of 1911 had constituted a definitive break with efforts at monarchial reform, the New Thought of the late teens marked a radical departure from attempts at halfway modernization in the world of ideas. For the first time, eminent teachers and men of letters advocated wholesale Westernization and total abandonment of China's Confucian heritage. The reaction of educated youth was highly favorable; henceforth, the more novel and shocking an idea, the more likely it was to win a receptive audience. The demonstration of May 4 also ushered in a decade of radical anti-imperialism. Vehement protests against the unequal treaties alarmed China's foreign community, and an anti-Christian movement jolted missionary schools. Disenchanted with the fruitless promises of Wilsonian liberalism and wooed by Soviet envoys, alienated intellectuals and students formed the Chinese Communist Party. Among them was Mao Tse-tung, a twenty-seven-year-old former Peita library assistant who had received his political baptism as a high-school student leader.

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Sun Yat-sen, too, was carried along by the radical post-May 4 tide. Frustrated by twenty years of political failure, he welcomed the counsel of Comintern agents; he agreed to accept Russian aid, revamp the KMT along Leninist lines, form a united front with the Chinese Communists, and establish the apparatus for mass mobilization, including a Youth Bureau. During the mid-twenties, students under both KMT and CCP leadership organized workers and peasants for political action. In Canton, the KMT's newly-founded Whampoa Military Academy set out to mold an indoctrinated military elite under Commandant Chiang Kai-shek. Students from all over China flocked to this mecca on the Pearl River.

As Chiang consolidated his forces, a series of atrocities by warlords and foreigners stimulated student nationalism and boosted the fortunes of the KMT-CCP alliance. An incident on May 30, 1925, was the most famous of these. Like the May 4 demonstration, the immediate cause was an imperialist outrage: A Japanese foreman in a Japanese-owned Shanghai factory had shot and killed a Chinese worker. Protesting students in the foreign-controlled International Settlement had been jailed. When a crowd gathered in front of a police station to demand their release, a British officer impulsively ordered his men to fire. The slaughter of unarmed students by foreign police on Chinese soil evoked a nationwide storm of protest. Twenty-four days later, indignation reached a new peak when British and French machine-gunners mowed down Whampoa cadets and other youthful paraders in Canton. On March 16, 1926, more anti-imperialist student demonstrators were massacred by troops of the Peking warlord, Chang Tso-lin. When Chiang Kai-shek launched the Northern Expedition on July 9, 1926, China's educated elite responded with enthusiasm to the slogan, "Down with the Warlords and the Imperialists!"

Beneath the façade of unity, both KMT and CCP maneuvered for the inevitable showdown. Chiang struck first. On April 12, 1927, he began the Party Purification Movement. This anti-Communist campaign began in Shanghai and spread throughout the country. It resulted in the summary execution of many student radicals. The purge, rupturing as it did the bond between the KMT and a significant element of the younger generation, neutralized much of the enthusiasm that had been created by the success of the Northern Expedition and the establishment of a national government in Nanking. A further blow to student activists was the ruling party's decision to discontinue mass movements. Student unions were to

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be replaced by apolitical self-governing associations, and youngsters were to stick to their books.

Youth lost fervor for a government that wasted precious resources in fighting warlords and Communist remnants at the expense of social reforms, but they also recognized the Nanking regime as China's only hope. Indeed, they might well have set their sights on bureaucratic, technocratic careers had not Japan invaded Manchuria in September, 1931. The Chinese government's failure to resist prompted young war hawks to flock to Nanking. For three months in the fall of 1931, thousands of student zealots descended upon the capital, often lying on railway tracks to halt traffic until free transportation was provided. Foreign Minister Wang Cheng-t'ing (a former YMCA student leader) was nearly beaten to death by a student mob on September 28. But the protest was relatively peaceful until December, when a radical minority from Peiping steered the movement in a revolutionary direction. Violent demonstrators manhandled KMT officials and wrecked the offices of the party newspaper, thereby forcing the government to adopt suppressive measures.

Once leftists had been jailed or driven underground, youthful nationalism was dampened by increasing political, social, and economic stability and by a hiatus in Japanese aggression. Official exhortations to "save the nation by study" apparently were making an impression. New moves by the invader, however, brought students once more to the streets in December, 1935. The Japanese were demanding an "autonomous region" in North China, and Peiping students were alarmed by Chiang's ambivalent response: "We shall not forsake peace until there is no hope for peace; we shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until the last extremity." They feared they would become subjects of a North China Manchukuo.

Organized protest began at American-influenced Yenching and Tsinghua Universities rather than at National Peking University, the traditional center of student politics. Yenching was a liberal missionary institution, and Tsinghua had originally been established with American Boxer indemnity funds as a preparatory school for Chinese students planning to study in the United States. Yenching was partly protected by extraterritoriality, and both schools were located five miles outside the city walls, which gave them some freedom from Peiping police controls. Large demonstrations on December 9 and 16 provoked a nationwide response among students and intellectuals reminiscent of May 4 and spawned a National Salva-

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tion Movement, which pushed Chiang toward a united front with the Communists and resistance to Japan. In May, 1936, the pro-Communist National Student Association was founded. The contrast between this and the troublesome but still loyal NSA dissolved seven years earlier by the Ministry of Training symbolizes the leftward trend among student activists during a decade of KMT rule.

The majority of the student generation of the 1930's committed themselves to no political party. They offered their allegiance to whoever would lead the country against Japan. Because they realized that only Nanking had the power to fill this role, they applauded Mao Tse-tung's call for a national united front, but reserved their most enthusiastic support for Chiang Kai-shek when he indicated willingness to lead the nation into war. Though thousands of idealistic youth joined the Communists in the hills of Shensi between 1936 and 1939, tens of thousands retreated to the Nationalists' refuge in the southwest.

To the casual observer, the eight-year period of war witnessed an unprecedented unity of Chinese youth under the leadership of Chiang. Between the summer of 1938 and December, 1945, there was practically no discernible student movement—not even a solitary protest against their wretched diet and rat-infested dormitories. Indeed, during the early war years, as the government fought, students rallied to China's defense and risked their lives to aid her hard-pressed armies. But by November, 1938, a military stalemate had developed, and after December 8, 1941, it became apparent that the war would be won elsewhere than in China. Morale deteriorated behind the lines as the government diverted men and supplies to blockade the Communists, while inflation and black marketeering sapped China's economic and psychological reserves. In the colleges of Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming, students pawned books and clothes to supplement meager government subsidies, prepared their lessons by kerosene lamps, suffered from malnutrition, and frequently contracted tuberculosis. Official policy dictated that these youths remain at their desks. Hoarded like the precious national resources they unquestionably were, the educated elite found no adequate outlet for their patriotic idealism. By late 1943, when students were finally encouraged to enlist in the army, cynicism had already begun to erode the foundations of academia.

The contrast with the Communist zones was striking. There students were trained and indoctrinated in special schools and sent

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to the countryside to mobilize the population for guerrilla warfare. The Communists emerged from the war with sufficient numbers of trained, dedicated young cadres to govern an area of a hundred million people. The nationalists had increased the number of students in institutions of higher learning from 41,609 in 1936, to 78,909 in 1945, and 155,036 in 1947. Aside from a loyal following in the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, however, these students were apathetic, if not hostile, toward the ruling party.

In the cities of East China that had been liberated from Japanese rule, the war's end reunited two groups—refugees returning from exile in the interior and residents who had collaborated, actively or passively, with the Japanese and their Chinese puppets. For both of these groups, the psychological effect of eight years of war had been disruptive.[3] The refugees nursed sentiments of self-pity and resentment. They viewed themselves as unsung heroes who had endured nearly a decade of unrequited suffering for the nation. Further sacrifice seemed unjust, especially since those who had remained behind seemed to have prospered by co-operating with the invader. Many of the latter, on the other hand, felt a need to atone for the compromises they had made.

Sensitive youth from these two groups crowded onto postwar campuses and provided the material for a series of student rebellions that reached a crescendo in the antihunger, anti-civil-war movement of May, 1947. In the emporium atmosphere of Shanghai and other cities, wartime restraints had given way to an *enrichissez-vous* atmosphere. An inflationary economy hungry for consumer goods favored importers, speculators, and influential officials. But in the schools, shortages and inflation meant further sacrifices for teachers and students. To returning refugees, the ramshackle housing, substandard diets, shortages of books and laboratory equipment, and restraints on freedom that had been endured as necessary during the struggle against Japan now seemed not merely unnecessary, but intolerable. Students who had spent the war years in occupied China were inclined to sympathize with the Communists on practical and psychological grounds. Many felt that they had no future under the Kuomintang, which discriminated in favor of youngsters who had shared the bitterness of wartime "exile." The CCP, in contrast, presented itself as a forward-looking organization dedicated to universal ideals of youth. By enlisting in this noble cause, they might expiate feelings of guilt over the past and open up new possibilities for the future. In a contest that seemed to pit

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young idealists opposed to war and oppression against the old cynics responsible for these plagues, such students unhesitatingly cast their lots with the former.

Caught in a downward spiral typical of governments in the final stage of revolutionary overthrow, Chiang's regime vascillated between reform and force. Eleventh-hour moves to establish institutions of representative government failed to placate American and domestic critics and did nothing to halt political polarization, stem the devastating inflation, or prevent civil war. In this milieu, the Communists channeled youthful frustrations into demonstrations against civil war, malnutrition, American military misconduct, and Chinese police brutality. The government's response was "counterproductive"; bully boys beat demonstrators, and gunmen assassinated opponents, while official propagandists asserted that the highest priority of postwar reconstruction was the extermination of Communist rebels. Increasingly, the government became convinced that force was the answer in the cities as well as the rural areas. Police arrested thousands of students and intellectuals suspected of Communist sympathies and muzzled the left-wing press. Such action lent credence to Communist charges of Fascism and won additional recruits for the widening ranks of Mao's supporters. As the People's Liberation Army swept southward, student reaction ranged from stoic acceptance to jubilation.

This historical survey must conclude on a cautionary note. While Chinese students, individually and collectively, were important in their country's modern transformation and an essential ingredient in the victory of Chinese Communism, the student movement was not a sufficient cause for this victory. Mao's contribution to Communist practice was not his utilization of students (a universal phenomenon among Communist Parties), but his use of peasants in a political-military context. Students contributed heavily to the CCP's leadership and were a source of harassment to the KMT, but mass movements of urban intellectuals remained ancillary to the struggle in the villages and on the battlefield.

Students in Chinese Society

To understand the Chinese student movement, one must take a closer look at its participants. Who were the Chinese students? From what social strata did they come? Which of them played an

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active role in the events we have described? Unfortunately statistics are limited, and it is impossible to conduct thorough field studies. The answers to these questions must, therefore, be more in the nature of gross generalizations than of scientific findings.

China's students have always been members of an elite. The traditional scholar-gentry was, however, not primarily an economic class. The key to advancement was neither wealth nor social position, but education. Commoners often achieved gentry status, and gentry families lost their social standing over the course of several generations. Everything depended upon success in examinations that were open to poor and rich alike. Of course, the wealthy enjoyed obvious advantages: They could afford to give their sons years of leisure for education and to send them to school or to hire tutors. They could rear them in a world of scholars, a universe remote from the life of the poor peasant. Furthermore, the wealthy landowner or merchant might buy his son a degree, a procedure that supplemented the regular examination system. Hence, in premodern China, social mobility existed both in theory and in practice, though never to the extent suggested by the Chinese Horatio Alger tradition.

During the twentieth century, when college and even high-school attendance has involved living away from home, educational expenses have increased. Moreover, the prestige of a foreign degree made costly study abroad desirable for those aspiring to high government office. Hence, China's students were a highly urbanized, upper-middle- and upper-class group during the first half of the twentieth century. Available data do not answer the question: "Which elements of this elite were political activists?" As I have observed elsewhere, "disproportionate numbers of student radicals came from the lowest groups that could afford a post-grammar-school education—landlords and 'wealthy' peasants."[4] But how many of these radical thinkers expressed themselves in terms of political action is unclear. Communist recruitment in the schools was not necessarily from the most impoverished groups, nor were needy students averse to advancement via the KMT.

Regardless of which student sector may have been most active in politics, *all* students were members of a privileged elite. The cream of this elite were those who studied abroad, and it is noteworthy that these youths played a major role in the Chinese student movement from approximately 1905 to 1925. Personal confrontation with the modern world had a jarring effect on these students,

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as it so often does on young people from underdeveloped areas. Radical ideas and organizations in Japan, France, and (after 1917) the Soviet Union helped to turn these students toward revolutionary movements.[5]

By the mid-twenties, the importance of overseas student leadership had declined due to the increasing self-sufficiency and radicalization of the indigenous student movement, and the emergence of a KMT government supported by and largely staffed by returned students. Moreover, more and more students were going abroad for personal rather than patriotic reasons.[6] The gap between returned and native students widened during the Japanese invasion of the 1930's, when many Anglo-American-educated academicians (as well as those trained in Japan) supported the government, sought help from the League of Nations, opposed the radical nationalism of the younger generation, and rejected student arguments that the national emergency made it imperative to interrupt normal education. In the middle- and late-forties, when war had fused the academic community, foreign-trained professors became increasingly impoverished, disillusioned, and inclined to sympathize with student protests. A striking example of this metamorphosis was the American-educated poet, Wen I-to, whose criticism of the government and support of student radicalism led to his assassination in July, 1946.[7]

Both the economic position and the social outlook of China's students changed during the war. Previously, the average student was insulated from the stark reality of daily life among the four hundred million Chinese, even though groups of activists spread propaganda in factories and villages. Arduous journeys from occupied areas to Free China, however, made a lasting impression on these young people. Others gained still more unvarnished views of society after joining the regular army, guerrilla groups, or auxiliary military service organizations. After 1937, even the sons and daughters of the wealthy, cut off from their families, often found themselves living on the margin of starvation. To provide for these youths, the government introduced a system of scholarships, which soon supported tens of thousands of students. But wartime and postwar inflation virtually wiped out the Chinese middle class and lowered to a proletarian level the standard of living for scholarship holders, as well as teachers and other salaried officials. Though school food strikes had been common during the twenties and thirties, the "antihunger, anti-civil-war" movement of 1947 was the

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first nationwide student movement directed against substandard diets.

Sources of Youthful Rebellion

The postwar student movement marked a victory for Communist propagandists who, after three decades of experience, had reached a high level of sophistication in wielding weapons of mass persuasion. But to assert that Chinese youth were duped by astute propagandists explains nothing. The question is *why* Communist slogans had such a wide appeal, *why* Leninism made so much sense to an educated elite, *why* Chiang Kai-shek was so easily cast in the villain's role, and *why* students helped to overthrow a lesser tyranny only to accept a greater one.

In the eyes of many observers, Chinese college students seem to have been driven to Communism by their relentless hostility to legitimate authority. The diversity of targets of school strikes and nationwide movements—England, Japan, and the United States, Manchus, warlords, and KMT, capitalists and landlords, principals and teachers, family and state—certainly suggests that there was an underlying impatience with established power. This, too, requires an explanation. Richard Walker has written that China's students and intellectuals were victims of "the mystique of 'the Revolution'" which "assumed an almost mystical and sacred quality in the language of the new literati."[8] As Walker observed, Kuomintang as well as Communist propagandists encouraged this semantic confusion. The students' profound commitment to the mystique was, however, based upon much more than confused semantics, as Robert A. Scalapino indicated in his trenchant analysis of Chinese students in Japan during the first decade of this century:

> Many of the students, no doubt, became revolutionaries after a process of soul-searching and reflection that involved a consideration of alternatives, and used their intellectual facilities in reaching their decision. It cannot be denied, however, that the espousal of revolution was the most logical method of achieving an emotional release, a method with which reformism could not easily compete. To students discouraged and impatient, the commitment to revolution represented a concrete, dramatic personal act by which they could dedicate themselves to the cause wholeheartedly, unselfishly, and with finality. It did not involve them in any of the intricate compromises and potential corruption that reform efforts would inevitably evoke. It was a heroic, simplistic act so in tune with the psychological needs of the time.[9]

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This statement is remarkably applicable to students of subsequent periods—especially 1923-27 and 1946-49. There was evidently nothing mysterious about the popularity of the revolutionary mystique, nor was the mystique ubiquitous. During the most dramatic periods of the movement, student activists chose the most radical of mentors, but this by no means implies that all students at all times were willing to sacrifice short-range goals of national unity, social order, and educational development to take the path of revolution.[10]

The history of the modern Chinese student movement also demonstrates that rebellion against established authority did not necessarily imply rejection of all discipline. Anarchism did enjoy a vogue among Chinese students during the first two decades of the twentieth century, but its influence waned under the competition of Communism and nationalism in the early twenties. A similar fate befell romantic and liberal individualism. Students' submission to Leninist leadership in the CCP and KMT suggests that they welcomed discipline in the name of nationalistic and revolutionary causes.[11] Furthermore, every generation of students has upheld forces of unity and order when these appeared to be viable possibilities. Even in 1949 few students accepted the Communist revolution without reservations. Given a unified nation, unthreatened by enemies, many of them would have preferred the ideas of Hu Shih to those of either Chiang or Mao. Indeed, Hu's advocacy of literary reform, intellectual tolerance, political experimentalism, and the application of the scientific method to academic and social problems won a sympathetic hearing from students of the May 4 era and continued thereafter to find a sizable audience among nonactivists. Under conditions of imperialistic aggression and civil war, however, Hu's cosmopolitanism was unable to compete with strident nationalism. The rapid disintegration of the old social order called for something stronger than his prescription of "bit-by-bit, drop-by-drop" change.

The difficulties of the liberals were compounded by the social and mental chasm that separated Anglo-American-trained intellectuals from the realities of rural China. These men, who filled the majority of college positions, failed to win the support of socially-conscious students. Their analyses seemed shallow, their solutions inadequate, their frames of reference irrelevant. More enduring was the alliance between student radicals and liberal and leftist writers whose years abroad had been spent in Japan, rather than

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England or the United States. From the 1920's on, the writings of Lu Hsün, Kuo Mo-jo, and others profoundly influenced the younger generation, but these men were victims of political polarization and became identified with the Communist camp.

China failed to develop a social democratic tradition, in part because her introduction to foreign ideologies was telescoped—the ideas of Marx and Lenin following close on the heels of liberal constitutionalism. Moreover, her cliques of progressive, democratic intellectuals were poorly organized and unarmed. The National Salvation Association, formed in 1936 as an offshoot of the December 9 Movement, provided some organizational cohesiveness for student patriots and their nonpartisan allies, and the Democratic League had its student following in the forties. Flanked by the armed, highly organized KMT on the right and CCP on the left, however, the third forces were doomed. By 1949, the only choices left to the splinter parties and their student followers were to seek exile in Hong Kong or abroad, or to serve as window dressing on the mainland or in Taiwan. For most students, the cause of China seemed best served by remaining on the mainland and working with the new rulers.

Students and the Ruling Parties: KMT and CCP

Perennial student dissatisfaction with the *status quo* has created problems for both KMT and CCP rulers. By evaluating their divergent responses under varying conditions, one may consider whether the modernization process in China has made student rebellion inevitable.

The Kuomintang suffered from internal weaknesses as it entered the political-ideological arena. In retrospect, it seems clear that this ruling Party, badly divided as it was, had slim hopes of satisfying China's college students. Filled with the high expectations common among youth in modernizing societies, these radicals were inevitably disappointed when mortal men failed to solve unsolvable problems. In industrialized countries, such as the United States and postwar Japan, young idealists may be expected to mature into integrated units of the "establishment." Yet this is impossible unless the established order offers well-defined rewards—social, economic, and psychological. Considering the series of convulsions that have shaken Chinese society since the mid-nineteenth century, it is not surprising that many of the young intelligentsia

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eventually were drawn into the Communist camp. Nor is it surprising that the temporary loosening of authoritarian controls in 1957 produced a student rebellion and that the staging of a massive revolutionary movement under official auspices was necessary to forestall another outburst a decade later.

But the CCP, for all its blunders, has controlled the student movement far more skillfully than its rival had. The Kuomintang's short-lived success with the younger generation ended when the Party came to power, and the abolition of extramural student organizations betrayed the KMT's lack of confidence in its own ability to compete with the Communists and other dissidents. Moreover, this negative policy failed to gain support from two key factions—the Ch'en Brothers' "Organization Clique" or "CC Clique" and the Whampoa Clique in the military. During the early- and mid-thirties, these groups competed, more or less clandestinely, with Communist organizers in the schools. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the party reversed its negative policy by establishing the Three People's Principles Youth Corps under Whampoa leadership. The Corps' achievements, facilitated by wartime patriotism, were nullified after V-J Day. Under attack from jealous Party regulars, the Corps was amalgamated with the Party in 1947.

In recent years, the Communists have been plagued by competition between civilian and military factions in their Party for control of the youth movement. Since the failure of the Great Leap Forward, militant Maoists have criticized the CCP and its adjunct, the Youth League, for their policies of retrenchment. These ideological purists, led by Lin Piao and his adherents in the People's Liberation Army, circumvented the League and organized the Red Guards in the summer of 1966. The Guards' countrywide crusade was made possible by the army's organizational and logistic support.

The generation gap, which perplexes Communist leaders today, is accentuated by a cult of youth that has provided opportunities and problems for adult politicians ever since the May 4 Movement.[12] Students led both KMT and CCP through their formative years, but both the KMT (which had been in existence for more than two decades before 1927) and the CCP (which had operated for nearly three decades prior to 1949) inevitably lost touch with the younger generation. The KMT, as we have seen, responded negatively to the challenge. During the early fifties, the CCP promoted student political action in a series of mass movements controlled by

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the Party and the Youth League. But from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties, functions of mass organizations were appropriated by the Party-League apparatus, League leadership became the preserve of middle-aged men, and its membership grew older. The generational crisis is not likely to be resolved by the Red Guards' attempt to reaffirm the values of the youth cult by glorifying a seventy-three-year-old patriarch.

The Red Guard imbroglio reminds us that the CCP's relationship with the students has not been free of contradictions. Since the twenties, the Party has realized the value of students in organizing workers, peasants, and intellectuals. By defining the class nature of students as wholly or partly *petit-bourgeois,* the Party has been able to use them both as allies in united fronts and as scapegoats for the Party's failures. Communist ideologists have, however, found reliance upon such a privileged elite embarrassing to the Party of the proletariat. Thus, students have been expected to lose their sense of separate identity and to become one with the masses. Party ideologues repeatedly quote Mao Tse-tung's dictum:

> The ultimate line of demarcation between the revolutionary intellectuals, on the one hand, and nonrevolutionary and counter-revolutionary intellectuals, on the other, lies in whether they are willing to, and actually do, become one with the masses of workers and peasants.[13]

Practical as well as ideological problems have compounded the Party's dilemma. By the Yenan period, the CCP was no longer a clique of intellectuals, but a rural-based political-military movement. This made it difficult for CCP to absorb the urban-intellectual youths who streamed in from Peiping, Tientsin, and other cities. From the viewpoint of the veterans of the Kiangsi Soviet and the Long March, these recruits were bookish and undisciplined. Thought reform was the Maoist cure for such ailments. The wartime movement labeled *cheng-feng* ("to correct unorthodox tendencies") was the first in a continuing series of attempts to remold students and intellectuals.[14]

Tensions underlying student-Party relations since the mid-1920's still exist. Students remain largely bourgeois in family origin, hence untrustworthy, though their skills are needed as much as ever. CCP leaders fear that nearly half a century of revolution may be negated by residual habits of traditional careerism and modern professionalism among the young. The very structure of Chinese education contains built-in contradictions. The Commu-

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nists inherited a university system modeled on the West's, manned by a Western-trained faculty, and designed to produce graduates dedicated to the disinterested pursuit of truth via "scientific" disciplines. With their newly acquired skills, these youths have sought to enter careers that would both further their own interests and modernize their fatherland. The Communists regard such attitudes as unfortunate hangovers from China's feudal and semicolonial eras. The pursuit of individual self-interest is thought to be incompatible with the development of the state, and the disinterested quest for scientific truth is considered secondary to the development of a "correct" Maoist *Weltanschauung*. The attempt to reconcile the contradictory purposes of education is formulated in the slogan, "Both Red and Expert." Changes in emphasis between these two desiderata have produced a series of crises, the most recent of which is the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with its offshoot, the Red Guards.

Red Guard membership initially was granted only to politically active students of proletarian origin. Youngsters with these qualifications had been accepted in institutions of middle and higher education during the Great Leap Forward, when it was more important to be Red than expert. It was they who suffered when the pendulum swung back, and academic performance became more important than ideological orthodoxy. Hence, in the spring and summer of 1966 they became enthusiastic recruits in campaigns to expel "bourgeois" chancellors, to revamp the system of entrance examinations, and to close the schools so that students could devote all their time to politics. These youth have but one hope for advancement in the highly competitive educational and economic systems—that political activism will replace academic achievement as the principal criterion of success. If the Communist leadership fails to satisfy their expectations, its quest for a generation of revolutionary successors will be doomed to failure. On the other hand, if it ceases to reward academic and technological achievement, its vision of a modern industrialized China will be shattered, and the country will be forced to fall back on its overcrowded rural hinterland.

Thus the CCP, like the KMT, has been trapped by its own ideology, by its failure to satisfy the expectations of youth who have taken the Party's teachings too literally. The Nationalists lost their student following by not acting sufficiently nationalistic; the Communists are now threatened by rebellious youth who demand that

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they practice Communism. The challenge posed by the Red Guards is likely to plague the Party long after the current leadership struggle is concluded.

The course of the Chinese student movement follows logically from China's history. The nation entered the twentieth century stumbling in the shadow of her past brilliance. Unlike Russia, where centralized despotism made anarchism attractive, China was weak, divided, and exploited. Hence, the goals of the student movement were state-oriented, those of internal unity, solidarity against foreign foes, national power through modernization and national identity through social revolution. Nationalism was equally important in helping students retain their personal identity as Chinese even while they were discarding their traditional heritage in favor of foreign innovations.

The nationalism of the 1905-1911 movement was both racialistic and modern. Its assumption was that China would grow strong if the alien Manchus were dethroned and traditional governmental forms were replaced with republican institutions. Nationalism in the garb of anti-imperialism and anti-Christianity developed rapidly after the 21 Demands and reached its peak after the May 30 incident. Like anti-Manchu nationalism, it blamed foreigners for China's woes, and this enhanced its appeal. Students supported the goal of the Northern Expedition—national unification via military conquest—but failed to appreciate Chiang's continued obsession with this program during the Japanese invasion of the thirties. Civil war had less nationalistic appeal than anti-imperialistic war. Between 1937 and 1945, KMT and CCP vied for popular support, each arguing that it embodied the principle of national solidarity against the Japanese.

After the war, the KMT contended that its struggle against Communist rebels carried on the task of national unification begun in the fight against the Manchus and continued in the Northern Expedition and the anti-Japanese crusade. But instead of a decadent dynasty, venal warlords, or imperialistic Japanese, the KMT faced a resurgent Communist movement. Mao, who had also established his patriotic credentials during eight years of resistance, offered a "new democratic" China as an alternative to the discredited government of the postwar Kuomintang. Convinced that the KMT was the main obstacle to internal harmony and that continued attempts to extirpate the Communists could lead only to

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interminable civil war, the students became Chiang's harshest critics during this crucial period.

Even though successive generations of Chinese students may be characterized as nationalistic, this does not imply an absence of change. Political circumstances altered the quality of that nationalism from decade to decade. The most influential force for change was the intrusion of partisan politics into every sphere of student activity: hence, the enormous difference between the nonpartisan May 4 Movement of 1919 and the highly politicized May 30 Movement six years later, to say nothing of events in 1935 and 1947. This intrusion reached its logical conclusion after 1949, when the student movement became a tool of Party control. Partisan politics have similarly engulfed other areas of Chinese life—most notably in literature where the social consciousness of the twenties evolved into the revolutionary polemics of the thirties, the patriotic homilies of the war years, and then state indoctrination after 1949.

Student politics have also varied greatly in intensity. Movements have flourished in modern China when governments appeared weak and inept. Only those able to control the nation's territory, manage its educational system effectively, and carry out energetic programs in domestic and foreign policy have generally succeeded in avoiding massive student protest: hence, the frequency of student disorder during the late Ch'ing and warlord periods. The promise of unity and reform gave the Nanking government relative immunity from 1928 to September, 1931, and from 1932 to December, 1935. The December 9 Movement erupted in the least-controlled university (Yenching) of an insecure area (North China), endangered by vacillation in foreign policy. National resistance to Japan and tight KMT control of Southwest China's campuses dampened student protest during the war, but governmental weaknesses encouraged its re-emergence in 1945.

There has been a tension in Chinese student thought between the desire for personal liberty and the quest for a strong state, but by and large liberty has been a secondary issue.[15] When the government has been strong, students have grumbled about suppression of civil liberties, but they have not rebelled. Only weak governments have had to answer for repressive policies. No rulers allowed greater academic freedom than the warlords who were more concerned with fighting battles than with running schools, but none elicited more bitter student opposition. KMT thought control failed because it was conceptually and operationally de-

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ficient, not because students valued freedom of thought above all else. CCP means of coercion have been more oppressive and more effective. The Communists mastered techniques of internal social control; the Kuomintang always seemed to approach students from the outside. Internal discipline, whether in a Peiping school or a Yenan thought-reform center, was more acceptable than external control by school administrators or military police. Pro-Kuomintang students were easily detected, labeled "running dogs," and isolated. Pro-CCP students were admired as self-sacrificing idealists.

Aside from its technical proficiency, the CCP was fortunate to arrive on the scene just in time to collect the fruits of revolutionary harvest. A century of national humiliation and a succession of thwarted reforms had imparted an irresistible allure to radical solutions. In the politics and literature of the students, as of the nation at large, unsuccessful fathers bequeathed a profounder radicalism to their sons. The generation of monarchial reform symbolized by K'ang Yu-wei (born 1858) was followed by one of republicanism epitomized by Sun Yat-sen (born 1866) and finally by the Communism of Mao Tse-tung (born 1893). In this context, the neo-Confucianism of Chiang Kai-shek (born 1888), modeled as it was upon the conservative reformer Tseng Kuo-fan (born 1811), seemed strangely out of place.

The intellectual, psychological, and moral vacuum left by the breakdown of the universal Confucian order was too vast to be filled by the relativistic pragmatism of John Dewey and Hu Shih. A new and totalistic world view was necessary—one that would explain China's failures without undermining national pride. Hence, the appeal evoked by a theory that blamed imperialists and reactionaries, but exculpated the Chinese people. Leninism did this. It analyzed a perplexing and oppressive environment in simple terms and plotted a corrective course of action. In its united-front version (incorporated into Mao's New Democracy), Leninist doctrine reserved an important role for the *petit-bourgeois* intellectuals. This was essential to an intellectual elite whose consciousness of its own political pre-eminence had survived the demise of Confucianism.

Mao offered China's students an attractive blend of the modern and the traditional, a combination by no means unique to Chinese Communism. Superficially, Chinese Communism appeared to be anything but modern. Under Mao's hegemony, life in the regions was technologically primitive compared with the urbanized sector

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under Chiang. In terms of social mobilization, however, Mao's efforts to bring the masses into politics were most modern even though they drew upon an indigenous tradition of peasant rebellions. Mao adopted a radically modern ideology, but he *adapted* it to Chinese conditions by finding the source of absolute virtue in the downtrodden rural masses. In the Communist countryside, students found assurance that they could be both pure and progressive, radical reformers and 100 per cent Chinese. On the other hand, Chiang's attempt to foster Confucian values in a foreignized urban environment seemed to combine the least appealing features of past and present.

Similarities between the recent Red Guard phenomenon and student movements of the past can be found only at a high level of historical abstraction. For example, frustrated careerism and betrayed idealism continue to unsettle China's youths. Students still view themselves as incorruptible social critics, and the purity of their protests is, as before, compromised by adult intrigue. One can isolate features of the Red Guards reminiscent of the traditional censorate, the Boxer uprising, and the post-May 4 student movements, to say nothing of Hitler Youth.[16]

The historian, however, is more impressed by the discontinuities. The most striking of these is the change in scale. In December, 1931, the capital city of Nanking was deluged with an unprecedented 16,600 demonstrators. In the late months of 1966, Peking received eleven million. This is indicative of a second fundamental change: The present government is the first in modern Chinese history capable of disciplining and mobilizing students on all levels throughout the country. Even the Red Guards, a product of internal struggle, testify most eloquently to this development. Unlike pre-Communist student movements, they represent an induced rebellion of part of the system against the whole, not a more or less spontaneous attack by an extralegal revolutionary force. Finally, the nationalistic component of the Red Guards is relatively weaker than it was in pre-1949 student movements. To some extent, this is a tribute to the Communists' success in removing the two principal targets of student protest: internal disunity and foreign exploitation. But chaos, for which the Red Guards are partially responsible, has shattered national unity and invited outside interference. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that adulation of the Maoist cult has permanently superseded the tradition of nationalistic student protest.[17]

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1. Joseph Tao Chen draws a vivid comparison between Peking and Shanghai in "The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), pp. 2-3. These two cities, containing the majority of China's college students until 1937, have been the major vortexes of twentieth-century student politics. In contrast with other countries, the political capital has not necessarily played a major role. It is difficult to generalize about the geographical and institutional determinants of Chinese student movements, but nationwide political activity has usually concentrated in the liberal-arts colleges of the larger universities in major cities that contained several centers of learning. National institutions have generally been more active than provincial ones in the public sector, secular institutions more so than Christian ones in the private. Colleges relatively inactive in countrywide movements are not always spared turmoil based upon local issues.

2. Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 47n.

3. For some of the observations in this paragraph and the following one, I am indebted to the insights of Professor Lucian W. Pye, who served in Peking and Tientsin from September, 1945, to April, 1946, as an intelligence and Chinese-language officer in the United States Marines. Letter to the author, September 12, 1967.

4. John Israel, *Student Nationalism in China 1927-37* (Stanford, 1966) based upon Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society* (New Haven, 1946), pp. 317-18.

5. England and the United States produced fewer revolutionaries due both to the nature of society and education in those countries and to a natural selectivity of students going abroad: Those of radical proclivities went elsewhere by choice, and those of limited resources by necessity. Japan offered easy accessibility and inexpensive living, the USSR provided political subsidies, and France had a "work-study" program.

6. Y. C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949* (Chapel Hill, 1966), pp. 149-50.

7. See Hsü Kai-yü, "The Life and Poetry of Wen I-to," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 21 (December, 1958), pp. 175-78.

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10. We may assume that no more than 10 per cent of China's college students were perennial activists and that less than 1 per cent held positions of authority in local, provincial, and national organizations. Though an estimated three thousand marched in Peking on May 4, 1919, and nearly eight thousand on December 16, 1935, the inert majority could be mobilized only in times of crisis. The diversity of student political credos is emphasized in Olga Lang's study of college students in 1937. In interpreting her conclusions, summarized in the table below, one should bear in mind that (1) students are categorized on the basis of their answers to open-ended questions; (2) 85 per cent of China's college students were in non-Christian institutions; and (3), as Miss Lang notes, "whatever their political opinions may be, almost all students are nationalists."

Political Sympathies of College Students in 1937

(*percentages*)

Political Tendencies	*Male* *382 Students of Christian Colleges*	*Male* *305 Students of Non-Christian Colleges*	*Female* *477 Students*
Conservative	14	7	9
Fascist	19	14	11
Democratic	10	7	16
Christian	10	2	16
Radical	12	34	16
Nationalist	21	14	13
Not clear	14	22	19

See Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society*, p. 316.

11. They shared this trait with students of other countries. See, for example, David Marr, "A Study of Political Attitudes and Activities Among Young Urban Intellectuals in South Viet-nam" (M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley), p. 79.

12. The writings of Pa Chin, portraying the breakdown of the traditional family, have been a mirror and a model for several generations of adolescent rebels. See Pa Chin, *The Family* (Peking, 1958), and Olga Lang, *Pa Chin and His Writings: Chinese Youth Between the Two Revolutions* (Cambridge, 1957).

13. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3 (New York, 1954), pp. 10-11.

14. For the *cheng-feng* movement, see Boyd Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44* (Seattle, 1952). For a study of "remolding" from a psychoanalytic point of view, see Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York, 1961), especially Part 3, "Thought Reform of Chinese Intellectuals."

15. See Chow Tse-tsung, "The Anti-Confucian Movement in Early Republican China," *The Confucian Persuasion*, ed. Arthur W. Wright (Stanford, 1960), p. 309.

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16. See John Israel, "The Red Guards in Historical Perspective," *The China Quarterly,* No. 30 (April-June, 1967), pp. 26-30.

17. I would like to thank the Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council, whose grant made this research possible, and the East Asian Research Center at Harvard University, which provided facilities for my work.

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PHILIP G. ALTBACH

Student Politics and Higher Education in India

For over a century, student unrest has been one of India's most serious educational and political problems.[1] Student agitation has caused state governments to fall and has forced the central government to revise its language policies. While there has been much discussion of the problem of student unrest and activism in India, there has been little analysis of the underlying problems students face in a society strained by severe academic and educational crises. Indian students function in a "society of scarcity," a consideration central to any discussion of Indian higher education.[2]

Higher Education and Student Politics— The Indian Context

Macaulay's famous "Minute" on education, approved in 1853, advocated a strong European bias in the Indian educational system, a bias that still exists. Indian influences on higher education were also strong, and men like Ram Mohan Roy in Bengal and Dadabhai Naoroji in Bombay helped to stimulate the rapid growth of higher education in the nineteenth century.

Until the establishment of universities at Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras in 1857, higher education in India did not have a firm foundation. These institutions, begun as "affiliating" universities patterned after the University of London, set uniform educational standards for the growing number of colleges in India by regulating courses and examinations. The number of colleges in British-administered India increased from 27 to 72 between 1857 and 1882.[3] During this period, higher education was almost exclusively limited to the sons of the very small Westernized middle and upper class and was largely confined to the cities. The student population remained numerically small and relatively homogeneous both in social

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class and caste. Most students hoped for careers in the civil service or the professions, particularly law and medicine.

The system of higher education developed by the British in India was designed to provide Indians with facility in English and with the skills necessary to fill the lower ranks of the civil service. As an Indian middle class developed, many realized that success depended upon a Western-style higher education, and growing numbers of Indians competed for the limited number of openings in the colleges. Indian higher education expanded to meet the demands placed upon it; in the first three decades of the twentieth century the student population increased fivefold, while the number of universities doubled. In 1921, there were almost sixty thousand students in Indian colleges and universities, but by 1936 this number had doubled.[4]

As the educational system grew and the number of politically aware and articulate Indians increased, the small Indian nationalist movement changed into a militant mass movement, and students actively participated in the struggle for independence.[5] Since independence, however, student attempts to intervene in political affairs have been sporadic. Lacking the ideological fervor that characterized the nationalist period, the mass student movements have collapsed. The strong support given by the leaders of the Congress to the student movement has been withdrawn, and both political figures and educators now urge students to avoid politics and to concentrate on acquiring the skills necessary for national development.

The Indian Student Movement and the Struggle for Independence

Several students organizations had been founded by 1900, although educational and social matters and not politics were their main preoccupations. Only a relatively small minority, perhaps numbering a few thousand throughout the country, took any interest in politics, and most of them were engaged in moderate discussion groups. As one British observer noted: "It was not till after the political and racial excitement [of the nationalist movement] that the youth attending schools and colleges showed signs of turbulence and insubordination."[6]

The period prior to 1920 was a time of establishing higher education in India and a slow development of political consciousness among students. While the militant activism of later decades was

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missing, students were exposed to ideological currents from Europe, and the growing political tensions within India added to this ferment.

The 1920's brought both educational and political changes to India. Continued growth in the educational system created increasing problems for the students. The establishment of new colleges, many without stable financial arrangements or adequate staff, lowered the standards of higher education and intensified the competition for jobs. Politically, the twenties saw the growth of the Indian National Congress as a mass movement under Gandhi's leadership. During its early years, the Congress was a moderate organization recruited primarily from the Western-educated middle class and not given to political agitation. As the Congress grew more militant in the early years of the twentieth century, the student community also took a more active interest in politics. The articulate and militant nationalism of the Congress appealed to the students because it provided the opportunity for dramatic political action and promised speedy independence for India. The Congress leadership was based in the college-trained intelligentsia, but the influence of radical thought on the growing working class gave it added strength.

Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920 was the first major mass agitation initiated by the Congress. It was also the first political struggle that involved large numbers of students. Youth Leagues were formed in major educational centers to co-ordinate student efforts, and the discussion and debating societies of earlier periods became the nuclei of political organizations.[7] Students helped with Congress campaigns and provided much of the manpower for the almost daily street demonstrations in the cities. In some areas, students assumed the movement's leadership when Congress leaders were arrested. National (anti-British) colleges were established in the major cities, but they were only temporarily successful, for many students returned to their regular classes when the heat of the movement abated. Although the Non-Cooperation Movement failed to expel the British from India, it did establish the Congress as a militant mass organization and gave the students and the growing trade-union movement their first experience of mass political struggle.

The Non-Cooperation Movement stimulated the foundation of a national student federation in India. The first annual All-India College Student Conference was held in Nagpur in 1920 to provide co-ordination for the growing student political movement. Similar

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student movements took place throughout the 1920's, and these annual gatherings helped to keep the political spark of the student movement alive in a period of general political quiet.

Regional student federations were founded in the Punjab, in Bengal, and in other areas. The All-Bengal Students' Association claimed a membership of twenty thousand in 1929. The Bombay Presidency (provincial) Students' Federation, formed in 1936, helped to bring ideological politics to the local and provincial levels. The All-India Student Conferences, which normally attracted more than three thousand students from all parts of the subcontinent, provided left-wing Congressmen with a platform and with support for their views. These conferences were characterized by militant nationalism, and the ideas of socialism and Marxism found support among the students.[8] The student movement was probably the most radical element in Indian political life during this period. The study groups organized by left-wing students brought to the Indian campus the ideologies of European Marxism and the Russian Revolution—both of which had a marked influence on the thinking of politically minded students. While only a minority of the student community was politically active in the 1920's, the movement established itself during this period and gained both organizational experience and ideological sophistication. One of the main campaigns of this period was a series of demonstrations against the Simon Commission, a British committee that visited Indian in 1928 to investigate the problems of Indian self-government. Students spearheaded demonstrations in most cities and demanded that the Commission recommend independence for India—the first time Indian students had organized a series of demonstrations on a national scale on their own initiative.

The 1930's brought an intensification of the political struggle in India. The influence of radical nationalist and socialist ideas spread by left-wing leaders, both in the Congress and in the student movement, prepared the students for a more active phase of the nationalist struggle. Gandhi's Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 involved students on an unprecedented scale, and many of the more militant activities, such as the boycotting of shops and the cutting of telephone lines, were carried out by students. The Gandhian concept of nonviolence was never fully taken up by the students, some of whom participated in terrorist activities.

One of the results of the agitation of the early 1930's was the creation of the All-India Students' Federation in 1936. From the

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beginning, the AISF was strongly nationalist and radical in its approach. Within two years, the new organization was able to claim one thousand affiliated organizations and fifty thousand members.[9] The AISF journal, *Students' Federation,* was circulated throughout India and provided a radical viewpoint on both educational and national issues. The AISF effectively united the student movement for several years while Gandhians, socialists, and Communists worked harmoniously within the organization. Provincial student federations carried on the regional work of the AISF, and the annual meetings of the organization usually attracted more than three thousand delegates, as well as many of the top Congress leaders.

In addition to the "mainstream" nationalist student movement, a number of other important trends existed within the student community. Many Muslim students, previously apathetic or pro-Congress, were influenced by Mohammad Ali Jinnah's call for a separate Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent and joined the Muslim League's All-India Muslim Students' Federation, founded in 1937. This organization, which had substantial support among Muslim students, did not participate in the independence movement, but pressed instead for Muslim rights. While the importance of the Muslim student groups diminished after the formation of Pakistan, the Muslim student movement helped to shape the political ideologies of a whole generation of Muslim leaders.

The Hindu right wing also gained strength, in part as a reaction to Muslin separatist sentiment. The *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), founded in the late 1920's, appealed to militant Hindu nationalism and to anti-Muslim and anti-Christian feelings among Hindus.[10] By upholding traditional Hindu values, then under attack from Westernized elements in India, the RSS was able to attract many students, particularly in smaller colleges. The Hindu Student Federation, founded in the 1930's and similar in ideology to the RSS, had a more sophisticated approach and greater appeal for college students. Its influence was limited to north India, however, and it never constituted a threat to the nationalist student movement.

The Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 ushered in the most active period of political agitation undertaken by Indian students. By 1938, Indian colleges were highly politicized, and students were involved in a variety of protest activities. Strikes against college authorities occurred almost weekly in many parts of India, instigated as often to further nationalist purposes as to correct a particular edu-

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cational grievance. Students not normally concerned with political issues were attracted to the dramatic nationalist struggle. Thousands served short jail sentences for their part in the struggle, and many left college to work in the nationalist and labor movements or the Gandhian educational and social-service projects.

The split within the All-India Students' Federation in 1940 indicated some of the problems of the growing ideological sophistication of the student movement. After a period of harmony, differences between the Communists, on one side, and the socialists and the Gandhians, on the other, came into the open in 1940, making the breakup of the organization inevitable. The Communist-dominated All-India Students' Federation lost a large part of its support when the Communist Party supported the British war effort after the Soviet Union entered World War II in 1940. The nationalists organized the All-India Students' Congress in 1945. This group continued the struggle against the British, but at the same time it opposed the Communists. The Students' Congress, which stressed both social revolution and patriotism, was by far the most important national student organization in India at this time.

The most militant and highly organized period of the Indian student movement came during the 1942 "Quit India" struggle. When the Congress leadership called for an all-out, although nonviolent, effort to drive the British from India, the student movement succeeded in closing most of India's colleges for extended periods and brought masses of students into the struggle. About 10 per cent of the student population of India (or fifteen thousand students) was involved in the day-to-day organizational work of the nationalist movement. Students not previously involved in politics participated in almost daily demonstrations. Student cadres took part in sabotage campaigns and tried, with some success, to disrupt the British administration.[11] When the adult Congress leadership was arrested, students often assumed leadership responsibilities and provided a key liaison between the underground leaders and the movement. Student groups published illegal newspapers and even operated a clandestine radio station. Although the 1942 effort failed to expel the British from India, it was the first time that the Indian nationalists became a kind of "national liberation movement." The militancy of the students' involvement in the 1942 movement was retained, although on a reduced scale, until the end of the independence struggle.

The growth of a militant student movement in the pre-1947

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period can be attributed to a number of factors—the main one being the highly politicized character of Indian cities and towns during the 1930's and 1940's. Many members of the student generation were attracted to the movement in these urban centers. The pre-independence student community, being small and compact, was relatively easy to organize. Because young people from rural areas and from the lower castes and classes were virtually excluded from the secondary and higher educational systems, the large majority of the students came from upper-middle- or upper-class and caste backgrounds.

The emphasis in the universities at this time was on the liberal arts, and students in this area have traditionally been more concerned with intellectual and political issues.[12] As in the post-independence period, students in the liberal arts were most active in political affairs during the nationalist struggle. Law students, who were destined for an independent professional career and had little chance for a government post, were particularly active.

The Transformation of the Student Movement

By 1947, the student movement had lost much of its momentum. The Students' Congress and other major student organizations were unsuccessful in shifting their efforts from an emphasis on political struggle to a program of Gandhian constructive service. Many radical student leaders were disillusioned by the compromises that the Congress leadership made in order to achieve independence without further bloodshed. The 1946 mutiny of the Indian Navy was an additional shock to the student movement, for the Congress leadership ordered the militant sailors to surrender to the British in the interest of a political compromise. Radical student leaders felt that they had been betrayed by the nationalist movement, and many left the student movement.[13]

With a few isolated exceptions, the student movement in India has been unable to regain its sense of militant unity and ideological purpose. Students have not ceased to participate in politics, but there has been a dramatic transformation of their movement. The nationalist fervor of the pre-independence period has been replaced by generally unorganized and sporadic agitation usually aimed at specific grievances.

The most important cause for the transformation of the student

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movement was the end of the independence struggle. Prior to 1947, political issues were clear and dramatic—the British had to be driven from the subcontinent, and radical social change had to be instituted in Indian society. The caste system, communal animosities, food shortages, and other social ills would be eliminated when India achieved independence and could guide her own affairs. Respected nationalist leaders encouraged students to take an active role in the political struggle. Following independence, the issues were no longer so clear. The Congress leadership was divided on how best to deal with India's many social and economic problems, and the departure of the British solved very little. Conservative elements in the nationalist movement achieved substantial power after 1947, and many radicals were forced into the opposition. Moreover, following independence, the Congress leaders reversed their former position and urged students to stay out of politics.

The spirit of individual self-sacrifice that had marked the independence struggle almost disappeared, and many political leaders became more concerned with their own careers than with ideology or national development. Regional, linguistic, and caste loyalties, temporarily put aside for the nationalist cause, resumed their old hold. For the post-independence student leader, a political career still depended on dedication to the Congress cause, as had been the case before 1947, but it also involved such undramatic details as winning elections and placating various economic and ideological tendencies.

Indian higher education was also undergoing changes. The expansion in enrollments, begun in earnest during the mid-1930's, continued after independence at an accelerated rate. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of college students increased from 263,000 to 645,000. In 1966, more than 1,094,000 students were enrolled in about 2,565 colleges.[14] The traditional base of Indian higher education, the liberal-arts college, was also waning in prestige and importance because the standards of instruction at these colleges declined seriously, as the student population expanded at an unprecedented rate. The value of a science education, on the other hand, increased substantially, as India's industrial production rose, and the standards of admission into the scientific fields tightened in order to protect standards of instruction. Technological institutions were created and given sufficient financial resources, while the liberal-arts colleges were allowed to expand almost without limit and were not adequately financed. As the number of graduates of the

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liberal arts exceeded the number of jobs available, educated unemployment became an increasing problem, and holders of B.A. degrees could consider themselves fortunate in finding clerical employment. Many employers began to demand a college degree for positions previously filled by literate, but academically unqualified individuals.

As the educational system grew, higher education became available to broader segments of the population, thereby destroying the homogeneity of the student population. Members of the student community had little in common since students were drawn from diverse class and caste backgrounds. Students from the lower-middle- and working-class families were often unwilling to risk their college careers to participate in political activity, and, in any case, they lacked a tradition of political activism.

A kind of "dual culture" has evolved on the campus as a result of the changes in higher education. Students from lower castes and classes often constitute a rather isolated, although growing, segment of the college population and seldom take part in extracurricular activities. Such students suffer most from the disadvantages of Indian higher education—poor conditions and falling standards of instruction, crowded institutions and fear of unemployment—and enjoy few of its advantages. Thus, they are frustrated and willing to participate in sporadic and disorganized student unrest and demonstrations. Working-class students or those from rural areas have generally gone into liberal-arts subjects, while upper- and middle-class students, who have received adequate secondary training and who have facility in English, have tended to go into the sciences, when they have been able to meet the rigorous admissions requirements.

The fact that the most able and qualified students have gone into the natural sciences and technical fields has had important implications for Indian higher education and for student political involvement. Students in the natural sciences have traditionally been less concerned with politics and more professionally oriented than liberal-arts students, and recent shifts have meant that many of the best students are no longer interested in political affairs.[15] Students in the sciences often do not have time for political activity, since their academic programs are both time-consuming and demanding. These changing conditions have reduced the numbers of students available for continuing political activity and have lowered the quality of student leadership.

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The Indian University in the Post-Independence Period—Higher Education and Student Politics

The transformation of the political student movement in India has altered campus life. The Indian campus probably has as many student groups and organizations today as at any time in its history, but the nature of these groups has changed with the decline of ideological politics. Student unions are, perhaps, the most ubiquitous organizations in Indian universities, and their functions often include responsibility for cultural and social programs. While the unions are intended to provide a link between administrator and student, in many cases their functioning is less than democratic, due, in part, to administrative regulations. In most colleges, student-union representatives are elected by the students, although seldom on the basis of political views.

Student unions in a number of colleges have taken on political importance. In some of the more volatile of the north Indian universities, such as Aligarh and Benares, student unions have spearheaded protest campaigns. Agitations undertaken by student unions usually stem from local issues, such as university examination policies, increases in college fees, living conditions, and the like, but in some cases student unions are controlled by ideological factions attempting to use the union as a base of operations against an opposition political group within or outside the university.[16] Communists, socialists, and factions within the Congress Party have not hesitated to use student unions for their own purposes, all the while formally decrying political interference on the campus. As a general rule, however, student unions have not been involved in politics and have been limited to their social and educational functions.

It is useful to distinguish between the kinds of student leadership found in Indian universities. The "respectable" nonpolitical cultural and social student organizations are led by students from upper-class families for the most part, and these students can be called the "academic" leadership of the Indian student community. Students active in direct-action campaigns have come more frequently from the lower social classes. This leadership constitutes a relatively new and dynamic force on the Indian campus. Students from social groups without a long tradition of education, often from illiterate families, have frequently led strikes and demonstrations. The continuing leadership of leftist student groups, however, is

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generally drawn from middle-class students, who have a political tradition and sufficient free time to devote to political matters. This dichotomy in student leadership is a peculiar characteristic in Indian student life.

Despite the changes in student political activity, a number of national student organizations have retained some influence. After the largest of the pre-independence student movements, the Students' Congress, was disbanded in 1948, Congress leaders expressed interest in the formation of a nonpolitical student organization, and the socialists agreed to unite with them in the formation of the National Union of Students (NUS) in 1950. The NUS proved unable to rid itself of the heritage of outside political manipulation and soon foundered, never becoming the representative nonpolitical student organization that its founders had envisaged. Inadequate financing, student apathy, and the difficulty of communication in a rapidly expanding educational system proved to be insurmountable obstacles. Factional disputes caused several splits in the organization, and by 1958 the NUS was, for all purposes, dead.

The National Council of University Students of India (NCUSI) was subsequently formed to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of the National Union of Students. This organization has faced many of the same problems that plagued its predecessor—opposition from educators and political leaders, student apathy, and personal ambition among its own leaders. The Cold War has created the problem of foreign financial support. The Soviet Union has financially supported the Communist-sponsored All-India Students' Federation, while the NCUSI has received funds from Western sources. It is unlikely that the NCUSI will become the representative student association in India, although it has tried to keep aloof from partisan Indian politics and has occasionally been a moderating influence on the Indian student community by encouraging students to work with administrators rather than resort to immediate agitation.

The political parties in India have adopted an ambivalent attitude toward students in recent years. The Youth Congress was formed in 1949 by the All-India Congress Committee. Despite its claim that it was India's largest youth organization, it did not attract much attention and served mainly as a "front group" for aspiring Congress politicians. Because the leadership did not encourage open political discussion, the organization failed to draw able, politically oriented youth, and the Youth Congress had few active

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chapters before its dissolution in 1965 because of internal political conflicts.

The oldest national student organization in India is the All-India Students' Federation (AISF), which has existed without interruption since 1936. The AISF, under Communist control since 1940, has lost much of its support and a large proportion of its membership. In 1955, the AISF claimed a membership of one hundred thousand, with major concentration in West Bengal, Andhra, and Kerala, all centers of Communist political support.[17] The AISF is, however, weak in areas without Communist strength.

Despite the considerable efforts the Communist Party has made to cultivate the students, the general decline in student organizations has also affected the AISF. The changing tactics of the Communist movement have also hurt its student allies. Although Communist support for World War II permitted the AISF to function legally while the nationalist student movement was forced underground, many students felt that the Communists were traitors to Indian nationalism. Immediately after Indian independence, the Communists violently opposed the Nehru government, thus alienating a large proportion of the student population. More recently, the split in the Communist movement caused by the Sino-Soviet dispute has disillusioned many leftist Indian students and complicated the functioning of Communist organizations. In many areas, the AISF's identity as a Communist student organization has been purposely obscured or de-emphasized. Despite this nonideological policy, AISF students in Calcutta, many of whom support the left-wing (pro-Maoist) Indian Communist Party, recently took a leading part in student demonstrations. Nevertheless, even these Calcutta demonstrations, led by ideologically committed students, erupted over purely local campus issues and spread only when the original student demands were not met by the university authorities.

In the recent past, right-wing student political organizational efforts have been quite successful in some regions. One of the most important student organizations in India today is the *Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad* (All-India Students' Organization). This group, commonly called the *Vidyarthi Parishad,* has claimed to be nonpolitical despite strong evidence suggesting that it is the youth wing of the rightist Hindu communalist parties, and particularly of the *Jan Sangh* (Peoples' Party). The *Vidyarthi Parishad* has concentrated on a culturally oriented program, avoiding broader political issues as much as possible. It has appealed for patriotism and

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was active in the nationalist upsurge following the Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962.

It is difficult to generalize about post-independence student political participation in India. There is no longer a unified student movement, and only a tiny fraction of the Indian student population is involved in the day-to-day operation of student political groups. Nevertheless, the annual number of demonstrations in the past years has been quite high. In general, the emphasis of the student movement has shifted from societal concerns to campus ones. Even organizations that have a basic ideological commitment, such as the All-India Students' Federation, have appealed to students on the basis of single issues, usually directly related to campus conditions. Student political involvement continues in India, stimulated in large part by the severe stresses evident in Indian social and economic life, and student activism will continue as long as India suffers from social, economic, and educational tensions and inadequacies.

Student Indiscipline—Causes and Effects

No other issue in Indian educational life has received more publicity than the problem of "student indiscipline." Violence is a distinctive characteristic of student indiscipline in India. In the Hindi-speaking areas of northern India, student agitation has often involved destruction of private and university property. Even local agitations, such as protests against an increase in tram fares in Calcutta, are often accompanied by violent student outbursts. This tendency toward violence is perhaps related to the lack of channels through which the deeply frustrated Indian students can voice dissent. The widespread publicity given to student indiscipline may, however, obscure the statistical fact that most Indian colleges have not been plagued by student unrest.[18]

The causes of the student unrest that swept northern India in 1966 are typical of the factors which have stimulated such agitation since 1947. It is difficult to discern one key cause for the 1966 agitation, for in most instances local grievances stimulated a demonstration or protest. An analysis of some 280 student strikes and demonstrations which took place in 1964 gives some indication of the causes for student unrest. About one hundred strikes were stimulated by demands relating to examinations and the administration of educational institutions. Another sixty had their origins in protests against the police or other government functionaries; miscel-

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laneous causes accounted for the rest. In most of the cases, there was no overt political motive. The Communists associated themselves with strikes on thirty occasions, the *Jan Sangh* twice, and other parties seventeen times. In 1964, 3 per cent of the agitations were due to nonacademic issues; in 1965, the figure rose to 5 per cent, and in 1966 to 17.4 per cent. In 1966, there were 2,206 demonstrations, of which 480 were violent. Only two years before, there had been 700 demonstrations and 113 violent outbursts.[19]

Regional differences, so vital to Indian life, have been mirrored in patterns of student political activism. There are wide variations in the intensity and nature of student unrest and activism in the Indian states. According to a government report, students in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal have been very involved in unrest and political activity in recent years. Bihar was added to this list in 1966. Students in Maharashtra have been passive, as they have in most of south India, with the exception of the language agitations of 1964 in Madras. West Bengal, with its strong tradition of militant political activism, has been a center of agitation, yet Kerala, which also has a strong Communist movement and a large and fairly concentrated student population, has seen little unrest. The Hindi "heartland" of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have been very much involved in student activism, yet the Punjab and Rajastan, which are also in the Hindi belt, have been fairly quiet.

It is difficult to generalize about the reasons for these strong regional differences. The political complexion of the student unrest differs from area to area. The right-wing *Vidyarthi Parishad,* for example, is strong in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, but is practically nonexistent in Bengal and in the South, due in part to the language question. Socialists are strong in Uttar Pradesh, but not in Maharashtra. The Communists have strength in West Bengal and Kerala, with only pockets of support elsewhere. Conditions of study also differ from region to region, and from university to university. Clearly Calcutta students study under particularly adverse conditions; this situation no doubt contributes to their activism. Some universities have traditions of administrative factionalism and internal infighting, while others have been administratively stable. Where the university administration is in firm control, and there is little faculty discontent, student indiscipline is less likely to occur.

Student action aimed at political issues directly related to broader social issues is most significant, as it is the most widespread

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and often the most destructive. This type of agitation is triggered by a specific local issue, either within the university or in the vicinity of the institution. The real cause, however, lies beyond the specific incident and is related to the more general problems that Indian students must face, both in their day-to-day lives and in their vision of the future. The continuing pressure of inadequate facilities, obviously substandard educational preparation, and the fear of unemployment after graduation make students more open to indiscipline. The surprising characteristic of student indiscipline is not the large number of demonstrations, but the lack of more widespread violence and destruction.

In Orissa, a co-ordinated series of student demonstrations throughout the state forced the resignation of the government in 1964. Student leaders charged that the state chief minister, a Congress politician, was guilty of corruption and demanded his resignation. The chief minister was forced to resign, and the students won a major victory in the state. The Orissa agitations were carried out by a well-organized student committee with representatives from many of the colleges in the state, thus proving that it is possible for *ad hoc* student agitation in an area relatively free of student unrest to be successfully organized.

In 1965, students sparked rioting in south India against the imposition of Hindi as India's national language. The anti-Hindi agitation, in which more than fifty people were killed and much damage was done, caused a national crisis and forced the central government to postpone the implementation of its language policies. A Students' Action Committee from colleges throughout the Tamil-speaking areas co-ordinated demonstrations and strikes, which often became violent.[20] Opposition political groups in the south, particularly the anti-Hindi DMK Party, strongly supported the students.

In late 1966, Calcutta was convulsed by student demonstrations in favor of a United Left Front antigovernment campaign. When violence broke out, university authorities shut all educational institutions—an action affecting one hundred thousand students. Local campus issues were combined with broader ideological concerns in the agitation, which spread for the first time to students from the prestigious Presidency College in Calcutta. Militant leftist leaders in Calcutta saw their movement as a first step toward an Indian revolution on the model of the Chinese "proletarian cultural revolution." Left-Communist Calcutta students are not so much pro-Chinese as super-militant in their political views.

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There are important institutional variations in Indian student unrest. Indiscipline is not a problem in most of the prestigious and well-financed technological institutions. While it is generally agreed that most student unrest has originated in the liberal-arts colleges, there are some key differences among these institutions as well. In general, older colleges that have been able to maintain relatively high standards of instruction and a spirit of corporate identity have been less plagued by student indiscipline than have the newer institutions.[21] Missionary-administered colleges have had less difficulty than other institutions, perhaps because there is often a tradition of academic excellence and a more satisfactory teacher-student relationship at these institutions.

The Indian university is closely tied to its society and shares many of the characteristics and contradictions of modern Indian life. In no society are "academic" values completely separated from the norms of the broader society, but in India these distinctions are even less evident than they are in many countries.[22] Caste and regional affiliations are seen as normal criteria for academic appointments, and factional politics within the universities bear a marked resemblance to political infighting in national life. Students attempt to use family influence in order to gain admittance to the university, or they resort to agitational politics to change an examination result. Thus, while some critics attack the universities for being an "ivory tower," higher education is very much in the mainstream of Indian social and political life.

The underlying causes for student unrest are not difficult to perceive, and there seems to be a general agreement among educators and other officials concerning at least some of them. A recent report on student unrest stated that the four main causes for student unrest are "1) lack of proper academic atmosphere, 2) absence of respect for authority—parental, educational, and governmental, 3) ideological frustration, and 4) political interference."[23] The status of university teaching has also declined since independence, and the traditional respect for the *guru* has virtually disappeared on the campus. Students seldom have an opportunity to talk to their professors, since classes are large and the teaching loads are heavy. At the lower ranks, college teachers are poorly paid, and many instructors must hold more than one job.[24]

Indian universities annually administer externally prepared examinations to college students, and consequently the individual professor cannot control either the curriculum or the evaluation of

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his students. Examinations have been one of the main causes of student indiscipline throughout the history of Indian higher education. Since the late-nineteenth century, students have rioted against difficult examinations, often forcing authorities to lower standards or to reschedule tests. Even with these agitations, the examination failure rate at some universities reaches 70 or 80 per cent in some subjects.[25]

Many students begin their collegiate careers at the age of fifteen or sixteen and lack the maturity that a few extra years would give. Furthermore, students living in hostels and away from their families for the first time are probably affected by their unprecedented freedom, particularly in view of India's strict family system. The generational problem, present in almost every society, lies somewhat below the surface in India, although it probably influences the students by causing resentment against constituted adult authorities.

The economic uncertainty of many Indian students is clearly a cause for ambivalence and indiscipline. Many students hold part-time jobs in order to pay for their educational expenses and must therefore divide their attention between job and university career. It has become increasingly more difficult for graduates, especially in the liberal arts, to obtain suitable employment. Students who cannot obtain jobs frequently return to the universities to do graduate work even though they are often not interested in the academic preparation involved. The number of students who do not finish their college educations is also quite high, and many of these former students remain on the campus, since employment is not always obtainable. Well over half of those who enter college in India do not obtain a degree.

Related directly to the economic problem are the difficult conditions under which many Indian students must study. In addition to inadequate university facilities, many students are unable to provide the minimum necessities of life for themselves. A survey of students in Calcutta pointed out that a substantial number were undernourished. In urban institutions particularly, students often must live in crowded and unsanitary conditions.[26] These factors cannot but increase the frustration and alienation of a large part of the student population.

Political, social, psychological, economic, and educational issues are intertwined in India, and all have contributed to student unrest. Present educational trends are likely to continue. Despite the warnings of educators, unplanned expansion of the educational system

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continues unabated. The government is unwilling to restrict educational expansion even though it is unable to allocate sufficient funds to maintain educational standards. As higher education becomes available to increasing segments of the population, the value of the Bachelor's degree decreases. Centralized standards have become even more difficult to enforce, since several new universities are established each year, and higher education remains a joint responsibility of the central and state governments.

The unprecedented expansion of the student population (India has the third largest number of college students in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union) and its growing heterogeneity have made the mobilization of the entire student community difficult, if not impossible, and have obscured the role of national student organizations. The prognosis for student politics in India is unclear. Student political activism is clearly not dead in India. Statistics indicate that the rate of unrest is increasing, and there is no reason to expect a reversal of this trend. The frustrations of the educational system, increasingly difficult conditions for the educated urban segment of the population generally, and a remnant of the nationalist tradition of student political involvement—all combine to insure the continuation of sporadic and often violent student unrest and "indiscipline." A major factor mitigating against a rebirth of the student movement is, however, the educational system itself. Few students can jeopardize their degrees by becoming politically involved, for an academic degree is a necessity in an increasingly difficult employment situation. The risks of student involvement make ideological student politics unattractive for most students. Moreover, there is little possibility that students could in any event have a major impact on Indian politics due to the relative stability of Indian political institutions.

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JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Burmese Student Politics in a Changing Society

AFTER FIVE years of military rule, Burmese political life has changed both in style and content. This transformation did not take place suddenly and without resistance. Its object went beyond limiting political opposition to revolutionizing the values and ideas, the relationships and institutions of the people.

Among the more notable examples of change since 1962 are the elimination of students from active political participation and the redirection of their energies and interests into wholly educational and socially constructive activities. For most of the students, both high school and university, redirection began only after a series of violent contests with the soldier-rulers in 1962 and 1963, during which the universities were closed, and youth leaders who had persisted in resisting the new order were arrested. Since 1964, the students have been separated from their political leaders, and they have accepted the new roles assigned to them in a changing educational environment. A minority still persists in its opposition by giving open or secret support to the outlawed political parties and by participating in the guerrilla warfare conducted by rebel political and ethnic groups against the government. The present role played by the student differs vastly from that of the past, and in order to understand the magnitude of the changes and assess their depth, it is necessary to review the history of students and politics and to look at the controlling variables that govern student behavior and values.

I

The Burmese tradition of student involvement in politics began during the first decade of the twentieth century as a response to

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the growing influence of Westernization that accompanied colonial rule and the development of commerce. In the port cities and centers of trade, English and Anglo-vernacular schools gained an unequal advantage over traditional schools run by Buddhist monks because the content of the new education provided the training necessary for jobs in the government, law, and commerce and for acceptance in the universities and colleges in England and India. In addition to adopting Western language, dress, and technology, the students became acquainted with Western ideas and values that were, in most cases, in sharp contradiction to those of their own culture. In the face of this foreign challenge, many young people, both in and out of high schools and colleges, joined in a movement for the protection of the Buddhist faith—the core of Burmese traditions and values. The Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) began as a nonpolitical movement with the object of looking after the people's religious, educational, and social needs. The topics discussed at the meetings, however, tended to be social or political rather than religious, and the movement became the training ground for Burma's future leaders. The movement took on an outright political function when it led a protest campaign against the wearing of shoes by Westerners in the precincts of pagodas and monasteries. The importance of this early manifestation of student political activity rests with its initial motivation—the protection of Burmese culture and traditions. This motivation continued for the next four decades and was one of the constant factors in student political activity in Burma.

Following World War I and the British promise to India of eventual self-government, the Burmese leaders moved actively to win the same concessions for their people. In 1921, the YMBA was succeeded by the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA). While students took an active interest in General Council, the leadership passed to older men who sought political power, as well as institutional changes.

This background produced the first purely student political movement. In 1920, the colonial government considered establishing a university in Burma to train a small number of highly qualified persons for eventual recruitment into the country's bureaucracy or leading commercial firms. At that time, the centers of higher training were Rangoon College, established in 1884 as an affiliate of Calcutta University, and Judson College, a small Baptist institution created a decade later. The colleges provided instruction, but the parent

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Indian university administered examinations and awarded degrees. This was not a satisfactory system for a growing province which needed a steady stream of highly trained indigenous people. The proposed University Act of 1920 called for the establishment of an independent residential university, on the model of Cambridge or Oxford, which would admit only the best qualified students. Those below the top might enter as probationary students. By setting high standards, it was thought that a small elite could be trained and later absorbed, thus assuring good personnel with a stake in the preservation of the system.

The university students rejected the Act and its limitations. They called a strike on December 4, 1920—a tactic already in use by Indians in their disputes with the British. The strike won the immediate support of the national political leaders, the Burmese adults, and the younger students in the middle and high schools. The strikers objected to the idea of an elite school, the probationary period, and the proposed program's emphasis on the arts and humanities, rather than science and technology. From their headquarters on the grounds of Shwedagon Pagoda, the leaders demanded a system of national schools whose curricula would be devoted to teaching the Burmese language, literature, history, and technology. The students tried to establish such schools in the Buddhist monasteries and other buildings with themselves and Buddhist monks as teachers. The movement spread beyond Rangoon, and a hierarchy of student-founded schools, catering to the needs of all ages, sprang up. Despite the energy of the student-teachers and the support of the public and the political leaders, the national-school movement gradually collapsed because it lacked both sufficient funds and recognition by the Department of Education and failed to develop quality education. By 1922, most of the national schools had closed or had been taken over by the government.

The student strike ended nearly a year after it began with the students winning a few minor concessions, but not their major objectives—the creation of a popular university that would serve the masses and a national school system that emphasized Burmese culture and history. Nevertheless, the strike was important for several reasons: It marked the marriage of educational and national goals with political tactics and demonstrated the unity of students on matters that were vital to their interests. Moreover, it drew nationwide support from all classes and ethnic groups and laid the foundation for a new political coalition—student leaders, politically

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active Buddhist monks, and radical professional politicians. From 1920 onward, the students were a potential force in the emerging political process.

Nearly a decade elapsed before the students returned to the political scene. The 1930's saw several important changes in the politics and the economy of Burma that helped shape the student movement. Following the inconclusive visit of the Simon Commission, which was charged with assessing the constitutional system and making recommendations for change, and the London Round Table Conferences, the people became politically active over the question of whether to unite with or separate from India. Concomitant with the constitutional issue was the problem of the effect of the worldwide depression on the economy of Burma. Thousands of farmers were forced off their land and driven to the cities to find employment. Ethnic competition for the limited number of jobs available erupted into violence, and Burma witnessed anti-Chinese and anti-Indian riots. In the countryside, a peasant revolt against British rule broke out in 1930. Although it was easily crushed, it excited the people and stimulated their interest in the radical solutions offered by some political leaders.

Out of this environment came a new political movement that united the university students, the nation's youth, and the radicals on the fringe of national politics. Together they founded a new party called *Dobama* (We Burmans) and adopted the title *Thakin* (Master) as the prefix to their names. As both names suggest, their initial goals were the revival of national culture and freedom from foreign rule. The former goal dominated their thought and action at the outset, and it persisted throughout their campaigns for wider use of the Burmese language in all aspects of life. The students in the Party were concerned mainly with the development of a secular literature in the national language, a cause they furthered by publishing essays, short stories, and articles. The student *Thakins* were also active in organizing the All Burma Youth League, which recruited middle- and high-school students to the *Dobama*. The League sought to awaken the students' feelings of love of country and to involve them in the political campaigns of the day.

The *Dobama* differed with the earlier YMBA mainly in its emphasis upon secular nationalism and its interest in political action as a means for gaining its ends. The society had little or no formal organization and, in its early phase, did not seek political power either through elections or violence. Its members devoted them-

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selves to study, and they read widely in an unsystematic fashion from the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, Marx, Engels, Stalin, Mussolini, the leaders of the Indian Congress Party, and the Irish Sein Fein movement. The youthful *Thakins* found a friend in J. S. Furnivall, a retired British civil servant who ran a bookstore in Rangoon and permitted them to use his shop as a place to read and discuss politics.

In 1935, the *Dobama* became more involved in radical politics. It was reorganized as the *Dobama Asiayone* (We Burman Society), which united the older members with the All Burma Youth League. Its ideology still remained nationalistic with an emphasis upon land, literature, and language. Several of its members had, however, become committed to Marxism and other foreign ideologies, and they sought to unite nationalist goals with ideas borrowed from abroad. After the 1935 constitution came into effect, the *Thakins* formed a political party, *Komin Kochin* (one's own king, one's own kind), in order to contest the election and win seats in parliament for the express purpose of destroying the new system. The *Thakins*, especially the student leaders among them, played a major role in awakening urban workers to political participation. They were most successful in organizing the workers of the Burma Oil Company and later led them on an ill-fated march to Rangoon that drew national attention to the grievances of the workers and the leaders of the *Thakins*. After 1937, the *Dobama Asiayone* grew more radical and sought to present itself as the only alternative to the other parties whose leaders accepted the constitutional system and the gradualism it implied.

While these changes were beginning to take shape, the majority of university students lived in semi-isolation and busied themselves with social activity, passing examinations, and looking forward to gaining good jobs and making successful marriages. By 1936, however, they were aroused politically when the Rangoon University Students' Union was captured by students interested in making this debating forum the center of student politics on campus. The expulsion of RUSU President Thakin Nu[1] for making provocative speeches and the disciplinary action against other leaders for publishing an inflammatory article in the RUSU journal, *Oway*, provoked the student body to strike. Although the expulsion and disciplinary actions were the catalysts for the strike, they were not the beginning of student politicization. That had begun years before in the middle and high schools, under the direction of the All Burma

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Youth League. Although most students who aspired to a university education may not have been active during that period, they had acquired the ideas, tactics, and training they now put to use. The particular issues were aided, no doubt, by the imminence of final examinations since most of the students were not opposed to any action that might postpone them. Thus, the student body responded immediately to the RUSU leaders' call for a strike. The strike quickly spread to the high schools in the larger urban areas. The student leaders, like their predecessors in 1920, established the strike headquarters on the grounds of Shwedagon Pagoda. They called for popular support and the political co-operation of the *Dobama Asiayone,* which they received almost at once. In the face of the widespread sympathy given the students and the interest in the strike shown by both Burmese government officials and responsible political leaders, the university administration and the government made concessions that included student representation on the university council. Following their victory, the student leaders became national heroes in the struggles against foreign rule and for student rights.

This strike, like the earlier one, was effective because it was initially a response to a student issue—disciplinary action by university officials. By emphasizing the problems of the indigenous student under the rule of alien teachers and officials who exercised power arbitrarily, it also attracted national attention through its appeal to the people's antiforeign sentiments. It differed from the earlier strike because it became political almost immediately and sought the support of radical politicians, monks, and the people at large. By winning a political victory as well as a student one—the postponement of the final examinations both at the university and in the high schools—the strike established the students once again at the forefront of the nationalist movement and gave their leaders fame and prestige, both on and off the campus.

After the British government implemented the new constitution of 1937, the RUSU took the lead in organizing and controlling the high- and middle-school students in new organizations, the All Burma Student Union (ABSU) and the All Rangoon Student Union (ARSU). When student leaders, Maung Ba Hein and Maung Ba Swe[2] were arrested for their part in the oil workers' march on Rangoon, the students made a public protest outside the Secretariat Building. In the excitement, the police tried to block the procession; failing to do this peacefully, they used clubs to reinforce their

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words. In the struggle, a student was killed, an event which provoked further demonstrations and a government crisis. On December 21, 1938, the university students called a new strike—directed against the government's brutality. This strike won a double victory —no reprisals against the strikers and the postponement of final examinations until June, 1939. In Mandalay, on February 10, 1939, the students at the Intermediate College and the National High School, together with a large group of politically active monks, held a demonstration against the government. Again a clash ensued, but this time seventeen students and monks were killed. This conflict led to further demonstrations, both in Mandalay and Rangoon, and united the people behind the students, who charged the government with brutality and repression. Thus, in the short period between 1936 and 1939, the student population became full participants in the radical nationalist struggle and saw its causes intermingled with the nonstudent nationalist issues of the day.

As the decade drew to a close, the student leaders who earned fame in the strike of 1936 and the demonstrations thereafter gradually left the campus and became more fully involved in national politics. Thakin Nu and Thakin Aung San, along with several others, joined in forming the Freedom Bloc in 1939. This organization, which united a majority of the members of the *Dobama Asiayone* with Dr. Ba Maw's *Sinyetha* (Poor People's Party), called for independence, the holding of a constituent assembly, and the immediate grant of power to the cabinet, pending the establishment of a new political system. The move came just as Great Britain entered World War II and was not favorably received. The anti-British speeches of the Freedom Bloc's leaders led to their arrest or escape from the country. One of those who left Burma was Aung San; he eventually went to Japan where he met with Japanese military officials who promised aid and military training for the Burmese in their struggle for national independence. Aung San returned to Burma and recruited twenty-nine former students to leave Burma and receive military training. With Japanese help, they were to become the spearhead of a military revolt against the British. In 1941, the "Thirty Heroes," as they came to be known in Burma, were poised in Thailand and Indo-China awaiting an opportunity to re-enter Burma and open the revolutionary phase of their fight for freedom.

Thus, on the eve of World War II, the students were fully committed to the nationalist struggle. They and their leaders had

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become radical in both their tactics and demands. Although their ideology was couched in the language of Western radical thought, its content remained nationalist and made its strongest appeal by joining linguistic and cultural issues with the demand for political independence. The students' honesty, their unwillingness to compromise with the system by accepting good jobs, and their devotion to the cause earned them the respect of the nation and an immediate place in national politics. Finally, their link to the *Dobama Asiayone* and the Japanese placed their leaders at the forefront of the radical nationalist movement that gradually adopted violent tactics to win total independence.

The student political movement took a new turn following the outbreak of World War II and the Japanese occupation of Burma. One of the first casualties of the fighting was the university; the invaders confiscated the buildings and grounds and halted all higher learning. In this situation, many of the students joined the Burma Independence Army and turned for leadership to former students who had led the 1936 strike and the Freedom Bloc movement. Most, however, were bewildered by changing events, and either returned to their homes or remained in the urban areas without guidance and leadership.

To remedy this situation and to win the support of the students and the nation's youth, the Japanese created in June, 1942, a Burma branch of the East Asiatic Youth League (EAYL) under the leadership of ten former university students. They, in turn, recruited members from among their fellow students and trained them as organizers and leaders of the various branches of the EAYL. The League's formal tasks were nonpolitical and ranged from digging wells and canals to building structures, training people in public health and sanitation, and educating the very young. By 1944, it had more than seventy thousand members. As a mass organization, performing socially useful tasks, the EAYL was well received by the people of Burma. In the rural, somewhat isolated areas, it acted as a link between the officials and the people.

The strength and popularity of the EAYL brought it into competition with the authority and prestige of Dr. Ba Maw's puppet regime. Toward the end of 1944, the Burma government outlawed the League. By this time, however, its leaders had become involved in the resistance movement and had moved underground to participate in the final uprising against the Japanese. Following the war, the EAYL took a new name, the All Burma Youth League (ABYL),

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and as a member group of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), it played a leadership role in the nationalist struggle for independence between 1945 and 1948.

The war's end, like its beginning, brought rapid changes and confusion to the nation as a whole, and to the students in particular. Many former students returned to the campus to resume and complete their interrupted education. They found the buildings partially destroyed, books and equipment damaged or stolen, and the faculty ill equipped to maintain prewar standards. These problems, however, were overshadowed by the nation's struggle for independence. As before, student and national issues became intermingled, and the students quickly found themselves involved in protests and demonstrations for educational and political goals.

The postwar period brought one other significant change in the student movement—the interlocking relationship between student political organizations and national political parties. Where in the past the students retained their separate political identity and cooperated with parties and leaders who were out of power and against the system, from 1945 onward the students and their organizations became part of the national political process and an object for control by the rival political parties. This was due, in part, to the times and political issues; in part, to the fact that the rivals for political power were products of the student movement and sought to continue their links, despite their graduation into the world of national politics.

On campus, the older student organizations reappeared. Both ABSU and RUSU were courted by the rival Communist and Socialist Parties in their competition to capture control of the independence movement. As long as the two parties co-operated inside the AFPFL (1945-46), their student counterparts followed suit. A division in the AFPFL, however, resulted in a split in the student movement. The students loyal to the AFPFL-Socialist coalition captured the RUSU, while those in favor of the Burma Communist Party gained control of the ABSU. The BCP-controlled group sought to exploit student grievances as a means of capturing wider support, and the AFPFL-controlled group emphasized nationalist issues and appealed to the students on the grounds of patriotism. In effect, the two groups acted out in microcosm the larger drama in the nationalist movement. The ABSU returned to the control of the AFPFL in 1947 after RUSU successfully appealed to the ABSU rank-and-file to call a conference.

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Aung San's assassination in July, 1947, precipitated a crisis in student politics, as well as among the political parties. With no leader in the government with the personal attraction of Aung San, the students drifted away from AFPFL and gave their allegiance to the BCP in support of student issues. Student problems soon gave way to national political concerns when the BCP went into open revolt against the independent AFPFL government in April, 1948. Students became involved almost immediately. Some went underground to aid the BCP, others joined more radical groups, and still others put their studies aside and joined the army in support of the government. Communist sympathizers maintained their hold on the student movements until 1949, when they tried to lead university and grade-school students in a strike in sympathy with the civil-servants union. The government arrested those it could capture and drove the rest underground. The socialists of the AFPFL moved quickly to take charge of the student organizations by backing a new student party, the Democratic Student Organization (DSO). The DSO then dominated student political life until 1952. Backed with both AFPFL funds and strength, the DSO leaders used their power arrogantly in support of the government and, consequently, alienated the students. Some became independents and took less interest in student political life, while others shifted their allegiance to groups that were not government-sponsored.

As resistance to the DSO grew, the BCP secretly supported a new student party, the Progressive Student Force—or Progressives —which appealed to the students on the basis of student issues and opposition to the government because of the poor conditions that existed at all levels of education. At this time, the AFPFL, in an effort to win voter support in the national election, opened new colleges and abolished tuition, thus permitting more students to enter the university. Students reacted negatively to these changes, which they thought could only worsen the present conditions and decrease the quality of their education.

The government, when faced with mass resistance to a decision to shorten the October, 1953, recess, used force to dislodge the protesters and jailed the Progressive leaders who led the boycott. The government's apparent victory turned to defeat as the "October Revolution" became the symbol of government interference and brutality. After this, government-sponsored groups (and DSO, in particular) supplied little leadership to the student political movement. From 1955 to the military seizure of power in 1962, the RUSU

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and the ABSU were in the hands of students who were sympathetic or allied with the BCP.

Student leaders continued to couch their antigovernment attacks in terms of student issues after the shift to the left. The students and government were both unwilling to face the dilemma they were in. Each wanted to see more students obtain higher education and better instruction, but neither was willing to face the consequences of their desires. The government failed to supply real leadership on student and educational problems, and thus the leftist RUSU leaders were able to cloak political criticism in student issues and were assured of mass support. When they did not employ this strategy, they stood alone.

It is also necessary to note another aspect of student politics in Burma. Students from the indigenous minorities have, from time to time since independence, taken to violence in support of ethnic political issues. Many Karens left the universities in 1949 to fight with the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) for a Karen State in which their people would have political independence or autonomy, and in 1959 Shan and Kachin students left the universities to join with groups of their own people in revolt against the growing dominance of centralized government and the Burman people. Minority students at the universities and colleges tended to group according to their language or ethnic identity. While they did participate with the Burmans in many student causes and national issues, they did not hesitate to follow their own leaders and to take an independent direction on issues they considered basic to the survival of their culture and political identity. This is not to suggest that ethnic cleavage kept the student movement divided. Indeed, during the revolts in 1948-49, most of the students from the minority races remained loyal to the Union government, a major factor in preventing the destruction of the Union of Burma.

In comparing the student movement before and after independence, several significant differences stand out. National political parties competed for control of the student movement. National issues were no longer anticolonial, but antigovernment. Student issues came to be more important than national ones in uniting the students. Thus, in order to mobilize widespread student support, student leaders continually sought to join national and student concerns. After independence, and during the first years of the several rebellions, students turned away from politics and sought friendships and social activity in their ethnic, religious, or regional

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organizations. When the military seized power and displaced the constitution and the elected leaders, the students—like the citizenry at large—accepted the change with quiet resolution.

II

Two important variables connected with the student movement merit closer attention: the political environment and the educational system.

During the long period just reviewed, the political environment could be characterized very broadly as passing from stability to instability. In the colonial system, power was concentrated in the hands of alien rulers who exercised it in an orderly and paternalistic manner. The indigenous subjects were given a degree of freedom which increased as Burma moved toward self-government. In view of their own goals, the rulers could provide the people with a limited opportunity to organize, discuss, and even share a portion of power without real fear of displacement. Under these conditions of stability, a pattern of political relationships between the governors, the indigenous elite, and the governed developed in an orderly and regular manner, and the behavior of all was fairly predictable. The students discovered that freedom to engage in political action was within the accepted rules of the game. They found reason to protest and act politically because they saw a connection between their educational-economic-social condition and the political system. As their tempo of protest increased, the colonial rulers—quite predictably—responded with the use of power and thus confirmed the students' argument that real change in Burma depended first upon change in the political situation.

Only when the British faced the challenge of invasion from abroad and displacement by another colonial power did stability begin to crumble, and the British evacuation from Burma produced confusion and instability.

Under the Japanese, opportunities for students closed in education, but possibilities opened for them to participate in the adult roles of government functionaries and revolutionaries. The student leaders who became involved in political action emerged after the war as part of the leadership group in the nationalist movement; for those who did not, the war was a period of confusion and doubt. With higher education halted, the rhetoric was emptied of content because it did not relate accurately to the existing situation.

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In postwar Burma, the British were unable to restore stable government and order. The growing conflict between the nationalists and the colonial rulers overshadowed all else. Once again the anticolonial ideology of the students was employed and drew positive response because it appeared to relate to reality and to explain the problems and conditions at the university. But the student movement had changed: The adult parties invaded the campus and competed for control of the student organizations; they divided the leaders and followers in the interest of partisan causes. The breach between student factions paralleled the divisions in adult political life. By the time independence was realized, the old antigovernment rhetoric gave way to the competing ideologies of the adults and contributed to the general polarization of the national elite and the instability in society.

Independence brought not stability, but revolt and civil war. The questions of political legitimacy and the authority of the government dominated all others. The student leaders and followers remained divided and in open competition as the campus became a microcosm of the nation. Intrigue, corruption, and struggle obscured all else. The student movement foundered without a clear relationship either to the political system or to the student body and education. The renewed efforts in 1958 by AFPFL leaders to create new youth political organizations helped to bring the divisions in the party out in the open and drove the majority of students further from the political arena.

The educational system contributed both to the attitudes of the students and to the environment. In Burma under British rule, the educational system was composed of three kinds of schools: vernacular, Anglo-vernacular, and English, with no common standards for all. Only the students from the latter two matriculated to college. The university was small and produced no more than four hundred graduates yearly—many of whom did not enter government service, but chose law, journalism, or business as careers. The university emphasized the arts and humanities and produced generalists; very few engineers, doctors, and scientists were trained—both because of the students' inadequate pre-university preparation in math and science and the lack of demand for people with such skills in Burmese society. The core of university subject matter consisted of Western ideas, history, and literature, with limited training available in national subjects. Thus, many of the graduates, through the education they had acquired in the Anglo-vernacular or English schools and

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the university, were more at home in a foreign culture than they were in their own traditions.

The style of education at the university placed heavy reliance on the self-motivation of the student for study and attendance. With success or failure depending on passing the final examinations, the student who took a "pass" degree—and most did—had a great deal of free time in which to participate in politics and do things other than study. He discovered in these other pursuits excitement and challenge that he did not find in his studies. Moreover, the activities brought him into the adult world where he was treated with respect and sometimes as an equal. The students protested against the content of their education and the elite character of the system, but failed to force the authorities to make real changes. Only after they employed the tactics of the strike and obtained national publicity did they win minor concessions. By the outbreak of World War II, the university was in almost continuous ferment as the students became more involved in the nationalist struggle than in their studies.

Following independence, education from primary school to university expanded. Large sums of money were appropriated for construction of new universities and colleges, for training future professors in foreign universities, and for development of teacher training, technology, engineering, and medicine. The results, however, were not equal to the investment. Inadequately trained primary- and secondary-school teachers dominated the lower grades and were incapable of preparing the students properly for higher education, especially in math, science, and technology. The university enlarged rapidly, but did not have adequate libraries, laboratories, or teachers. The number of students increased, and any effort to remove those who could not do the work met with protest and resistance. The pattern of course selection followed tradition, with most students taking arts, humanities, and law in order to prepare for careers in government and law. After nearly two decades of education under self-government, the universities had trained only a handful of scientists and technicians, while they had produced more candidates for civil service and law than could be absorbed. Thus, despite political independence and interest in broadening and improving higher education in order to develop an educated elite, the educational system was no more related to the social needs of the people than it had been in the time of colonial rule.

The student reaction to the university in the period of inde-

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pendence was mixed. Many saw the university as the last obstacle to overcome on the way to a good job and successful marriage. They wanted no real changes either in academic standards or administrative control of discipline. Others saw the university as a bridge between tradition and modernity. They resented its inadequacy and supported political action when the issues were cast in student terms. Still others saw it as the training ground for a career in politics. Such students entered solely to develop their skills and to begin their life's work. With prestigious jobs in government diminished and with inadequate preparation to do much else, the students protested against the system. In doing so, however, most did not want to see the requirements made more difficult and thus bring about their own failure. They stood ready to protest against the system, but, at the same time, they attempted to prevent any real changes that might bring improvement. With little or no creative educational leadership in the government and discontent on the campus, the university system continued largely as before and failed to inspire respect from either the students or the nation at large. So long as it did not relate to social needs by producing a truly educated elite, it brought frustration and disappointment to the students and their parents.

The Burmese university student has been and continues to be a transitional man in his society. He and his fellow students come, in the main, from traditional homes located in the cities and towns where their fathers earn very modest incomes, where religion and religious values and practices dominate and regulate their lives. In order to get to the university, however, he must acquire a degree of proficiency in a foreign language and a knowledge of facts, ideas, and processes that are foreign in origin and not clearly related to his life. He probably is the first member of his family to go to a university or college and, in doing so, he hopes to earn a degree that can open the door to a good job and salary. He plans to share his wealth and talent with the less fortunate members of his family and society through religious and social acts of charity and service. Despite his Western education, he probably will continue to consult the astrologer, remain loyal to his religion and traditions, and live in a way which approximates the pattern he knew as a child.

In the pre-independence period, the student population was divided between Burmans, Indians, Chinese, and Anglo-Burmans. The latter three groups tended to devote themselves to their studies and to seek training in medicine and engineering—subjects normally avoided by the majority of less well-prepared students. Members

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from minority groups avoided politics because they were cast in Burman nationalist terms. When the issues were presented in student terms, however, they joined with the Burman students to provide a genuinely united student response.

Before World War II, members of the indigenous minorities, with the exception of the Karens, did not make up a significant part of the university student population. After independence, the student composition broadened. By far the greatest number were Burmans, but there were also representatives of the Chinese and Indian communities and members of the indigenous racial groups. As before, their basic social groupings were nonpolitical, ethnic, religious, or local associations that grew in number and size. As student politics came under the control of the adult political parties, most of the students retreated from political involvement on campus, unless an issue was directly related to student affairs. If the students gained a common identity as members of the university community, it was a thin overlay on deeply rooted separate identities that they never lost.

III

The coup of 1962 brought major changes to the political environment of Burma. With no hesitation in using force against any group or individual who opposed them, the soldiers-in-power eliminated all dissenting legal groups by arresting the leaders or silencing them through fear, by outlawing their activity, and by disposing of their property. By 1964, the military government controlled the population centers and most of the countryside, with only the border regions and the remote jungle areas in the hands of the rebels. Despite their power, the military cannot prevent an occasional attack on a government outpost or the other acts of violent protest that have become more frequent during the past two years.

The military rulers have sought to re-educate the people to the new socialist values they set forth in *The Burmese Way to Socialism*. According to the new ideology, the old educational system was wrong because it was not equated "with livelihood." In the new Burma, education was to be equated with livelihood, and it would be based on socialist moral values. Precedence would be given to science in the curriculum, and higher education would be open only to those "who have promise and enough potentialities and industriousness to benefit from it."[3] The military rulers began to implement

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these basic changes in the educational system in 1964. They have reorganized the university according to a plan for decentralization that separates arts and sciences from technical, professional, and vocational training. The new decentralized university makes no provision for student political activity and organization. A student is expected to devote himself fully to his studies in order to gain the knowledge and skills that can be used in building a new Burma; any who do not apply themselves are dropped. The military is conscious of the need to convince the nation that the change was necessary and long overdue, that education finally has been made relevant to the needs of the society, and that higher education is a reward reserved for those with both talent and the willingness to work.

It is too early to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the new educational programs. There has, however, been a forced tranquillity in the schoolyards and classrooms. With no demonstrations and strikes to distract them and with incentives to succeed, the students have produced better results on the national examinations. There is no shortage of students who seek admission to the university and employment in government service, and the government has been firm in restricting admission. If the educational system continues to receive the funds and equipment it needs, if it succeeds in training a core of teachers who can do their work with skill and imagination, and if the social system can absorb the talents of the youths when they complete their studies, the changes will be accepted, and education will at last have become relevant to the needs of the society.

The student movement no longer exists as it did before the coup. When the new school year began in June, 1962, the students found changes in the administration, a new set of stringent rules governing their behavior, and a requirement that they pledge to observe the regulations before they would be allowed to register. The RUSU organized a protest against this invasion of student freedom, and the demonstration degenerated into a riot. The government answered by sending troops who fired upon the students; more than fifteen students were killed. When order was restored, the university was closed, the students were sent home, the student leaders were arrested, and the RUSU building was destroyed. By the end of the rainy season, the government reopened the university to all who provided the authorities with letters from officials in their home areas guaranteeing their behavior. Despite this and other restrictions, the students continued to demonstrate and protest. The military tolerated these expressions of political opposition and even promised

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to rebuild the RUSU building. During the government's negotiations with the insurgents,[4] the student political organizations met with the rebel leaders, publicized their cause, and supported many of their demands. When the government finally broke off discussions in November, the students called for a mass demonstration. The government responded by arresting the student leaders, reclosing the university, and ending student politics.

The university reopened in 1964; this time real changes took place. The reorganization and decentralization program had been put into effect, and the students were carefully screened before readmission. Under stricter discipline and academic pressure, the students remained quiet and the university became nonpolitical.

There are no indications of how the military leaders view the nonpolitical organizations of the university students. Because they tend to divide and isolate student groups from one another, they probably are not encouraged; on the other hand, because they fill an important social need, they probably exist. The soldier-rulers have pursued a campaign to demonstrate that Burma is rich in cultural diversity and social harmony. It is likely, therefore, that the groups are tolerated and will be until the other programs take deeper root. Thus far, the government, the newspapers, or other media of communication have not mentioned them.

It was clear before the coup that only student issues could unite the students and inspire them to demonstrate and take political action; after the coup, the student political leaders used student issues as a means for uniting campus opposition to the military government. For a long time, the students have sought a more meaningful experience at the university and a better education. The military leaders are attempting to satisfy these desires by isolating the students from outside distractions and by improving the quality of education. In the three years since the student movement was put down, there have been no signs of its revival on campus. Thus far, most of the university students have co-operated with the new rulers.

A general quiet exists on campus and among the students. Whether it reflects genuine tranquillity or a smoldering fire cannot be determined yet. The long tradition of the student movement is not totally erased from the memory of this generation.[5] Many of the military leaders and high officials won fame and developed their political skills as student leaders during the 1930's. Perhaps when the military relaxes its hold on the government and the Burma Socialist Program Party replaces it at the helm of the emerging political

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system, the change-over may be the spark to ignite a new student political movement.

References

1. After World War II and the assassination of Aung San, he became the head of the AFPFL and the first Prime Minister of the Union of Burma.
2. Maung Ba Hein became a Communist when the Party was formed in 1939; he died in 1946. Maung Ba Swe was a leader of the Socialist Party and became Prime Minister in 1956; he held the office until early 1957, when he gave it up in favor of U Nu.
3. Revolutionary Council, *The Burmese Way of Socialism* (Rangoon, 1962), p. 6.
4. In April, 1963, a general amnesty was proclaimed, student political leaders were released from jail, and the government offered to negotiate with all groups in open revolt.
5. During the anti-China demonstrations in June and July, 1967, the university students were permitted to march and participate as a unit.

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RICHARD E. PETERSON

The Student Left in American Higher Education

In striking contrast to students in many other countries, American college students have not been known until recently for their interest in politics and national affairs. There has never been a tradition of student politics, radical or otherwise, in American life, and it is in part because of the sharp break with the past that the surge in student political activism during the 1960's has so captured the fancy of observers of the American scene.

It may be useful at the outset to distinguish the student left from three other varieties of contemporary student dissent—student rightists, campus-issue protesters, and hippies. The student left is viewed as a movement that has emerged in the past seven or eight years on the basis of a shared rejection of many prevailing American institutions, a vaguely democratic-socialist political ideology, a faith in participatory democracy, and a commitment to direct social action. While the student left has grown out of an amalgam of shifting civil rights, peace, and anti-poverty sentiments and activities, its ultimate goal is radical reform of American society and the characteristic nature of human roles and relationships on which it rests.

The programmatic thrust for the student left has come chiefly from two organizations—the predominantly Negro, loosely structured Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the almost totally white, nationally organized Students for a Democratic Society. SNCC, after last year's ironic shift in goals and tactics, seems to be weakening as an effective force for change. SDS is weighing new priorities in the hope of extending its grass-roots support and keeping the radical movement alive.

The student right, by comparison, directs its protest not so much at the *status quo*, but rather at what it perceives to be a rising tide of leftist influence ("liberal orthodoxy") on the campus and in the broader society. The educationally oriented tactics of the student

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conservatives are aimed chiefly at counteracting the efforts of both the student leftists and the nonideological campus-issue protesters.

Easily the most important conservative student organization is the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), which claims a membership of twenty to thirty thousand spread across some two hundred campuses. From its founding in 1960, YAF grew to a peak in grassroots support during the Goldwater-Johnson campaign of 1964. Since then, YAF has probably been best known for its efforts on behalf of the Administration's Vietnam policy—demonstrations of support for various escalations toward a military victory, blood donations, Christmas packages for the troops, and so forth.

Parents of conservative students are disproportionately Republican and Protestant, and they tend to be authoritarian and achievement-oriented in their child-rearing practices. Student rightists, heavily concentrated in business curricula, appear to be active not only at the large, prestigious, and visible institutions, but also at many smaller colleges—especially church-related ones, southern universities, and technical and other career-oriented institutions.[1] As S. M. Lipset and Philip Altbach have observed, despite impressive financial and organizational backing, student conservatives "have not been successful in building a movement which has much commitment from its membership," nor has it "made any real impact on the campus."[2]

Quite the contrary is true of campus-issue protesters. In the years "since Berkeley" (Fall, 1964), college campuses in many parts of the country have witnessed an unprecedented level of organized student protest over campus conditions, and the impact has been substantial. During the academic year 1964-65, there were more demonstrations about dormitory and other living-group regulations and campus food service, than about U.S. actions in Vietnam. Moreover, larger numbers of students, most likely representing wider cross-sections of student bodies, were generally involved in protesting internal campus issues.[3]

While many of the trouble spots are old and somewhat trivial, there is a new urgency and stridency. Often led by legitimate (elected) student leaders, the campus-issue activists have borrowed some of the tactics of the student leftists—the marches, sit-ins, and confrontation strategies of the civil rights movement, for example. Certainly the strategies of the FSM activists at Berkeley have not gone unnoticed by students on other campuses who generally seek more limited objectives. With the emergence of new models of

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higher learning—the experimental colleges and the free universities, for example—as well as the appeal of a politics of "student power," concern for *real* educational reform is unmistakably on the rise among these more conventional students.

There is some question as to whether discussion of hippies is relevant to a paper on college students. Collegiate life in its usual form is anathema for the confirmed hippie, whose characteristic response is aesthetic rather than intellectual. The hippies exist mostly on the periphery or in the underground of large urban colleges and universities—in a sense, dropping in and out. In contrast to the politically committed left-activists, real hippies have withdrawn from American culture and despair of any hopes that they, the "new lefties," or anyone else can alter the prevailing patterns of that culture.

The Organized Student Left: Brief Notes

The "new" student left is not to be confused with the "old" left or, in Jack Newfield's words, the "hereditary" left—the student wing that is now chiefly represented by the Progressive Labor Party.[4] Very weak numerically, the old left cannot be taken seriously as a political force mainly because—owing to its factionalism and ideological dogmatics (such as rigid reliance on economic variables)—it is not taken seriously by the new-left groups.

By way of further definition, it may be asserted that students on the new left share the belief that American society is so grossly defective that nothing short of a fundamental reconstruction of basic institutions will provide an adequate remedy, and they are willing to act on behalf of this belief. This definition would distinguish the leftists from the hippies, who are disinclined to act, as well as from the liberal groups whose goals are less radical. Among the latter would be the campus affiliates of ADA, SANE, ACLU, the College Young Democrats, and probably also the recently established University Christian Movement (UCM).[5] By our definition, there would, of course, be many student leftist who are not dues-paying members of or active workers for leftist organizations. The student left, as defined, includes perhaps something on the order of 1 to 2 per cent of the total student population. The *organized* student left—formal affiliates of SDS, SNCC, SSOC, CORE—amounts to fewer than 15,000.

SNCC came into being at an October, 1960, meeting in Atlanta,

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the result of efforts by SCLU worker Ella Baker to bring together leaders of the various sit-ins that had occurred throughout the South since the original Greensboro and Nashville demonstrations earlier that year. Almost all of the early SNCC activists, both Negroes and whites, were of Southern middle-class background. They shared a religious devotion to the ideals of nonviolence, love, and peace, along with a suspicion of formal organization and leadership. Early tactics emphasized direct confrontation—sit-ins, freedom rides, and the like.

Late in 1961, SNCC embarked on a new course and began sending full-time workers into rural communities in the South to help Negroes register to vote. The incredible heroism of individual SNCC organizers in Mississippi and Alabama has been movingly described by Newfield: "They were shot, beaten, gassed, whipped, jailed." The summer of 1964 saw the failure of the SNCC-inspired Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and the tragedies of the SNCC-conceived Mississippi Summer Project (notably the murder of Goodman, Chaney, and Schwerner).

After a period of black-white populism, SNCC organizers began to lose faith in white liberals and federal civil rights measures. The belief emerged within SNCC that it was best for Negroes to make their own destiny rather than to integrate with a "sick" white society.[6] In May of 1966, Stokely Carmichael replaced John Lewis, and a new SNCC was born out of a legacy of frustration and despair. Financially broken, its less than eighty paid workers are now seeking to stir the younger Negro generation toward open militancy and eventual Negro self-determination.[7]

SDS also took shape soon after the original sit-ins. A small group of student intellectuals, mainly at the University of Michigan, established ties with the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) which was seeking to reconstruct its moribund student sector. Groups organized on eleven campuses, and Tom Hayden drafted SDS's manifesto, the *Port Huron Statement*. In June, 1962, fifty-nine people gathered for a founding convention at the F.D.R. Labor Center at Port Huron, Michigan.

After a year of organizing campus chapters and minor local polemicizing, SDS turned to community organization in northern urban ghettos, both black and white. ERAP (Economic Research and Action Projects) were under way in ten cities by 1965. "Community organization" has meant many things: fostering indigenous leadership, building a capacity to make decisions, initiating direct action, giving hope.

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In 1965, SDS's focus was again on students, and the issues of Vietnam, the draft, and student power. In April, 1965, twenty thousand people came to Washington for a SDS-organized march to protest the war. SDS helped set up the first teach-in at Ann Arbor, and soon after initiated projects for draft resistance. SDSers in Cambridge helped guide the 1967 Vietnam Summer project. Many of the demonstrations against campus recruiters this past fall were organized by SDS chapters. According to Richard Blumenthal, SDS grew from 1,200 members and 30 chapters in 1965 to more than 6,000 and 227 chapters in 1967.[8]

SDS is currently exploring new priorities and directions. To bring a larger element of rational analysis into its workings, it has established the Radical Education Project (REP) as an arm for research and theorizing. While aggressive efforts to influence student opinion continue on many fronts (as at the 1967 NSA Congress), there is also an emerging interest in ways to radicalize various middle-class adult groups.

Pluralistic (no one is excluded), nondogmatic, leaderless, and decentralized, the unifying bond for most SDSers seems to be a moral outrage at the hypocrisy in American society—the gap between the liberal democratic dream and the grim human reality of American life—and a commitment to work for radical social change.

The Spectrum of American Higher Education

Since the end of World War II, the proportion of the college-age population (18-21) attending college has doubled—from 22 per cent in 1946 to 45 per cent in 1965.[9] In the fall of 1967, approximately six million students were attending about 2,300 colleges and universities. Something over one third of these are public, tax-supported institutions; given their typically large size and egalitarian admissions policies, however, the public institutions presently enroll two thirds of the total student population.

American higher education, in short, has undergone a remarkable democratization. Perhaps its most contemporary expression is the local community supported and controlled "open door" two-year junior college. In 1945-46, there were 242 public junior colleges enrolling 110,000 students, while in 1965-66, there were 392 with enrollments totaling almost 700,000. Public junior colleges have assumed many functions. As evidence of a "cooling out"

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function, Lewis Mayhew has estimated that only 12 to 15 per cent of those who enter the JC's as freshmen eventually obtain Bachelor's degrees.[10] (A sizable minority in the technical-vocational programs, perhaps 25 to 30 per cent, of course, at no time have BA aspirations.)

A second major theme in American higher education is its decentralization and consequent diversity. In 1965, there were 154 universities, 89 of which were public; 815 liberal-arts colleges, with six times as many private as public; 186 teachers' colleges, with all but 28 under public control; 55 technical institutions equally divided between public and private; 622 public and private junior colleges; 207 church-operated theological schools; with the balance of the 2,230 made up mostly of private professional and technical schools. In the private sector, 490 Protestant-controlled colleges enrolled 8 per cent of the total student population, 376 Roman Catholic-controlled institutions slightly over 7 per cent, and 490 independent institutions 18 per cent. In size, institutions range from over thirty thousand students on one campus, as at several midwestern universities, to the several hundred schools with enrollments of less than five hundred.

There are also huge differences in affluence, preparation of faculty, admissions selectivity, and other indices of institutional quality. Almost half of the colleges and universities are *not* accredited by an official accrediting organization. In California, the seventy-two generally well-financed and competently staffed JC's are open to all citizens of that state. (Not even a high-school diploma is needed if the applicant is over age eighteen.) On the other hand, some thirty or so institutions (rated as "most selective" by Cass and Birnbaum)[11] comprise the "Paradise" of Kenneth Eble's cosmos[12]; old, independently controlled, well-endowed, and concentrated mainly in the Northeast, they receive three or four applications for admissions for every freshman admitted. In intellectual sophistication, their student bodies stand well apart from the rest of the field.

With the exception of youths who live in states with poorly developed systems of higher education and lack the financial means to leave the state or the academic ability to obtain a scholarship, some form of higher education is available to all. Because of the many forms, prospective freshmen are often able, in Martin Meyerson's words, to "sort themselves according to their images of themselves and of the colleges to which they apply."[13]

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A Typology of American College Students for the Late-Sixties

Given an open, mass educational system, the diversity in student characteristics is extremely great. As a summarizing and expository convenience, recourse to some sort of typology is unavoidable. One typology that has proved to be particularly meaningful was proposed by Berkeley sociologists Burton Clark and Martin Trow in the form of four "sub-cultures"—the vocational, the academic, the collegiate, and the nonconformist.[14] The model to be outlined clearly has roots in the Clark-Trow paradigm. It also draws on recent empirical studies, mainly the work of Harry Schumer and Robert Stanfield at the University of Massachusetts, the investigation by Jonathan Warren based on students from four southern California colleges,[15] as well as data gathered with the College Student Questionnaires (CSQ), which contain a method for classifying students according to the Clark-Trow typology. In the past four years, the CSQ has been administered to over 120,000 students at some 250 colleges and universities.[16]

The model posited here consists of eight student types distinguishable in terms of their dominant value commitment. It is useful to consider how the types might be arranged on a continuum of degree of acceptance-rejection of prevailing American institutions. Lacking pertinent data, this venture—summed up in the diagram below—is largely inferential and speculative.

Stance vis-à-vis American Institutions

Acceptance		Neutral			Rejection
←					→
Vocationalists Professionalists	Collegiates	Ritualists	Academics	Intellectuals	Left-Activists Hippies

It hardly needs to be said that the names refer to analytic, ideal types; they are oversimplified abstractions that mask the huge variability on many dimensions that unquestionably exists within each type.

Vocationalists. The basic commitment of the vocationally-oriented college student is to the training he is receiving for a specific occupational career. He views his college education chiefly in instru-

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mental terms—as a means of acquiring a skill that will ensure the occupational security and social prestige that his family has lacked. Vocationalists are predominantly from working-class backgrounds, and they differ from what we will refer to as professionalists mainly in terms of socio-economic background. In college, they specialize in engineering, education, business, or other technical specialties. On various items in the CSQ, they evidenced a relatively firm and long-standing commitment to their vocational fields of choice, as well as a decidedly passive, dependent attitude toward learning. Students classified as vocationalists consistently score relatively low on the CSQ measures of cultural sophistication, social conscience, and liberalism (Figure 1). The vocationalist, in sum, is preparing

Figure 1

CSQ Profiles for Undergraduates Divided According to a Typology of Student Subcultures Proposed by Burton Clark and Martin Trow



SF: Satisfaction with Faculty
SA: Satisfaction with Administration
SM: Satisfaction with Major Field
SS: Satisfaction with Students
SH: Study Habits
EI: Extracurricular Involvement
FI: Family Independence
PI: Peer Independence
L: Liberalism
SC: Social Conscience
CS: Cultural Sophistication

Description of the sample of students as well as definitions of the eleven scales are included in the *Technical Manual* for the *College Student Questionnaires.*

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himself to "make it" within the American system, which he accepts uncritically.

Professionalists. This type, the name borrowed from Kenneth Keniston, differs from the vocationalists in a number of important ways, but not, it is argued, in terms of the hypothetical dimension of acceptance-rejection of American institutions. Born of upper-middle-class and professional parents, he (this category is practically all male) aspires to much the same life pattern as his highly successful father—achievement, expertise, *noblesse oblige.*[17]

Well-endowed intellectually, the professionalist was strongly motivated to succeed in secondary school (often one of the best), and in college he is bent on continuing his record of outstanding academic achievement toward early enrollment in a postgraduate professional school (law, medicine, business, government, and so forth). Professionalists would be disproportionately found in the best undergraduate colleges, a necessary springboard to the right graduate school and first job. Characteristically "staying cool," they are seldom excited by issues and ideas. While there clearly are attitudinal differences within this hypothetical category, the general political outlook of the professionalist is conservative to middle-of-the-road, and oriented toward the *status quo.*[18]

Collegiates. The collegiate commitment is to popularity, play, and sex, as these proclivities may be realized through the various formalized extracurricular activities as well as informal off-campus events, such as spring-vacation congregations at beach resorts or fraternity weekends in the mountains, that define "college life."

Collegiates are from the middle classes. They are attracted to the relatively unselective public colleges and universities, especially the large and old ones in the South and Midwest, which are strongholds of big-time football and the national Greek-letter fraternities and sororities. Anti-intellectual, the collegiate's course work tends to center in fields that make relatively few intellectual demands. While particular subtypes of collegiates may exist on particular campuses, the common denominator seems to be an orientation toward the extracurriculum, broadly defined.[19] Collegiates scored significantly higher on the extracurricular involvement scale in the CSQ than the other three Clark-Trow types (Figure 1), and they tend to be conformist and other-directed (low

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peer independence). Although the self-reported political attitudes of collegiates gravitate toward the conservative, politics—in the sense of adult partisanship and real issues—are simply not relevant.

Ritualists. The distinguishing attribute of the ritualist (the name suggested by Harry Schumer and Robert Stanfield) is his lack of commitment to anything. Possibly of less than average academic aptitude and usually from lower socio-economic strata, he has in a sense been swept into college by forces beyond his control—parental prodding, friends going on to college, a college within easy driving distance with admissions standards that can be met.

Schumer and Stanfield describe the ritualistic type as more strongly oriented toward home than the university, as preferring solitary rather than social activity, and as uninterested in either the academic or the collegiate environment. For the ritualist (as an ideal type), lack of commitment is total. He is apolitical, having no beliefs one way or another about the efficacy of American institutions.

Academics. The fundamental commitment of the academic type is to scholarly achievement within a specific subject field or academic discipline. Academics are concentrated in the selective and prestigious colleges and universities. They plan to go on to graduate school, a Ph.D., and a career of research and scholarship.

As identified in the CSQ, academics are broadly middle class in background and have relatively well-educated parents. In high school, by self-report, they studied extensively, received recognition for academic achievement, and found particular satisfaction from course work in the natural sciences. As a type, they are not critical of their college (mean scores on the four CSQ-2 satisfaction measures fall about at the norm) and are serious and organized in their study routines (study habits mean is the highest of the four types).

On the attitude scales in the CSQ, the academic type tends to score above the norm. We would infer that as an analytic type, the academic is slightly left of center in his politics. By nature and because of the pressure of other commitments, he is not an activist; he would, however, be a sympathizer and possibly even a participant in some future, broadly-based radical student movement.

Intellectuals. Whereas the academic pursues knowledge within the

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confines of a specific academic discipline, the intellectual, as a type, is oriented toward ideas and networks of ideas irrespective of the curriculum. In distinguishing the intellectual from the academic, Christopher Jencks and David Riesman have characterized the intellectual as being concerned with "questions of interest . . . to intelligent men everywhere."[20] The prototype academic is a scientist, the prototype intellectual a philosopher or historian; the former seeks truth through the scientific method, the latter through an interplay of human insights.[21]

These students tend to come from middle- and upper-class families, to be highly individualistic, liberal in their political outlook (but rather cool or unemotional about it), and aesthetically sensitive. Motivation for grades, a mark of the academic type, is not noticeable in the intellectual.

In view of the illustrious history of the alienation of intellectuals, we infer that the intellectual college student of the 1960's stands well over on our hypothetical acceptance-rejection of American institutions dimension.

Left-activists. The basic commitment of the left-activist, dues-paying and otherwise, is to personal involvement in action directed at reforming some facet of American life—be it political, economic, or cultural. His parents are prosperous and liberal in outlook. Highly intelligent, activists are found for the most part in the most selective and best-known colleges and universities, where their noncareer-oriented academic interests center in the social sciences and humanities. Activists share many of the personality traits of the intellectual, although the radical activists are characterized by a more passionate sense of outrage at perceived hypocrisy, injustice, and wrong-doing, and they have the courage to act.

Hippies. Of the eight types, the hippie's estrangement from American values and institutions is the most thoroughgoing. Unlike the left-activist who hopes for radical reform through political action, the hippie is pessimistically apolitical. The hippies who are enrolled in college would reject most of the usual student roles. On their respective campuses, they constitute, as Kenneth Keniston has put it, "a kind of hidden underground, disorganizing and shifting in membership, in which students can temporarily or permanently withdraw from the ordinary pressures of college life."[22]

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Personal Characteristics of Student Radicals

The nine or so data-based studies of radical activists that have been published yield a remarkably consistent profile of the personal and background characteristics of these students.[23]

In terms of the usual criteria, student leftists are upper-middle-class in their social origins. Their parents are politically liberal or radical, and many have been involved in radical politics. Both the students and their parents consider themselves to be either non-religious, or liberal and non-formalistic in their religious orientation. Parents of activists are permissive and democratic in their child-rearing practices, and their children are both highly intelligent and intellectually rather than career oriented. They are disproportionately concentrated in the social sciences and humanities and underrepresented in preprofessional programs. They perceive themselves as independent from most sources of social influence and authority, and are interested in and sensitive to various forms of artistic expression. Radical activists perceive in themselves an altruistic sense of responsibility in relation to almost all people, and their interpersonal relationships stress empathy, openness, and honesty.

Student Activists at Michigan State University. As part of his doctoral work at Michigan State University, George Paulus gathered data during 1966 on three groups of students on that campus: 25 activist leaders, 25 student-government leaders, and a control group of 25 students carefully matched to the activist sample.[24] The activist group consisted of leaders of the local SDS and SNCC organizations, as well as the leaders of a campus group called Committee for Student Rights (CSR). The student government leaders were elected ASMSU officials.[25] These 75 students completed CSQ Parts 1 and 2. Mean scores for the three groups on the 11 CSQ-2 scales are profiled in Figure 2.

Many commentators have spoken of the alienation and depersonalization of individual students at the multiversity. They often go on to reason that because of frustration many students seek identity and fulfillment through involvement in radical politics and larger political issues. Judging from the pattern of mean scores on the four CSQ satisfaction scales in Paulus's data, the relationship between dissatisfaction with college and radical politics is not a simple

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Figure 2

CSQ Profiles for Three Michigan State University Student Groups*



* Data made available by George Paulus of MSU

one. Taking SF (satisfaction with faculty and student-faculty relations) and SM (satisfaction with major field work) as indicators of *academic* satisfaction, and SA (satisfaction with administrative rules and practices) as a crude index of satisfaction with the *non-academic* side of college life, it appears that the MSU activists were generally *not* displeased by their academic experiences, but were highly provoked by the university's posture regarding student life outside the classroom. Specifically, SF and SM (and SH) differences between the activist and matched control groups were not statistically significant; the gap on the SA scale, however, was fully two standard deviations.[26] The activists, furthermore, roundly rejected the usual "collegiate" brand of extracurricular activities (low EI).

The pattern of mean scores on the other scales, as shown in Figure 2, tends to agree with results of other studies in other settings. Judging from their high FI and PI scores, the MSU activists generally operate relatively independently of influence from parents or peers. The liberalism scale mean is the highest heretofore obtained with any student group. A standard deviation separated the

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MSU activists from the matched controls on the social-conscience measure, a scale intended to tap moral concern over human injustice. The high cultural sophistication mean is in line with other research that has pointed to the aesthetic interests of activist students. Finally, the MSU activists fell roughly a half a standard deviation above the "norm" on the CSQ-1 socio-economic index (not shown in Figure 2).

The Institutional Factor: Variation in Student Activism at Diverse Colleges and Universities

Earlier we noted the diversity in American institutions of higher education—in purpose and curriculum, size, type of control, admissions selectivity, and the like. Additional institutional characteristics are also important in understanding the current status and future prospects of the student left: location of a college in a large urban center where the country's social ills tend to be focused; a tradition of student radicalism, as at Berkeley and the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin; the degree to which a college—in both its explicit or informal policies—is closed and rigid or open and libertarian with regard to its students' personal and political lives. Many colleges and universities are known to prospective entrants in such terms. Institutions, in short, have reputations or images. The reasonably affluent student applies to or preselects three or four colleges whose images he thinks are compatible with his own interests, values, and aspirations.

This preselection mechanism is critical in understanding the variation in student activism from one college student body to another. In view of what is known about the personality and background of student leftists, the disposition to become involved in radical politics exists prior to entry into college. Such students select colleges where their disposition may find fruition. The activist-inclined student, it is suggested, is particularly mindful of the rigid-libertarian dimension of a college's image in his preselection deliberations.

Institutional Variation in the Climate of Freedom

Edmund Williamson and John Cowan's *The American Student's Freedom of Expression* will surely stand as a milestone in research on higher education.[27] This study set out to describe the extent to

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which colleges allow their students freedom to express their beliefs on controversial issues. Questionnaires covering a host of policy manifestations were sent in the spring of 1964 to five officials at all the accredited four-year institutions in the country. Respondents included presidents, deans of students, chairmen of faculty committees on student affairs, student-body presidents, and editors of student newspapers. Eighty-five per cent of the colleges returned one or more of the five questionnaires, and almost 70 per cent returned all five.

The authors described private universities as being relatively permissive in regard to student freedom to discuss controversial topics, invite off-campus speakers, demonstrate actively, and engage in civil rights activity. Student-newspaper editors were exceptionally independent on these campuses, and there were many social- and political-action groups. Students clearly practice freedom more widely at private universities than they do at most other colleges.

Although students at private liberal-arts colleges enjoy freedom comparable to that in private universities, these colleges tend to be more in the "ivory tower" tradition, and students are less inclined to exercise their freedom or to engage in controversy about freedoms. Results for large public universities generally parallel those for private universities, except that administrators expressed only an "average" commitment to the principle of student freedom; student participation on policy-making committees was relatively greater, however, and there was less agreement among respondents than at private universities.

Student freedom to discuss or demonstrate at small public universities was not significantly above the average for all schools in the study. Student leaders, however, were independent and active in policy-making. The number of administrators committed to a philosophy of freedom was not unusually large, and respondents disagreed about the extent of freedom on respective campuses. The pattern of results for Protestant universities and liberal-arts colleges also did not differ substantially from the responses of all the schools as a group. There was, however, greater than average independence for the student editor. There was also exceptional disagreement among deans and student presidents concerning prohibition of liberal student organizations. Technical institutions were essentially at the national mean with respect to practice of academic freedom; administrators disagreed about whether freedom for students to address themselves to controversial social problems was essential

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to education. Students were seen as seeking competence in specialized fields, rather than interesting themselves in social issues.

An "average" amount of freedom for student groups to take controversial stands was thought to exist at Catholic universities. Student freedom to invite controversial speakers was significantly below the national mean. There was a great deal of supervision of student editors, and few student political organizations existed on these campuses. Administrators showed relatively little commitment to the concept of academic freedom. This pattern was much the same for the Catholic liberal-arts colleges, except that students were significantly restricted in freedom of expression.

There was less than average freedom to discuss topics, invite speakers, or demonstrate at teachers' colleges. Student newspaper editors were unusually dependent on the administration. There were few student political organizations. Student participation in policy-making, however, was about "average," but freedom seemed to be more preached than practiced.

Institutional Variation in Incidence of Student Protest

Planning for our survey of organized student protest got under way in the late spring of 1965, in the wake of the Berkeley crisis and reports of widespread student unrest.[28] The general purpose of the study was to assemble some reasonably trustworthy information about the dimensions of discontent among America's college students.

In September, 1965, questionnaires were sent to deans of students at all the accredited four-year colleges in the country; the population of institutions, thus, was the same as that used by Williamson and Cowan. The deans were asked to indicate in relation to each of twenty-seven issues—class size, speakers regulations, dormitory rules, Vietnam, and so forth—whether there had been any occurrence of organized student protest during the preceding academic year (1964-65). They were requested to limit their judgments to planned, public expressions of disapproval on the part of groups and not to consider the usual complaints of individual students. Student personnel deans were surveyed on the assumption that among campus officials they are generally in closest touch with student protest activities. Based on an 85 per cent return, then, these survey results provide a picture of student activism as it is drawn by deans of students for the academic year 1964-65. The discussion that follows

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will be limited to the off-campus issues—civil rights and U. S. military policies—which, in contrast to the internal on-campus problems, most directly engage campus leftists.

Before turning to institutional variation in student activism, some mention of the over-all, national picture may be of interest. Of the twenty-seven issues considered, civil rights was the focus of student activism on the largest number of campuses. The year 1964, especially the summer, marked the heroic period in the civil rights struggle, at least insofar as the involvement of college students was concerned. Vietnam protests were reported at about one in five colleges (21 per cent), about the same as the number reporting protests about dress regulations (20 per cent). Agitation concerning food service and dormitory regulations was reported on 29 per cent and 28 per cent of the campuses respectively. While there was little geographical variation for the campus issues (dress regulations and so forth), proportionately fewer colleges in the South reported student activism in relation to the off-campus issues.

Percentages of nine different types of institutions indicating protest on the six off-campus issue-statements in the survey are given in Table 1. One can readily see the general parallel with the Williamson-Cowan results.

Civil rights involvement was most frequently reported by the independent universities. The deans at over half of these institutions reported that some of their students participated in civil rights activities locally or in the South during the summer of 1964. At the other extreme, about one in eight teachers' colleges reported student involvement in civil rights. A crude ranking of the eight types of student bodies in terms of civil rights activism would be: independent universities, independent liberal-arts colleges, public universities, and Catholic institutions—all standing above the "national norm"; ranged below the norm would be the public liberal-arts colleges, Protestant institutions, technical institutions, and teachers' colleges.

Variation by institutional type was more pronounced for the U. S. foreign-policy issues than for civil rights. On the Vietnam issue, the incidence of organized student protest ranged from a high of 61 per cent in the independent universities to 8 per cent in both the Protestant and Catholic institutions and 6 per cent at the teachers' colleges.

The deans were also asked (multiple-choice questions) to give the following information about their colleges: proportion of faculty

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Table 1

Percentages of Different Types of Institutions Reporting

Student Protest Over Six Off-Campus Issues

	All	*Indep. Univ.*	*Indep. L.A. Coll.*	*Public Univ.*	*Public L.A. Coll.*	*Prot. Inst.*	*Cath. Inst.*	*Tech. Inst.*	*T.C.*
	$N=849$	$N=51$	$N=144$	$N=133$	$N=89$	$N=160$	$N=147$	$N=28$	$N=63$
Civil rights: local area (off-campus)—protest and/or work	38	53	46	44	30	30	45	36	13
Civil rights: in the South during the summer of 1964—protest and/or work	28	51	35	37	22	25	23	14	11
Other civil rights protest or work	24	33	33	29	16	13	30	11	14
Disarmament, "ban-the-bomb," peace, etc.	12	26	18	20	14	5	5	7	2
U. S. policies regarding Vietnam	21	61	27	36	17	8	8	25	6
U. S. policies regarding the Dominican Republic	5	6	6	11	6	1	1	7	3

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doctorates, proportion of student body living on campus, proportion of student body belonging to leftist groups, and total enrollment (institutional size). Relationships between each of these variables, as well as the response to the question on civil rights activity in the South during the summer of 1964 and each of the protest issues were studied by means of product-moment correlation analysis.

Correlations involving the faculty-doctorates dimension (a crude index of institutional quality) and the six off-campus issues ranged from .18 on the Dominican Republic situation to .43 for the Vietnam issue; this last finding may be of some significance if the Vietnam war continues, since graduates from the "good" colleges will tend to be the opinion leaders of the coming generation. All six correlations with the commuter-residential dimension were negligible, which suggests that, in general, this factor is not related to campus activism. The range of correlations between estimated proportion of student body belonging to the organized left was from .22 (other civil rights) to .47 for Vietnam.[29] Correlations for the response to the question concerning civil rights activities in the South ranged from .33 for the Dominican Republic situation, through .47 for Vietnam, to .54 for civil rights locally. The hypothesis here, of course, was that the presence on campus of highly committed civil rights activists would be associated with student militancy in behalf of other issues and problems.

Size of student body proved to be unrelated linearly to organized student protest to any meaningful degree. Reasoning that the relationship may be curvilinear—that is, that student protest would occur most frequently at the *very* large institutions—a separate tabulation was made for the fifty largest public universities in the sample. (All have graduate and undergraduate student bodies exceeding ten thousand.) The figures for this subsample turned out to be considerably higher than those for any of the institutional types included in Table 1 (specifically: civil rights locally, 56 per cent; civil rights in the South, 54 per cent; other civil rights, 40 per cent; disarmament-peace, 44 per cent; Vietnam, 68 per cent [34 out of 50 universities]; and the Dominican Republic issue, 26 per cent).

As we have argued elsewhere, the relative prevalence of organized student activism concerning off-campus political and social issues in the large institutions is probably less the result of multiversity-induced alienation than it is a reflection of the gross numbers of diverse individuals brought together at one time and place.[30] The larger the student body is, the greater is the likelihood of there

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being some student who wishes to start something—an SDS chapter, a speech walk-out, a student strike—and of his being able to find others who will sympathize.

"Discovery" of the subjection of Negroes in democratic, enlightened America give rise to the radical student movement. It took heart, until his assassination, in a young idealistic President. It was intensified by the discovery of grinding poverty in the world's wealthiest nation and by the thought of the world's greatest power being engaged in a war of attrition in a tiny, undeveloped country. It is sustained by the view that students themselves are being degraded in the university and, indeed, that citizens everywhere are leading "lives of quiet desperation." And it is supported by the belief that the social system that permits these hypocrisies cannot be tolerated and must be altered.

Only a small fragment of college students shares this powerful sense of outrage—no more than about 2 per cent. Intelligent, independent, noncareerist offspring of affluent parents, the student leftists tend to be enrolled in the "best" and most libertarian colleges and universities. In the general student population, student radicals would be greatly outnumbered by almost every "type" of student, probably including even the hippies who share the activists' moral revulsion, but not their willingness to act on behalf of a vision that goes beyond the self. The overwhelming majority of American college students are politically apathetic—caught up in their vocational, academic, or hedonistic pursuits.

Student leftists, working in league with various temporarily activated campus issue protesters, have already had a significant impact on university life, especially its nonacademic aspects. New freedoms have been granted students on many campuses—probably more often out of fear of the boat being rocked, however, than on the basis of some model linking personal freedom with intellectual and personality development. Professors, with little at stake in the nonacademic issues have generally stood aside, often relishing the sight of administrators being manipulated by students.

By contrast, the impact of student radicals on the academic side of college life has been less noticeable. Here the professors do have a stake, and their conservatism on matters of instruction, curriculum development, and the like is well known. Such student-initiated alternative models as the free universities and experimental colleges, while they exist on upwards of forty of fifty campuses, enroll rela-

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tively small segments of the respective student bodies—mainly intellectuals, activists, and hippies. There are, however, some signs of reform. New grading practices such as pass-fail are, for example, being tried out (often as much because of the connection with the draft, however, as because of any presumed benefit to learning).

On balance, though, most signs indicate that the assault on the university is gathering steam. "Student power" was perhaps the salient catch phrase at the 1967 NSA Congress, and the great majority of the delegates there could in no sense be regarded as leftists. (SDSers began using the "student power" slogan soon after "black power" demands began to be heard.[31]) New-left theorists regard issues in university reform as matters around which larger masses of students may be "radicalized" or "politicized" toward eventual reform of other social institutions. The university is also viewed as an increasingly pivotal and catalytic institution in American society; its reformation is expected to have wide repercussions.

So far, the impact of the student left on life in America outside the university seems to have been rather small. While lunch counters, bus terminals, and a few schools have been integrated, the lives of very few Negroes have been genuinely improved. New hopes may even have led to deeper frustrations and more desperate actions. While there appears to have been a dramatic shift in public opinion about the Vietnam situation in recent months, which must in part be attributed to student activism, the war in Vietnam goes on. Only token changes have been made in the draft law. The gap between the haves and the have-nots in America seems to be growing wider rather than narrower. Institutions, organizations, and relationships between people continue to be essentially bureaucratic in nature. In short, meaningful achievements have been few; all the conditions that spawned and nourished the radical movement still exist.

The future of the student left is contingent on many things: full-scale war, neo-McCarthyism, the capacity of the liberal establishment to co-opt radical ideas, the students' practical intelligence to deal with social and political complexities, and the temptation of materialism and careerism.

Students, by themselves, cannot effect major social changes. Student leftists must be willing to ally themselves with other radical and liberal elements: church people, various intellectuals (academic and professional), Negroes, the chronically unemployed and other elements of the excluded underclass, and some (maybe many)

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trade unionists. White student left groups have generally been willing to enter coalitions; black radicals, at the time this is being written, however, are pressing for positions that will strain even the loosest of coalitions.

Historians will credit the student leftists of the 1960's with being a major stimulus for reforms in higher education; these will mainly mean greater personal and academic freedom for students. New, highly open structural forms will have come into being to add to the total diversity of the system. Outside the university, however, the impact of the student left still largely remains to be seen.

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1. The half-dozen or so empirical studies of student conservatives have been summed up by Jeanne H. Block, Norma Haan, and M. Brewster Smith, "Activism and Apathy in Contemporary Adolescents," *Contributions to the Understanding of Adolescence,* ed. James F. Adams (New York, 1967).

2. S. M. Lipset and Philip G. Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States," *Student Politics,* ed. S. M. Lipset (New York, 1967), pp. 199-252. See especially pp. 206-207.

3. Richard E. Peterson, *The Scope of Organized Student Protest in 1964-65* (Princeton, 1966).

4. Jack Newfield, *A Prophetic Minority* (New York, 1966). This was the chief source for the paragraphs on the history of SNCC and SDS.

5. Well-financed and sophisticated in the use of communications media, UCM could become an important element in the student left. The "organizing principle" of UCM "is to bring about social change through reformulation of the university."

6. Cf. Irving Howe, "The First Generation of SNCC," *Dissent* (July-August, 1967).

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9. Statistics are primarily from the U. S. Office of Education's *Digest of Educational Statistics,* 1966, and also from Martin Meyerson's paper, "The Ethos of the American College Student: Beyond the Protests," *The Contemporary University: U.S.A.,* ed. Robert Morison (Boston, 1966).

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14. Burton R. Clark and Martin Trow, "The Organizational Context," *College Peer Groups,* eds. Theodore Newcomb and Everett Wilson (Chicago, 1966).

15. Harry Schumer and Robert Stanfield, "Assessment of Student Role Orientations in College," *Proceedings of the 74th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1966* (Washington, D. C., 1966). Jonathan R. Warren, *Patterns of College Experiences* (Claremont, Calif., 1966).

16. Richard E. Peterson, *Technical Manual: College Student Questionnaires* (Princeton, 1965). There are two questionnaires: CSQ Part 1 is designed for entering freshmen; Part 2, which contains 11 Likert-type scales (see Figure 1), may be completed by any undergraduates who have been in college for a term or longer. A study of thirteen thousand entering freshmen classified according to the Clark-Trow model is reported in Richard E. Peterson, *On a Typology of College Students* (Research Bulletin 65-9, ETS, 1965). A comparable analysis of seven hundred undergraduate respondents to CSQ-2 (Figure 1) is contained in the *CSQ Manual.*

17. For a more comprehensive description of the professionalist, see Kenneth Keniston, "The Faces in the Lecture Room," *The Contemporary University: U.S.A.,* ed. Robert Morison (Boston, 1966).

18. In a study with the CSQ, undergraduates planning to attend law school (N=178) scored significantly higher than a group headed toward graduate schools of business (N=175) on the measures of liberalism, social conscience, cultural sophistication, and extracurricular involvement (as in student government). R. E. Peterson, "Some Notes on the Prospective Graduate Business Student," *Proceedings of 1966 Graduate Business School Admissions Symposium* (Princeton, 1966).

19. At the University of Massachusetts, Harry Schumer and Robert Stanfield identified three collegiate types: (1) the "instrumental collegiate," involving "active participation in extracurricular activities as a leader, an organizer, or a worker"; (2) the "consummatory collegiate," involving dissipation of students' energies "in activity and inactivity that is experienced as intrinsically pleasurable"; and (3) a "Greek" factor centering on participation "in the Greek system on campus."

20. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, "Patterns of Residential Education: A Case Study of Harvard," *The American College,* ed. Nevitt Sanford (New York, 1962).

21. Empirically distinct academic and intellectual patterns emerged from both Harry Schumer and Robert Stanfield's and Jonathan Warren's fac-

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tor analyses. Both studies drew attention to the intellectual's intrinsic satisfaction from ideas as against satisfying course requirements. Schumer and Stanfield's intellectual factor was characterized also by a humanities content orientation.

22. Kenneth Keniston, "The Sources of Student Dissent," *The Journal of Social Issues* (in press).

23. Five of the studies deal with activists at Berkeley: Glenn Lyons, "The Police Car Demonstration: A Survey of Participants," and Robert H. Somers, "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November 1964," both in *The Berkeley Student Revolt: Facts and Interpretations*, eds. S. M. Lipset and S. S. Wolin (New York, 1965). Paul Heist, "Intellect and Commitment: The Faces of Discontent," *Order and Freedom on Campus: The Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty and Students*, eds. O. W. Knorr and W. J. Minter (Boulder 1965). Block, Haan, and Smith, "Activism and Apathy in Contemporary Adolescents," W. A. Watts and D. N. E. Whittaker "Free Speech Advocates at Berkeley," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, No. 2 (1966), pp. 41-62. In the other four studies, the samples were students from Chicago-area homes who belonged to several different "movement organizations": Richard Flacks, "The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest," *The Journal of Social Issues* (1967, in press); Peace Activists at Pennsylvania State University: David L. Westby and Richard G. Braungart, "Class and Politics in the Family Backgrounds of Student Political Activists," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 31 (1966), pp. 690-92; SDS National Convention delegates: Richard G. Braungart, "SDS and YAF: Backgrounds of Student Political Activists" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Miami, Florida, August, 1966); and a group of participants in the 1962 Peace March on Washington: Frederic Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "Youth and Peace: A Psychosocial Study of Student Peace Demonstrators in Washington, D. C.," *The Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 20 (1964), pp. 54-73. General reviews of this literature are available in Lipset and Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States." Joseph Katz, *The Student Activists: Rights, Needs and Powers of Undergraduates* (Washington, D. C., 1967). Keniston, "The Sources of Student Dissent." Block, Haan, and Smith, "Activism and Apathy in Contemporary Adolescents." See also "Students USA," *Intercom*, Vol. 9 (July-August, 1967).

24. This section is based on George Paulus, *A Multivariate Analysis Study of Student Activist Leaders, Student Government Leaders, and Non-activists* (Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Michigan State University).

25. For a recent comprehensive study of a national group of student leaders, see *A Report on the Delegate Questionnaire: The Congress as a College* (Washington, D. C., 1966).

26. All three MSU groups stood below the multicollege "norm" on each of the satisfaction measures. This is a usual finding. Large-versus-small-

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college differences on the CSQ satisfaction scales are reported and discussed in *The CSQ Technical Manual.*

27. Edmund Williamson and John Cowan, *The American Student's Freedom of Expression* (Minneapolis, 1966).

28. Peterson, *The Scope of Organized Student Protest in 1964-65.*

29. The magnitude of the organized student left in the eyes of deans of students in 1965 is reflected by the facts that one in four deans (26 per cent) reported members of leftist student groups on their campuses, and only six out of 849 colleges reported that student radicals amounted to more than 5 per cent of the student body. By type of institution, the presence of student leftists was reported at 63 per cent of the independent universities and 48 per cent of the public universities, but at only 13 per cent of the teachers' colleges and 9 per cent of the Catholic institutions. Note the parallel to the Williamson-Cowan conclusions.

30. Peterson, *The Scope of Organized Student Protest in 1964-1965.* Also, Richard E. Peterson, "Organized Student Protest in 1964-65," *Journal of the National Association of Women Deans and Counselors*, Vol. 30 (Winter, 1966-67), pp. 50-56. This point was made by Somers ("The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November, 1964," p. 549).

31. Carl Davidson, *The Multiversity: Crucible of the New Working Class* (Students for a Democratic Society, undated).

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MARTIN DUBERMAN

An Experiment in Education

In the fall of 1966, at the beginning of a new term, I received permission from the Course of Study Committee at Princeton University to drop all grades from my undergraduate seminar on "American Radicalism." It was agreed that the record of each student taking the course would show only an asterisk in the space where a grade would ordinarily appear, and that the attached explanation would read: "Experimental course; no grades given." It was further agreed that the experiment would be for a single term only, and that at its end I would present a formal report to the Committee describing the results. This is my report.

I have been an educator for ten years, but I have really been interested in education only for the past year or so. Before that I was chiefly interested in my career. I still am, but having got tenure three years ago, it became possible for me (this was not conscious: I see it only in retrospect) to concern myself solely with how I evaluated the success of my teaching and not how the senior members of my department did. My experience with teaching bears out the central point that I will be trying to make about learning: that only when the necessity to please others is removed, can the main job of *self*-evaluation begin. Most young teachers, like most students, are afraid much of the time they are in class, and fear guarantees that energy will go into defensive strategies rather than creative explorations.

Various threads besides the "release" which tenure gave me helped to produce my new concern with teaching and learning. Perhaps the original germ had been planted in 1962 when some students suggested that I read A. S. Neill's *Summerhill*. I did, and was moved by Neill's candor and exhilarated by his demonstration that children flourish when they are allowed freedom. After dis-

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covering Neill, I read Paul Goodman, Edgar Z. Friedenberg, and, most significantly and most recently, John Holt—in other words, the "romantics" of educational theory, as they have been dubbed by their critics. I had also, within the past two years, read a great deal about Anarchism, in line with a play I was then writing on Emma Goldman. I strongly identified with Anarchism's anti-authoritarian basis; it was the closest I had come to feeling at home in a philosophical tradition. (I'm aware that this effort—that all such efforts—at charting "influences" is a little foolish. For all I know, the true cause of my developing interest in unstructured education may have been familial—an unresolved authority problem?—or even metabolic.)

But to continue the exercise: My experience in group therapy must also be taken into account. I cannot fully demonstrate why, but I feel that membership in a therapy group for the past three years may have been the most profound of the influences prompting me to re-evaluate my role as an educator. In the therapy group, I became aware of how many levels of the person can be "educated" simultaneously when a group is functioning well—that is, when an atmosphere of mutual trust and forebearance prevails. The willingness to suspend judgment of one another in the name of understanding, the tolerance of mistakes, the opportunity to reveal and examine one's inner self without fear of punition—all encourage growth.

My experience in therapy made me impatient with other group enterprises that were narrowly functional—like a university seminar that *merely* engaged in the transmission of factual information. I knew that much more than information could be exchanged when a permissive, non-judgmental atmosphere prevailed. Indeed, little important information can be transmitted if an emotional transaction is not simultaneously in process, for an individual will not expose his deepest assumptions nor be able to perceive those of another if their relationship is purely intellectual. (I continue to use outmoded, dualistic terminology like *intellectual* and *emotional* because more accurate vocabulary is not yet available.)

Much of what I have outlined thus far became clear to me belatedly. At the time I petitioned the Course of Study Committee for permission to drop grades, I knew only that my dissatisfaction with traditional methods of teaching had accumulated to the point of irritability. I wanted something more and different

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from my classroom experience. I felt that most students did also. For years I had heard graduating seniors speak unhappily of their education and express bewilderment at how eager, curious freshmen had been turned, four years later, into prototypes of articulate emptiness. ("I still don't know who the hell I am"; "I still don't know what I want to do with my life"; "I don't even know if such questions matter to me any more.")

The job of self-discovery is never, of course, complete; it is hardly surprising that twenty-one-year-olds do not fully know "who the hell they are." But the point is that they have not begun to know. In many cases, four years of college do not initiate or further, but dampen or destroy efforts at self-exploration. This may not be the intent, but it is nonetheless the result of the tactics employed by those who administer and teach in a university. They make certain that the student's energies are directed at fulfilling tasks set by them rather than by himself; they encourage him to define his worth in terms of his success in winning their approval: high grades, good letters of recommendation, departmental honors, prizes. He is taught to regard these tangible signs of election as the only important evidence or kind of achievement, and as the indispensable precondition, almost the guarantee, of a satisfying life. What he is not taught is that orientation toward gaining the approval of others carries high costs: the acceptance of disguise as a necessity of life; the unconscious determination to manipulate others in the way one has been manipulated; the conviction that productivity is more important than character and "success" superior to satisfaction; the loss of curiosity, of a willingness to ask questions, of the capacity to take risks.

The removal of grades is a necessary, but hardly sufficient means for reversing this disastrous orientation. Grading is but one way in which we turn potentially creative individuals into data-processing machines, adapting them to their society but alienating them from themselves. More than grades must go. The entire superstructure of authoritarian control in our schools must give way if we are to enable people to assume responsibility for and to take pleasure in their own lives. We cannot expect aliveness and involvement when we are busy inculcating docility and compliance.

In this regard, the false distinctions that separate student from teacher must be broken down. What do we think titles like "professor," "sir," or "mister" achieve? Perhaps the illusion of respect,

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but certainly not its reality. Those qualities which are worth admiring in a given person—perception, experience, honesty, empathy, openness—will be admired regardless of title, and no title can create admiration when such qualities are absent. But a title can—and often does—establish a pattern of formality that prevents free exchange and the common pursuit by student and teacher of understanding. Titles also provide the professor with a subtle means of discipline and a false sense of self-importance, neither of which is conducive to humanness or communication.

Then there is the matter of "requirements." John Holt has written a brilliant critique of the notion that certain bits and pieces of knowledge are "essential," that adults know which these are and at what point and in what way they can best be fed to the young. It seems to Holt, and to me, that this is dangerous nonsense. There is no agreement as to what knowledge is essential. (Should everyone read *Crime and Punishment*? understand ego psychology? study Greek civilization? learn about quasar theory? All of these? None of these?)

The individual young have their own interests and timetables, and if these are stifled by the teacher's imposed demands, the result may be a certain number of facts (temporarily) absorbed, but at the cost of knowledge becoming irrelevant and curiosity being destroyed. Schools, as Holt puts it, should be places where students "learn what they most want to know, instead of what we think they ought to know." In any given seminar, it is far less important to convey the particular body of information that the professor happens to care about than to seek the information that the student cares about. It is far more valuable for the student to let a course on, say, the American Revolution wander off during a given session into a discussion of the "utility of violence" than to insist on the day's set topic of the British Navigation Acts; the latter will stick for about as long as it takes the student to walk out the door, while the former could provide grist for a personal re-evaluation of lasting significance. Moreover, if knowledge is made relevant to the student's current needs, it is henceforth viewed as a desirable commodity. A student who is allowed to ask questions that matter to him soon learns the habit of self-generating inquiry.

Finally, there is the matter of leadership. A crucial distinction must be made between authority and authoritarianism. The former represents accumulated experience, knowledge, and insight. The latter represents their counterfeits: age masquerading as maturity,

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information as understanding, technique as originality. Authoritarianism is forced to demand the respect that authority draws naturally to itself. The former, like all demands, is likely to meet with hostility; the latter, like all authenticity, with emulation. Our universities—our schools at every level—are rife with authoritarianism, all but devoid of authority.

In any given seminar the teacher, expounding on the subject of his choice, almost always knows more facts than anyone else. He is also older and has had more professional training. These are the raw materials—information, experience, discipline—out of which authority can come, but they do not guarantee authority. If information has not been digested and personalized, if years have added grayness rather than growth, if training has submerged the person in the specialist, then the potential authority turns into a mere authoritarian. And it is the rare authoritarian who, when given power—when put, say, in charge of adolescents—can resist the satisfaction of reducing them to his level. So it is that one generation, desperate lest its own achievement be exceeded, corrupts the next—all the while protesting benevolence. Fathers are not known to encourage patricide—and few youths grow to manhood.

But let us look at the authority, rather than the authoritarian. Even the genuine authority—no one realizes this better than he—is limited in perspective. The ideal Professor Jones, a master of both Shakespeare and himself, knows that he can be surprised. He knows that Joe Smith, freshman from Dubuque, has some special experience that can illuminate a word or passage from *Hamlet*: Joe may be oblivious to generations of scholarship, but he knows something about sons. And he will tell it—if the climate is right, if Professor Jones has made it clear that no one has a corner on truth, that competence is never across the board, and that therefore leadership (in a classroom discussion, in life) should shift as areas of competence shift. If he can convey that much to Joe Smith, Professor Jones will have given him the one encouragement essential to true education: Ultimately each man can, must, become his own authority. This is the one path to adulthood—and democracy.

I suppose some will feel that I have put the cart before the horse. Theory is supposed to follow fact, not vice versa. The arrangement of this report is, however, true to my experience. Previous to the experiment in "History 308: American Radicalism," I did have

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decided views on education—otherwise I would never have conceived the experiment. This is not to say that the seminar merely confirmed my earlier views. On the contrary, it did not neatly bear out my theories, nor was it a wholly satisfying experience, either for myself or for the students. Nevertheless, it *was* a qualified confirmation, and given the context in which the experiment took place, with all that meant by way of obstacles and inexperience, even a qualified success seems to me significant. My evaluation can best be tested, however, by a detailed look at what actually took place in the seminar.

I limited the enrollment in History 308 to twenty-four students so that I could break the group into two sections of twelve, thereby making a seminar format feasible. At the first meeting, however, we met as one group, so that I could explain the content of the course and its "experimental" features. (Most of the students already knew my intentions from having talked with me earlier.)

The course was to be structured, I said, by the over-all topic "American Radicalism," but the specific topic for any given week could and should vary in response to what they, as a group, felt would be most logical and useful. The two groups, I added, could go in entirely different directions. One, for example, might feel the need to discuss the Radical Right in detail, the other might choose to omit the Radical Right altogether. What was important, I felt, was that each group develop, as a group, its own personality and direction. There would, of course, be individual variations in interest and need, and the group should not be so determined in its collective purpose as to prevent these individual requirements from being met.

I hoped to accomplish both purposes—group identity and individual variety—through "open-ended" reading lists. I had prepared in advance, I told them in that first session, about a dozen topics which I felt could concern us during the term: the Abolitionists, the Wobblies, the Socialists, the Populists, and so forth. None of these topics was mandatory; after each session we would discuss, as a group, what we wanted to do the following week. I expected each group to reject some of my suggested topics, to deal with others only in passing, and to suggest alternative topics of its own. In order to preserve individual preference, I would make no assignment on any given subject, but would prepare lengthy reading lists, describe each book in detail, and encourage

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the student to choose that aspect or approach to a given topic which most appealed to him and to read those books which related to it.

On some topics one book might be so outstanding—like David Shannon's volume on American Socialism—that I would strongly recommend that everyone read it, but not because I felt a common reading list was necessary to produce discussion, nor because I was trying to sneak in a requirement under the guise of a recommendation. Nothing, I made clear in that first session, was required: neither reading, nor attendance, nor "performance." If, throughout the term, some students chose to do only a minimum of work or none at all, there would be no reprisals, since the course would not have grades, exams, or papers. (In this regard, I added that if anyone wished to write down anything at any point, I and no doubt others would be glad to read it—and this happened several times during the term.)

During the first meeting we also decided on the membership of the two groups. I had hoped for a fairly even division, and a tally of preferences showed an exact split of twelve and twelve. Although this was accidental, the membership of each seminar was less random than might appear. Friends tended to sign up for the same seminar, with the result that the two groups differed significantly from each other.

Everyone in the evening seminar, it turned out, was a senior, whereas the afternoon group included four juniors and one sophomore. This was significant because, as all the undergraduates agreed when we discussed these matters at the end of the term, seniors are more "deadened," more cynical and disinterested, than those who have not yet "been through the system." The undergraduates also pointed out that fewer members of the afternoon group had previously known one another or been friendly. This they considered a decided *advantage*. It was easier, they felt, to discuss the "big questions," to generalize and speculate, in front of comparative strangers.

The students also pointed to the different pattern between the two groups in terms of "eating club" affiliations.[1] The afternoon seminar included more Woodrow Wilson members and more "independents"; moreover, only two of its members belonged to "big five" clubs, whereas almost all of the evening group did. Members of the "big five," the students agreed, emphasized "keeping cool," remaining detached, "above it all," presenting only the superficial

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aspects of self. In a seminar, such values would manifest themselves as an unwillingness to allow emotion to enter into discussion, to expose one's deeply held values, to engage another person in any full confrontation of opinion and belief. The "big five" personality was further described as involving a distrust of anything "different," "strange," "off-beat," a tendency to value and to adhere to that which is traditional and respectable. I should stress that those members of the seminar who were themselves in the "big five" clubs fully agreed with this diagnosis.

Finally, the undergraduates came to believe, and I concur, that the afternoon group was simply lucky in its "chemistry"—a factor beyond prediction and not susceptible to close analysis. By "chemistry" they meant that the members of the group took to one another early and well. Mutual respect and trust were established among people of widely different viewpoints; this made it possible to expose feelings and to engage in debate without excessive fear of "being made a fool of."

Following the organizational meeting, the first full session of both groups was devoted to the "New Left." I had suggested, and the suggestion had been adopted, that we begin our study of "American Radicalism" with the contemporary scene and then go back in time to study other radical movements, such as the Abolitionists, the Socialists, or the Wobblies—though the actual choice of topic would depend on group decision each week.

The afternoon group took off in a blaze, without even a brief period of awkwardness or hesitation. Indeed, the rapid-fire exchanges, the passionate interruptions and debates worried me a little. The pace and tone seemed to smack of hysteria. People were not listening carefully to one another; they were briefly silent in order to prepare their next broadside, rather than to digest what someone else was saying.

Though the general feeling was that things were going swimmingly, I was not alone in having doubts. After the second session, a student named "Paul" handed me a typewritten statement he had prepared.[2] (I had encouraged the students from the beginning to let me know—in whatever form they wished—their opinions on how things were going, and especially if they felt any discontent.) Paul, who up to that point had not said a word in seminar, was decidedly discontented. He found the seminar "anarchic more than democratic," merely "a series of chain reactions." This especially

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bothered him "on a personal basis" because he felt unable to participate in discussions if he could do so only by fighting for the opportunity:

I refuse to out-shout or vie with someone who begins to speak at the same time I do. To participate in the seminar requires of me a combativeness, a competitiveness, and a disregard for others which I do not want to cultivate in myself.

I agreed with Paul, but thought he was exaggerating, and doing so in order to avoid his own share of responsibility. I knew Paul well; his statement represented his ideal of himself more than his actual self. He had, in fact, a pronounced combative streak of his own, but preferred to deny it. He was frightened by his aggression, and it was this, more than the group climate, which prevented him from participating.

Still, he had made a legitimate point, and the point needed airing. An opportunity presented itself at the next session. We had spent the meeting, our third, on the Abolitionists. I had played a more active role which, by the end of the session, left me uneasy, so I asked whether the group thought the meeting had been too structured in comparison with the earlier sessions, and my role too prominent. The reactions were varied. The more we talked, the more I began to see that the source of uneasiness, mine and theirs, was that leadership had shifted into new hands. I had earlier outlined this as one of our chief aims, yet when it did happen, a number of us were made uncomfortable.

Toward the end of this session, one member suggested that some mechanism be established for allowing people to make points without having to interrupt or to concentrate their attention on finding an opening into which they could jump. In the discussion which followed, we agreed that we did not always listen carefully to one another and that it was not always possible to speak without interrupting. We also agreed, however, that there seemed no way to correct these occasional defects without re-introducing, through some such device as hand-raising, a formality which we felt was less desirable still. The student who had brought the matter up, when pressed, had no suggestion as to how we might improve communication. The general feeling was that on the whole the group functioned unusually well, that perfect communication was impossible and the expectation of it unrealistic, and that addi-

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tional devices for trying to achieve it would defeat the spontaneity and ease of the sessions. Better, we concluded, to leave it to each individual to assume increased responsibility for talking only when and as long as he had something to say and for listening closely when someone else was talking.

In my view, this discussion had good effect. By the next (fourth) session, the hysteria had notably abated, members were listening to one another more attentively, and the group had begun to function as a group—that is, to work together toward understanding, each for himself, the material. The "shakedown" period for the afternoon seminar was over and its prospects seemed promising.

The evening group had a quite different history. Its first session, on the New Left, was not so lively as the afternoon one had been, but I thought that was all to the good. Some restraint was natural during the phase of getting to know one another and was to be preferred to the hyperactivity of the afternoon group. In the following three weeks, unfortunately, the restraint grew and the liveliness diminished. Later, when the term was over, some of the students wrote (on a voluntary basis) retrospective evaluations in which they offered explanations for the failure of the evening group to catch fire. (Significantly, only four members from the evening section turned in evaluations whereas eight from the afternoon group did.)

The explanations offered by these four students stressed the hampering effect of a chronological approach, the minimal interest of some members of the seminar in its subject matter and experimental format, and the initial uneasiness at the lack of factual emphasis—an uneasiness, they agreed, which later gave way to appreciation as they came to question their previous definition of what was "useful" knowledge. These explanations are, to my mind, peripheral at best. Much more important in understanding the failure of the evening session, I believe, is the collective personality of the group. In this regard, I have already discussed the "cool" presentation of self stressed by the "big five" mentality. Another attribute, which I have not yet touched upon, may, in fact, be the most crucial of all—passivity.

I became aware of this problem only gradually, as various comments and bits of behavior began to add up to a coherent pattern. One student, for example, early tipped me off with his complaint about "the dominating nature" of certain members of

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the evening group. There were many times, he said, "when one person or another would try to add something to a discussion and either be unable or cut short." He then added, and I think significantly: "These people, including myself, were not forceful enough to interject their ideas until they were no longer pertinent."

Another bit of evidence came from Norm, a student I knew from previous courses to be uncommonly docile and dependent; he had insisted on "guidance" at every step, but when I had tried to guide rather than to direct him, to help him find his own way rather than to insist that he follow mine, he had always become uneasy. On the way home from the third session, Norm told me he was "confused." He did not know "what was going on," "what was expected of him." I tried to suggest that nothing was expected of him, that the point of dropping grades and exams was to encourage him to meet his own expectations rather than someone else's. The conversation then went something like this:

Couldn't you at least assign readings?

Why would that be valuable?

Because then I'd know what to read.

But you do know. I suggest a number of books each week, and I tell you what each book is like. You then read those that tie in with your interests.

But I don't have any special interests.

We talked in this vein for some time. I tried to encourage Norm to rely more on himself. I told him I knew this was difficult when for eighteen years or so he had been trained to rely on everyone but himself, but that he had to start at some point. Either that, or he would spend his life in dependency, doing what others told him was important, but never finding out what was important *for him.* He seemed to agree, or said he did, but in fact he never came alive in the seminar. He remained for the rest of the term on the periphery, a nonparticipant, the least affected student (at least consciously) in the group. Yet, as his talk with me indicated, initially he *was* shaken up by the experience of self-regulation. Apparently the challenge proved too frightening. His passivity represents, in extreme form, what I take to have been the central problem of the

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evening seminar, a problem which finally came to focus during the fourth session.

We had, by then, shifted our meeting place. At first we had met in my office, but that had proved to be too cramped. We then moved to a larger room down the hall, but this proved to be too "diffuse." Still hoping that a shift in scene might produce a shift in attitude, we started to meet in one of the student's living rooms, which was spacious and comfortable. In an additional, rather desperate effort to get things going, I agreed to the suggestion that if anyone wanted beer, he could bring it. I probably should not have agreed. Instead of contributing to informality and helping to loosen us up, the beer seemed to underscore the prevailing attitude of unseriousness. Instead of encouraging responsible commitment to the discussions, it seemed to confirm their view that learning was an irrelevant game.

The subject under discussion at the fourth session was Pragmatism. A student had suggested the topic at the end of the previous meeting, as a natural follow-up to our discussion of the Abolitionists' "absolutist" approach to social change. Few of the others seemed enthused at the suggestion, but there was still less enthusiasm for discussing Populism, partly because that was the topic on which the afternoon group had settled. By this time, as I gathered from occasional comments made during the seminars, a certain amount of ill-feeling had developed between the two sections: The evening section referred to the members of the afternoon one as "wild-eyed fanatics," the latter referred to the former as "proto-fascists."

Earlier in the term I had suggested it might be a good idea to invite outside guests who had special interest or expertise in the day's topic, and at almost every session, some guest did attend—dates, other undergraduates, and once a group of four or five dropouts from Harlem who were spending the day in Princeton under the sponsorship of the Urban League. I invited Mrs. Green, an expert on Dewey and James, to the fourth session because I myself felt inadequate to discuss Pragmatism, and I deduced that no one else in the seminar had much knowledge of the topic or much incentive to gain it. In retrospect I think the invitation reflected my own inability to "let things happen." I had not the time nor interest myself to bone up on Pragmatism, and I feared a leaderless and lethargic session. I could have tolerated this had the seminar been going well, but I hadn't guts to sit through another

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lifeless meeting. Perhaps if I had, we all would have learned more from it, if only the knowledge of our inadequacies.

It became clear early in the evening that no one had done much reading on Pragmatism. For forty-five minutes, the group struggled with the topic, but our ineptness, our inability to utilize the talents of Mrs. Green, became increasingly embarrassing. When someone, in passing, mentioned the New Left, the group shifted to that topic with a rush of relief. There then followed an unusually animated discussion of Princeton's SDS chapter and why it had not drawn support on campus. During the discussion, the passive orientation of most members of the group was clearly exposed.

A view much expressed was that those who joined SDS did so for the simple reason that they were not members of the "in" group on campus. Not only were their motives highly suspect, it was said, but their personal style was distasteful: They dressed like "weirdos," they "smelled bad," they were "dirty." How about their position on current issues? I asked. Was SDS right in its diagnoses? Did it point to real ills in our society? There was general agreement that it did. Then why, I asked, did they not join SDS? Was it really because the personal style of its members put them off, or were they using that as a convenient excuse for not becoming active in behalf of their own beliefs?

Mrs. Green joined the discussion at this point. She said that the refusal to take responsibility for one's own life—or, as a subdivision of that, to assume direction for one's own education—was probably the single most characteristic trait of Princeton (perhaps of all American) undergraduates. Her remarks cut deep. A few admitted the indictment, painfully. More protested it, though not with much conviction. Later, with leisure to digest Mrs. Green's remarks and to confront them in privacy, others came to admit their validity.

Three weeks later, the issue of passivity was again brought up, this time by one of the members of the seminar. Hank had been one of two students in the evening group who had persistently tried to establish active discussion. Discouraged at the meager results and hearing of the success of the afternoon section, he decided to sit in on one of its meetings to see if a different climate did, in fact, prevail, and if so, why. He brought up his findings that same evening.

In a quiet way, without trying to provoke guilt, he reported that he had attended the afternoon session, had been amazed at the intensity and intelligence of the discussion, and had wondered,

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"Why we don't swing the way they do." His tone and attitude were free enough of hostility and of accusations against individuals that no one felt especially threatened, and a discussion followed which, I felt, was frank and searching.

As Hank saw it, he said, the basic failure had to do with their refusal to accept responsibility for themselves as individuals and also for the group of which they were a part. They preferred to continue in the traditional mold, to hope that someone else would, as always, "do it for them," and to encourage me, especially, to be that doer. In short, they preferred dependency to active exertion in their own behalf.

At this point, I spoke up. I agreed, I said, with Hank's diagnosis, and moreover it had set me to thinking about the utility of the kind of experiment we had been attempting. Perhaps, I said, it was too late by age eighteen to begin encouraging people to exercise control over their own lives, to discover and respond to the pressures within rather than to directions from without. Their pre-Princeton experience in authoritarian homes and schools may have established the habit of docility so firmly that subsequent encouragement to self-regulation could do little—other than confuse. Perhaps the real surprise, I said, was not that the evening section had had trouble functioning in a permissive climate, but that the afternoon group had not had trouble; perhaps the chief puzzle to be solved was not why most Princetonians do not know what to do with freedom, but why a few do.

I said, too, that despite all this I thought we had to be careful in our definitions and estimates of what made a "successful" seminar. I, for one, did not feel that mere noise or vociferousness was proof that something was happening. Activity, when manic, was itself a form of passivity, though disguised to look like its opposite. "Busyness," like "boredom," could serve as a device for avoiding self-confrontation. Passivity was best measured not by how often a student spoke, but by what he said. The passive person surrendered direction of his life, and this could be accomplished in varied, even directly opposite ways—by being inarticulate or by being overarticulate. The active person was present in his own life and concentrated his energies on engaging, not avoiding, himself.

In drawing this definition, I had, curiously, Hank himself in mind (though I never said so). Hank's eagerness to talk, his discomfort at silence, and his determination to make the seminar

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"work" had chiefly represented, I felt, the desire to please me. Though his tactics and personal style were different from those of the majority, Hank was only slightly less passive than those he labeled as such. As if to confirm my estimate, Hank broke into the discussion to say that he had been eager to do a "conscientious job" mostly because I had "stuck my neck out" for them in arranging the seminar on an ungraded basis, and he felt that in return he had an obligation to me to make the seminar a success.

I replied, in what I hope was a fairly gentle tone, that he didn't owe me a thing. I had set up the seminar on an experimental basis, I said, chiefly for my own sake. My discontent with authoritarian education and its negative results had accumulated to the point where in order to maintain my interest—to justify my existence—I had to try a new approach.

As the discussion proceeded, only two students tried to shift responsibility for their apathy from themselves to the group as a whole. One insisted that his unresponsiveness had been due solely to intellectual discontent. He had become distrustful of the "tenuous analogies" constantly being drawn in seminar between what he took to be wholly dissimilar protest movements; he felt we were straining to make the past relevant to the present. (Even if he had invented his argument to avoid personal responsibility, and I think he had, that did not mean the argument was necessarily false; indeed it led us into a side discussion of "the utility of history," which ended in a whole session being devoted to that topic.)

The second student protested that a few verbal types had monopolized discussions, leaving no opportunity for others to participate. In reply, one of the "verbalizers" said that he had talked only to fill gaping silences and would have welcomed interruption at any time; the fact that it rarely came was, he said, not his fault but theirs. I think he was right—not in having talked to fill a void, but in pointing out that anyone really wanting an opportunity to speak could have made one.

These two exceptions aside, the seminar members agreed that "passivity" did correctly describe the dominant mood, and that responsibility for ending that mood rested with each individual. One student closed the discussion by pointing out—I thought eloquently—that if we could truly accept, each for himself, the diagnosis of passivity, the seminar could then be accounted a large success, though little had been read or remembered, though the discussions had been banal and the interchanges superficial. The

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seminar would have been successful because it would have provided new self-awareness for each member. If we had the courage to realize, he said, that when offered the opportunity of self-regulation, we had been unequal to it, that when given freedom we had either not wished or not been able to utilize it, then we would recognize to what an alarming degree we had already become automatons. To achieve that kind of insight was to fulfill the chief aim of education.

As a result of this self-examination, the remaining meetings of the evening section seemed to me more fruitful; there was wider participation and the discussions were better informed, more centered on matters of substance, and more lucid in content. After the final meeting, one student commented, "too bad this wasn't the first instead of the last." Another claimed (though I do not agree) that "in a less dynamic way" the members of the evening group ultimately "got as much" out of their seminar experience as the afternoon group had.

The afternoon section, while maintaining consistently high levels of participation and enthusiasm, developed frictions of its own. They centered around Sherm, who at one point in almost every meeting tried to reintroduce, under various guises, some form of authoritarian structure. Each of his suggestions was greeted with loud opposition, some derision, and considerable impatience.

Someone pointed out to him that his chief, almost sole, criterion for a useful discussion was efficiency, and that he measured efficiency, in turn, by how much factual information was amassed and how closely the group stuck to the stated topic of discussion. These criteria, it was said, were shallow. As it was impossible to "cover" most of the topics we discussed, the group should focus on those aspects which most interested it, since only these would be retained anyway. Moreover, when the group did wander off into a discussion of some peripheral matter which had come up—taking drugs, say—the lack of immediate relevance to the over-all topic at hand was more than compensated for by its broader relevance to the lives of those involved. The seminar should hold one and only one pursuit sacrosanct: self-knowledge through group interaction. "Rituals of legitimacy," as one student put it, should not take precedence over the unorthodox and the unexpected, especially since the latter could often produce authentic experience.

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Sherm took these reprimands in good spirit; indeed he largely ignored them, tenaciously returning every week or two to his pet schemes. Nor was he intimidated by the outcry against him; not only did he continue to participate actively in the seminar, but in fact helped to initiate what we came to call our "lab work."

In about the fourth week, Sherm and a few others suggested that since the seminar was studying radicalism and was itself a radical experiment in education, it followed that its members should take the lead in "radicalizing" its own community—namely, Princeton University. Aside from the inherent value of the undertaking, it would, secondarily, enable seminar members to discover empirically the problems characteristic of all radical movements.

I made it clear from the outset that if a movement for change at Princeton were to develop, it would have to be their movement. I would be glad to participate in strategy sessions, but, as in the seminar itself, I did not intend to play, either openly or covertly, the role of Gray Eminence. It was agreed that those interested in the "Princeton movement" would get together at 10:15 P.M. once a week, after the close of the evening seminar.

These sessions went on, irregularly, throughout the term, with attendance varying a good bit. In the beginning fifteen of the twenty-four seminar members attended, ten of whom were from the afternoon group. Only one member of the evening group, Hank, showed up with any regularity. I myself attended almost all of the meetings, occasionally contributing a comment or question, but more often simply sitting in and listening. As the term proceeded and as pressure from other course work mounted, attrition set in. At some meetings only six or seven students showed up, and now and then a meeting would be called off entirely "because of midterm exams" or the like.

In the first few meetings, an effort was made to thrash out what a university ideally should be and to what degree Princeton met those specifications. A voluntary committee of four formed to draw up a "Statement of Principles," and after innumerable delays and false starts, it presented a draft statement to the full group, where suggestions were made and new drafts subsequently drawn. Two such statements were eventually mimeographed, but by then exams and papers had descended, and still further inroads were made in attendance. I know that one "Statement of Principles" was circulated privately to various student leaders, faculty members,

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and administrative personnel, but beyond this the movement brought no concrete results.

That nothing more materialized can be laid, I believe, not only to the competing demands of course work and campus activities, but also to the division of views on tactics and theory which existed among the seminar members and to their feeling, assumed from the first, that any sizable campus-wide interest in behalf of change was unlikely. Yet the sessions themselves, which probed, often with sophistication, into basic aspects of university structure and educational theory proved of considerable value to those who attended—certainly to me. Members of the movement did gain insight into the kinds of social obstacles that have often defeated radicals in the past, into the nature of the Princeton community, and, perhaps most important, into their own inability to resist the pressures of conformity and routine, to place their concern (often deep) about public malfunctions above their fear of personal reprisals.

At the final meeting of the term, the two sections again met as one to evaluate the seminar experience. The views expressed in that meeting, in combination with material presented by those who turned in written evaluations, make up the topical summary which follows.

Grades and Exams

There was no dissent from the view that the elimination of grades and tests had been liberating. One student expressed appreciation for being "treated as if we wanted to learn," for the recognition that it was possible to discover and nurture internal incentives in place of external ones—a substitution especially welcome because the latter encouraged not curiosity and satisfaction, but merely competition and showmanship. Another student expressed relief, apparently shared by all, that the "stultifying effect" of exams had been removed. For once, he said, "students were not required to tailor thoughts to those useless three-hour blitzes and were allowed to let their thinking run free."

The only regret expressed was that grades and tests could not be eliminated from all courses. So long as those devices remained operative in the rest of the university, so long as "professorial retribution" continued to hang over them in other courses, they

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could never take full advantage of the liberating potential of a single unstructured seminar. One student put the matter this way:

When one is taking three other subjects, two of them departmentals, which are all-important to grad-school admission, which in turn will supposedly determine much of one's future life, the tendency is to put off the ungraded work, as we all did.

It is often said that grades are necessary "training for life," for the competition that defines and measures all aspects of adulthood. While one may agree that competition is omnipresent, one can question its desirability and necessity. To the extent that we know anything about human nature, and we don't know much, there is little reason to believe that the competitive drive is an instinctual and therefore inevitable component of behavior (witness the human product of the *kibbutzim* in Israel). Competition continues to be the hallmark of our society because we continue to train our youth to act competitively, to measure their worth in terms of how successfully they dominate others rather than themselves.

The grading system also trains young Americans to be more adept at judging others than at understanding them, and at judging, moreover, on the basis of limited and largely unattractive qualities: how well an individual "performs" in public; how readily he assimilates established values; how responsive he is to pressure situations; how adept he is at memorizing and verbalizing; how mechanically he can provide "right" answers; how obediently he can avoid "wrong" questions.

I do not doubt that tests and grades prepare the student for the American life style. The question is whether we approve of that style and wish to perpetuate it.

Readings

When the coercive power of the grading system is eliminated, can we rely on any alternative stimulus to motivate students to learn?

Quite a few seminar members felt that "natural curiosity" was a sufficient motivating force for learning, but a number of rebuttals were and can be made to this assumption. First of all, even if "natural curiosity" is innate, it can be argued that the deadening procedures of pre-Princeton schooling will have bred this quality

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out of many undergraduates. Those whose curiosity has at least partially survived are then subjected to, and often defeated by, the rituals of the Princeton system.

Moreover, there is reason to doubt, as Bernard Z. Friedlander has recently argued, whether "natural curiosity," "hunger for learning," or "joy in knowledge" can be relied upon as a sufficient incentive for academic learning. Friedlander points out that young children are chiefly curious about matters that relate to sexuality and that such curiosity is not automatically transferable, as the child grows older, to scholastic topics. Indeed, if curiosity about sex is not satisfied—and in our society it is more usually disapproved and suppressed—the child's interest in asking questions may be permanently destroyed. Having been given no answers or false answers to questions of pressing urgency, he is not likely to consider raising questions about matters of less potent interest.

All of which raises the pessimistic possibility that curriculum reform on the college level may be an enterprise of marginal value only. By age eighteen, it could be said, it is too late to salvage curiosity. One could answer that those who arrive as freshmen at college, especially at a "prestige" college, can be assumed to be those whose early craving for information was satisfied and encouraged. This answer is not, however, very persuasive. The arrival of freshman Joe Brown at Princeton's portals means only that he has distinguished himself in a secondary school, that he has performed better in meeting its requirements than most of his classmates. Since those requirements are usually geared to satisfying the needs of teachers rather than students, Joe Brown's high grades may directly reflect, in inverse ratio, the slow strangulation of his own curiosity.

At discouraging moments during the seminar, one thought kept occurring to me: Anyone interested in education should teach on the primary-school level, where there is still some chance of it mattering. At other moments, however, I preferred this more sanguine syllogism: The curiosity of many students arriving at Princeton has already been destroyed; it is too late in any significant degree either to harm them or to help them. Nevertheless, some freshmen are still eager and alive, and it matters very much whether they are subjected to destructive discipline or encouraged to seek, without fear of retribution, honest answers to honest questions. The experience of History 308 provides evidence to confirm both the discouraging thought and the sanguine syllogism.

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With a single exception, the students admitted that they did less reading and studying in the seminar than they did in courses with assignments and grades. The confessional chorus was loud and long—lamentations of *mea culpa* generously interspersed with recriminations against a "system" that "feeds our worst impulses." A few students, in their extremity, were reduced to suggesting as a remedy the very coercions against which they otherwise protested. "I think," wrote one, "that it may have been worthwhile if I had been expected to present a paper or perhaps an oral presentation. . . . This would have forced me to do reading in areas where I was lax . . . to gather my thoughts about radicalism in general." Yet in another part of his written evaluation this same student expressed the opinion that my method of indicating the subject matter and value of each book on a list of suggested titles was preferable to the usual system of assigning a common set of readings. The conflict in this student's feelings—the way in which he simultaneously called for more coercion in written and oral work even while expressing appreciation for being allowed to set his own reading pattern—accurately represents, I believe, the blurred reactions of the majority. They were excited by freedom and yet, because they failed by their own (perhaps excessively demanding) standards fully to grasp its opportunities, repelled by it.

Discussions

The strengths and weaknesses of our seminar discussions were best perceived, it seems to me, by members of the afternoon group, perhaps because they were convinced of the over-all value of the discussions and so felt less inhibited about articulating its incidental deficiencies. The chief complaint centered on what was called "formlessness," or "lack of direction." Only a minority viewed this as a deficiency, and no two people who did shared the same reasons for thinking it so. The most extreme statement came from a student who claimed to be "basically happy" with his seminar experience, but felt that he could have got still more out of it had the sessions been tightly organized. He suggested—and this, I feel, is yet another example of an endemic unwillingness or inability to exercise individual responsibility—that since "it would have been very difficult for any of us to impose this kind of discipline successfully," the solution was for me to impose it on them. He did not suggest how I could do this without inhibiting spontaneity and destroying "the

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relationship of complete equality between professor and student" that he himself felt had "contributed so much to making our discussions worthwhile."

This position, shared by others, was sharply rebutted by the majority. They agreed that discussion frequently became generalized, unknowledgeable, and discursive, that the "bull-shit quotient" was often high and that "a snarling five-man cacophony" often replaced thoughtful dialogue. But such "dysfunctions" are to be expected, they said, are perhaps even necessary bi-products, of an alive atmosphere. Talk, by its very nature, is spasmodic, discursive, repetitive, even at times incoherent. To try to trim it into neat, orderly packages is to drain it of life.

The important point they were making, it seems to me, is that human exchange is fullest when it operates on a variety of levels, including the emotional, the irrational, the fantastic. Unfortunately, most educational situations concentrate on only one level of human interaction—the rational. In doing so, they try to make people into what they are not—thinking machines—and end by turning the average seminar into an exercise rather than an experience.

The chief function of a university should not be, as is currently assumed, the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge, but rather the encouragement of individual growth. Factual information can aid in that growth, but to do so it must be made relevant to the individual's needs; it must pose some problem, extend some challenge, answer some longing, if it is to be incorporated rather than merely appended.

There is no one way to make knowledge relevant. Any seminar is composed of a variety of individuals with disparate life styles and contrasting perspectives. Moreover, the needs of a seminar group as a whole, like those of the individuals who make it up, do not remain constant. A seminar's structure must, therefore, remain flexible enough to register shifts in mood, and its climate permissive enough to allow individual variety in the approach and solution of problems. Some discipline is necessary to a coherent discussion, but it should be imposed not from above, but by the individual on himself when he senses that the group's collective need demands a shift in attitude and approach.

The central point, it seems to me, is that a seminar must involve more than intellectual exchange. Opinions and values are most likely to be revealed when the atmosphere encourages rather than suppresses emotional interaction. Opinions, never shaped

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solely by reasoning, are always influenced by personal relationships and encounters, themselves freighted with emotion, and thus are most likely to be exposed and examined in an environment that contains an emotional dimension. We want students to "re-examine their beliefs"; that, we like to say, is the whole point of education. Since those beliefs were first formed in a multidimensional setting, they cannot be successfully challenged in a setting that is one-dimensional.

This was, I think, the main reason why so many of the students in History 308 came away from the seminar feeling, as one put it, that "no course I have ever had in this university has challenged and changed my attitudes and views as much as this 'bull session.'" The term *bull session* is instructive; it was used by a number of the students to connote the sense of a discussion among friends, one more free of formality and constraint than most, one in which more of the person gets exposed and involved than it does in a seminar discussion narrowly confined to a selected topic or issue. To my mind, the frequent use of the term *bull session* to describe our meetings is a testimony to their success.

Perhaps someone might object that I had confused the purpose of a university seminar with that of a group-therapy session, that my function as a professor was not to treat personalities, but to develop minds. I would answer such an accusation in part by denying it and in part by embracing it. I would deny that the seminar was chiefly designed to encourage members to reveal pathology, that our purpose in coming together was "medicinal." Yet neuroses were revealed, and something which could be called "therapy" did take place. In the process of actively engaging one another, the students exposed personality traits of all kinds. To the extent that a given individual became aware of what he had revealed about himself and chose to ponder it (I do not mean openly, in seminar, but privately, with himself), some personality changes could have ensued. Henry Anderson has said: "Any experience that is humanizing might be called psychotherapeutic." If History 308 did partake of psychotherapy, I would, therefore, not only welcome the news, but consider it the best possible vindication of the seminar—for I do not know what "education" is if not self-examination and change.

This does not necessarily mean that I believe education and therapy should henceforth become interchangeable processes. (I am not sure that I believe the opposite, either.) I do feel, however,

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that the simple dualism which pretends that education is concerned solely with "informing the mind," and therapy with "understanding the emotions" falsifies our everyday experience. No one actually functions on the basis of such neat categories; our emotions always color our intellectual views, and our minds are continually "ordering" our emotional responses.

It would be grotesque and dangerous for a professor of history to claim the insight and skill needed to conduct group-therapy sessions, just as it would be foolish for a psychiatrist to conduct a seminar on Plato for his patients. But this is not to say that a university seminar does not influence the emotions of its members. We need to recognize that when a seminar is functioning well, the emotions of its members *are* engaged and, once engaged, will be transmuted.

Intellectual development does not, cannot, take place *in vacuo*. Indeed, it can be argued that intellectual development is predicated on the simultaneous development of the emotions. By intellectual development, I do not mean the amassing of facts (we all know walking encyclopedias who are emotional infants), but rather what William Kessen, professor of psychology at Yale, has called the individual's "delight in the solution of problems, pursuit of the orderly, joy in his own active inquiry, the relief and excitement of setting his own goals." For that kind of intellectual development, one needs emotional growth as well. The two are inextricably linked, and it is because we have tried to separate them—have tried to exclude emotion from the classroom—that we have turned out many more pedants and parrots than human beings.

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1. Princeton's private, alumni-subsidized eating clubs resemble fraternities except that they have no national affiliations and offer no dormitory facilities. Nearly all upperclassmen (90 per cent in 1967) join one of the fifteen clubs, each of which numbers about one hundred members. The admissions process (called "bicker") is highly selective, and most students would admit to a strict social hierarchy among the clubs (the prestigious "big five" clubs being the "inner circle"). Because few alternative social facilities exist, few students "go independent" (only 6 per cent) or join the university-subsidized Woodrow Wilson Society, whose fellowship and facilities are open to all. Annual club membership costs about $1,100; Wilson Society membership about $700.

2. All the names in this account are fictitious.

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